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ABSTRACT 
The thesis asks a central question: what is the nature of the relationship between state security 
and domestic politics in contemporary Turkey? It aims to show that although the pendulum of 
Turkish politics has swung back and forth between democratic elections and military 
interventions, in the last decade a new set of historically conditioned discourses and practices 
of state security have fused the political and military realms to produce a peculiar regime 
which I call security govemmentality. Understanding the traits of Turkish security 
governmentality is the task of the thesis. It adopts a genealogical approach. The subject-matter 
analyzes both the historical-political conditions within which security governmentality 
emerged as a dominant practice of rule and the prospects of its dissolution. Indeed, the 
dissolution of security governmentality gained an air of expectancy particularly after 1999 
when Turkey was granted an 'official candidacy' and started to adapt the EU democratic 
membership conditionality. Within this framework, the thesis explores the peculiar 
entanglement between security and politics in Turkey, which has produced an uneven 
distribution of power between the military and the society, and examines the challenges of the 
EU membership reform process to Turkey's security governmentality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The thesis asks a central question: what is the nature of the relationship between state security 
and domestic politics in contemporary Turkey? It arises from the author's observation that in 
the last decade the Turkish state has employed a specific set of security discourses and 
practices that have, in considerable measure, shaped and molded political and personal 
conduct. The state security discourses and practices have framed the scope of political 
conduct and informed a range of responses to domestic political dissent. Significantly, these 
discourses and practices have been accompanied by certain institutional, legal and conceptual 
instruments utilized by the state elites. As such, Turkey represents a paradigmatic example of 
the cases where the discourses and practices of state security are interior to and in some part 
constitutive of domestic political conduct. State security and its attendant regimes, programs 
and strategies have become extensively enshrined in the constitution and political practice to 
the extent that at times the concern over 'the security of the state' is imposed on the workings 
of democratic politics. State security is systematically internalized by the ruling elites through 
a set of rational and institutional mechanisms. Such a configuration of security produces 
significant practical ramifications for the government of the people. As a result, power and 
authority is unevenly distributed in the polity, that is, the discourses and practices of security 
in Turkey help maintain and reproduce the power of the state elites in domestic politics. 
Security governmentality comprises two kinds of juxtaposed actors: state elites and political 
elites (Heper, 1992b: 146-7). State elites can be identified as acting in a 'bureaucratic ruling 
tradition' and a considerable number of them believe that they both know and protect the 
national interest better than the citizens (Turan, 1984: 116). The state elites see themselves as 
the modernizing agents, guardians and 'true servants' of the state; its Kemalist ideology and 
public-national interest (Yavuz, 2000a). They believe that they are free to act in order to 
protect 'vital matters', and if necessary do it at the expense of any other (democratic) political 
procedure (Heper, 1984: 93). Within the state elites, the thesis identifies the Turkish military 
as the main agent. Its unprecedented political power has derived from the relevant 
institutional and legal capacities conferred to it to define and respond to 'domestic threats', 
especially that of political Islam. The thesis also identifies a second category of elites. These 
are termed 'political elites', and involve the elected representatives of the political parties, 
which are normally inclined to protect the socio-economic rights and needs of their 
constituencies. The distinction can be seen as follows: the state elites can be considered as 
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representing the 'vertical' dimension, whereas the political elites represent 'horizontal' 
dimension of Turkish politics life (Heper, 1991). It is partly this juxtaposition that engenders a 
conflictual dynamic in democratic politics between appointed state elites and elected political 
elites (Karpat, 1988). 
Another significant ramification of security govemmentality is that state security 
infringements on the governmental functions and powers have blurred the liberal demarcation 
between the civilian and the military. This produces an undemocratic and complex politico- 
military rule. For instance, the influential discourses and practices of state security make 
crucial inroads into the individual and societal conduct by embodying novel channels of 
intervention of the state (security) forces into the collective and personal conduct. Within this 
context, it is possible to argue that national security has been the passion of the day for the 
ruling state elites since 1996, when an Islamic government took office for the first time in the 
history of secularist-modem Turkey. As a result, the age-old Ottoman Young Turk question of 
'how can the state be savedT against the external (European) powers (Koker, 1990: 69; 
Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3) has been turned into a question of how the state can be saved 
from the internal 'Islamist threat'. The state, we are often told by the military, has to be saved 
from these 'internal - threats' posed by an assortment of social or cultural categories: be it 
people with Islamic sensitivities or people with ethno-political Kurdish identity (Yavuz, 
2000a: 25). In the words of Turkey's former Chief Public Prosecutor, the demands of such 
people for wider visibility and recognition in society represent unequivocal 'security threats' 
for the 'survival of the state' (Savas, 2001a: 7). Accordingly, state security has been 
resourcefully employed to function as a discourse, mentality, method and identity at the 
service of the non-democratic agents of the state (e. g. the military) for intervening into 
political and personal conduct. 
AIMS 
The thesis therefore explores the research question: how can we understand the nature of the 
relationship between state security and domestic politics in contemporary Turkey? More 
specifically: How have the military elites activated state authority and (non-democratic) state 
power in the name of the security of the secular state? To answer these questions, the thesis 
explains the ideology of Kernalist secularism and its role in the related justifications, 
discourses, practices, processes and strategies of the non-democratic state elites such as the 
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military for undertaking a related range of political actions without any routine and 
institutionalized negotiation with other societal actors. Because this type of relationship is not 
fully addressed by the mainstream International Relations and its sister traditional Security 
Studies, the thesis seeks to develop a new theoretical perspective. By gleaning insights from 
Critical Security Studies and Michel Foucault's 'governmentality' approach, the thesis will 
explain the relationship between security and politics in Turkey as 'security governmentality'. 
The analytical framework of security governmentality allows one to account for the 
increasingly overt political presence and intervention of Turkish national security institutions 
in the country's social and political space. It also helps address the degree to which Turkey's 
security politics is able to produce an unequal distribution of power between the military and 
the civilians. It is to this aim that the thesis addresses itself and explores the political impact 
of security discourses and practices through which the state elites have deployed their forces 
against the demands of active socio-political forces such as the Islamist Refah Party 
government (1996-1997) and the Justice and Development Party government (2002-present). 
The thesis hopes to contribute both to the literature on Security Studies in general and to the 
politics of Turkish security in particular, by showing the political and practical consequences 
of national security politics under military tutelage. 
WHY SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY? 
The politics of the Turkish state security can hardly be grasped within the parameters of 
traditional approaches and the contribution of the present project is to explore it through a 
novel perspective. As Chapter 1 argues, security in mainstream International Relations tends 
to focus on problem areas and questions about military strategy, external state defence and 
state-to-state war (Walt, 1991: 212). Traditional Security Studies rarely questions the status 
quo and investigate how states may cause insecurities for their own people (Wyn Jones, 1999: 
112-7; Wheeler, 1996). As a result, there emerges a supposedly apolitical conceptualization 
of security upheld at the expense of other substantive issues such as the security of the very 
people within states (Booth, 1991: 318; Williams, 1998b). Secondly, there is little awareness 
in TSS as to how certain conceptions of security can actually relate to domestic politics or 
how the military dimension of security can foul normal politics and interfere into political 
conduct in the name of state security (Kemal Pasha, 1996: 287; Khattak, 1996; Andreas and 
Price, 2002: 32-6). Some security issues are either ignored or go unnoticed in the traditional 
approaches to security, and Chapter I will explore the reasons for this neglect. 
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To decode the complexities of Turkish state security it is necessary therefore to begin by 
asking alternative questions about the theory and practice of security. Most of the existing 
answers within TSS are not particularly helpful for they decline to engage with complex 
dilemmas, histories and struggles of 'real lives in real places' (Booth, 1995: 123). Whether 
ignored or taken as given, TSS leaves aside such significantly related questions about the 
institutional and organizational aspects of security issues, power, authority and 'states as a 
source of threat rather than as a source of security' (Booth, 1997: 99). 
Hence, this thesis engages the following important but often neglected questions as: What is 
security? What constitutes a security problem? How should one study security? Who or what 
can help provide security? And whose security are we talking about? (Williams, 2001: 21-30, 
38-53; Bilgin, 2000: 50). It is because of these questions that the thesis has as its starting point 
the Critical Security Studies perspective. CSS argues that states' supposedly apolitical 
security policies are not merely by-products of immutable or objective threats to the states and 
their physical environment (territory) but rather products of tangible and moral historical 
configurations of expertise, knowledge, authority and specific institutional settings (Williams, 
1997: 297-8). Unlike TSS, which is status quo oriented (Bilgin, et aL, 1998: 141) CSS offers 
an academic orientation to differentiate the analysis at hand from problem-solving approaches 
by calling into question 'prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into 
which they are organized, as the given framework for action' and by investigating 'the 
process of change' (Cox, 1981: 128-9). Hence, the insights of CSS into security offer an 
innovative lens through which to critically analyze Turkey's politics of security and its 
potential transformation after the EU membership official candidacy. An obvious advantage 
of adopting a CSS (and governmentality) angle in this investigation is that it enables an 
analysis of 'the politics of security' (Williams, 1997; 1998). CSS also foresees that security 
discourses and practices of states are constitutive of politics rather than its epiphenomenon of 
politics (Booth, 1997: 106; Krause, 1998: 305-16). This is a crucial argument in this project. 
Besides the contributions CSS brings to the discussion, a critical approach to state security 
allows a better grasp of the state power. In particular, it surpasses the one-dimensional liberal- 
democratic view of legitimacy and consent and the relevant contractual theories of 
sovereignty evident in the mainstream IR, which does not explicitly spell out its theory of 
state (Kelstrup and Williams, 2000: 7). An alternative grasp of the state power is needed to 
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enhance our understanding of the institutional and political sources of such unconventional 
security discourses and practices of states. Such an approach can highlight social and political 
effects of state security in Turkey. It is to this aim that the thesis introduces Foucault's 
concept of govemmentality. 
The works of Michel Foucault are relevant for understanding state-society relations in Turkey 
because his analysis of state power helpfully invokes the realm of the familiar and the 
immediate. There has been a relative absence of governmentality studies on the Turkish state, 
which indicates a lack of engagement with Foucault's later works possibly because the 
governmentality approach was not available to scholars until the summary on his lectures was 
published by Colin Gordon in 1991 (Lemke, 2001: 191). Foucault's work in general is 
appealing because it emphasizes the daily and immediate aspects of state practices. As 
sociologist Ayse Oncu writes in Turkey; 
[n]ewspapers are filled with incidents of police brutality, 'suspicious' deaths in 
prisons, or 'unexplained' disappearances. Foucault's analysis of the 'modem' penal 
system can be read to understand the nonmodemity of Turkish prisons. But also, 
notions of 'disciplining' and 'disciplined' bodies-in schools, in the army and in the 
bureaucracy-, have immediate and very concrete resonances in the Turkish context 
(1997: 269). 
The concept of 'govemmentality' as originally coined by Foucault (1991), involved the idea 
of the state in terms of a triangle of 'sovereignty-discipline-govemment, which has as its 
primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security' 
(Foucault, 2000: 219). Foucault's theory of govemmentality expands the liberal-functionalist 
view of modem state authority as stemming from a 'general will' or 'core values and 
normative consensus' and instead locates exercise of state authority within 'apparatuses of 
security' (Foucault, 2000: 220). The inclusion of governmentality as a component of the 
present analysis is vital to understand the configuration of state power around the discourses 
and practices of security. This approach can also help constitute, in the Turkish case at least, 
an answer to the question about 'the nature of the power possessed by states and state elites' 
(Mann, 1988: 4). But more crucially it also helps us capture the essence of certain specific 
processes of activating this very state power (Foucault, 2000: 221). In other words, it enables 
us to attain 'the means, techniques, rationalities, forms of knowledge and expertise that are to 
be used to accomplish the enfolding of authority' (Dean, 1996: 222-3). 
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Combining the insights from CSS and governmentality literatures, the thesis introduces the 
term security governmentality to refer to the politics of state security and to analyze its 
rational, conceptual and institutional components. Here, security governmentality enables the 
investigation of security as a discursive and political method through which the ruling state 
elites frame and regulate the exercise of authority and power at the expense of normal 
(democratic) politics. Although not undertaken in this project, it is also possible to also 
consider security govemmentality as an 'articulation' that strives to 'arrest the flow of 
difference, to construct a centre' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112). In this view, security 
governmentality is a centre of acquaintance for the military protagonists who wield it as a 
political weapon to advance their national-international agenda and position. In addition, this 
approach posits the individual and societal elements (i. e. the governed) firmly into the 
problematic and identifies - miscellaneous tensions between state security and 
individual/societal freedom. 
Military interventions into Turkish politics have been studied in the past literature (for 
instance, Brown, 1989; Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997; Cizre, 2003; 2004; Karabelias, 1999; Narli, 
2000; Demirel, 2003; Insel and Bayramoglu - et al, - 2004). However, there are some 
shortcomings that hinder studying the contemporary (post-1997) nature of Turkish military 
behavior. Firstly, the study of the Turkish military is a thorny issue and in some cases 
dangerous in that it can cost the academic position of the researcher in the country (Jacoby, 
2004a: 150). Secondly, the classified nature of the information pertaining to the military's 
recent actions and legal-political considerations considerably fetter access to primary sources 
and give rise to rather a limited number of study. Consequently, there has overall been rather 
a limited scholarly interest due to the restricted access to jealously guarded military sources. 
(Bayramoglu et. al., 2004: 8). Thirdly and most importantly, particularly since mid-1990s the 
prevailing attitudes of the military have come to signify unconventional patterns of political 
intervention against certain out-groups such as Kurdish insurgents and Islamists. That is, 
rather than using the perpetual threat of direct military intervention, the military legitimizes its 
guardianship role of protecting 'the territorial and ideological integrity' by using newfound 
techniques of intervention under the relevant legal-constitutional shelter and cloaked 
effectively in the state security discourses and practices (Jacoby, 2004a: 151). Therefore, the 
nature of the contemporary military-democracy relationship, as Umit Cizre argues, can hardly 
be fully captured by the existing theoretical literature on civil-military relations (2003: 215-6). 
6 
There are certainly other reasons for studying the relationship between security and state in 
Turkey. An obvious one is that the discourses and practices of state security often degenerate 
into non-democratic state practices. That is, the discourses and practices of state security open 
up a valuable strategic and socio-political maneuvering space for the non-democratic state 
elites (i. e. the military) to invest and deploy institutional and ideological powers against the 
active socio-political forces demanding political transformation in state-society relations. 
Despite the existence of this vital interplay between security and politics in Turkey, such a 
relationship has been scarcely studied so far. The thesis thus fills a gap in the literature by 
investigating how security can become a key political method and justification at the hands of 
the non-democratic or unelected state actors such as the military to interfere into, and at times 
take up, certain governmental activities. 
WHY TURKEY? 
Many analysts are 'perplexed' by Turkey and its people (Mango, 2003: 206), a country 
ordinarily described as one of 'fertile complexity' (Pope and Pope, 2004: x). Part of the 
puzzlement is attached both to its 'unique' geographical location 'as the gateway from Europe 
to -Asia' and to its, social identity, that is, 'the way the country combines being Western 
oriented though Turkish and Muslim at the same time' (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 1). Indeed, 
Turkey's social identity, domestic problems, the political autonomy of its military, and its 
involvement with the hotspots of world politics (e. g., Cyprus and Aegean problems with 
Greece, military incursions into the Northern Iraq, to name but a few) and its relentless bid for 
EU membership have often generated widespread debates inside and outside of the country 
(Mango, 2002: 179-80; Kalypso, 2004: 1-9). Turkey's 'alternative experience of modernity', 
its future directions, its handling of domestic challenges (i. e., Kurdish problem, the rise of 
Islamic identity) and its relations with the Eastern and Western civilizations are all issues that 
capture domestic and external academic and public attention (Kaya, 2004: 1-15). More often 
than not, the complexities of the country accompany the complexity of its analyses that at 
times lead to some pungent conclusions. Robert Kaplan, for one, intriguingly asserts that 
Turkey 'has the potential to dominate the Middle East once again' and that it and its culture 
4can harbor extensive slum life without decomposing [it] will be, relatively speaking, the 
future's winners' (quoted in Kasaba, 1997: 33). 
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More specifically, the dissertation's investigation on the Turkish state security was provoked 
by an experience of the ongoing confrontation in the last decade between the secularist state 
forces (most notably the military) and contemporary socio-political manifestations of Islamic 
resurgence (most notably by the Islamist parties). This confrontation has been heightened by 
the two 'eye-opening' general elections of 1995 and 2002 which saw the 'Islamist' parties 
fonning governments, repsectively. As a result, the nature of political life has been marked by 
a proliferation of antagonisms and instability of socio-political identities (Celik, 1996: 235). 
The social and political spaces have been once again open to violent solutions as evinced in 
the Kurdish question and the persistent rise of political Islam (Celik, 1996: 235). Most 
significantly, the Turkish military has been more openly taking a political side in this 
confrontation in the name of state security. In other words, the Turkish state in this while aims 
to remove 'all manifestations of religion from the public sphere and put it under strict control 
of the state-This struggle against the traditional "forces of darkness" uses a militant 
secularism to justify an authoritarian military-bureaucratic establishment' (Yavuz, 2000b: 33). 
Not only did this kind of undemocratic resolution of the socio-political conflicts reaffirm the 
historical role of the Turkish Armed Forces as the 'arbitrator' or 'guarantor' of the polity 
(Abromowitz, 2000: 8); but also the Islamist political rise in the 1990s has led the military to 
take an overt political positioning (Cizre, 2003; Yavuz, 2000a). 
Crucially, the Turkish case was chosen here also because the language of its domestic 
political confrontations is primarily articulated in the discourse of state security. In this 
respect, the ensuing politicization of religion and security (endorsed by the Islamist political 
parties and the military, respectively) has dominated 'many facets of Turkish life, from 
political power to education, and complicate Turkey's relations with the United States and the 
EU' (Abromowitz, 2000: 8). The over-dramatization of the relevant events pertaining to these 
domestic political confrontations is further fuelled by the mainstream media, slanted in favor 
of the secularist camp (Finkel, 2000: 147-67). The mainstream media thus hype up the 
confrontation by bringing 'security threats' into the living rooms of the population. 
Consequently, this puzzling confrontation between the secularist state and the religious 
society continue to grip the attention of the national and international public to such an extent 
that the confrontation is sometimes referred to as a 'culture war' (Pak, 2004: 337). 
The present project does not aim at formulating possible policy options that could help us 
resolving the Turkish puzzle of state-society relations. Its goal instead is to point out that the 
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recent confrontations between the ruling state elites and the active societal and political actors 
in Turkey can be better understood by investigating Turkey's state security discourses and 
practices. Such practices serve as a context for exploring the relationship between state and 
society in general and security (e. g. the military) and politics (e. g. democracy) in particular. 
These topics are important and demand exploration for a number of reasons. Firstly, the far- 
fetched security discourses are still largely under-examined (for two exceptions, Cizre, 2003; 
Bilgin, 2005). This is despite the fact that security in Turkey has embedded an extraordinary 
range of administrative and policy issues (Economist, 31 January 1998; Jenkins, Sunday 
TimeslHome, 20 March 2005, p. 38). Indeed, the discursive and practical reach of state 
security is so extensive that security often provides a legitimate gambit for the state elites for 
securitizing and criminalizing normal political activities and public debate beyond the 
confines of anti-tefforism laws or other familiar internal security arrangements (Jenkins, 
200 1; Sozen and Shaw, 2003; Cizre, 2003,2004) 
Secondly, security has generally been studied in Turkey typically by emphasizing the related 
geo-strategic policy analysis. As a result, little attention is paid to the question of how the 
, discourse and policy of state security can produce domestic political effects. Examining state 
security in Turkey presents a valuable empirical case study that enables us to explore how the 
discourse and practice of security can contribute to the annulment of normal democratic 
politics by a country's formal structures of power. In other words, national security generates 
material and immaterial obstacles that derails or distorts the democratic resolution of political 
conflicts between social forces (Cizre, 2003; 2004). Here, securitization' is used by the state 
elites as a counter-measure to cope with a burning domestic political agenda such as the 
Kurdish ethno-cultural demands for recognition and the pressing issue of political Islam 
(Yavuz, 2003a: 239-265). These latter issues are left out from the traditional security studies 
which explore external, state-centered and military security issues. Apart from a small number 
of researchers or investigative journalists (e. g. Kinzer, 2001; Akpinar, 2001; Pope and Pope, 
2004), such immediate political issues are rarely addressed in academia. 
Thirdly, although unconventional activities of the state have informed the historical and 
sociological analyses of Turkish politics (see, for example, Yavuz, 2003a; Kaya, 2004; 
1 Securitization is a political act of classifying an issue as one of 'security', implying an existential threat and 
emergency measures that call for and justify 'actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure' (Buzan, 
et aL, 1998: 23-4) 
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Jacoby, 2004a), these have rarely acknowledged the role of the security discourse and 
practices on domestic politics in their own right. This, for instance, can be observed in the 
case of the military interventions into normal politics in the name of state security. As stressed 
by the former US Ambassador Abramowitz, the military's role goes beyond defense and 
includes a political posture of 'the dedicated guardians of Turkish territorial integrity, public 
order, and the secular state' (Abromowitz, 2000: 8). Indeed, state security figures 
predominantly as the 'cause' and 'justification' of the military interventions. For instance, the 
former Chief of General Staff and President of the National Security Council Kenan Evren 
said that the military had to undertake the September 1980 coup 'in order to secure the 
Turkish nation the prosperity and happiness which she rightfully deserves, to give a new 
strength and impetus to Ataturk's principles that are being eroded ... and to reinstate the 
vanishing authority of the state' (Evren quoted in Karpat, 1982: 395). Despite this relevance, 
the importance of state security for the military has often been understudied and scarce 
attention is paid to such justifications of the military coups. 
Turkey furthermore represents a case enabling the researcher to explore how the coercive 
apparatus of the state, such as the military, state security courts and National Security Council 
can be deployed for domestic political missions. Turkey's experience exemplifies the links 
between politics on the one hand, and national security institutions, rationalities, identities, 
missions and techniques, on the other. The Turkish case allows the researcher to explore how 
an outward expansion of the portfolio of national security issues from previous traditional 
military security into domestic political operations is made possible. It is also possible to 
consider the consequences of these changes for the traditional agenda of Security Studies, 
reflecting both a militarization of politics and politicization of military. 
To recapitulate, Turkey represents a major case for analyzing the antagonistic relations 
between the military and Islamists, secularism and Islamism, the National Security Council 
and the governmental cabinet, security of the state and human rights, securitization and 
democratization. These have become conspicuous elements of government in Turkey. It is 
through studying the social and political effects of these dichotomies and antagonisms that it 
is possible to better grasp the political role of state security discourses and practices. Such an 
investigation also enables the security analysts to better understand how the state elites 
increase their hold over the body politic and manage to precipitate domestic control 
mechanisms by the use of techniques as political agenda control through national security 
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concept, the National Security Council, media manipulation and securitization. In brief, the 
Turkish case provides an excellent case study for understanding how security and politics 
cross-fertilize each other. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The thesis explores the politics of security in Turkey since the mid-1990s to clarify the 
relationship between state and security. Part I articulates the theoretical framework derived 
from the CSS and governmentality literatures, whereas Part II offers a genealogy of socio- 
historical conditions of security govemmentality as a three-dimensional construction. Part 1111 
explores change, and specifically, how the EU membership process affects the different 
components of security governmentality. It relies both on primary and secondary sources 
attesting the relevant actors' cognitive affiliation with regard to the EU membership, in 
general, and the changes in democratic political rationality, secularist and Islamic identities, in 
particular. 
Admittedly,. political Islam and secularism are not the only pressing issues in the country. 
Indeed, there are other significant - socio-political issues that have been expressed in state 
security language and logic such as the Kurdish problem. However, the thesis almost 
exclusively focuses on the domestic political conflict revolving around the secularist-Islamist 
divide. Although some relevant aspects of the Kurdish problem have been included into 
analysis, overall the author was forced to take a conscious decision to separate it based on the 
fact that the complexity of the Kurdish problem would have required an in-depth analysis that 
was simply impossible to develop here. 
Specifically, a genealogical study of Turkish state security discourses and practices is 
employed to understand the relationship between the country's discordant social and political 
phenomena such as secularism, political Islam and state security. Genealogical method is used 
as to investigate the contemporary experience of security governmentality 'so that it can be 
seen as put together contingently out of heterogeneous elements each having their own 
conditions of possibility' (Barry et al, 1996: 5). In general, this genealogy uses 'a 
contextualized line of inquiry determined by the socio-historical specificity of the subject 
matter' (Jacoby, 2004b: 413). As such, the genealogy of security governmentality encloses 'a 
historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
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ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking and saying' (Foucault, 1984a: 46). The 
genealogical method tracks down a history of the conditions of security governmentality in 
which the ideal of the secularist-nationalist state has eventually become a problem. What is at 
stake here is an inquiry not in search of 'origins' for finding out how the present (i. e., security 
governmentality) has emerged (Foucault, 1991b: 58-9). Rather, it is about using 'history as a 
way of diagnosing the present' (Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 4). Furthermore, the aim is also 
to attest the role of the 'events' that play significant roles for their 'unique' characteristics 
(Foucault, 1984b: 80). This is a method also called 'eventualization' by Foucault (2000: 226- 
9). It holds that through the analyses of events (such as the military's 'post-modem coup in 
1997' or the 'headscarf crisis') we can find the 'reversal of a relationship of forces, the 
usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once 
used it, a feeble donýiination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked 
"other"... responding to haphazard conflicts' (Foucault, 1984b: 88; Dean 1994). 
Theoretically, the present project aims to examine how the discourse and practice of state 
security can be approached in order to bring out its wider social and political significance. It is 
necessary here to point that state security discourses are not taken as merely linguistic but also 
'real and. material' in that they have their 'conditions of possibility' and as such they arenot 
simple effects of 'ideas or consciousness' or mere fictions, distortions or delusions (Kendall 
and Wickham, 1999: 37). Neither is the concept of discourse taken here as an overarching 
category or 'articulation' that can explain the cohesion and unity of social and political 
practices (for such a view, see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 107). Discourse is rather understood 
as 'an ordering of terms, meanings and practices that forms the background presuppositions 
and taken-for-granted understandings that enable people's actions and interpretations' 
(Milliken, 1999: 12). 
The thesis will analyze security discourses of various state actors 'in order to show how they 
seek to render proper certain policies while marginalizing alternative courses of action' 
(Bilgin, 2005: 117). Hence, the emphasis is on both discourses and practices of state security. 
Discourses of state security can be better seen as 'economies' that have 'their own intrinsic 
technology, tactics effects of power which in turn they transmit ... 
Power is inscribed within 
the discourses not outside them' (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 488). State security discourse in this 
formulation becomes 'the medium through which human beings are situated in social reality' 
(Yegen, 1994: 49). In other words, discourses in this sense function-like 'the framework of 
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meanings and values within which people exist and conduct their social lives' (Purvis and 
Hunt, 1993: 479). 
The emphasis on discourse notwithstansing, the present analysis is genealogical rather than 
archaeological. The genealogical approach views the 'empirical work as necessary to question 
and reformulate presumed continuities and discontinuities so that it is possible to offer 
diagnosis of the limits and possibilities of the present' (Dean, 1999: 46). Key for the analysis 
here are both the discursive visibility and historical contexts of security governmentality, 
including the related power relations, claims, identities, and techniques. Hence, rather than 
focusing merely on the 'rules of formation' of security statements of the state as 'a snapshot 
or a slice through web of discourse' (Foucault, 1989: 34-78), attention is paid to the historical 
&processual aspects of the web of discourse' and material practices that is to their genealogy 
(Kendall and Wickham, 1998: 30-1). Therefore, the subject matter is not reduced to the 
discursive unity of the state security but incorporates diverse, fragmented practical aspects 
(Joseph, 2004: 147). Genealogical method is more or less similar to the historical analysis but 
it alerts the researcher to the particularities rather than general aspects of the present 
problematic while using the historical research. 
The point of analyzing the prospect of a change in and other forms of resistance to security 
governmentality (i. e. the EU and Islamist political parties) is in keeping with the place of 
ethics in both CSS and Foucault's thought. As to the former, CSS gives priority to 
considering the difficulties of 'those men and women and communities [e. g., the plight of the 
headscarf wearing university students and female politicians] for whom the present world 
order is a cause of insecurity rather than security' (Wyn Jones, 1995: 309). In regard to 
Foucault's thought, for instance, investigating the 'Islamist' political movements within 
security govemmentality is due to investigating their functions in bringing out change, rather 
than endorsing their actions as ethically right or proper. In other words, they are explored with 
a view to 'allow[ing] a space for the work of freedom' or opening up 'the received fixedness 
and inevitability of the present' and 'letting in a little glimpse of freedom-as a practice of 
difference-through its fractures' (Barry et. al., 1996: 5). 
Therefore, the thesis might at times sound moralizing. It does not adopt the problematic 
'detached observer status' (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 10), for it remains committed to the 
paradigm of a pluralist democracy (see Mouffe, 1992). It is usually from this ethical point of 
13 
view that the ideological components of security governmentality are compared and 
contrasted. Here again, this line of thought is also a result of the theoretical presumptions 
made use of in the thesis. CSS, in this regard, rejects the conventional definition of politics 
that views the state, its sovereignty, its moral authority and its status as 'the key guardian of 
people's security' (Booth, 1997: 106; Bilgin, 2000: 54). Likewise, engaging with Foucault's 
approach requires being alert in research, since the ethos of his genealogy is a 'militant 
criticism' of political reason or 'a permanent and pragmatic activism without apocalyptic or 
messianic ends' (Dean, 1999: 44; Visker, 1995: 54). In other words, Foucault's approach is 'a 
skeptical attitude towards many forms of expertise and claims to authority, and suggests that 
we should not assume that the good intentions of particular institutions [be it the military or 
the AKP] will guarantee good outcomes' (Cooper, 2001: 7). Furthermore, Foucault suggests 
that such investigations are necessary 'to grasp the points where change is possible and 
desirable and to determine the precise form this change should take' (Foucault, 1984a: 46). 
The thesis uses both primary and secondary sources. Its primary sources include newspaper 
research, interviews, and a questionnaire. The method employed is one of 'data triangulation' 
that gathers empirical information by checking and juxtaposing multiple sources (Arksey and 
Knight, 1999: 23). The material was obtained from the Marmara University Centre of Turkey- 
EU Relations, Bilkent University Library and the Turkish National Library in Ankara, the 
Jean Monnet Centre for European Studies and Hugh Owen Library at the University of Wales, 
Aberystwyth, the National Library of Wales, and the European Research Institute at the 
University of Birmingharn. 
Part III of the thesis relies on newspaper research, recent pamphlets and books by 
representatives of the state and 'Islamist' party elites. It also includes personal interviews 
conducted with the military officials and the 'moderate Islamist' AKP members (the ruling 
'Justice and Development Party') in Izmir, Kayseri, Ankara and Istanbul in January, April and 
August 2004. Here, the aim was to supplement the available interviews with the party 
leadership with the personal interviews and questionnaire conducted by the author. The 
interviewee involved 'rank and file' and other intermediary party officials serving in the 
capacity of local district heads and/or active party youth divisions, whose acts abridge the 
party's democratic discourse (especially EU poitical conditionality) with the respective local 
electoral base. Attached in the appendix is the questionnaire submitted to the party's youth 
divisions. The questionnaire aimed to explore whether the changed democratic-EU 
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membership discourse can only be evinced at the party leadership level or can as well be 
obtained within the party official levels 2. Trying to arrest such a change is important for 
evaluating the future identity orientations of security governmentality and the Islamic 
movement. The questions asked included: what are the implications of the EU membership 
democratic conditionality for Turkey's national security? Will the EU membership threaten 
Turkey's cultural and religious identities? 
To test how the electorate responded to the new 'moderate Islamist' party discourse tuned into 
the EU democratic discourse, the interviews took place before and after the local elections of 
March 2004. The interviews used a semi-structured format, lasted around one hour and were 
carried out in Turkish in the interviewees' respective party buildings in eight of Istanbul's 31 
districts: four selected in the Anatolian part (Anadolu Yakasi) and four in the European part 
(Avrupa Yakasi) in January, April and August 2004. Istanbul was chosen because it 
constitutes one fifth of the whole national electorate and because it is a locus of diverse social, 
ethnic, economic, and cultural groups. 
Interviewing elites or 'special populations' on topics related to security constitutes 'socially 
sensitive research', (Lee and Renzetti, 1993: 5; Arksey and Knight, 1999: 122-5). In this 
respect, the ethical issues of privacy and confidentiality are preferred whenever necessary to 
protect the identity of the participant military personnel and the 'moderate Islamist' party 
members. This pertains especially to the interviews with the military personnel. As for the 
latter, the lack of complete sampling frames, threats to career advancement associated with 
the research, the relative anonymity of the respondents, and sensitivity of the questions asked 
made random sampling quite difficult. Instead, sampling was selective, mostly 'because 
potential participants have [had] greater need to hide their involvement' (Lee and Renzetti, 
1993: 30). The major strategy used for gaining access to these 'special' 'research populations' 
of the military personnel or the party members with Islamic persuasion was twofold. The first 
involved attending general social sites within which potential participants could be reached. 
Second 'cultural sensitivity approach' was utilized so as to increase familiarity and rapport by 
trying 'to learn about their actual life styles (beliefs, needs, habits, fears, risks) and to 
communicate in ways that the individuals understand, believe, regard as relevant to 
themselves, and are likely to act upon' (Sieber, 1993: 19; Arksey and Knight, 1999: 115-122). 
2 This questionnaire has been conducted with the 120 members of AKP's 'rank and file' in different districts of 
Istanbul in April 2004. 
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THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis has a three-fold structure. Part I introduces the theoretical approach and empirical 
study. Part II examines the constitution of security governmentality by focusing on its central 
dimensions: rationality, identity and technique. And Part III explores the impending 
dissolution of security governmentality in Turkey associated with the EU membership reform 
process. More specifically, Part 1, 'The Politics of Security, ' develops a theoretical framework 
informed by Critical Security Studies and the governmentality literature to explore how 
security discourses and practices shape domestic political conduct. Part II, 'The Construction 
of Security Governmentality in Turkey', analyzes the relationship between security and 
politics, a relationship which involves ideology, institutions and socio-political processes. Part 
III 'EU Membership and Change in Security Governmentality' investigates how security 
governmentality has been impacted by the ongoing European Union membership process 
from 1999 when Turkey gained an official EU candidacy status to the end of 2004. 
In Part I Chapter- 1, 'The Politics of Security: CSS and Govemmentality' combines the CSS 
approach with Foucault's' governmentality to present a 'security govemmentality' 
perspective. The CSS approach enables one to investigate state security processes through 
which 'security threats' and 'appropriate responses' have been constructed by the Turkish 
state, whereas governmentality thesis explores discourses and practices in four dimensions: 
visibility, rationality, identity and technique. The chapter, by combining the two, offers a 
theoretical framework for understanding the politics of state security discourses and practices 
in Turkey as security governmentality. 
Chapter 2, 'Security Governmentality and its Visibilities' identifies the different facets of 
security governmentality by mapping out the prevailing historical, institutional and socio- 
political discourses and practices of Turkish military and state institutions. It also shows how 
state security has been enmeshed with politics through a state-induced legally binding shift 
from external to internal threat construction. Specifically, it notes how security discourses 
have been employed as a counter-measure particularly against the rise to prominence of the 
Islamic social and political forces since the mid-1990s. It analyzes how the most visible agent 
of security governmentality, namely the Turkish military has played an active role in 
democratic politics. 
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Part II focuses on the constitution of security governmentality. It defines the constitutive 
elements of security govemmentality as rationality, identity and technique. Chapter 3, 
'Rationality of Security Governmentality' discusses the 'rationality' of security 
governmentality, that is, a particular knowledge that at the thought level constitutes state 
security discourses and practices. The chapter shows that the Turkish state (particularly the 
military) has produced knowledge of the 'reality' of the governed subjects under the rubric of 
official state ideology of Kemalism. More significantly, in the 1990s and early 2000s the 
rationality in security governmentality has been constituted and constrained by two principles: 
'secularism' and 'reason of state'. These have been deployed to preserve the ideological 
character of the state against internal and external dissenters or 'threats'. 
Chapter 4, 'Techniques of Security Governmentality' is devoted to methods of state intrusion 
into the public and private spheres. It distinguishes between two security-related techniques 
used by the state elites: macro and micro techniques. These interventions in particular 
empower the military over the political class by enabling the former to define the 'domestic 
.. threats to. the state security'. 
Macro techniques signify constitutional, institutional and other 
formal. sources -of state intervention into -the domestic political conduct, such as National 
Security Council and the military. The micro techniques stand for a means of intervention 
such as securitization and the media representations that interconnect the macro techniques 
with the social/individual conduct. It is through these two methods that the state elites find 
institutional and constitutional channels of intervention into the public and private sphere, 
including religious choices. The chapter introduces a relatively understudied case: the military 
intervention in February 1997 (the so-called 'post-modem coup') that illustrates the 
deployment of macro and n-kro-techniques. 
Chapter 5 investigates the identity dimensions of security governmentality. The chapter 
argues that the identity dimension in Turkey's security governmentality is crystallized around 
the two identity expressions: the secularist identity of state elites (the military and civilian 
bureaucracy) and the political Islamist parties (the Refah Party in the 1990s and the AK Party 
since 2002). The security confrontations between secular and Islamic identity produce a 
playground of antagonisms through which security govemmentality has been justified, 
articulated and executed. Such antagonisms are also couched and expressed in dichotomies 
such as normal/virtuous, abnormal/criminal and so on. Categorization and normalization of 
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this kind paves the way for the state actors to employ the relevant techniques so as to make 
inroads into the private and public conducts. 
Part III investigates the issue of change in security governmentality. It argues that since 1999, 
Turkey's politics of security has undergone a period of change with the effect that Turkey's 
EU membership bid appears to be eroding some of traditionally well-established aspects of 
security governmentality. The EU membership conditionality and membership reform process 
forces the state to remedy the ailing civil-military relations by striving to wield institutional 
balances in favor of civilians and empowering them with democratic institutions. 
Chapter 6, 'Change in the Rationality Dimensions of Security Governmentality' investigates 
how the EU membership reforms in Turkey have attempted to inculcate a democratic 
rationality as an alternative replacing the reason of state rationality of security 
governmentality. The first section also provides an historical account of the EU-Turkish 
relations. It charts the changes in both Turkey's membership bid and the changing EU 
membership conditionality that culminates in the 'Copenhagen Political Criteria'. The latter 
obliges Turkey to conform to a democratic reform package which galvanizes- the issue of EU 
membership in Turkish politics. 
Chapter 7, 'Change in the Techniques of Security Governmentality' investigates how 
techniques of security governmentality changed in response to reforms passed to meet EU 
accession criteria. The EU-induced reforms have managed to redress the political autonomy 
of the military and some of its techniques in security govemmentality by curtailing the power 
of the institutions such as the National Security Council. 
Chapter 8 assesses the changes in identity dimensions. It examines the prospect of change in 
the secularist identity of the military-led state elites and the religious identity of the relevant 
political parties. It concludes that although the secularist identity of the military-led state 
elites has mainly remained unaltered, that of the Islamist political identity has changed 
significantly. The chapter concludes that a key constitutive (identity) aspect of security 
governmentality is likely to decompose in the post-EU official candidacy era thanks to the 
change in Islamist identity. 
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The Conclusion aims to provide an overall assessment of the themes developed out of the 
conceptualization of security governmentality. Reconsidering the relationship between the 
military and democratic politics in Turkey since 1999, the main questions the conclusion 
addresses are: What are the consequences of security governmentality? What are the 
prospects for a more democratic mentality and practice of politics in Turkey, which could 
accommodate the demands of socio-political. actors such as people of Islamic persuasion and 
Kurdish citizens for a wider social and political recognition and participation? In other words, 
the thesis begins to answer the question: how can a genuine transformation in security 
governmentality in Turkey be possible? 
19 
PART 1: THE POLITICS OF SECURITY 
CHAPTER1 
CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENTALITY 
This chapter discusses the theory of state security. It explores the role state security plays in 
the production of socio-political conditions which perpetuate security governmentality. The 
chapter begins by surveying the central claims and assumptions of the Traditional Security 
Studies (TSS) and Critical Security Studies (CSS). It goes on to explore Foucault's theory of 
governmentality which provides the basis for the subsequent discussion of state power. 
Instead of seeing state security as a militarily static concept-an approach followed in TSS-the 
chapter adopts the perspective of CSS and governmentality. Its goal is to explain how Turkish 
state security discourses and practices encroach upon and distort the normal workings of 
domestic politics and generate a particular political regime type, that is, security 
governmentality. The aim is to show that CSS and govemmentality approaches are better than 
TSS in supplying a theoretical reference point for the study of the Turkish state security. 
Hence, the approach proposed here combines CSS and governmentality studies and lays the 
conceptual foundations for the chapters in Part II, which study how state security functions as 
a category of rationality, identity and technique of governing. 
1.1. SECURITY AND POLITICS IN TRADITIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 
With the advent of the Cold War international structure, the IR sub-field of TSS3 came to 
occupy a prominent place on the academic and intellectual agenda of the era (Williams, 2001: 
21-2). In this scholarship, a nation was typically identified with the state and considered to be 
'secure' insofar as it was 'not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values... and [be] able, 
if challenged, to maintain them by victory in war' (Lipmann quoted in Wolfers, 1962: 150; 
147-65). TSS tended to define 'national security' as the military defense of the state defined 
mainly in territorial terms and the strategic calculation of military stability (Waever, 2002: 43- 
8). For TSS, the main object of security is the state; the mission is to safeguard the modem 
state and the buzzword is 'state survival' (Krause, 1998: 301). As Buzan argues, security is 
viewed as a primary value not only in itself but also a precept condition for other values such 
3 Admittedly TSS here is taken as a general category for analysis with the possible omissions of important 
differences within its rubric. Also, TSS should be understood as referring primarily to the neo-realist shcool, 
which is dominant in IR discipline. 
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as health, welfare, and economy (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al., 1998: 141-62). The study of 
security thus focused on a particular practice within a context of external interstate relations. 
In so doing, this scholarship mostly relied on rnicroeconomic individualism, materialism and 
objectivist theorizing about the behavior of its primary unit of analysis-the state (Williams, 
1998a: 438; McSweeney, 1999: 32-44). 
According to TSS, the behavior of the state depends largely on the anarchical structure of the 
international system, where each state rationally and competitively pursues its own self- 
interest expressed in terms of security (Waltz, 1979). As a result, a 'natural' perpetual security 
competition and a relentless cycle of violence follow as 'tragic' outcomes of the anarchical 
structure of the international system, which does not (need to) look at the regime type or 
'domestic political considerations' (Mearsheimer, 2001: 10-1). Once defined in these terms, 
security becomes 'tragedy', namely, a natural disaster or a constant exterior of politics 
(Schmidt, 2004: 431). 'State interests' refer to the pre-given state preferences or goals (Rose, 
1998: 152) that are orientated either towards seeking a 'scarce' commodity like security, or 
alternatively, towards influence (Gilpin, 1986: 308-9; Zakaria, 1998: 19). 
For TSS, national security is the prime objective of the states and, as Barry Buzan argues, 'the 
fact that no other agency exists for this task [of security provision] is what justifies the 
primacy of national security' (1991: 329). Having taken such an understanding of the state as 
the dominant wielder of power in the international system, TSS bifurcates the state and by 
implication, world politics, into an 'inside' against an 'outside' (Walker, 1993: 12-3). As 
such, security has significant normative implications, despite TSS claims to conceptual 
neutrality and objectivity (Williams, 2001: 28-30). That is, security in the TSS formulation 
appears to be an exclusively state-related task where security expertise lies in the hands of the 
relevant state actors. Here, 'military force is legitimized, state sovereignty is seen as a 
superior value and consequently, all non-state groups which threaten a state are delegitimized' 
(Eriksson, 1999: 313). Rarely in the TSS understanding can one find an interest into the 
question of how the security forces of a state can be expropriated as a tool of intervention into 
the social construction of rationalities, subjectivities and rules of engagement in politics. 
Within TSS, the characterization of the role of military power is externally constructed. As 
Andreas and Price point, in TSS the use of military power mostly corresponds to the external 
defense of the state which supposedly has little to do with the domestic political process 
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(2001: 31-2). In this formulation, militaries are responsible only for 'national security' and for 
the external defense of states from external threats (Walt, 1991). Given the anarchic structure 
of the international system, security is the driving force of an internationally interactive 
environment. The central focus lies on military force and its study reflects 'the threat, use, 
and control of militaryforce' (Walt, 1991: 212). Security practice has its key determinants 
located in a potentially conflictual anarchical structure, inhabited and coordinated by the 
unitary/sovereign self-helping states (Art, 1992: 141; Grieco, 1993: 315, Elman, 1997). Such 
an understanding of security suggests that the military force is the primary arbitrator during 
conflict which is the dominant, if not ubiquitous, condition of world politics (Mearsheimer, 
1994/5; 2001: 5). In this context, war becomes a prime mover since there is no higher 
authority to curb it (Waltz, 1959: 205). 
Unsurprisingly, the TSS approach renders the security of the state synonymous with the 
accumulation of military power and the use of military force (Sweeney, 1999: 219). It is 
possible to further argue that TSS exhibits what is called a Lockean 'Military morality' on the 
proper use of the armed forces which assumes that 'the armed forces can only be used 
[externally] by the authority of the civilian state, whose authority derives from the people'- 
(Cresswell, 2004: 640). This Lockean take on state-society relations in turn becomes an 
unproblematic explanation of state authority and citizen political duty. The contractual nature 
of the sovereign nation state-either actual or hypothetical-then safely places the focus of 
analysis on external state security (Krause and Williams, 1997: 39-40). Thus, TSS simply 
likens the state's military power to preserving existing national and international orders and to 
'ensuring continuity and maintaining the status quo' rather than changing them (Williams, 
2001: 27). 
TSS assumes that states have responsibility for the security of their subjects (Thompson, 
1994: 22). This view implies a state system in which 'the core function of states' or 'the 
baseline function of the states has been to provide security to its citizens' (Stein, 2002: 21). 
While state security is made synonymous to an 'aggregate individual security'; individual 
security is in turn reduced to an external security, that is, to the state's protection of the 
individual from other states (Reus-Smit, 1992: 17). State security in TSS formulation does not 
consider the security of the individuals or domestic society (Waever, 1993: 42; Krause and 
Williams, 1996: 232; Krause and Williams, 1997: 43-9). This is so because in the TSS 
characterization of security, the contractual obligations 'underwritten by the authority of the 
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state' means that 'the security of "citizens" is identified with (and guaranteed by) that of the 
state; and, by definition, those who stand outside it represent potential or actual threats' 
(Krause and Williams, 1996: 232; Reus-Smith, 1992: 17). 
Indeed, the TSS conception of security makes a critical reference to the 'rational subjectivity' 
of the citizens. This conception in particular refers to the theoretical-pragmatic construction of 
individual human beings as both 'self-contained and instrumentally rational' subjects 
(Williams, 1998b). This portrays rational individuals as pursuing their interests egoistically 
within a perilous insecure environment whose content can be only secured by the existence of 
the state (Krause and Williams, 1997: 40). That the state emerges as the primary security 
provider grants it legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. The state assumes the unique banner 
of security for the internal constituencies and demands the consumers of security-that is, the 
citizens-to provide three most valuable political batons: legitimacy, authority and obligation. 
These are three important political categories which TSS takes for granted (Krause and 
Williams, 1997: 48). 
The 'statism' characteristic of TSS goes back to the nineteenth-century idea that 'all loyalty 
and decision making power should be concentrated on states' (Booth and Vale, 1997: 349, 
Booth, 1999). TSS's idea of 'the state as the exclusive security referent' is, however, endorsed 
without a requisite theory of the state (Krause and Williams, 1996: 232). Instead, states are 
assumed to be autonomous, instrumentally rational and self-contained units, whose domestic 
societal influences are territorially limited by a claim over the monopoly of the means of 
violence (Weber, 1968: 64; Tilly, 1975: 27; Barnett, 2002: 117). 
It follows that under the conditions of international anarchy states are merely seen as 
functionally undifferentiated units whose task is to provide security to their inhabitants 
(Waltz, 1979). The TSS approach thus not only glosses over domestic politics but the main 
category of analysis, the state, is conceived within a monist theory of the state. The idea of the 
indelible unity of the state in relation to other political entities at the national and international 
levels is one of the key theoretical underpinnings of neorealism. An implication of the 
neorealist theory which creates difficulties is that states are burdened to cope with the ultimate 
problem (survival) on their own (military) terms (Waltz, 1979: 100-1). The sovereign state is 
to emphasise the internal unitary role states play in regulating various interaction processes of 
their individual/subgroups at the intemal-domestic level. Having denied any significance to 
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the space inside and outside the state, the analytical focus is on the question as to how an 
internally secure state participates in international politics by ensuring its external security 
against other states. 
According to TSS, the role of politics is one of 'pure technique' or 'mere calculation of 
instruments of control' and becomes operational at the hands of (dominant) power elites. In 
essence, politics purports to reflect no more than an 'instrumental coaction among dumb, 
unreflective, technical-rational unities' (Ashley, 1986: 292-3). If one follows the TSS 
approach, security has to be taken as merely exterior to politics meaning that various state 
interests would be collapsed into a uniform category of external-security seeking. This, in 
turn, translates into a biased perspective, namely, one of a satisfied and status quo oriented 
state power (Schweller, 1996: 91). TSS accepts that there might be states that allocate 
resources for goals or activities other than survival-motive but these are nevertheless only a 
'prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have' (Waltz, 1979: 91). That the survival 
may not be the only motive for some states is moreover another factor that buttresses the 
argument for security policy. This is so since if there exist some states for whom 'survival 
does not exhaust their political ambitions; others are forced, logically, to look to their 
defences' (Waltz, 1959: 204). Once again, the opportunity to explore the domestic nature of 
state behavior is missed. 
TSS has a special take on the (liberal) contractual/constitutional aspect of domestic politics. 
Significantly, it assumes away rather than argues for the peaceful domestic workings of the 
military/civilian bureaucracy or the 'offices and organs making up the state' (Poggi, 1990: 
30). In TSS understanding, the ultimate decision power within a state is vested in the state's 
non-bureaucratic organs or in 'the very seat of sovereignty', be it the Crown, Parliament or 
the ruling party (Poggi, 1990: 31). Domestic politics is construed as a hierarchically ordered 
and constitutionally constrained domain. The units within domestic political structures are 
thus 'formally differentiated according to the degrees of their authorities' and possess the 
'specified distinct functions' (Waltz, 1979: 81). In that domain, the relevant political units and 
portfolio for their actions are forecasted in predefined and institutionally hierarchical sub- 
structures. It is the similarity/difference in the structure that should be studied and that 
'[E]verything else is omitted. Concern for tradition and culture, analysis of the character and 
personality of political actors, consideration of the conflictive and accommodative processes 
of politics, description of the making and execution of policy-all such matters are left 
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aside ... despite cultural and other 
differences, similar structures produce similar effects' 
(Waltz, 1979: 82,88, emphasis added). Then, surely there is also an alleged need for a 
successful theory to separate politics from other categories such as economics, culture and 
social dimensions (Waltz, 1979: 79). 
The TSS view of the state is accompanied with a standard perspective on the domestic 
decision-making process. It is a perspective of 'expected utility' which emphasizes that state 
actors (understood as political elites) 'weigh the utilities of different outcomes by their 
probabilities, calculate costs and benefits of all alternative policies, and choose the option 
with the highest utility' (Brooks, 1997: 454). The neorealist view, for example, grants that 
states seek to advance their security and/or power over other nations, and that there is 
gessentially no need to look at domestic-level processes because actors are understood to have 
minimal discretion regarding the strategies they adopt' (Brooks, 1997: 471). Drawing on 
political realism and state sovereignty literatures, TSS privileges the state as the pre-eminent 
actor and ontological unit of analysis in security studies (Buzan, 1996: 51). Bound by 
geography, human nature and a (strategic/instrumental) rationality, the focus of the inquiry is 
placed on the state as a unified actor (Keohane and Stein, 1993: 32). 
It can be argued that TSS's bracketing of the domestic politics generates a blind spot in the 
discourse of security understood within a broader tradition of modernity, one that copes with 
questions of violence, history and normativity (Williams, 1998b). For TSS, the very security 
and nature of domestic political community is related to the practices associated with the 
modem conceptions of an individual 'empty' self 'freed from claims about its personal 
identity and united with others through the structures of contractual sovereignty' (Williams, 
1998a: 438). State security is, therefore, premised upon an idea of domestic society comprised 
of aggregate, atomistic and material individual persons stripped of their personal or collective 
identities (Williams, 1998a: 438). 
TSS by implication takes domestic society to be relatively homogeneous (Waltz, 1979). Inside 
the state, a space of relative order and peace exists and change is expected in the forrn of 
development and progress (Buzan, 1996: 53). To be sure, domestic politics in TSS 
fonnulation is fractious and competitive too, that is, TSS does 'not expect all states to have 
identical domestic structures' (Desh, 1998: 159). However, domestic conflict over power is 
often assumed to be irrelevant to 'functional similarity' of state behavior (Desh, 1998: 159). 
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Or alternatively, it is understood to be 'pacific' and 'constrained by institutional procedures' 
that 'regulate the struggle for the control of the state' (Terriff et al, 1999: 41-2). This is so 
since there is the reference to 'specification of the functions' and the 'hierarchically ordered' 
nature of the domestic political system in which, according to Waltz, a 
broad agreement prevails on the tasks that various parts of a government are to 
undertake and on the extent of the power they legitimately wield. Thus Congress 
supplies the militaryforces; the President commands them. Congress makes the laws; 
the executive branch enforces them; agencies administer laws; judges interpret them. 
Such specification of roles and differentiation of function is found in any state, the 
more fidly so as the state is more highly developed (Waltz, 1979: 81-2, emphasis 
added). 
Another source of this vision of domestic political order, central to TSS, is the idea of a 
'tradeoff' faced by citizens. This idea implies that security is juxtaposed with individual/group 
liberty such that 'the most profound of all the choices relating national security is ... the 
tradeoff with liberty, for at conflict are two distinct values' (Ullman, 1983: 131). These views 
on instrumental rationality and the homogeneity of political society, however, conceal such 
state security practices that expose domestic socio-political divides. One explanation of this is 
that TSS does not analytically separate security from politics. As a result, security is often 
subsumed under various variables such as survivability, conflict and war which in turn mean 
that the TSS approach underestimates the political agency of states (Waltz, 1979; 
Mearsheimer, 2001). 
There are other approaches that do not underestimate the political agency of states. On the 
contrary, they do establish the important parallel between state security and domestic politics. 
Indeed, such approaches understand security as a 'political condition' in such a way that a 
6positive correlation' is set out between security and the degree of stateness, that is, security 
as dependent upon the fragility or comparative infancy of statehood (Ayoob, 1995: 22; 1997). 
While offering some insights into a more critical analysis of security, this perspective 
provides a contentious account of the relationship between security and politics. That is to 
say, this understanding of 'security as stateness' privileges rather than problematizes the 
existing political authority (Krause, 1998). It also uncritically consigns a positive trust and 
authenticity to the state elites in finding solutions to the problems stemming from 'state- 
building' activities (Ayoob, 1995: 2142). Besides, this perspective leads to an elitist outlook 
which equates security 'to the security of those who profess to represent the state territorially 
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and institutionally' (Ayoob, 1995: 9). The resultant frame of analysis entails an ethical 
commitment that favors 'regime security' rather than security of the people and tends to 
safeguard 'the elite's grip on power' (Ball, 1988: 95; Terriff et al, 1999: 19). In other words, 
the 'state makers' are expected to have abundant ime and opportunity since they need 'lots of 
time and relatively free hand' in order 'to persuade and coerce the disparate populations' 
(Ayoob, 1995: 29). 
These important shortcomings notwithstanding, analytically the present case of Turkey does 
not conform to this formulation both because it has a solid 'degree of stateness' a 'strong state 
tradition' (Heper, 1991; 2000; Sozen and Shaw, 2003) and also because state security 
continues to be a recurring concern for the state elites (Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3; Koker, 
1990; Aydinli, 2003). In addition, the view of 'security as [a] political condition' differs from 
the position defended in this chapter which makes security a political practice and asset that 
serves the state elites against other rival societal forces. Furthermore, this view of security 
would not help to chart detailed analytical framework appropriate for exploring a complex 
case such as the Turkish politics of security. The approach adopted here therefore explicitly 
'focuses on the connection between security and politics. 
To recapitulate, the discussion so far shows that the important interplay between state security 
and domestic politics is left out in the conventional TSS approaches. TSS therefore fails to 
provide a solid theoretical ground for studying Turkish state security discourses and practices, 
since it cannot explain how and why elites appropriate state security for their own primarily 
domestic political purposes. Two critical aspects thus deserve mentioning with regard to the 
specificity of the Turkish case study. First, studying the dynamics of Turkish state security 
require a sound theoretical awareness of state security as intemally rather than externally 
orientated state action. Secondly, a proper analytical framework would also have to account 
for the military's enduring clash with political Islamists in the name of state security in the 
period between 1995 and 2004. As shown above, TSS is too rigid to accommodate such an 
analysis. The approach advanced here embraces the alternative CSS approach and bridges it 
with Foucault's governmentality approach. This combined perspective allows one to better 
investigate complex state security discourses and practices. 
1.2. SECURITY AND POLITICS IN CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES 
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Unlike the TSS's state and status quo oriented premises, CSS provides innovative lens 
through which one can critically view Turkey' state security discourses and practices and 
their potential transformation. CSS-quite usefully for the present study of Turkish state 
security discourses and practices-sees security discourses and practices of a state as 
constitutive rather than an epiphenomenon of its domestic politics (Booth, 1997: 106; Krause, 
1998: 305-16; Waever, 1999: 337). 
Before discussing CSS, it is necessary to clarify the use of the very term 'critical', often 
ascribed to the Frankfurt School, or, alternatively, to post-structuralism. Although CCS seems 
divided between the Frankfurt School-cum-Critical Theory and poststructuralist critical theory 
(Booth, 1997: 109; Wyn Jones, 1999: 165-6), there is no unanimity over what a 'critical' 
approach to security studies means (Williams, 1999: 341). Perhaps this is why the editors of 
the first collection of a CSS work did not impose a precise meaning of 'critical' in either a 
methodological or political sense (Williams and Krause, 1997: viii; Williams, 2001: 31). 
Notwithstanding much of the differences, it is pertinent to stress that the term critical 
challenges the atomistic, unitary, discrete, disengaged (Cartesian) and apolitical academic 
subject who unproblematically -exist antecedent to the discourses that it constitutes and 
empowers (Dillon, 1995: 324; Huysmans, 1998). CSS is sympathetic to the view-that 
'knowing and acting subjects are social and embodied beings, and products of their thought 
and action bear ineradicable traces of their situations and interests' (McCarthy, 2004: 193). In 
other words, when academics study their subject matters; 'they do not leave their lives on the 
coat-hook outside' (Booth, 1995: 110). 'Critical' in CSS is then, amongst other things, an 
academic orientation to differentiate the analysis at hand from problem-solving approaches by 
calling into question the 'prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into 
which they are organized, as the given framework for action' and by investigating 'the 
process of change' (Cox, 1981: 128-9). It can be said that CSS takes as its foundation the 
question of change in both an explanatory and an evaluative sense (Williams and Krause, 
1997: xii). 
For the present study, the term 'critical' utilizes all those approaches that criticize the 
orthodox metatheoretical assumptions of much of Security Studies (Booth, 1997: 104). The 
term 'is meant to imply an orientation toward the discipline [rather] than a precise theoretical 
label' (Williams and Krause, 1997: x-xi). The term 'critical' is an umbrella concept to include 
all studies that fall outside the mainstream rationalist or traditional neoliberal-neorealist 
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scholarship (Krause, 1998: 299). The perspective adopted in this thesis reflects a similar and 
broadly 'critical' perspective and takes CSS as a typological device by making use of all the 
approaches that are critical of TSS (Wyn Jones, 1999: 165-6). 
CSS rejects views of security portraying it as 'derived from a top-down, masculinized Anglo- 
American conception of security and politics' (Booth and Vale, 1997: 332; Buzan, 1991; 
1995; Booth, 1991; 1997; 2005; lipschutz, 1995; Krause and Williams, 1996; 1997; 
Williams, 1999). It runs counter to the perspectives which define 'security' in state - military 
terms and render state-military security into something of a 'higher value' (Bilgin, et al., 
1998: 141; Williams, 2001: 24-30). As argued above, the TSS logic of security stipulated that 
what needed to be secured was (the modem conceptions of) sovereignty and 'the state' 
(Buzan, 1991: 22-3; Walker, 1997: 66-72; Williams, 2001: 38). This a priori claim to state 
security has been challenged by the emergence of unprecedented problems such as threats 
stemming from terrorism, environmental problems, fragmentation of states, third world 
insecurity, globalization, identity-based conflicts, and the division of sovereignty among a 
number of agencies at the transnational, international, sub-national levels (UNDP Report 
1999: 344-6; Held, - 1992: 16; Bush and Keyman, 1997: 319-25; Dalby, 1997: 4; Acharya, 
1997: 301-2; Strange, -2000: 153-4; Yearley, 2000: 375-381). What CSS challenges is not 
simply the nonnative inadequacy of state or state sovereignty-the referent objects of 
traditional security studies. This means that although CSS does not ignore or challenge the 
material manifestations of the state and the military; it challenges their moral and practical 
status (Booth, 1997: 107). Furthermore, whereas TSS presents an unrealistic and partial 
(externally oriented) analysis of security practices, CSS aims to provide 'a fuller analysis of 
security practices and a (realistic) assessment of their dynamics and possible reorientation' 
(Williams, 1999: 342). Central claims of CSS can be summarized in six maxims (Krause, 
1998: 316-7): 
1. The principle actors in world politics-whether these are states or not-are social constructs, 
and products of complex historical processes that include social, political, material and 
ideational dimensions. 
2. These subjects are constituted (and reconstituted) through political practices that create 
shared social understandings; the process of constitution endows the subjects with identities 
and interests that are not given or unchanging but contingent. 
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3. World politics is not static and unchanging, and its structures are not deten-nining, since 
they are also ultimately social constructs. 
4. Our knowledge of the subjects, structures and practices of world politics is not objective, 
since the organization and explanation of the 'facts' of the world is a collective and social 
process involving observers and/or social actors. 
5. The appropriate methodology for the social sciences is not that of the natural sciences. 
Interpretive methods that examine actors' understandings of the organization of their social 
world, as well as the relationship between these understandings and the social structures and 
practices, in which they are embedded, are the central focus of research. 
6. The purpose of theory is not explanation and prediction, within a framework of 
transhistorical and generalizable casual claims but rather contextual understanding and 
practical knowledge. 
What is. a Security -Issue? - Developing the Theme of Security as Politics 
The goal behind investigating Turkish state security discourses and policies from a CSS 
perspective is 'to lay bare the political work of the signifier security, [and, critically, to ask 
questions such as]..., what it does, how it determines social relations' and in this regard 
further probe such questions as to 'how does a security story order social relations? What are 
the implications of politicizing an issue as a security problemT (Huysmans, 1998: 232-3). 
Consequently, the object of security and the corresponding concept of political order become 
keys for the present investigation. Such an inquiry seeks to render problematic and political 
what is mostly taken for granted, apolitical and static about state security. 
What is 'security' from a CSS perspective? First of all, security is a derivative concept or in 
other words 'security is what we make it' (Booth, 1997: 106; Bilgin et al., 1998: 140). 
Security is a concept that forms part of deeper assumptions about the nature of politics and the 
role of conflict in political life (Wyn Jones, 1999: 166). The major problematic of CSS is that 
security in itself is a less notion, which, to have any meaning 'necessarily presupposes 
something to be secured; as a realm of study it can not be self-referential' (Williams and 
Krause, 1997: ix). This is why CSS first investigates the political process through which 
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'threats' and 'appropriate responses' are constructed, and then searches for possibilities for 
overcoming 'security dilemmas' (Krause, 1998: 318; Williams, 2001: 34). Security discourses 
and policies do not come from a void but result from and represent the related historical 
processes, social and institutional power structures (Williams, 1997: 296-302; also see 
Foucault, 1989: 44-54). 
Security discourses and policies are clearly associated with the state and its institutions and 
CSS aims to engage in 'analytical and ethical debate about the state, a debate which has been 
remarkably absent from traditional discussions within security studies' (Williams, 1999: 342; 
Booth, 1997; Ayoob, 1997). However, the point is not simply to bring forward the historical 
centrality of the state and/or institutions of sovereignty in security discourses and practices 
(lipschutz, 1995: 8; Buzan, 1995). What is at stake is an understanding of how the state 
resolves the problem of political order through security discourses and practices (Williams 
and Krause, 1997: x; Dalby, 1997: 9-12; Williams, 1998b; Williams and Neuman, 2001: 372- 
74). CSS holds that security discourses and practices order social life in a particular way that 
is embedded in a technological/instrumental take on knowledge as power and a modem 
conception of politics (Dillon, 1996: 15). 
What makes something a 'security problem'? The securitization approach associated with the 
Copenhagen School claims that in naming a certain development a security problem, 'the 
state' can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the 
state and its elites. Consequently, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to 
be so (Waever, 1995: 54). Because of this very powerful ability power-holders can always 
utilize the instrument of securitization of an issue in order simply to have control over it. This 
way securitization can be a technique of intervention into politics as it becomes a device to 
'decide' on 'friends and enemy' (Williams, 2003). The ones occupying administrative 
positions can effectively use this method for their own (political) purposes. In this context, 
security is seen as a 'speech act'. As Waever says; 
In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the 
utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a 
promise, naming a ship). By uttering 'security, ' a state-representative moves a 
particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block it (Waever, 1995: 55). 
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Following these CSS premises, one can argue that the concept and practice of state security 
function as 'a specific principle of political method and practice directed explicitly to "the 
ensemble of population"' (Campbell, 1998: 201). It is within these parameters that certain 
security discourses and policies become able to frame normal politics by elevating certain 
policies to the level of 'extraordinary' or a 'prepolitical immediacy' (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). 
Such a political use of security offers tactical-political attractions for the state elites in that it 
helps render otherwise inappropriate state discourses and policies both acceptable and 
inexorable, while effectively discarding other democratic options (Waever, 1995). 
Furthermore, in so far as discourses are in part sources of subject positions (Foucault, 1989: 
44-54); security discourses can be seen as constitutive of political agents, practices and order 
(Dalby, 1990; 1997: 10; Dillon, 1996: 12-35). At issue then is 'the overall discursive fact that 
security is spoken about at all, the way in which it is put into political discourse and how it 
circulates throughout politics and other discourses' (Dillon, 1996: 14). 
According to this view of security, how an issue becomes a security threat is not necessarily 
an objective venture unproblematically undertaken by the state elites (Weaver, 1995). The 
reason for this is that an overemphasis upon 'urgency' and 'survivability" of the state security 
simply excludes the political notion of 'we' from that of the enemy or 'others' and generally 
does away with other processes in (democratic) politics (Waever, 1995: 51). State security 
generally provokes an image of 'survivability' and 'urgency' providing the state with the 
historical and legitimate right to resort if necessary to 'extraordinary means' for fighting 
against the threats to its sovereignty. As it is argued; 
If states acquire their identities qua security-seeking-provider agents, this would then 
mean to a large extent that it would potentially bypass the political order or procedures 
since it sees itself as dealing with a problem of utmost importance: the issue of 
$survival' of the state as state (sovereign, independent) (Buzan et al 1998: 57-58). 
In this regard, it is useful to recall that within TSS understanding, state security was related to 
a perception of survivability and the threats to security were deemed relevant only when they 
affect the survival of the basic political unit: the sovereign state (Waltz, 1979). The 
justification of this view was that if those threats to the state as the overarching 
political/sovereign unit are not dealt with, the state will disappear and with the possibility of 
addressing other political problems too (Buzan, 1991: 117). Contrary to this understanding, 
CSS argues that the concept of security is not lacking pre-assumptions, images, specific 
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meanings, connotations. In other words, 'security is neither objective (threats in themselves) 
nor subjective (a matter of perception), but intersubjective and political: who can securitize 
what with what effects' (Laustsen and Waever, 2000: 708). 
Therefore, it might be a better strategy to address the concept of security as a discursive 
political practice (Laustsen and Waever, 2000: 708). As opposed to its daily usage, the word 
6security' connotes a special effect of evoking the images of military threat-defense, state and 
intemational/national security. In this regard 'the exact definition and criteria of securitization 
is the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects' (Laustsen and Waever, 2000: 708). Because the state and states 
system are defined as the current dominant forms of political organization concerned with 
security and violence (Deudney, 1995: 87), security contrary to its 'daily' image is not a 
neutral concept, devoid of any pre-given meanings, images and connotations. Consequently, 
an abstract notion of security is hardly available. As Waever puts it: 
The problem is that, as concepts, neither individual security nor international security 
exists. National security, that is, the security of the state, is the name of an ongoing 
debate, a tradition, an established set of practices and, as such, the concept has a rather 
formalized referent; conversely, the 'security' of whomever/whatever is a very unclear 
idea. There is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of 'security' in non-state terms; 
it is only as a critical idea, played out against the concept and practices of state 
security, that other threats and referents have any meaning (Waever, 1995: 48, 
emphasis original). 
In short, labeling a particular issue a security issue renders it ultra-valid and urgent. It also 
activates a political reaction which makes the state actors mobilize 'extraordinary measures' 
to eradicate the challenging political tendencies (Waever, 1995: 48). In essence, securitization 
increases the intractability of the problems since it invokes an image of urgent threat-response 
dichotomy and militarizes mind-sets, 'hence 'allocating to the state an important role in 
addressing it' (Waever, 1995: 45). Consequently, security can be better understood both as 
inter-subjective, dependent and derivative concept. The conventional character of security is 
that it refers to a 'field of practice' where states threaten other states, disturb or challenge each 
others' sovereignty; impose their will on others and so on. In this context, military and state- 
centered security understandings might well lead to militarism and militarization of the 
politics, where the notion of survivability rather than negotiation, compromise, civil society, 
and meaningful social action prevails. Security may also refer to a specific practice that 
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constitutes a social reality (security field) via a set of codes, rules, norrns and common 
understandings and a specific discourse, which constructs a field or realm, having its own 
laws and agenda (Weaver, 1995). Indeed, as Gul Khattak argues 
References to national security suggest a broad and very powerful repertoire of 
meanings through which to convince a population both that its being and unity are 
threatened and that collective protection can be ensured (1996: 341, italics original). 
Since security is articulated within particular institutional spaces (Williams, 1997), the power- 
holders in a political system become eligible for elevating a particular political issue to the 
security level or realm. This way, they have the 'legitimate' right to mobilize all necessary 
means to handle the 'security problem' and prevent the 'negative' repercussions from the 
audience and thus protect their own privileged positions out of securitization process. This 
tactic can be best countered with a process of 'less security and more politics., As Waever 
argues, it is equally vital to grasp that; 
The language game of security is, in other words, a jus necessitates for threatened 
elites, and thi ,s 
it must remain... The problematique itself locks people into talking in 
terms of 'security, ' and this reinforces the hold of security on our thinking, even if our 
approach is a critical one (1995: 56-57). 
In regard to the case of Turkey's security governmentality, and within the general parameters 
of CSS, security hence will be viewed in an alternative way, that is, as an effective means of 
political intervention at the disposal of the 'despotic power' of state elites. The 'despotic 
power' designates 'the range of actions which the [state] elite is empowered to undertake 
without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups' (Mann, 1988: 5). It is 
precisely the political power of state security that helps the Turkish state elites to by-pass the 
routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society (Savvides, 2000). Specifically, for 
instance the primary institutional authority in Turkey that securitizes political issues is the 
National Security Council. As Chapter 2 will argue, the most notable securitizing actor in 
Turkey is the n-fflitary. 
In order to better delineate the role of the state in generating security discourses and practices 
that have significant domestic political resonance, the CSS understanding of security should - 
at least in the Turkish case-be supplemented by a theory that can conceptualize the many 
layers behind the concept of 'the state'. As argued, TSS employs an unhelpful view of 'the 
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state', which considers the state to be simply a reflection of sovereign authority (i. e. the office 
of Prime Minister or President) and hence risks marginalizing the active roles played by other 
non-democratic actors, processes, programs and strategies of power (such as the role of 
national security concept or securitization) that seek to regulate particular domains of 
individual and collective behavior (Miller and Rose, 1995: 592). In addition to CSS's more 
fruitful approach to security, Foucault's concept of governmentality can allow the students of 
state security to better understand unconventional security discourses and practices of the 
states. 
1.3. FOUCAULT'S CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENTALITY 
As mentioned earlier, Foucault coined the term sgovernmentality' in his later works (1991, 
2000), when he defined the state in terms of a triangle of 'sovereignty-discipline-govemment 
which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism as the 
apparatuses of security' (2000: 219). He characterized govemmentality as 'the conduct of 
conduct' meaning the activity to affect, modify, shape or direct the space of (human) conduct 
which embraces theý practices of individuals and other socio-political entities particularly 
concerning the relationship between those practices and government of political domain 
(Foucault, 2000: 218; Gordon, 1991: 2-3). The historical forms of government of human 
conduct are conceived as a changing phenomenon or more correctly as appearing in a process 
(Barry et al, 1996). The emergence in history of the problematic of government is traced back 
to the idea that government is 'the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a 
convenient end' (La Perriere, quoted in Foucault, 1991: 93). Foucault draws one's attention 
towards a shift in the objectification of government from that of territory/men to 'things. 
Indeed, this shift marks a turning point for the characterization of the subject of power in that 
the initial focus on the territory and its inhabitants (Machiavellian principality) and juridical 
understanding of sovereignty seems to be replaced by a concern with goveming 'things' 
(Foucault, 2000: 220). That 'things' surely involve human beings or 'men', but government, 
as Foucault argues, is more about 
[a] sort of complex composed of men and things ... but men in their relations, their 
links, their imbrications with those things that are wealth, resources, means of 
subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, customs, habits, ways of acting and 
thinking ... property and territory are merely one of its variables' (1991: 
92-3). 
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Basically, the governmentality approach tries to conceive the problem of state power from the 
perspective of diverse mechanisms and configurations of political rule (such as the Turkish 
National Security Council and national security concept) which cannot be easily categorized 
into philosophical and ideological compartmentalization (Bndess, 1996: 96-136; Barry et. al., 
1996). Foucault's work enables the analyst to delve into multiple and more complex 
operations and mechanisms of power between the rulers and the ruled than the discourses of 
right and obligation or 'legitimate consent' (lEndess, 1996: 106). His conception is helpful in 
distinguishing and analyzing different mentalities, practices and govemment rather than an 
understanding of modem states dominated solely by the discourses of light-obligation or 
'legitimate consent' (Hindess, 1997: 259). 
The governmentality approach does not accept uncritical descriptions of the state that as an 
authority that governs simply through the legitimacy of consensual agreement. Instead of 
viewing the modem state as a unified apparatus, govemmentality takes up a view of the state 
as a network of different institutions and practices. State power thus does not operate from a 
single source but from variegated procedures and techniques. For Foucault, 'The state is 
superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, 
the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth' (2001: 123). Govemmentality hence 
is introduced to address 'the "how" of power and microphysics of society' (Marsden, 1999: 
26). 
More specifically, Foucault's conception of government throws into question the traditional 
liberal, functionalist or Marxist views on the state (see Mann, 1988: 1-32). Instead of 
picturing government 'as the work of a sovereign power that is founded upon, and operates 
through, the consent of its subjects', Foucault describes it as something 'far more intimately 
involved in moulding the public and private behaviour-and even the personalities-of 
individuals than any conception of those individuals as citizens would allow' (Ilindess, 1996: 
131). The issue of government thus concerns the state and its activities not simply as the 
operations of making and enforcing laws by a sovereign power based on 'right and obligation' 
but in the context of specific rationalities of government (Barry et aL, 1996). 
Governmentality moves beyond conventional accounts of the state and politics which take for 
granted the unproblematic internal organization of the political apparatus and the legitimacy 
of sovereignty discourse. The government of society has its agencies which extend beyond the 
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state and its institutions to incorporate non-state contexts such as family and school and find 
expression in 'the pedagogical state' (Hunter, 1996: 149). Here, Foucault's vision enables one 
to extend the scope of the Weberian argument of the distinctive skills and specialized 
knowledge of the bureaucracy by making it possible for power to include non-bureaucratic 
forms of expertise such as accountancy and psychiatry (Hindess, 1996: 135-6). Such an 
understanding of governmental power also widen the scope of state activities beyond the 
classical legislature-executive model of government that reduces the finalities of political 
power to 'the maintenance of law and order within the collectivity and the securing of its 
boundaries against external encroachments' through 'binding-rule making' functions of states 
(Poggi, 1990: 14-5; Mann, 1988: 13). In addition, governmentality broadens the activities 
referred to as politics in relation to the state in a way that goes beyond the confines of 
orthodox Marxist or Leninist discourses of politics (Hunt, 1980: 11-6; Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 83-4) based upon 'hermetically sealed, wholly autonomous, pure economic 
phenomena' of a class-divided society most famously expressed in the metaphor of 'base and 
superstructure' (Hobson, 1997: 289; Mercer, 1980: 108). 
Instead of an exclusive concern with who possesses power in the state, the point is to see how 
the exercise, application and effects of state power in relation to people can account for -'how 
[this state power] circulates through the social body' (Joseph, 2004: 155). The operations of 
what is called 'bio-power' render health, sexuality, sumptuary laws and other regulatory 
mechanisms of life and the body as subjects of administration and management of 
populations. The task to analyze how the subjects within the states are governed today is not 
so much to dispense with the idea of 'the cold monster' of the state that strives to dominate or 
colonize the society but rather to consider 'the broader strategies of government within which 
the instrumentalities of the state are incorporated and deployed' (Hindess, 1996: 109). From 
this standpoint, it is not the state (considered as a distinctive institutional structure) that 
determines what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the 
private and so on' (Foucault, 1991: 91). Rather, the range of state actions is by specific 
rationalities of government (Hindess, 1996: 112). In other words, what is at issue is: 
How and in what ways, and to what extent the rationales, devices and authorities for 
the government of conduct in the multitude of bedrooms, factories, shopping malls, 
children's homes, kitchens, cinemas, operating theatres, classrooms and so on have 
become linked up to a 'political' apparatus? ... How did different political forces seek to 
programme these new domains? (Rose, 1996: 38) 
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Quite relevant for the case of Turkish state security is Foucault's discussion of the 
apparatuses of security within governmentality (2000: 221). At a basic level, the apparatuses 
of security 'include the use of standing annies' and their practices are neither understood as 
'instrumental' in terms of the functionalist tradition of state theory nor as being at the service 
of the executive authority, which simply heads and coordinates it (Mann, 1988: 2). Instead, 
the governmentality approach understands the apparatuses of security as trying to foster, 
optimize or discard 'the forces and capacities of living individuals' (Dean, 1999: 20). 
According to the governmentality approach, state power is activated not simply through the 
legal and political instruments of the sovereign-disciplinary state but also through the 
apparatuses of security in the context of attendant rationalities, identities and technologies of 
governing (Ilindess, 1996: 12-3; Dean, 1999: 23). In other words, govemmentality 
characterizes state power in such a way that governmental rationalities, identities and 
technologies together with apparatuses of security make possible 'the continual definition and 
redefinition of what is within the competence of the state' (Foucault, 2000: 221). 
Analytics of Governmentality 
An analytics, of governmentality is about distinguishing 'the particular mentalities, arts and 
regimes of government and administration' (Dean, 1991: 2). An 'analytics' of 
governmentality is used for distinguishing and analyzing particular mentalities, practices and 
government such as those pertaining to security regimes, programs and strategies. It strives to 
answer 'how we govern and are governed within different regimes' (Dean, 1999: 23). Political 
rationalities of government, for instance, are cast as more than ideologies 'constituting a part 
of the fabric of our ways of thinking about and acting upon one another and ourselves' (Barry 
et. al., 1996: 7). 
Instead of the uncritical renditions of the state provoked by the approaches such as that of 
TSS, the present project hence proposes an 'analytics of security governmentality'. This latter 
adds value in research terms because it enables one to examine the emergence, stabilization 
and change of the Turkish state security regimes, programs and strategies. The analysis falls 
upon Foucault's work on governmentality as well as the broader literature to explore the 
problem of the Turkish state security in the post-Cold War era. In developing this framework, 
Michel Dean's four-dimensional 'analytics of govemmentality' (visibility, rationality, 
technique, identity) provide a useful starting-point for exploring the relation between security 
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and politics in the Turkish case. Because Dean's four-dimensional model of governmentality 
(1991, ch. 1) is used to organize structurally the present project, its four components-visibility, 
technique, rationality and identity-need to be articulated. 
a. Visibility of Governmentality 
The first component in Dean's scheme is visibility. The visibility dimension denotes socio- 
historical contexts where state conduct and targets of state conduct are identified. This 
dimension strives to lay bare the matrix of relationship between state and society that appears 
to be problematic. An example of this would be the legal, political and institutional aspects of 
the Turkish state and military. The concept of visibility presupposes that the processes of 
governmentality is understood as regimes ofpractices, namely, organized ways in which we 
do such things as cure, care, relieve, punish, educate, and train (Foucault, 1991b). Visibility 
addresses different ways of doing (governing) in different times and places. 
b. Rationality of Governmentality 
The second component in the proposed analytical framework adopted from Dean is 
rationality. Rationality denotes the intelligibility of regimes of government and uncovers its 
intrinsic logic operating in specific programs or policies (such as Kernalist secularism and 
strong state rationality of reason of state). Rationality in other words is about purposive 
attempts to regulate, re/organize, institutional and personal spaces with a view to generating 
routines, rituals, and procedures which construct objects of selfhood and institutional- 
professional authorities. As Gordon argues, the 'rationality of government will thus mean a 
way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; 
what governing is; what or who is governed)' (1991: 3). The analysis of rationality of 
government aims not to track down ' "institutions", "theories", "ideology", but practices 
[which] possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and 
44reason... (Foucault, 1991b: 75). 
The governmental rationality or episteme stands for various forms of knowledge that 'arise 
from and inform the activity of governing' (Foucault, 2000: 201-222; Dean, 1999: 31). Such 
knowledge denotes not an abstract form but a set of programs or 'formulas of rule' to 
objectify, know, regulate and organize populations, institutions, persons and their conducts 
(Foucault, 2000: 217-22; Dean, 1995: 566; 1999: 32). The rationality of government 
designates 'a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government' 
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(Gordon, 1991: 3). 'Rationalities' and associated programs/formulas for governing 
populations might differ across time and place (Rabinow, 1984: 14-23). That is, there are 
processes of 'rationalization' which are 'open to investigation, without assuming any 
necessary overall coherence' (fEndess, 1996: 147). These rationalities might be culminating 
in a definite material form such as set of regulations or texts rather than simple ideological 
paradigms. 
In other words, historically contingent and multiple forms of rationality of government are at 
issue. Indeed, the term govem-mentality incorporates the task of defining a field of action for 
the political authorities. In this sense the term has a discursive aspect in the sense of 
suggesting that the targeted objects and boundaries need to be specified before the exercise of 
power. This linking between goveming and mentality (modes of thinking) indicates two 
things. First, there is a 'reciprocal constitution' of power techniques and forms of knowledge, 
and, second, because the exercise of power is rationalized; it is not possible to grasp 
technologies of power before analyzing political rationalities that underpin them (Lemke, 
2001: 191). The rationality of the conduct of govemment is in the plural and refers to a 
multiplicity of rationalities, different ways of thinking and defining purposes and employing 
knowledge (Dean, 1999: 11, emphasis added). This means that what gets manifested is any 
form of rationality regarding how to govem which therefore cannot be reduced to a single 
universal standard or 'specific rationalism of the West' (Dean, 1994: 78-9 1). 
In brief, such an intersection between governing and mentality entails the delineation of 
concepts, the specification of objects, borders and the provision of arguments and 
justification, on the one hand, and agencies, institutions, procedures and legal forms, on the 
other. In this manner, not only the objects and subjects of a political rationality are governed 
and but also the problems are addressed and certain strategies offered for solvingthandling 
problems (Lemke, 2001: 191). The relevant questions of this dimension can be: What forrns 
of knowledge, thought, expertise and rationality are employed for governing? How does 
thought envisage particular issues or problems as governable? How do the practices of 
government produce particular regimes of truth? 
c. Identity of Governmentality 
The relevance of identities, which are about the 'characteristic ways of forming subjects, 
selves, persons, actors or agents' emanates from the fact that the particular ways people live 
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become an object of governmental programmes and practices (Dean, 1999: 23). The practices 
of a state in this respect can take 'life-conduct of the ethically free subject' as 'the correlative 
object of its own suasive capacity' (Gordon, 1991: 5). This political interest in an otherwise 
private issue, namely 'life-conduct' is that individual life and its social environment are 
increasingly seen as conditions, instruments and components of state-strength particularly 
within the rationality of 'reason of state' (Foucault, 2000: 414-6). For the latter, the particular 
ways populations live might well become an object of the practices that can be put under the 
rubric of 'the political technology of individuals' (Foucault 2000: 415-7). 
The practices or programmes of government often seek to form both individual and collective 
identities through which governing operate. Emphasis is both on the governing bodies and the 
governed. This is so because one needs to address the question as to how particular agents 
come identify themselves with their duties, rights, statuses, capacities, personage and selfhood 
by presuming to know 'what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of 
individuals and collectivities', and this aspect of governmentality invites almost inevitably the 
questions of who/what one is or should be (Dean, 1999: 12). Governmental practices attempt 
to shape or affect public and private identities. By implication, some important questions thus 
cannot be. avoided: -How can individuals and collectives identify and be identified with certain 
groups and categories? How are rights and duties attributed, articulated, reformed, endorsed, 
enforced or constrained? What sort of expectations arises from those identifications? 
d. Techniques of Governmentality 
The regimes of government are much surrounded by their technical dimension which has to 
rely on the resources and capabilities of the ruling regime to maintain, transform and 
regenerate its fields of existence. To realize their ends, governments employ certain technical 
and technological devices together with the related instruments, mechanisms and institutions. 
The key issue in the context of the present project is to address those security related 
techniques and examine their effects on security governmentality, that is, on domestic politics. 
The main question to be taken up in Chapter 4 thus would be: What are the instruments, 
procedures, tactics, technologies, mechanisms and vocabularies in the exercise of authority 
and rule for the conduct of government? 
The relevance of the concept of governmentality for the present study is obvious for many 
reasons. Firstly, the scheme which outlines the four dimensions of governmentality will serve 
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as an analytical map that enables one to register how and what (through state discourses and 
practices) is done in the name of state security. Secondly, the governmentality approach 
places the people (governed) into the analysis and draws attention to specific processes 
through which some segments of society are cast out politically by the governing regime in 
power. In other words, questions of who governs and how and who are the governed and how 
they are influenced and participate-that is reproduce, resist and maintain-the practice and 
discourse of governmentality-are key. The issue is how dominant groups in society are 
positioned through legitimate or illegitimate means. In other words, the focus is to shed light 
on the distributions of power or the division between state and civil society and the mobile, 
changing and contingent assemblages of regimes of government (such as security 
governmentality). Thirdly, what is highlighted is the tension-the fluctuating and competitive 
venture-taking place between the state and society. These various dimensions allow one to 
examine specific, historically contingent state actions in relation to state elites as occurred in 
the socio-political crises in the period between the 1990s and 2000s. Lastly, the project 
addresses the question about the modes of participating and gaining access into the political 
arena and the ways into which different segments of society call the rulers to account. 
More - specifically, the framework - of governmentality adopted here is helpful for 
understanding Turkey's security practices for at least three main reasons. It enables security 
conceptions and institutions to connect with the multiple 'sites of emergence of technologies 
of rule and forms they assume' (Miller and Rose, 1995: 591). Secondly, it deals with different 
regimes of authority (such as the Turkish military) under which 'the ways in which the lives 
of the individuals are acted upon' (Miller and Rose, 1995: 591). Thirdly, the governmentality 
perspective goes beyond the ideological components to take into consideration the historically 
changing ways of governing to account for the changes introduced after the EU official 
candidacy. The aim is to bring forward the historical significance of 'invention, contestation, 
operationalization, transformation of the rationalized schemes, programmes, techniques and 
devices' (Miller and Rose, 1995: 592). For instance and (as Chapter 5 argues) the thesis 
explores Turkish secularization as a state-enforced project taken by the elites rather than as a 
historical process (Kadioglu, 2005). Such a view enables the researcher to see pressing 
problems such as the 'political Islamic threat' not as manifestations of some 'inner' or 
'hideous' 'Islamic threat' but rather as stemming in part from a specific political rationalities 
galvanized by state elites. 
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In brief, the study of Turkish state security is about discourses, political rationalities, 
identities, and institutions employed by the Turkish state elites (most notably the military) to 
sustain the status quo and eliminate or control certain political, religious, social, or even 
personal conducts. It is the socio-historical discourses/practices, rationalities, identities and 
techniques of state security that shape the 'solutions' proposed by the military-led state elites 
to such problems of contemporary political order as crisis of legitimacy, a yawning gap 
between the state and society marked by the increasing dominance of the public over private 
sphere and individual freedom. Hence, when seen from the lenses of CSS and 
governmentality, the discourses and practices of Turkish state security clearly appear to be 
functioning as a justification and political method of domestic control and repression by the 
historically salient assemblage of state elites. This is expected to be a valuable addition to 
both the governmentality literature as well as the critical security studies. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter argued that traditional theoretical approaches to the study of security do not 
clearly delineate the relationship between state security and domestic politics. This was an 
invitation to articulate. an alternative framework through which to explore this relationship, 
and moreover, exploring it by reference to the Turkish security politics since the mid-1990s. 
Most TSS approaches considered the relations between security and politics as given-both 
conceptually and theoretically-and as something independent of domestic politics. Two 
reasons can be identified as to why the TSS account of state security cannot be deemed 
satisfactory. Firstly, mainstream IR often conflates the question of security with other issue- 
areas having to do with military strategy, especially, external state defense or state-to-state 
war. Because this results in an exclusive emphasis upon military strategy, status quo and the 
state, there emerges an apolitical conceptualization of security upheld at the expense of other 
substantive issues of domestic politics and security associated with the very people within 
states, especially with their daily practices and discourses. Secondly, TSS cannot address the 
question as to how certain conceptions of security relate to domestic politics or how the 
military dimension of security can foul democratic politics and interfere with the political and 
personal conduct of the individual in the name of state security. The main argument of this 
project is that the relationship between state security and domestic politics in Turkey can be 
better understood by an alternative, critical approach, which combines the CSS perspective 
with Foucault's concept of state power as governmentality. 
43 
Because of its complexity, the Turkish state security discourses and practices call for a 
different conceptualization of 'the state' and 'state power' than those offered by the TSS 
literature. State security - especially in the Turkish case - is not properly captured by the 
conventional understandings of 'the state'. The conventional understanding does not capture 
state security effectively because it either reduces the notion of state power to a simple 
quantitative capability (as was the case with Waltz) or portrays this power, in a similarly 
oversimplified fashion, as one that reflects legitimate political rights stemming from a 
consent-based model of the state power. 
The chapter also argued that security should be understood as a derivative concept reflecting 
deeper assumptions about the nature of politics and the role of conflict in political life, a key 
assumption for CSS. CSS investigates political processes through which 'threats' and 
&responses' are constructed. Secondly, security discourses originate in and represent historical 
processes as well as diverse power structures. Such an understanding allows the researcher to 
understand how the state in part resolves the problem of political order through security 
discourses and practices. State security -thus becomes a political, method and practice 
-employed directly- for- the domestic government of the people. The securitization approach- 
which is a critical rather than a traditional one-plays a key role in supporting one of the main 
arguments of this project, namely, that state security is a political practice. By way of 
securitization, the state claims a special right of intervention into politics, and securitization 
becomes a device to 'decide' on 'friends and enemy' of the state. Within the parameters of 
security discourses and policies, state elites are able to circumvent the normal workings of 
politics by elevating certain policies to the level of 'extraordinary' or a 'prepolitical 
immediacy'. Such a use of state authority through securitization yields political means for the 
state elites by rendering undemocratic state discourses and policies acceptable, while 
discarding other democratic options. CSS argues that those supposedly apolitical security 
policies of states are not the by-products of immutable/objective threats to the state's physical 
survival but rather resulting from certain tangible/moral historical configurations of expertise, 
authority and specific institutional settings. 
The domination of the defense-militarist concept of security can be overcome by locating the 
discussion within the parameters of CSS and governmentality. Here, state security would be 
understood as an effect of a wider and complex power relations formed by ideas, identity, 
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institutions, and techniques. Turkish state security in this configuration stands for the ability 
of state elites to try to engineer certain rationalities, identities and techniques of governing 
that are facilitated by the relevant institutions of military, bureaucracy and politics. Once 
located within these parameters, state security comes to serve as a political asset for the 
accredited state elites, especially the military. State security thus becomes part of structure of 
interaction among socio-political actors concerning state discourses and practices. The current 
project thus enables us to better understand how security discourses and policies are 
constructed, contested and employed as politically effective by the state and powerful elites in 
their relation vis-ý-vis domestic society. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE VISIBILITY DIMENSIONS OF'SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY' 
The present chapter analyzes the visibility dimensions by analyzing the main contours of the 
historical, institutional, socio-political and legal sources of security governmentality in 
Turkey. The chapter first introduces security governmentality with a view to charting its basic 
contours. Secondly, it analyzes the historical, institutional, political and legal conditions under 
which security governmentality has been able to flourish. The chapter also identifies the 
major features and actors in security governmentality by locating them into their relevant 
social and historical settings. Such an undertaking serves two aims. First it helps us delineate 
the relevant historical-political context within which the sweeping canvas of national security 
has come to absorb democratic politics. Second, such an investigation also helps wrench the 
complexities of socio-political forces (such as political Islam) out of the parochial dismissal of 
these forces by the state as 'pre-modem' and 'irrational' security threats. 
Such an, investigation constitutes the first aspect of an 'analytics of government' in so far as 
the 'visibility' of govemmentality refers to 'the intrinsic logic or strategy of a regime of 
practices' (Dean, 1999: 22). In so doing, the chapter tries to understand the operational 
practices of governmentality or the 'characteristic forms of visibility, ways of seeing and 
perceiving' (Dean, 1999: 23). Overall, instead of reifying the perceived ahistorical and 
homogenous nature of societal dynamics as naturally and comfortably located out and against 
the Turkish state, the chapter examines 'how different locales and agents are [historically] 
connected with one another, what problems are to be solved, and what objectives are to be 
sought' (Dean, 1999: 30). 
2.1. SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY AS A DOMESTIC POLITICAL REGIME 
IN TURKEY 
Modem states often use security discourses for political purposes in order to convince their 
populations that the state is threatened by inter/national challengers to such an extent that 
&national security has very often been a conservative formulation equating the political status 
quo with desirable order' (Dalby, 1997: 10). 'State security' is one such discourse that is 
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invested in a repertoire of meanings at the disposal of the accredited state authorities (Khattak, 
1996). Aside from its role in constructing conventional distinctions of inside/outside, the 
discourses and practices of state security also produce advantageous rhetorical resources in 
political life (Kemal Pasha, 1996). One way of recognizing domestic political leverage of 
state security is to identify when security is rendered with protecting more than the narrow 
conception of external military defense of the territory so as to include protection of domestic 
'political order' (Williams and Krause, 1997: x; Andreas and Price, 2001: 35). In this case, 
security is burdened with 'essentially normative' and 'radically idealist' visions of modem 
state that is 'preoccupied with containing change within territorial boundaries and legal codes' 
(Walker, 1997: 62). 
In the Turkish case it is vital to note that the discourses and practices of security denote far 
more than conventional territorial/external defense and crucially include the protection of an 
idea and ideology of the state as the primary referent object of security (Muller, 1996: 177-8). 
Once designated as such, state security cannot but register certain segments of population as 
threatening such unconventional referent objects of security as 'secularism' (Cizre, 2003: 
216). From the second half of the 1990s onwards, the salience of security discourses and 
policies have granted certain state security institutions and conceptions a wide autonomy in 
Turkish politics, which has given rise to a fusion between state security and policy making. 
The most significant outcome of this process has been an enlarged political domain and 
ascending political profile for the Turkish military, which has since then resorted to an overtly 
politicized discourse and legitimized its various political involvements in the name of state 
security (Cizre, 2003). 
This increased political activism of the security institutions (i. e. the military) together with the 
attendant rationalities, identities and techniques have established a new style of governing or a 
regime of practice in Turkey, which is here called 'security governmentality'. Security 
governmentality can be defined as a regime of government and administration that is 
undertaken by the military-led state authorities and agencies, which employ certain forms of 
knowledge and an array of techniques that seek to shape political and private conduct 
through the identities, aspirations and beliefs of the citizenry. Specifically in the Turkish case, 
security governmentality refers to the techniques of the military, informed by the political 
rationalities of secularism and 'reason of state' for intervening in political and private 
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conduct. So construed, security governmentality is used here as a heuristic device to describe 
the defacto political regime that has been at work in the last decade, which has inhibited and 
sometimes cancelled out the workings of normal (democratic) politics. 
In general, the ebb and flow of Turkish state security discourses and practices shows two 
significant characteristics perpetuating security governmentality. Firstly, they demonstrate 
that a persistent and semi-reflexive urge to save the state against 'domestic political threats' 
has been entrenched within the discourses and practices of the state elites, who are mainly 
composed of the secularist military, state bureaucracies, and the mainstream media (Lowry, 
2000: 48). In this way and secondly, exerting such a non-democratic security-based control 
over certain political actors heralds relatively newer security functions of the state elites (as 
argued in Chapter 4 in relation to the military intervention in February 1997) (Cizre, 2003: 
216). These military functions concern, inter alia, an unconventional interventionist attitude 
into macro and micro realms of polity and society in the name of Turkish state security. 
Therefore, in the last decade it has become usual for the state security institutions such as the 
military and the National Security Council (one of the most influential institutions of 
decision-making in the country) to take on the 'domestic threats' supposedly, posed by the 
Islamists to the -'security of the secular state'. At the heart of the efforts of the military-led 
state elites is, as Yavuz argues, 
[a] quixotic quest to radically recast Turkish culture, history, and identity [that] has 
ensured a permanent kulturkampf against society, guaranteeing, ironically, Turkey's 
failure to make the transition to a Western-style liberal democracy (2000a: 34). 
By examining the prevailing parameters of security governmentality it is possible to pin down 
a new pattern of military involvement into politics that has departed considerably from the old 
patterns in two significant ways. Firstly especially since 1997, the military interventions into 
politics have been carried out and justified with recourse to the discourse of security of the 
secular state defined as the need to protect the state against the ideological and political 
challenges posed by the religious forces in society (Insel, 1997; Yavuz, 2000af Secondly, the 
military has taken up its guardian role in maintaining secularism to a point where it no longer 
served to protect secularism or 'the secular nature of the state' merely as part of the 
4 One recalls that a rather similar discourse of 'threats' to secular order was also employed against the ruling 
parties in the 1960 and later 1980 military coups. At these times, however, there hardly was a robust Islamic 
political movement, nor were the accused governments uch as the Democratic Party government Islamist or 
anti-secular (see Karpat, 1960; Demirel, 2003). 
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constitutional order but rather to reassert Kemalist secularism as a hegemonic 
political/ideological discourse against the challenges by the Islamic social periphery (Dagi, 
2005: 24,27). In this context, the state elites hold that the 'survival of the state' is in peril not 
because of external physical-military threat but rather because of an ideologically driven 
domestic socio-political movement acting under the rubric of political Islam that is allegedly 
bent on destroying 'the secular character of the Turkish state' (The NSC Decisions, 28 
February 1997, see Appendix 1). 
Indeed, since the mid-1990s the most visible socio-political 'domestic threat' in the state 
security discourse has been dubbed as the political Islamist movements (Insel, 1997; Yavuz, 
2000a). The ensuing confrontation has generated a stringent security logic and dynamic 
platform of conflict between the dissenting socio-political (Islamist) elites and the secularist 
state elites (i. e. the military) in Turkish politics (Insel, 2001; Laciner, 2004). It is in this milieu 
that the secularist state forces (the military, but also the mainstream media and a certain 
segment of civilian bureaucracy) have come to confront head-on the Islamist political parties 
and their demands for visibility in the public sphere such as the Refah Party government 
(1996-1997) and the incumbent ruling AK Party government. This way, the military-led state 
elites often claim that. there exists a Manichaean struggle against the onward march of. a 
'deluded' political Islam that is allegedly set to 'destroy' the secular nature of the state (Savas, 
2001b: 33-4). 
In all, security governmentality lays the groundwork for the range of military interventions 
into political and personal conduct quite extensively by manipulating state security discourses 
and practices. The military and other state elites have come to see their mission not simply as 
physical defense against foreign forces but ever more so against the domestic socio-political 
forces. Especially since the mid-1990s, the military has not failed to find channels for 
meddling into the 'ways of acting and living' of the individuals and collectivities (Salt, 1999; 
Yavuz, 2000b; Tank, 2002; Cizre, 2003). As argued in the subsequent chapters of the thesis, 
the military's newfound political activism can best be couched in the complex workings of 
security govemmentality. As mentioned, govemmentality can be understood through 
examining its dimensions of visibility, rationality, technique and identity (Dean, 1999: Ch. 1). 
The section below tries to establish the visibility dimension of security govemmentality with a 
view to finding out its historical, institutional-political, social and legal aspects that have 
helped constitute security govemmentality. 
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2.2. HISTORICAL ASPECTS 
Especially since the mid-1990s, Turkey's exclusionary discourses and practices of state 
security rendered the ethno-cultural demands of the population as 'security threats'. The 
reasons for such securitizations can mainly be traced back to the process of development of 
modem Turkish state (Heper, 1992b; Sozen and Shaw, 2003; Jacoby, 2004). More often than 
not, Turkey's puzzling state-society relations are attributed to the brazen transformation 
process the country underwent from a largely multicultural, multilingual and non-secular 
imperial setting into a secularist, nationalist, republican and homogenizing socio-political 
setting (Ozdemir and Frank, 2000: 6). Indeed, the effects of this transformation figured 
prominently in the politics of the late Ottoman modernization and establishment of the 
Republic (Yegen, 1999a; Jung and Piccoli, 2001). In this process, the state and society 
confrontation bore the brunt of a persistent political tension between the need to liberalize the 
regime and to maintain the security of the state (Aydinli, 2003: 210-12). In other words, the 
historical attempts to open up to the masses or democratize the political regime were often 
curtailed arid/or accompanied by a belligerent set of domestics and international security 
problems, -which, in: tum, aggravated the state concerns over regime security (Aydinli, 2003: 
210-12; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 83-106). 
Here a particularly potent source of the historical tension between liberty and security can be 
traced back to the violent dismemberment of late Ottoman Empire at the hands of victorious 
European powers after the First World War. This particular tension finds its expression in the 
'Sevres Syndrome' referring to the overzealous concerns over the idea of national unity and 
the territorial integrity of the state against internal and international conspirators (Jung and 
Piccoli, 2000: 94; Candar, 2000: 141-2). It is often argued that the 'Sevres Treaty' imposed by 
the Western powers with the 'goal to divide the country continues to weigh heavily in the 
common memories of the Turkish state and society' (Aydinli, 2003: 223). Indeed, between 
the French Revolution and the early twentieth century, the Ottoman-Turkish state faced 
threats to its security due to the developing, aggressive and divisive nationalisms and 
European imperial expansion (Zurcher, 1997: 23-32). Consequently, as the former advisor to 
the President Turgut Ozal and pre-eminent journalist Cengiz Candar argued: 
The republic that replaced the Ottoman Empire after the World War I was 'security 
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oriented'. Founders of the republic were, after all, the top military brass and civil 
servants of the Ottoman state, which had experienced steady territorial losses for more 
than a century. The distrust for outsiders stemmed from that Ottoman experience and 
was deeply embedded in the ruling elite of the new state (2000: 123). 
In addition to war against the European powers, following its independence the newly 
established Turkish Republic had to fight on another front for the rise and maintenance of the 
nation-state against the internal ethnic and Islamic oriented resistance groups (Tokluoglu and 
Hunt, 2002). Here an important example was that of the Kurdish-Islamist Sheikh Said 
Rebellion against the Kernalist regime in 1925. The latter proved to be a symbol of fanaticism 
that had to be suppressed by the state elites and a means for naming 'most serious subsequent 
opposition to government policies ... [and] ... the disaffected groups [as] traitors' (Olson, 1991: 
158-60). Since the establishment of the Republic, this double security predicament eventually 
led to a persistent reactionary stance on the part of the state elites against the domestic and 
international critics of the state (Candar, 2000: 140-2). Although this antagonistic national 
international political environment did not lead the state elites to give up on their 
Europeanization reforms, the logic was still tied down to the security of the state. This double 
predicament notwithstanding, the survival of the state was believed to lie in a full-fledged 
modernization process, which was to radically transform an ailing traditional society. Tq save 
the state, the Ottoman-Turkish state attempted to reform its legal, educational, and economic 
structures from the 1830s to 1870s under the banner of Tanzimat (Shaw, 1997: 55-172; 
Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3). In other words, the state's 'urge to modemize-that is, 
Westemize-was more a pragmatic effort to secure the survival of the state than an ideological 
posture' (Candar, 2000: 123). Hence, in the era between the Young Turk Revolution (1908) 
and the Democrat Party governments (1950-60) Turkey witnessed considerable efforts for 
secularization and nationalization of the state and society at least partly in the name of 'saving 
the state' (Karpat, 1982: 465-77; Berkes, 1998: 479-503; Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3). 
The ensuing insecurity perception has come to inform the activities of the state elites in the 
1990s and 2000s (Drorian, 2004: 2). This ultimately gave way to a 'national security 
syndrome' that gripped the state elites, who were occupied with internal as well as external 
'security threats' (for example see Savas, 2001 a; Ilhan, 2002; Yucel, 2002; Yazicioglu, 2004). 
In their power struggle against domestic socio-political dissenters, it was this existential 
insecurity problem that fed into the activities of the military-led state elites and helped 
constitute their justifying discourses and practices (Candar, 2000: 140-2; Insel, 2001: 8-13; 
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Aydinli, 2003). From the 1960s until early 1990s (against the backdrop of entry into NATO, 
rapid industrial expansion, urban migration, application for a full membership into the EU and 
the Kurdish problem) Turkey endured three military interventions in 1960,1971 and 1980 all 
in the name of security of the (Kemalist ideology and values of) the state (Tachau and Heper, 
1983: 17-33; Heper, 1992b; Jacoby, 2004: 127-164). Consequently, from the late Ottoman 
modernization to the contemporary EU membership struggle; there has been a marked 
obsession on the part of the state elites with state security. The latter helped shape state action 
in its relations with domestic and international world (Aydinli, 2003: 209-212; Jenkins, 
2001b: 272). Thus unsurprisingly, the pendulum between civil liberties and state security in 
Turkey has generally swung in favor of the latter (Mardin, 1969; Heper, 1991; Cizre 2003). 
2.3. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL 
CULTURE 
It seems possible to assume that certain institutions acquire 'pivotal positions in the society' 
and that 'power accrues to positions within institutions that had become dominant' such as the 
military and the executive (C. Wright Mills quoted in Seligman, 1973: 304). The mi-litary is a 
particularly pertinent institution, where 'the specialists on- violence are the most powerful 
group in society' (Lasswell, 1941: 455). As indicated earlier, the major agent and protagonist 
of security governmentality in Turkey is the military. The politically high-profile of the 
military is often attributed to its 'non-political' social and legal positioning in the system, 
which places the military as being 'above' the confines of daily politics (Cizre-Sakalliogiu, 
1997). Indeed, the military has long internalized a guardian and vanguard role to ward off any 
'threat' to its Kernalist ideology such as its secularist rationality (Bayramoglu et al., 2004: 7- 
12). Yet as will be argued in Chapter 4, since 1997 the military has embarked upon a 
newfound route that has increased its involved in the daily politics of the state (Insel, 1997; 
2001; Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b; Jenkins, 2001; Cizre, 2003; Jacoby, 2004). As shown below, 
through the legal and institutional capacity given by an all-encompassing national security 
concept and the NSC; the mflitary has been able to define and respond upon the domestic 
security threats (Cizre, 2003). In short, the military has effectively called the shots in Turkish 
politics (Doxey, 1997: 12). How can this political activism of the military be understood? 
Understanding the military's paramount influence and the fusion between democratic politics 
and state security necessitate charting the role of the military in society and polity. In general, 
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the nature of Turkey's contemporary civil-military relations exhibit two main features. First, 
the military's acceptance of civilian authority makes it necessary to disguise its political 
weight and/or legitimize its overt political interventions. To these aims, the military gradually 
expanded its institutional functions and acquired legal and constitutional powers to the point 
that some of its functions are even assumed as of 'social engineering' such as surveillance of 
the civil activities, dress codes, and belief orientations (Insel, 2001: 13). Second, the military 
as an institution became politically autonomous mainly because 'the ultimate justification for 
the military's political predominance rests on its [institutionalized and legalized] 
"guardianship of the national interest, "' (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997: 154). As argued by Umit 
Cizre, a leading expert on civil-military relations in Turkey: 
Since 1983 the military has used legal/constitutional, historical/cultural, and structural 
reasons and mechanisms to retain its privileged position in issuing demands, policy 
suggestions, and warnings on political matters. It has done so at the expense of 
nonmilitary groups, such as the left, youth, the retired, women, the unemployed, and 
intellectuals, whose views carTy less weight (1997: 153). 
What are the institutional-political cultural sources of the military's influence in contemporary 
Turkish politics7 
Political Culture of a 'Rationalist Democracy' 
The legal and political emphasis on Turkey's 'concentrated rather than diffused state values 
and norms' breeds two kinds of actors in the political drama: the state elites and political 
elites (Heper, 1992b: 148-150). In other words, the political elites represent the 'horizontal' 
dimension by comprising the elected representatives of the political parties who are inclined 
to protect the socio-economic rights and needs of their constituencies. The state elites in the 
military and civilian bureaucracy represent the 'vertical' dimension, meaning that the state 
elites are primarily responsible for 'the security of the state' against the 'misuses' of the 
particularistic interests of the 'intermediary structures' (Heper, 1992b: 147). These appointed 
state elites act in a 'bureaucratic ruling tradition' (Akyaz, 2002: 23). They are the 
modernizing agents, guardians and 'true servants' of the state, its ideology and public-national 
interest (Heper, 1984: 80; Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 108-20). They act to protect the 'vital 
matters' at the expense of any other (democratic) political and administrative procedure 
(Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 111). Modelled on the lines of French grandes ecoles and largely 
isolated from the social groups by way of exclusive education in institutions such as the 
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Military Academies and the School of Political Science, the state elites are exposed to 
Kernalist indoctrination which means that nationalism, republicanism and secularism become 
'articles of faith' (Zurcher, 2004: 102-3). 
The party political fragmentation and polarization contribute further to the negative impact of 
the n-fflitary-led state elite's notion of democratic political regime. The latter for the military 
was not conceived as a specific political regime boldly demanded by the rising social groups 
(for instance, Moore, 1966) or as a system of rule through which various particularistic 
interests could be negotiated and reconciled (Heper, 1992b: 146). Instead, the state policy of 
westernization incorporated an understanding of democracy as 'adopted' by conscious 
decisions of the state elites (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 17-33; Cizre, 1999: 61). Therefore, for 
the Turkish military a 'viable democracy' does not denote 'a debilitating pluralist conception 
of democracy' but refers to 'a rationalist understanding of democracy' (Heper, 1992b: 147, 
emphasis added). Hence whenever the chronic political instability coincides with rising 
religious and/or ethnic awakenings in the society that challenges the basic principles of the 
Kemalist official ideology such as secularism, the discourses and practices of state security is 
employed by the military against the actions of the Islamist political elites. When such- 
concerns over state security are voiced by the military in public or private then the ability of 
the incumbent governments to operate within a more liberal political order or security is 
plagued (Yavuz, 2000b; Yucel, 2002; Bilgin, 2005). One significant result of rationalist 
democracy has been the demarcation of state politics from formal electoral politics played out 
by political parties and political elites. 
Demarcation of State Politics and Electoral Politics 
A competitive politics operates in Turkey based upon a parliamentary democracy since 1950. 
Turkish politics has generally been characterized as 'party-directed' and 'network politics' 
(Carkoglu, 2004). The latter functions as a medium for transferring state resources to party 
supporters in a 'patron-client' pattern (Ayata, 1996; Sozen and Shaw, 2003). Although Turkey 
has been ordinarily described as a competitive 'electoral parliamentary democracy' or as an 
'established democracy' (Heper, 1992b; Stepan and Anderson, 2004), in general when 
dissenting societal demands challenge the Kernalist state ideologies of secularism and 
nationalism, they are mainly not recognized as legitimate voices to be heard (Salt, 1999: 72-8; 
Yavuz, 2000a: 33). 11istorically, the rural populace considered the state elites and political 
class not necessarily as guarantors of their well-being and security; on the contrary, the very 
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word 'siyaset' (politics) retained a negative connotation for centuries. In the words Serif 
Mardin: 
[t1he modem Turkish word siyaset still retained the grim connotation of its earlier 
meaning under Ottoman rule, where it was in official parlance also a synonym for a 
death sentence imposed for reasons of state (quoted in Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 26). 
Specifically through the post-military coup constitutions of 1961,1971 and 1982, the military 
was able to give rise to a 'double-headed' or 'dual-track' political system (see Shambayati, 
2004). That is, certain state institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Turkish Radio 
and Television, and the universities were created as 'constitutional institutions', which could 
autonomously engender 'an enlightened public opinion' against 'irresponsible politicians' and 
'the excesses of the majority' (Heper, 1992b: 162). In other words, the above mentioned 
duality of roles by the state elites and political elites helped create a system of government in 
which 'the civilian council of ministers coexisted with the national security council on the 
executive level' (Cizre, 1997: 157). Uter, following the 1980 military coup, a new system of 
criminal courts called 'State Security Courts' were introduced, which contained a military 
judge -along with the civilian judges in its hearings. State Security Courts tried 'the cases 
involving the security of the state' by which 'the military system of justicer continued-to 
operate independently alongside the civilian system' (Cizre, 1997: 157). 
To underline this demarcation institutionally and preserve 'the matter of state' against the 
6vulgar' daily politics, other legal-constitutional instruments were also introduced. More 
specifically, after the 1960 military coup a new constitution delivered further legal powers 
and delineated overt institutional spaces for the defacto demarcation between daily politics 
and the state (affairs). The 1961 constitution brought in 'the authorized agencies' such as the 
NSC that were expected to exert supervision over the general political process and even the 
parliament itself. After the 1980 coup, the constitution was largely *rewritten to establish this 
demarcation. According to the 1982 Constitution, another politically unaccountable state 
actor, the President joined in these 'authorized agencies' to supervise the political decisions 
by the sheer existence of his veto power on the governmental decisions. These non-political 
but constitutionally authorized 'supervising' institutions also included Higher Education 
Council (YOK) (Heper, 1992b: 162). The latter was particularly influential not only to 
scrutinize 'the legal validity of administrative decisions and parliamentary acts' but also 
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[t]o test the political and administrative desirability of the said [politically reached] 
decisions and acts. And these tribunals, on the whole sympathetic to the views of the 
bureaucratic elites, did not always make their decisions in an impartial manner' 
(Heper, 1990: 232). 
Amogst the state elites, the most notable aspect in the visibility of security govemmentality 
concerns the political and ideological position of the military. The role of the military in 
articulating a particular security discourse is more effectively cast than other relevant state 
institutions. The former is mainly because of the historical, institutional and legal implications 
of the political culture. The Turkish modernization project was launched by and through the 
military elites that foresaw the production of a new social identity (secular, western, national, 
modem) as a necessary step to be enforced. The military was involved in this enforcement 
process from its inception as the main 'vanguard' and 'guardian' of the 'modernization- 
project' and secular identity (Tachau and Heper, 1983; Heper and Aylin, 1996; Sen, 1997; 
Cizre, 2004). In fact, this was in line with many other modernizing militaries. As Krause 
argues; 
[m]odemization was not only in the 'fonns of civil-military relations, patterns and 
norms'of military recruitment and education, claims on economic'and social resources 
-that had. been under reconstruction but --also in the very options between various 
aspects of concepts of security as to who or what constitutes the threat and how to 
handle it (Krause, 1998: 135). 
The Turkish military is the 'ultimate locus of the idea of the state' (Heper, 1992b: 147). It 
represents itself as 'the guardian of the republic' (Cizre, 1999: 67-79). It operates as a 'total 
institution' in seclusion from both social and political elites (Birand, 1986: 140). Despite its 
institutional and social seclusion, the military is closely associated with domestic politics and 
intervenes into politics on the grounds that it has the role to firmly defend the priority of the 
Kernalist state principles against any domestic socio-political dissenters (Tachau and Heper, 
1983: 17-33; Lowry, 2000: 41; Kinzer, 2001: 165; Jenkins, 2001: 45). 
Because of the military's formal commitment to parliamentary democracy and quick returns 
to the civilian rule after its interventions of 1960,1971, and 1980; Turkish civil-military 
relations have generally been presented as relatively milder versions of the general typologies 
in the literature of civil-military relations (Finer, 1962/2003: 38; Nordlinger, 1977: 21-9; 
Tachau and Heper, 1983: 17-33; Interview with Prof. Metin Heper, University of 
Birmingham, 26 September 2003). Whatever their type, however, these coups together with 
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the post-modem coup in 1997 (see Chapter 4) clearly exemplify the overt influence of the 
n-fflitary over nonnal politics (Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b; Cizre, 2003; 2004). 
Institutional Autonomy of Turkish Military 
In addition to its historical and social setting; the military has possessed a certain degree of 
political, administrative, judiciary, and financial autonomy in security governmentality 
(Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997). The status of the chief of the general staff in the hierarchy of state 
bureaucracy clearly shows the powerful positioning of the military: Article 117 of the 1982 
constitution renders him responsible only to the prime minister rather than the defense 
minister as the latter would be the case in a liberal democratic political order (Dikmejian, 
1982; Diamond and Plattner, 1996). Moreover, another sign of military's political weight can 
be found in the separation between the jurisdiction of civilian courts and jurisdiction of the 
military criminal courts (Military Court of Appeal and Supreme Military Council) to such an 
extent that 'military prosecutors can issue warrants for civilians involved in unlawful acts that 
concern the military' (Ozcan, 2002: 20). The military has jealously guarded its institutional 
autonomy. Whenever its high status was disputed by the politicians, the general staff 
expressed its disapproval of such criticisms (for instance, Cumhuriyer, I May 1992,2). 
As argued in greater detail in below section 2.5, the 'guardianship' role of the military in the 
state structure and its position in society as the 'most trusted institution' is also shored up by a 
formal legal basis. This includes Article 35 of the Internal Services Act of 1961, which 
establishes that 'the duty of the armed forces is to safeguard and defend Turkish territory and 
the Republic of Turkey as designated by constitution', whereas Article 85 of the Internal 
Service Regulations asserts that the 'Turkish armed forces shall defend the country against 
internal as well as external threats, if necessary by force'. Despite the fact that constitutional 
and national laws change, the issue of 'protection of the republic against both external and 
internal enemies remains the essential role of the armed forces' (Tank, 2002: 220). 
Therefore, the military as an institution plays a vital role in Turkish politics especially in 
matters that are deemed within the domain of state security. The ever-extensive definition of 
the latter has been the exclusive preserve of the military (Ozcan, 2002). The significant 
political role of the military also derives from the Turkish administrative and political culture 
(Sozen and Shaw, 2003). The latter represents the characteristics of a 'strong state' (Heper, 
1992; 1993). Starting as earlier as the 1924 Constitution, the 'strong state' meant that the 
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&state interests' have always enjoyed priority over societal interests. Although the latter 
articulated that sovereignty belonged to the nation (Earle, 1925: 94) the military and the 
bureaucratic elites did not interpret sovereignty as 'popular sovereignty', which would put 
forward the sectional, individual or group interest of the people rather than the general, 
collective national interest of the state at the forefront of politics (Heper, 1992; 1993; 2000). 
As Heper argues (1990: 322) 
This meant that in the view of the military and the bureaucratic elites a search for 
'what was best for the country' was far more important than the reconciliation of 
interest groups... The ensuing conflict between the bureaucratic and the political elite 
was a consequence of, and in turn, contributed to the continuing salience of cultural 
rather than functional cleavages. The political elites were preoccupied in demarcation 
of their territory ('politics') as distinct from that of the bureaucratic elites ('the matter 
of state'). 
Fragmented Political Party System 
The Turkish political culture, in particular its party system, also provided the military with a 
fertile ground to exert its influence over domestic and foreign policies. Having weak ties with 
their constituency over the years, the top-down oriented elitist and undemocratic internal 
parties mostly declined to pay heed to the demands of a more democratic and inclusive 
politics (Cizre, 1999: 15-28). This has bred a perception and practice of politics as an elite- 
driven bargain process of getting access to material rewards (Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 108-20). 
This view in turn implanted a narrow or procedural perception and conception of political 
process in that politics became a function of a patrimonial or patron-client structure of power 
(Keyman, 1999). This structure of political parties is largely reminiscent of a 'cartel party' 
that sides with the state as it swings away from the public demands (Cizre, 1999: 20). As 
Jenkins summarizes: 
Political parties tend to resemble clans rather than institutionalized organizations and 
form around charismatic individuals rather than ideological conviction or common 
goals. Advancement within the party is invariably the reward for royalty to the leader 
rather than ability. Dissenters are faced with the choice between obscurity and 
resignation. Under the current political parties law, party leaders are able to appoint 
not only candidates for general elections but also the delegates to the party congresses 
which elect the party leaders. The result is a collection of self-perpetuating autocracies 
and oligarchies rather than democratic institutions (2001: 14-5). 
Unable to carry the interests and opinions of the masses to the political stage, the political 
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class in Turkey have instead largely sided with and conformed to the state interests set almost 
exclusively by the military dominated state elites (Bayramoglu, 2001: 17). Turkish political 
elites have thus often appeared 'legitimist' vis-ý-vis state elites, especially the military (Insel, 
2003). This form of political culture has in turn helped the military to control politics. The 
role the military played in politics was also enabled in part because some political elites and 
civil society groups encouraged and even invited the military to reign in whenever cultural- 
ideological cleavages, extremist sectarianism, rightist and leftist movements terrorized the 
society and destabilized the political system, this is so, as Jenkins stresses, mainly because the 
[v]ast majority of Turkey's politicians are still products of a social and cultural 
environment which sees the military as embodying the highest virtues of the nation. In 
addition to any practical considerations, such as the possibility of a coup or a loss of 
public support, it is also very difficult psychologically for most Turkish politicians to 
challenge the authority of the military (Jenkins, 2001: 52). 
The effect of this political culture is the daunting failure of the politicians to curtail the 
immense power hold of the military in the country's political system. In other words, a 
supposedly non-political agent, namely the military has been able to take hold of the political 
decision-making process (Insel, 1997). However, after its 1980 intervention into politics, the 
military pursued an indirect rather than overt influence over Turkish politics (Insel, 2001). As 
argued in Chapter 4, the military exerted its influence over society and polity not through a 
military coup but by devising a new constitution (the 1982 Constitution) and by establishing 
related institutional arrangements such as the National Security Council and the National 
Security Policy Document (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997). 
Consequenty, the political system has been largely swamped by the institutionalized security- 
related anxieties and policies of the military dominated state elites, whose views could be 
summarized as 'saving the state against the internal and external challengers' (Jenkins, 2001: 
57-83; Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3). 'Saving the state' here meant preserving the 'nature of 
the state' referring to basic components of the Kernalist state ideology most notably 
secularism as explained in Chapter 3. This interest in saving the state did not always yield a 
crude military domination over the policy-making structure. That is, even the direct 
interventions of the military were not aimed at carving out a manifestly authoritarian-n-tilitary 
regime or supporting a particular political leaning but rather at preserving the status quo with 
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a commitment to the parliamentary democracy and capitalist economy (Jacoby, 2003). As 
Heper stressed: 
[r]emaining true to its guardianship tradition, the military in Turkey has always 
permitted civilian rule, but kept it under tutelage by using intermittent, direct 
interventions whenever the party 'logic' departed from the spirit of the Ataturk 
revolution (1979/80: 103). 
Viewed within this context, then, the political weight, public mandate and high social status of 
the military should not come as a surprise. That is, when the military finds itself operating 
within such helping historical and social conditions, it is little wonder how it comes to inhabit 
such a prominent place in the political life of the country. 
2.4. SOCIAL ASPECTS 
One of the obstacles that prevents Turkish politics from fully adopting itself to a more 
inclusive pluralist democratic arena is related to the effects of the socio-political dynamics in 
the country.. As mentioned, the latter carries a historical baggage of the strong state tradition 
and. fragmented party politics to the pxtent. that the most obvious characteristics of Turkish 
politics in the 1990s have been those of fragmentation and polarization (Tachau, 2000; Sozen 
and Shaw, 2003). The relevance and importance of these recurring political-cultural trends to 
the present study is noteworthy: the near total absence of a public and political outcry over the 
military's interference into Turkish politics is a feature that helps perpetuate the real policy 
objectives of the state elites in security govemmentality. 
How can we make sense of this lack of public-political outcry over the military's interference 
into politics? Despite all the rhetoric deployed to stress otherwise, it is possible to discern a 
marked continuity between the Ottoman and the Turkish state power structures and elite 
habitus (Heper, 2000; Jung and Piccoli, 2001; Jacoby, 2004). The Ottoman 
patrimonial/patemalistic state tradition was continued in shape by the new Republican 
Kernalist state elites (Mardin, 1973: 200; Ozbudun, 1994: 192; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 30). 
That is, the absence of large landlords or economically powerful bourgeoisie, for instance, left 
first the Ottoman state bureaucracy and after 1923 the modem nationalist bureaucracy 
relatively independent of social pressure or challenges (Mardin, 1973: 199-200; Gulalp, 
1997b). The social segments could not find necessary political mediums for pressurizing the 
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ruling nationalist and bureaucratic elites to recognize and materialize their civil and political 
rights (Heper, 1992b). 
More specifically, at the state level the political weight of the Mama (clergy) began to decline 
during the westemizing period of the Ottoman Empire, but it was the final dismemberment of 
this class from the state by the new Republican elite that made a substantial difference in the 
political regime and the power structure of the new Turkish state (Mardin, 1971; 1990 Hunt 
and Tokluoglu, 2002). Victorious finally over the Ulania, secularist forces and civil 
bureaucracy captured the state and filled its key institutions, in particular the military. The 
overwhelmingly authoritarian history of the single-party government (1923-1950) under the 
Republican Peoples' Party (RPP/CHP), which was almost exclusively established by the 
Republican state elite, is a clear testimony to this process (Zurcher, 2004). 
When this socio-historical legacy overlapped with the Turkish top-down modernization 
process, a state security-oriented elitist outlook was bestowed on the political structure 
(Keyder, 1997: 86). Turkey's modernizing officials believed that they had a duty to instigate a 
top-down transformation of society (Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004). In this process; politics has 
come to -be' seen by the state elites not a process of meeting or accommodating diverse group 
demands but as a normative engagement in search of the 'right' for the entire 'egalitarian' 
society (Heper, 1984: 96; Keyman, 1999: 112). As mentioned, the RPP governments between 
1923 and 1950 were exemplary in conforming to this 'rationalist' democracy and the politics 
of modernization. Since then, multi-party democracy has both curtailed down the heavy-hand 
of authoritarian modernization and broadened political participation; but military coups were 
periodically undertaken to correct perceived deviations from the logic of 'rationalist 
democracy'. 
According to the state elites, political elites tend to overlook the lofty and sacred interests of 
the Republican state as against the petty interests of their groupings and their diverse demands 
to attract more votes and guarantee political office. This generated a yawning gap with 
general societal elements, which hindered social demands to be incorporated by the political 
centre and thus largely emptied the existing political space from civic involvement (Yavuz, 
2000a: 33). The state elites have become largely unresponsive to the changing social 
demands. Consequently, as Yishoi succinctly argued: 
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A tradition which assumes the existence, primacy, autonomy and sovereignty of the 
state has evolved militating against liberal democracy. The Turkish state was able to 
frustrate the development of civil society by placing an emphasis on the long-term 
interests of the community at the expense of sectional interests. The upshot was a 
monist polity, where the bureaucratic elites dominated the polity (1998: 158). 
As argued in Chapter 3, one pertinent dimension of rationality in security governmentality has 
been the 'reason of state' a by-product of an 'extremely strong state tradition' in the Turkish 
political system (Heper, 1992a; 2000; Sozen and Shaw, 2003). The latter embodies respect for 
authority and other social conformity patterns that have been closely observed in modem 
Turkey, something which 'makes the task of the government in Turkey much easier' (Frye, 
1957: 186). Historically, social segments suffer from lack of autonomous intermediary 
political mediums (interest groups and/or civil society) for pressurizing the ruling nationalist 
and bureaucratic elites to recognize and materialize their civil and political rights (Mardin, 
1969: 265). Such a view of the state is perpetuated by the near absence of powerful or 
autonomous civil society or interest groups (Mardin, 1990: 33-4). This is not to suggest that 
the state has been omnipotent vis-A-vis the civil society or that the societal forces have been 
historically non-existent or powerless all the way down (see Ozdek, 2005). It is rather to point 
out that civil society could not develop in line with its western counterparts, that is, powerful 
enough so as to struggle to secure its interests from the state and/or to represent a real 
alternative to the state policies (Mardin, 1990: 21-34). As Jenkins emphasizes, 
Turkish society tends to be hierarchical, patriarchal and authoritarian, with an 
emphasis on collective rather than individual rights and values. The result is a society 
which is both more cohesive and more restrictive than those in Western democracies. 
But both the cohesion and the restrictions owe more to traditional values and social 
pressure than to legislation ... Pluralism, whether personal or political, is often viewed 
with suspicion as posing a potential threat to social and national cohesion. Turkish 
children are taught that "one of the elements that makes the Turkish nation is the 
subordination of the individual's own interest to those of the nation"... Schoolchildren 
are told: "Every Turkish citizen is a willing, fearless soldier in our army which 
protects the independence and integrity of the country ... Our army is the symbol of our 
national unity and the guarantee of our future, which fulfils its duty to the letter" 
(2001: 11-3). 
It has been argued that a chief reason for the relative weakness of the civil society is a 
historically attained detachment between the centre and periphery in the Ottoman and Turkish 
socio-political system (Mardin, 1990: 35-77). Ottoman-Turkish political development showed 
a particular trend that differed from the European 'state societies' where the state developed 
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alongside society with an often conflictual. interaction pattern with such peripheral or 
alternative authority structures as landed interests or bourgeoisie (Heper, 1992b: 148-9; Mann, 
1988). Ottoman-Turkish political rulers were conquerors rather than members of patrician, 
patrimonial, tribal or feudal families (Heper, 1992b: 148-9). Hence, since the Ottoman era the 
hierarchical, patrimonial and vertical social structure in Turkey lacked functional, 
differentiated and antagonistic socio-economic strata or classes, gathered around common 
goals for the promotion of conflicting interests (Sozen and Shaw, 2003). 
In all, the composition of the domestic-political structure consisted of a weak civil society vis- 
A-vis the strong state (Heper, 1992b). While the 'strong state tradition' did not spell the doom 
of civil society, it rendered weak the influence of societal actors in effectively pressing their 
demands upon the decision-making process. Undoubtedly though, the 'strong state tradition' 
has on the whole bedeviled the development of a public outcry against the undemocratic 
security discourses and practices of the state elites. 
The Challenge of Islamic Political Parties 
Since the mid-1990s, the most significant social problematic of security governmentality 
concerned the role that political Islam has come to play in Turkish politics. Any investigation 
of the visibility of security governmentality should take into account the most troubling issue 
for the state, which is political Islam. In addition to the Kurdish ethno-cultural reawakening in 
the 1980s, political Islam with the emergence of two ruling Islamist governments has come to 
dominate the official agenda as the most pressing crisis facing state security in the 1990s and 
the 2000s (Carkoglu, 2004). Political Islam figured predominantly in the state security 
discourse as the existentially threatening vestiges (mustehase) of a past Turkey must have 
long left behind (Yegen, 1999a; Yavuz, 2000b). 
Such hostility towards political Islam derives from the fact that the idea of the territorially 
delimited 'ideal society' (see Chapter 5) has largely denied much space to alternative 
identities and civil rights. This was basically because Turkish nationalism embraced unity, 
cohesion, solidarity and homogeneity and opposed all types of cosmopolitanism (Akural, 
1984: 130). In other words, because the 'Turkish Nation' is held to denote all the citizens 
within the political boundaries of the state the outcome was an outright dismissal of the 
recognition of the ethnic and/or religious demands for recognition of the citizens (Yegen, 
2004). However, the accelerated incorporation of Turkey in the global capitalist economic 
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order in the early 1980s brought in cultural diversification and emboldened political demands 
for representation (Onis, 1997; Gulalp, 1997a; 1997b). 
The liberalization process of the 1980s involved import and export facilitations, a greater role 
for the private sector, debt management programs and so forth (Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990; 
Baysan and Blitzer, 1990). Thereafter and contrary to the official representations of the 
'Turkish Nation' in the 1990s the state citizenship norms based upon secularist and nationalist 
ideology were increasingly challenged by political-Islamic and Kurdish-ethnic revivalism in 
society and polity (Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b). From this period onwards a struggle and 
confrontation between the Kernalist state identity of secularism-nationalism and Islamism- 
ethnic secessionism ensued (Taspinar, 2004; Tank, 2005). It is this resultant sociopolitical 
power contention that added new constitutive components into the state security discourse. 
Unlike the Cold-War based geo-strategic and inter-state threat discourse of the state 
(Erguvenc, 1998: 35), the 1990s saw certain domestic socio-political actors as 'security 
threats' (Jenkins, 2001: 48). 
Of particular significance was the 'Islamist threat. The state elites seemed apprehensive and 
troubled with the rise of the Islamic social and religious orders and economic forces such as 
MUSIAD5 that made a dramatic re-entry into the Turkish political arena especially since the 
rriid-1990s through the electoral successes of the Refah (Welfare) and later AKP (Justice and 
Development) party in the early 2000s (Bugra, 1998: 533-4; Cizre, 2003). This anxiety of the 
state was not simply related to the party's afleged counter-revolutionary discourse since they 
have been acting in accordance with the constitutional boundaries of the political game. Their 
discourse was not 'anti-systemic' but rather related to their politically unprecedented 
successes in national elections (Yavuz, 1997a; 2003). They were legally legitimate political 
expressions of a broader social base, which was formed against the perils of urbanization and 
the secularist policies of the state (Gulalp, 1995: 54-6). 
The successful cultural and political expression of these Islamic sensitivities in 1990s was 
made possible basically by 'the popularization of knowledge through mass 
communication ... by a new class of intellectuals based in the print and the electronic media, 
and of the party's internal organizational flexibility and ideological presentation of the 
5 MUSIAD is an umbrealla organization for Islamic-oriented business groups estimated to control ten percent of 
Turkey's trade (Shankland, 1999: 172). 
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[Islamic] "just order"' (Yavuz, 1997a: 66-7). The latter's sustained, moderate and gradual 
inclusion of some of excluded groups such as Islamists (and some Kurds) by addressing their 
economic, social and cultural demands through political participation offered a new political 
community and a language of communication for voicing discontent (Yavuz, 1997a: 75). As 
Kamrava argued: 
With a populist image, a vaguely Islamic platform, and an impressive organizational 
set-up actively trying to attract members and supporters, the party largely succeeded in 
distinguishing itself from the rest of the field (1998: 276). 
When this Islamic language of discontent attracted masses and yielded the most dramatic 
electoral successes in the form of an Islamist-led coalition government in the summer of 1996 
and later as a single party power in the Autumn 2002, the secularist alarm bells went off. 
Indeed, the obstinate policy of disallowing any kind of public discussion let alone 
representation has forced the state elites to address this question simply as 'security problem' 
(Yavuz, 2000b; Cizre, 2003). The military-dominated state elites denied the existence of 
cultural and religious dimension of political Islam (Yavuz, 2000a). However, despite this 
denial they never ceased to 'think', 'speculate', and 'speak' on these questions by generating 
their own distinct approach in which these groups appeared as 'backwards bandits' 'sheikhs' 
and 'secessionists' (van Bruinessen, 1988: 40; Yegen, 1999b: 555). This contradistinction was 
basically because the political role Islam plays in Turkey is at odds with the dearly held and 
strictly interpreted principle of secularism of the Turkish state. Within this context, secularism 
has increasingly found its place in the Turkish state discourse as a security issue in the 1990s 
and the 2000s (Cizre, 2003; Tank, 2005). The main reason for this was the re-emergence of 
Islam in public space as an unprecedented political force in the country, as Yavuz argued: 
In spite of the state-led secularization policy, Islam has remained a depository for 
regulating day-to-day social life for the masses ... the republican goal of secularization 
has met with opposition. Its advocates did not take into account that Islam is socially 
embedded in various forms of social life and is more conducive to mass mobilization 
than either nationalism or socialism because of its flexible networks system, norms 
and symbolic value (1997a: 64-5). 
The security-driven anxiety of the state vis-A-vis the Refah phenomenon was related to the 
most distinguishing feature of the Refah politics, namely its ability to challenge the 
established status quo and norms of secularist and nationalist political platform (GuIalp, 
1997). These challenges were quite alarming for the secularist-nationalist republican state 
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elites, who believed that the party's 'real' intention was to topple the republican regime 
(Bugra, 1998: 534). Further alarming for the state was a new legal order proposed by the 
Refah's intellectual circles that would be based on 'multiple legal orders' in order to grant 
every existing community the right to perform and implement their own laws and conventions 
within respective legal systems (Cinar and Kadioglu, 1999). This was adopted in the 1993 
party convention and advocated a relaxation of the role and a reformulation of the state's most 
valued principles, namely secularism (Yavuz, 1997a). To this end, the Refah proposed in 
parliament a constitutional amendment o the principle of secularism. In the fiery words 
allegedly of the party leader, Necmettin Erbakan later claimed 'it should never be forgotten 
that democracy is a means, not an end. The real end is the creation of a felicitous order 
[Saadet Nizami]' (quoted in Gulalp, 1995: 56). 
Furthermore, in contradiction to the established western oriented foreign policy of the state, 
the Refah party leadership after coming to power paid its first critical international visits to 
two most notoriously 'anti-systemic' states in the region, namely Libya and Iran (Salt, 1999: 
73). At the domestic level, these visits were interpreted by many secularist state elites as 
revealing the 'real intention' of the party to align itself with the Islarnic world instead of the 
established state policy of western alignment. Many secularist state elites observed these two 
visits as open revelation and reception of Turkey's political Islam at the national and 
international scene (Akpinar, 2001). These and other foreign policy initiatives of the Refah 
were 'eye-opener' to secular circles, which then refused to come to terms with this brand of 
politics and rather chose to frame it as a security problem. 
With the crucial local and general elections in mid-1990s the Islamists demonstrated an ability 
to package their cultural, political and economic messages and party programs as constituting 
the single most eminent alternative position on the political arena fraught with corrupt 
mainstream parties (Carkoglu, 2004: 112). The Islamist social bases were represented by the 
elites with divisive and sharp dichotomies that gave the impression of an upcoming battle that 
reflected potentially explosive cleavages between Islamists and secularists (Carkoglu, 2004: 
111). The dramatic political expression of these cleavages has been made particularly evident 
after two electoral successes of the Islamists in 1995 and 2002 by the Refah and AKP 
respectively (Sabah, 04 October 2002, p. 1; Radikal, 04 October 2002, p. 1; Yeni Safak, 04 
October 2002, p. 1). At issue in the confrontation between the Islamist political elites and the 
secularist state elites has been a wide gamut of social, economic and political matters, as 
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Carkoglu puts it: 
The front line of this secularist vs. pro-Islamists confrontation is quite wide, ranging 
from a debate around the ban on turbans and headscarves in universities to religious 
education in the country, from Islamic principles in the economy to Turkish foreign 
policy towards Middle Eastern countries (2004: 111). 
The success of the Islamist Refah and later of the more moderate AKP demonstrated that 
although the secular state identity remained as an organizing principle of the polity, it rather 
fell short of serving as a homogenizing non-native force within Turkish society (Yavuz and 
Esposito, 2003: xxii-xxvi). Instead of secularist identity the Islamist socio-economic groups 
were able to establish themselves outside the public space at the expense of their political 
representation (Cakir, 1990: 148-217; Bugra, 1998: 533). They carved out an influential space 
first in the some societal establishments and then the political scene, through voicing the 
dissent and demands of their repressed Islamist identities under the secularist regime (Ayata, 
1996). 
To sum up: the social and political visibility of religious discourses and pr4ctiýes in security 
governmentality_ has been represented by the state not as occurrences of freedom of 
expression of individual pious citizens, nor as stenu-ning from religious obligations or 
personal choice; on the contrary, they have been seen as devious assaults and political 
attempts to rewrite the 'imagined cerography' of the secularist public space (Gole, 2002: 180- 
4). For that reason, the state elites concerned with security goverrimentality have received 
alternative cultural and religious sensibilities as political rather than cultural-religious 
practices and most significantly as 'security threats' to the foundations of the Turkish state 
(Dewey, 1997: 12; Ayata, 2004). In brief, security governmentality has construed the 
religious sensibilities of the citizenry in security language and has denounced them as 
'security threats' (Savas, 2001b: 257-74). 
2.5. LEGAL ASPECTS: STATUS AND CAPABILITIES 
The combination of the aforementioned historical, institutional, socio-political conditions has 
helped provide the backdrop of security governmentality. The latter, however, cannot be 
thought about without the legal texts that constituted the basis of the state security discourses 
and practices against the domestic dissent. There has been a palpable legal base to the 
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visibility dimensions of security governmentality, which is effectively wedded to the security 
discourses and practices of the state. In the recent past, the legal sources of security 
governmentality have come to construe the public visibilities of Islam as illegitimate political 
reactions and 'domestic threats' to the state security. The basic condition of possibility for 
such a threat construction has been a particular legal-constitutional security discourse. It is 
partly due to the latter that 'public Islam' appears an 'outcast element' in an otherwise 'ideal 
society', which supposedly has faced a 'political subversion' or even 'regime change' by the 
political Islamists (for such a state view see, Savas, 2001a; 2001b). Over the years these legal 
texts have served for the military led state elites as pretexts of denial of a more pluralist public 
space that could accommodate various ethnic, cultural or religious demands for recognition. 
The political nature of security governmentality is thus based on the above-mentioned 
historical imbalance in state-society relations. This politics is vitally shored up by certain 
legal and institutional mechanisms that have enabled the military-the main protagonist and 
guardian of the state-to upset the variegated social demands staged on the political scene 
(Jacoby, 2004a: 127-54; Demirel, 2004b: 345-79). These texts have enabled the most decisive 
political power-base of the military in security governmentality: to shape and shove the 
decisions of elected governments in according with its own ideological persuasion-and 
without staging military coups d'etat (Insel, 1997: 16; Sevinc, 2000: 64). What are the sources 
and means of these undemocratic political capacities of the military in expanding the concept 
of national security? 
As explained above, the military acquired its moral and political power by representing itself 
as protecting the generic 'state values' against parochial and 'debilitating' political interests. 
The military's historically acclaimed 'role' of protecting the state from external and internal 
dissenters however led to an acute differentiation between state interest and political interests 
(Insel, 2004: 43-6). Significantly, this dual political reasoning (i. e. state interests vs. political 
interests) was conveniently equipped with the relevant legal and constitutional sources by 
invoking certain concepts, institutions and politics of security. Consequently, although the 
military remained 'notionally subordinate' to the political authorities and its decisions has not 
been immediately legislated and implemented by the civilian authorities; the military 
nonetheless could still intervene into daily politics (Bayramoglu, 2004: 113). This was done 
by either presenting the governments 'with detailed draft of measures' or by issuing 
guidelines/publicly expressed opinions in order to restrict and/or confine certain governmental 
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policies within specific parameters (Sahin, 1998: 111-24; Jenkins, 2001: 41-2; Insel, 2004: 
41-6). 
How Does the Military Influence Domestic Politics? Legal Status and Political Capacities 
of Security Governmentality 
It is possible to describe the 1990s as the formative years of security governmentality. This 
was facilitated mainly by the initiatives of the military. The military in this period steadfastly 
and expansively defined domestic 'security threats' so as to include not only territorial 
defense or political and economic interests but also crucially the preservation of Kernalist 
legacy especially against perceived dangers to the secular character of the regime (Sarlak, 
2004: 287-93; Kardas and Kucuk, 2004). So much so, that the military commanders have 
come to hold that the 'importance of our army is increasing because of those who are against 
the republic, democracy and secularism' (quoted in Cizre, 2003: 213). The justification for 
upholding counter-measures against such 'security threats' to the 'secular nature' of the state 
was given by one of the architects of '28 February Process' (see Chapter 4), the hawkish 
Commander of Navy Admiral Guven Erkaya stated that: 
-The 12 September military coup [makers] theorized on the assumption that [because as 
an enemy ideology of the state] communism rejected religion, [they should] encourage 
the public to reclaim their religious credentials [to dissuade the threat of communism]. 
This helped generate an imbalance [tilting towards increasing general religiosity] and 
inadvertently led to the establishment of an environment conducive to the efforts of 
those people to cunningly capitalize on the religious feelings of the public (quoted in 
Baytok, 2001: 226). 
As further explained in Chapter 4, in order to thwart the 'anti-secularist threats' to the state 
the military has utilized its 'moral authority' and high public esteem when it needed to ensure 
that its securitization attempts (i. e., to galvanize public opinion to apply pressure on the 
governments on the basis of its perceived threats to the secular nature of the state) would get 
political authorization by the civilian counterparts. As explained in Chapter 4, the military 
shrewdly resorted to its media savvy techniques through which it publicized its expressions of 
security concerns in both public speeches and 'carefully prepared on or off the record 
briefings to selected journalists' (Jenkins, 2001: 49; Akpinar, 2001: 229-32; Cevizoglu, 2001: 
15-18). 
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Crucially, it should be noted that in addition to its public prestige and 'moral authority' 
(origins of which are explained above), the military's political weight and role in policy 
formulation also derived from its legal-statutory powers, responsibilities and obligations and 
formal institutional channels such as the NSC and other state bureaucracy (Bayramoglu, 2004: 
82-97). In other words, the military has been able to utilize not only official security platforms 
such as the NSC to influence governmental policy making and impress its decisions over the 
political bodies, but also its legal-constitutional capacities in the name of state security (Cizre, 
2003). Although the military is careful not to bypass at will the promulgation of legislation 
and intervene in such governmental policy areas as the econoMY6, in other areas it has been 
able to discharge its capacity to influence politics either through formal channels such as its 
wide-ranging definition of 'national security' or informal channels such as the affin-native 
mainstream media coverage (see Chapter 4). As Jenkins' (2001) and Bayramoglu's (2004) 
comprehensive surveys demonstrated there have ordinarily been a set of main laws pertaining 
to the status and legal responsibilities of the military that have enhanced its political profile. 
Here it is pertinent to mention these basic sources: 
The Turkish Constitution 
It should be emphasized that the security discourses bear a deep imprint of the 'basic goals 
and duties of the state', which are expressed by Article 5 of the Constitution as 'to protect the 
independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the 
republic and democracy, and to provide for the prosperity, peace and happiness of individuals 
and the society'. Additionally, Articles 2,4 and 24 refer to the secular character of the state 
and posit it as an unchangeable component of the Constitution. Article 24 states: 
No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things 
held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or 
political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, 
political and legal order of the State on religious tenets (www. tbmm. gov. tr). 
These legal bases are interpreted as 'of great importance from the aspect of internal security' 
and the emphasis on the prosperity of the state is affixed to 'national interests'. The latter is 
defined as those interests pertaining to the 'Eternal Existence of the State and the Prosperity 
of the Nation' and expected to be achieved through national objectives as guaranteed by the 
6 The military however did enter the sphere of business and industry as exemplified in the experience of OYAK. 
The latter is an acronym for Army Mutual Assistance Association. OYAK was active especially in the 
automotive industry (see Jacoby, 2003; 2004). 
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National Security Policy (Mite Paper, 2000: Part 3). 
Until various amendments on 17 October 2001 and 22 May 2004 due to the EU reform 
process (see the changes in www. tbmm. gov. tr) the Constitution of 1982-introduced by the 
NSC during a period of military rule-has served to ensure a Kemalist political worldview (see 
Chapter 3) protected by the military and other security forces in which the idea of a sanctified 
and militarized state, and an authoritarian mentality of rule were legitimized (Bayramoglu, 
2004: 82-4). Article 13 restricted fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals because of 
the concerns over the security of the state (Bayramoglu, 2004: 83). Other areas such as 
education policy were also affected by the restrictive nature of the constitution, for instance, 
Article 131 of the constitution granted the Chief of Staff the right to nominate his own 
candidates for membership of the I-Lgher Education Council (YOK). This military member of 
YOK was to ensure whether the curriculum of higher education (e. g., university education) 
conformed to Kemalist principles (Jenkins, 2001: 44). 
The National Secutity Concept 
An all-embracing definition of national security serves as the most effective technique of 
discourse control in.. security govemmentality. It consists of the relevant legal source for the 
state intervention in politics, potentially criminalizing certain public and private conducts 
(Yavuz, 2000b). The concept of national security legitimizes, and provides content and 
direction for the influential National Security Council's decisions (Yucel, 2002: 11). The 
concept is so extensively defined in the constitution and other relevant formal texts that it is 
'often difficult to find any issue that in one way or another does not fall within the National 
Security Council's prerogatives' (Ozcan, 2002: 25). Article 2a of the National Security 
Council Law of 1983 (No. 2945) stands as testimony to this broad definition, it declares that 
National security means the defense and protection of the state against every kind of 
extemal and internal threat to the constitutional order, national existence, unity, and to 
all interests and contractual rights in the intemational arena including in the political, 
social, cultural and economic spheres. 
The other formal texts also underline similar definitions. For instance, national security is 
defined in another official text as 'the protection and maintenance of the state's constitutional 
order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests on an 
international level, and contractual law against any kind of intemal and foreign threat' (Mite 
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Paper: Defense, 1998: 12, emphasis added). Here, it is significant to note that this definition 
is provided exclusively by the military and that it is also legally binding as in the Act on the 
'National Security Council and National Security Council General Secretariat', which is dated 
9 December 1983 (VMite Paper. Defense, 1998: 12). The National Security Policy is 
described in the same Act as 'a policy covering the principles of the internal, foreign and 
defense patterns of behavior determined by the Board of Nfinisters within the views set by the 
National Security Council with the aim of ensuring national security and achieving national 
objectives' ("ite Paper., Defense, 1998: 12-13). 
There also exist additional constitutional sources that make provision for this broad 
understanding of security. For instance and in line with this wide-ranging scope of the 
national security concept, Article No. 5 of the 1982 Constitution declares that: 'The state's 
main objectives and obligations are to protect and maintain the independence and integrity of 
the Turkish nation, the indivisibility of the country, the republic and the democracy to ensure 
the prosperity, peace and happiness of the individuals and society' (Turkish Constitution, 
www. mfa. gov. tr. ). Additionally, as another article that is often cited as the source of the main 
NSC decisions, Article No. 24 states: 'No one can exploit or misuse religion, religious 
feelings or-things considered religious in whatever form or amount with the aim of making the 
basic social, economic, political or legal order of the state dependent on religious rules for 
political or personal interests or to exert influence' (Turkish Constitution, reached at 
www. mfa. gov. tr). 
It is evident from the scope of the above definitions that the breadth of both the national 
security concept and policy is wide-ranging. This scope bears both external and internal 
dimensions. The external dimension of the traditional understanding of security such as the 
protection of the territorial integrity, non-interference into domestic affairs and indivisibility 
of the state are already ascertained in the legal discourse of security. Decisively, these 
traditional security concerns over external matters are rigorously accompanied by internal- 
domestic security concerns such as preserving the Turkish state's ideological pillars of 
nationalism and secularism. 
The National Secutity Policy Document 
Turkey's national security concept is formally called the 'National Military and Security 
Concept', which is contained in the National Security Policy Document (NSPD) (Cizre, 2003: 
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221). The NSPD provides another influential formal instrument for state intervention into the 
public and private conduct of the citizenry (Bayramoglu, 2004: 89). The NSPD is ostensibly a 
'classified' document that singles out the internal and external threats to the state security and 
is prepared by the NSC secretariat that reflects the evaluation of the policy goals by the 
military (Jenkins, 2001: 41). As Ozcan avers, the NSPD technically; 
lists the [domestic and external] threats to national security, sets out priorities, lays 
down policy guidelines, and provides a detailed framework of foreign and security 
policies for governments and state institutions ... tells governments to formulate these 
policies in the [context of] views determined by the National Security Council ... No 
government can pursue a policy that contradicts the document, which was concluded 
without any parliamentary debate, classified as top secret, and retained by the NSC 
secretariat. This authority has been underscored by other legal arrangements having 
the force of law, such as government decree No. 174-176, which stipulates that all 
ministries carry out their services in compliance with the national security policy 
documents (2002: 28). 
Revealingly, after its preparation, the NSPD is not presented to the parliament for ratification 
but sent to the National Security Council for approval (Jenkins, 2001: 41). Once approved by 
the National Security Council, a ratifying decree without indicating its content is presented to 
the Council of Ministers for signature after which follows its publication in the Official 
Gazette (Jenkins, 2001: 47). The Turkish military is here as well actively involved in the 
preparation of the NSPD, because it is essentially tasked with and held responsible for not 
only defending the external boundaries of the country but also for the ideological nature of the 
regime basically defined in the constitutions as secularism and nationalism (Yucel, 2002: 12; 
Hale, 1994: 80). 
To this aim and from 1963 onwards, the military has primarily determined the content of the 
NSPD, which is regularly updated every five years or sooner if necessary (Jenkins, 2001: 42). 
Initially, the security threats were defined chiefly in line with the international context of the 
Cold War targeting the Soviet Union. In 1992 and for the post-Cold War era, Greece and 
Middle East were instead named as the main security threats. Most significantly, the NSPD 
was amended in 1997 with a view to reordering the internal and external threats catalog under 
the light of the new developments such as the coming to the power of the Islamic coalition 
government of the Refah Party in June 1996 as discussed in Chapter 5. According to this new 
NSPD, which remains in effect, the military defined foreign threats as Greece and the 
southern flank (Syria and Iraq), whereas it named the domestic threats as Islamic 
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Fundamentalism, Kurdish Separatism and Organized Crime. The crucial change here was that 
unlike the 1992 NSPD, which named Kurdish separatism as the primary domestic threat, the 
military named the religious fundamentalism as the 'primary threat' (Sevinc, 2000: 67, ft. 16). 
The NSPD has thus been one of the most resourceful anq fervent techniques of political 
intervention in security governmentality. The NSPD provides direction and content to the 
foundation of Turkey's security politics. The document is purportedly classified and is 
normally not open to public inspection to the effect that it is sometimes nicknamed as the 
'Red Booklet' indicating its nub and significance through the red color (Ozcan, 2002: 28). 
Due to the secrecy and lack of democratic scrutiny surrounding its preparation, the NSPD is 
also called a 'secret constitution' of the state (Hurriyet, 29 August 2002, p. 1). 
The Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law 
Another basic statutory regulation is provided by the Turkish An-ned Forces Internal Service 
Law of January 1961, which delineates the legal role and obligations of the military. The law 
holds the military responsible for protecting 'the nature of the Turkish regime', namely the 
most notable Kernalist principles of territorial integrity and secularism, Article 35 clearly 
states 'The duty if thý& Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland 
and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution' (Jenkins, 2001: 45). As to the method 
of the acting on this responsibility, Article 85/1 of the Armed Forces Internal Service 
Directive declares that 'It is the duty of the Turkish An-ned Forces to protect the Turkish 
homeland and the republic, by arms when necessary, against internal and external threats' 
(Tank, 2005: 4). 
The Ptime Ministerial Crisis Management Bill of 1997 
On 9 January 1997, the Official Gazette issued a law that has increased the political autonomy 
of the military (Resmi Gazete, No. 22872). Although it was subjected to the signature of the 
PM (but not to the approval of the parliament) this law conferred the administrative and 
political government of the country to the military 'at times of crises' (Bayramogiu, 2004: 
103-5). The issue at stake was that while nominally remaining under the authority of the PM's 
office, the law shifted the role of coordinating and implementing of a 'crisis situation' from 
the Prime Minister to the NSC secretariat and enabled the NSC to govern other state and 
public institutions in the relevant cities and townships and 'at times of crises' (Insel, 1997: 15- 
8). Another issue was that the definition of a 'crisis situation' was crucially left vaguely so 
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that the military was able to interpret so as to name and target certain social movements as 
security threats to the state and cope with them in the name of crises management, Section 4/b 
read: 
A crisis includes the existence of all or each of the following situations: malign 
attitudes and behaviors against the indivisibility of the state and the nation; national 
targets and interests; violent acts to destroy the constitutionally erected free 
democratic order or the related rights and freedoms; natural disasters; dangerous and 
contagious diseases; greats fires; important chemical and technological events such as 
radiation and air pollution; great economic crises; asylum and great demographic 
movements. 
It was this law that conferred extraordinary political powers to the military under the 
institutional umbrella of the NSC secretariat so that it could make its political strategy in a 
&crisis situation' and shape the key 'National Security Policy Document' accordingly (Sevinc, 
2000: 64). In a 'secret' internal memorandum sent to the NSC secretariat, the leader of the 
Islamist Refah Party and then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan has clearly revealed how 
this bill was equipped with extraordinary executive powers: 
Based onthe. decisions of the NSC and the related decisions of the council of ministers 
and plans Confin-ned by the PM; in 1997 the NSC se6retariat or the personnel it 
appoints are given capacity in the name of PM office to supervise, monitor, observe, 
orientate and coordinate the actions undertaken by the ministries, public institutions 
and city authorities (quoted in Insel, 1997: 17). 
As investigated in greater detail in Chapter 4, the primary institutional channel through which 
the military expresses its voice has been the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was 
formed through the Article III of the 1961 constitution. It has been a constitutional institution 
since the 1961 Constitution (Heper, 1992b: 147). The promulgation of the NSC Law No. 129 
on II December 1962 has formed the NSC and its General Secretariat. The NSC was held 
responsible for 'determining the internal, external and defense policies'. According to the 
article of I 11 of the 1961 Constitution, the duty of the NSC is to 'to recommend to the 
Council of Ministers the necessary basic guidelines regarding the co-ordination and the taking 
of decisions related to national security'. 
As mentioned, the NSC law of 1983 gives a definition of 'national security' that hints at the 
army's broad policy-making capacity. Clearly, such a definition is immensely broad and can 
contain literally almost everything that gives the military such a huge power in designating 
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the threats it sees 'real'. 
20 years later, Article 118 in the 1982 Constitution has extended the power of the NSC in 
such a way that it has put the Council of Ministers to a position 'to give priority consideration 
to the decision of the NSC concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the 
preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of 
the country and the peace and security of society'. This was the extraordinary Article 2a of 
NSC Law No. 2945, which had been ratified on 9 September 1983. It remained in force up 
until October 2001 and defined the scope of national security in such a way that has covered 
literally the entire policy perspective. It is in this definition that 'the preservation and 
protection of the vitally important values of the state formed by the constitutional order... 
[are] ... included in the 
definition of the concept of National Security against all kinds of 
intemal and external threats directed to Turkey form the legal parameters of Turkey's 
National Security Policy' (Mite Paper, 2000: Part 3, emphasis added). 
SUMMARY 
Following Michel Dean's four dimensional analysis of goverrimentality, the present chapter 
has attempted to understand 'security governmentality' and its visibility dimensions. Security 
govemmentality is established through four dimensions: visibility, rationality, identity and 
techniques. It is in these dimensions that we can examine the political activism of the military 
and the establishment of a new style of rule or what is called here 'security governmentality'. 
Chapter provided a definition of security govemmentality as a regime of government and 
administration that is undertaken by the military-led state authorities and agencies, which 
employ an array of techniques and forms of knowledge that seek to shape political and private 
conduct through the identities, aspirations and beliefs of the citizenry. The most visible actor 
of security governmentality is identified as the military, whose unprecedented political 
activism helped establish a national security oriented, semi-military government particularly 
through the systematic process of domestic threat construction in the name of state security. 
Secondly, the chapter charted the historical, institutional, socio-political and legal sources of 
the visibility dimension in security governmentality. These sources have formed and 
presented an extensive political space for the military-led state elites, who are unaccountable 
in the democratic political system. In addition, it is in part these sources that bore a tenuous 
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democratization process, which in turn endowed the state elites with a strong political posture. 
The chapter also highlighted that since the mid-1990s the state security discourses and 
practices engaged with the domestic social and political dissenters as 'domestic threats' to the 
state rather than as social and political protagonists. In particular, it is the political Islamic 
identities in the country that has been represented as 'security threats' to the secular nature of 
the state. From the second half of the 1990s onwards, the state security discourses and 
practices reflected the context within which the socio-political effects of security 
governmentality became pertinent. 
Overall, the Chapter argued that state security here has charted a course well outside the 
conventional claims of security as 'external defense'. For the foundation of security 
governmentality has basically been the Turkish military's domestic defense of the official 
ideology of Kemalist secularism. Indeed since 1997, newfound 'domestic threats' to the 
secular nature of the state (i. e., political Islam) have gained primacy in the discourse of state 
security over the conventional external interstate security threats. Such a redefinition of state 
security now covers as many diverse sectors as education and political participation. Thus, the 
military has been able to assert its newfound clout in Turkish politics precisely through its 
successful shift -of - national security definition from external to dornestiC threats; The- most 
salient ideological rationalization of security governmentality is achieved with the military's 
recurrent discursive references to the 'domestic threats' to the unity and integrity of the 
secular character of the state. Consequently, the 'praxis' of this justification can be captured 
by studying the impact of state security discourses and practices on party politics, religious 
education and mainstream news media. It is the ensuing replacement of the normal 
democratic politics by security governmentality that should be analyzed in relation to the state 
security discourses and practices utilized by the military-bureaucratic elites. Accordingly, 
security governmentality will be analyzed by investigating its constitutive dimensions. The 
most significant of the latter are rationality, identity and technical dimensions. Part II begins 
this task with its rationality dimensions. 
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PART 11: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY 
GOVERNMENTALITY 
CHAPTER 3 
RATIONALITY OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY 
Having outlined the concept of security governmentality and its historical, institutional, social 
and legal sources, Part II begins to explore the construction of security governmentality. The 
present chapter investigates the constitutive rationalities of security govemmentality. Its goal 
is to delineate the broad episteme of security governmentality in Turkey under the two most 
prevailing aspects of rationality: secularism and the 'reason of state'. These two rationalities 
have informed state security discourses and practices at least since the mid-1990s. 
Specifically, the chapter first outlines the umbrella ideology of Kemalism as an ideational- 
pragmatic program of the modem state since 1923. Then, it argues that the kernels of 
contemporary rationality have been Kernalist secularism and the 'reason of state'. The chapter 
asks: what form of security-based thought, knowledge, and expertise were employed under 
the rubric of Kernalist secularism. How has the 'reason of state' rationality come to inform the 
state elites? In line with the governmentality perspective, the chapter aims to show that these 
two basic rationalities elucidate the underlying state security -discourses/practices and related 
forms of knowledgeý, - plans, visions, objectives, and specific ideals. All these together strive to 
tregulate, reform, organize and improve what occurs within regimes of practices in the name 
of a specific set of ends articulated with different degrees of explicitness and cogency' (Dean, 
1999: 31-32). 
1. KENMLISM 
It is possible to argue that 'the ultimate representations of Turkey since its establishment 
centre around the predominant metaphor in the whole Turkish discourse: Kemalism' (Stone, 
1998: 21). Although much has been written on Kernalism (Landau, 1981), to understand its 
practical social and political ramifications one needs to stay away from its ideological 
foothold. In keeping with governmentality literature (Dean, 1999: 23), and instead of 
reiterating the ideological premises of Kemalism, it is pertinent to begin the discussion by 
pointing out that the prevalent Turkish state discourse of Kemalism appears less of a unified- 
coherent ideology than an elite-instigated socio-political project aiming to mould the society 
into a national-secular political community (Akural, 1984: 125; Stone, 1998: 5; Celik, 1996; 
Yegen, 1996; Yavuz, 2000a). 
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The founders of the Turkish Republic expressed their ideological program in the early 1930s 
in six principles: republicanism, etatism, populism, revolutionism, nationalism and 
secularism. Together these six represent the basic pillars of the official ideology of the 
Turkish state: Kemalism. Also known as the 'Ataturkism', Kemalism constitutes 'the chief 
foundation of Turkish national statehood and appears as a predominantly political ideology' 
(Karpat, 1982: 366). Kernalism has helped define the political rationality of the state. The 
KemalisC movement's basic tenets essentially arose out of debates and refon-n currents in the 
nineteenth century that revolved around the 'Westernization' of the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 
1990; Kazancigil, 1981; Jung and Piccoli, 2001). After the establishment of the Republic in 
1923, Kernalism went beyond reforming the Empire and took up an outright task of 'radical 
transformation of Turkish society from Islamic to a Western setting' (Toprak, 1993: 630). 
Thereafter, Kernalism was increasingly described as a programmatic set of 'guiding ideas' 
rather than a thorough ideological 'system of ideas' (Dumont, 1984: 25). It consists not only 
of the famous 'six principles' but also a more generic set of ideas, speeches, programs, laws, 
attitudes and opinions established by the state elites (Parla, 1992). As Zurcher argues, 
Kemalism. is; 
[a] flexible concept and people with widely differing world views have been able to 
call themselves Kernalist ... Together they [the six principles] formed the state ideology 
of Kemalism, and the basis for indoctrination in schools, the media and the 
army ... Nevertheless as an ideology it lacked coherence ... This ideological void was filled to some extent by the personality cult which grew up around Mustafa Kemal 
during and even more after his lifetime. He was presented as the father of the nation, 
its saviour, its teacher ... At the time of writing it is still very much part of the official 
culture of Turkey (1997: 189-90). 
Kemalism is better understood as a top-down elite-instigated socio-political project (Akural, 
1984: 125) which 'aims to change some basic structural aspects of the Ottoman Empire so as 
to form a [new] society in line with the Western civilization taken as the first step towards the 
world civilization' (Mardin, 1990: 181). Kemalist principles have been effectively 
'indoctrinating' the officers and civil servants of the state (i. e. military officers, governors, 
diplomats and administrators) especially at the 'Military Academy and General Staff College' 
and 'Civil Service Academy' (Mulkiye) that still serve to this aim under the new name 
7 Kemal Ataturk refers to the founding father of the Turkish Republic (1881-1938). Kernalist is someone, who 
devotedly follows the principles of Ataturk: Secularism, Nationalism, Etatism, Revolutionarism, Populism, and 
Republicanism. 
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'School of Political Science' (at the University of Ankara) since 1935 (Zurcher, 2004: 102). 
As the historian Erik-Jan Zurcher stresses in regard to these two institutions; 
In time both institutions also became the centres of Kernalist indoctrination, where 
republicanism, nationalism and secularism were articles offaith for staff and students 
alike-a situation that continues to this day (2004: 103, emphasis added) 
The constitutional-legal arrangements provide the basic traits of Kemalism which is taken as 
sacrosanct sources with a special emphasis on nationalism and secularism (Karpat, 1982: 
366). Initially, the defining six principles of Kemalism were singled out under the rule of 
Republican People's Party (RPP/C1HP) which spotted these principles as the state's 
overarching roadmaps and included them both in the constitution and its party programs from 
1931 onwards (Parla, 1992: 35-47). On 5 February 1937, these six principles were also 
included into the amended Article 2 of the Constitution (of 1924) which read: 'The Turkish 
State is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist and Revolutionary-Reformist' 
(Ahmad, 1993: 63). 
3.2. SECULARISM 
In its most common sociological sense 'secularization' refers to 'the process by which sectors 
of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols' 
(Berger, 1973: 113). In this process, 'a new vocabulary is acquired which provides a medium 
for asking and answering questions about the meaning of life' (Lidtke, 1981: 22). These new 
vocabulary is about the marked transformation that modemization bears on the traditional- 
spiritual societies. That is, it is held that modem economic transactions by their nature 
(division of labour, instrumental, competitive, profit and market-oriented capitalist modes of 
production) lead to the de-theologisation of social and political relations of authority and 
domination largely by means of formal-instrumental rationality (Kadioglu, 1998a). As the 
latter develops in the world through a process, furthennore, full secularization is expected to 
be a universal development, a promise made by scientific thinking and economic growth 
(Bruce, 2000). For instance, a Marxist class analysis can be a point of reference in secularism 
debates. From an ideological point of view, Marxism predicts that religious beliefs will be 
abandoned in due time, simply because religion is dismissed as serving to the interest of 
'ýampire property holding class' (MacIntyre, 1967: 30). More specifically, in Marxist 
analysis industrialization and urbanization are expected to link secularization to the rise of 
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class divisions and the concomitant class differentiation in value systems, aspirations and 
legitimation, which is then expected to produce a non-religious platform for moral 
justification and meaning of life (MacIntyre, 1967: 30). The secularization thesis aims to shed 
light on changing state-religion-society relations in modernity. It suggests that with the arrival 
of formal rationality and modem nation-states, which gradually replace the local religious 
communities, the role religiosity plays in social and political structures diminishes and even 
eventually disappears. The religious-traditional order becomes increasingly discredited and 
instead modem social, economic, health and other sectoral altemative-effective arrangements 
are accompanied by the emergence of different classes and professionalism (Bruce, 2000). 
Hence, the relationship between the temporal and spiritual is recast-religiosity is pushed away 
from the public sphere and confined to private space (Wallis and Bruce, 1992: 8-30). While 
some political theorists mention the 'religious bloodbaths' of the past to view secularity as a 
precondition of non-violent civil society, others underlie the political advantages of 
secularizing time which de-links events from pre-set 'metasocial values' or meanings attached 
by 'divine time' and instead instills only temporal interactions of speaking/acting citizens, 
which is vital for democratic civil society (Keane, 2000). 
Secularism is not exempt from criticism. Critics of secularism underline the relationship 
between Protestantism, individualism and secularization and highligh it as 'a gift of 
Christianity' while questioning its thesis in general and the transferability of secularism to 
other non-Western societies in particular (Madan, 1987: 754). They question the idea that 
secularism, itself an element of European modem life, is a requirement of modernization 
elsewhere (cf. Archer, 2001). In addition, other critics highlight the 'self-contradictory' nature 
of secularism in that in secularized modem civil societies 'existential uncertainty' replaces 
religiosity but also leads to personal crises and stress/confusion which in turn invites the 
return of the sacred (Keane, 2000: 12-3). Some also argue that liberalization and 
modernization could not erase the importance of the religion in society but might even 
accentuate a new 'hunger for spirituality' in non-organized, informal ways (Shiose, 2000: 
324). 
Secularism is another constitutive rationality of security govemmentality. As regards to the 
Turkish experience, an investigation of the relationship between secularism and security 
matters because secularism has been an impending constitutive component of the discourse 
and practice of state security especially since the mid-1990s when the Islamist socio-political 
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forces began to occupy the governmental posts. Since then, the dispute about political Islam 
and Kernalist secularism continues to flare up in the polity in a struggle to shape the basic 
contours of political and personal conduct. In other words, the recent developments in Turkish 
politics are understood here partly with recourse to the symbiotic relationship between 
secularism and the concept (i. e. political security) and institution (i. e. military) of security. 
Exploring the connection between state security and Kernalist secularism is important also 
because there is a congruity of secularism with the role military plays in the Turkish politics, 
which happens to be one of the basic obstacles in Turkey's bid for the EU membership as 
argued in Part III. 
The Rise of Kemalist Secularism 
This section explores Turkey's secularist doctrine in relation to state security. It does not 
provide a theory or ethic of secularism, nor does it seek to find a corrective for the 'dogmas 
and wrongdoings' of secularism. It also leaves aside vague official accounts of the Kemalist 
secularism. Its goal is to lay down the domestic political relevance of Kernalist secularism that 
since the mid-1990s has been a recurrent theme in the state security discourses and practices. 
This recurrence can be attributed to the fact that Kernalist secularism has been identified with 
the state itself and assuch become the signifier of. f the political' for the modem republic that 
replaced the non-secular residues of the defeated theocratic-Ottoman regime (Celik, 1996). 
Here, state security almost automatically enters the equation because any challenge to 
Kernalist secularism is then constructed as a challenge to the Turkish state itself. Dissent 
concerning secularism is subsequently securitized by the state elites as a major threat to the 
state's political survivability. In this sense, therefore, Kemalist secularism does not attest to an 
ideal-type Western secularism. Instead of serving as an 'ideal-type' emancipating political 
ideology, secularism is defined as a discourse and practice of state security. 
Secularism (also referred as laicism) is arguably the most fundamental principle of the 
modem Turkish state (Tachua and Heper, 1983: 17; Steinbach, 1984: 78; Tank, 2005: 4-7). 
Before discussing its implications, a historical description of Turkey's experience with 
secularism is in order. Following the establishment of Turkish Republic, and starting with the 
abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the Ankara government transformed a large portion of the 
Ottoman political-religious order by secularizing its administrative, juridical and educational 
institutions eventually finding a formal expression for secularism enshrined in the 
Constitution in 1937 (Dumont, 1984: 36). In this reform process, the Islamic Caliphate and 
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the Sultanate; the Islamic religious legal system (the Shariah laws), religious education 
including the Arabic script, were all abolished. The free exercise of the practices of Islamic 
faith were all forbidden in the public domain and only state sanctioned expressions of Islam 
were allowed (Berkes, 1998: 495-500). 
At the time, the main stimulus for such unflinching secularism was to radically transform the 
political system towards an absolute secular polity and society and to obliterate the country's 
Islamic heritage and its Ottoman past and instead implant a 'top - down' new socio-political 
conduct (Okyar, 1984: 49-53). Crucially, the maxim in this transformation was that the 
insecurity and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was facilitated by the reactions and 
resistance of the elements of 'obscurantist', 'retrogressive' or 'reactionary' Islam in society to 
the modernization efforts of the late Ottoman rulers (Heper and Aylin, 2003). As Stirling 
(1958: 399) highlights, for instance, one version of this view puts the blame on 
[t]he failure of the Turks to remain the leaders of the human race in technology and 
political power on the "dead hand of Islam. " It was necessary only to get rid of Islam 
and T urkey would rise buoyantly again to world leadership. 
Concerns over state security helped inflict a conception of public space where the plurality of 
societal differences should be restricted and antagonisms (or politics of difference) were to be 
minin-dzed for the sake of state security (Savvides, 2000; Tank, 2005). This conviction that 
dictated that the political sphere should be exempt from religious motives or, rather, more 
strikingly, that religion at best must serve the aims of the state remains alive today (Houston, 
1999: 83-98; Tank, 2005: 4). Because the republican state was formed in part by an uneasy 
exclusion of religion from the state discourse (Hunt and Tokluoglu, 2002), the political order 
was punctuated by a discourse of transition from a political community of ummet (unity of the 
Islamic community based on the doctrine of religious fraternity) to the secular nation-state 
(Celik, 1996: 12). The contradictory result was that this top-down move polarized the social 
space since secular politics displaced societal elements with Islamic persuasion from the 
public sphere (Yavuz, 2000a). Overall, this task of relegating Islam from the status of 'an 
autonomous positive signifier of the public sphere' to a negative and private matter was an 
uneasy and paradoxical process. As Celik argues: 
[t]his negation imposed on the public authority a requirement of drawing thorough 
boundaries for religious practice. Strict state control was imposed on religious 
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practice. Ant attempt to expand its boundaries beyond personal lives was violently 
suppressed. This, at the end of the day, made religion a subject of state affairs, and its 
organization a public matter, and blurred the dividing line between the public and 
private realms (1996: 13-4). 
Thereafter, and by implication, (political) Islam (i. e. Islamic principles in law and 
policyrnaking) or even any of its variants or derivatives has become adverse for the new 
republic in order not to repeat the fatal termination of the Ottoman polity. Through this 
reasoning the survivability of the Turkish republican political establishment is held to be 
closely associated with the principle of secularism. It was in this sipirit that the elites took up 
one of the first tasks of the modem Turkish state as the elimination of the religious institution 
of the Caliphate in 1924 as a sign of its commitment to secularism (Berkes, 1998: 467-73). 
Secularism was crucial for the state elites in so far as it designated the symbolic rejection and 
end of the Ottoman socio-political system (Tank, 2005: 5-6). Indeed, the Ottoman political 
and administrative structure was accustomed if not strictly dominated by the logic and 
practices of Islam, which allowed various ethnic and other group identities to identify 
themselves as 'the Ottoman' (Yegen, 1999a: 57-98). They had enjoyed a degree of social and 
political recognition of their 'difference' within the Ottoman state system because Vle 
Ottoman political structures provided a non-national political p'Aatform (Yegen, 1996: 216- 
26). 
Towards the end of the Eighteenth century, however, the Ottoman political-administrative 
system was challenged and threatened by the Western powers. The power relations between 
the two were undergoing a radical change at the expense of the Ottoman political regime. The 
latter's reaction to and remedy for this sweeping imbalance had mostly emerged from the 
conviction that saving and securing the Ottoman regime from the challenge of the 'West', 
necessitated the modernization of its state structure and adaptation to the Western state system 
(Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 28-35). In this regard, the state's economic backwardness was 
attributed to the country's traditional heritage; progress was taken as a by-product of the 
westernized-secular state structure, and modernity at large was seen only possible by ridding 
the republic of its Ottoman-Islamic foundations (Mardin, 1990: 161-180). 
The founders and intellectuals of the Turkish Republic were vehemently in agreement with 
this notion (Tank, 2005: 5-6). The founder of the republic Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) himself, 
for instance, 'regarded the form of Islam as practised under the Ottomans as an obscurantist 
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obstacle to development' (Jenkins, 2003: 46). In their view, it was the religious foundations of 
the old regime that prevented the success of the Nineteenth century reformation movements 
(the so-called Tanzimat period) and eventual demise of the Ottoman political regime. In other 
words, they perceived a close relationship between the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the 
persistent opposition of religion to the modernization efforts of the late Eighteenth and early 
part of the Nineteenth centuries. These elites perceived secularism as the critical dimension of 
the republican ideology (Heper and Guney, 2000: 636). 
Later, the discourse of secularism has started to occupy the centre stage in state security and 
political discussions, and thereby become one of the constitutive components of the state 
security practices. To this end, especially between 1920s and 1980, the republican 
government launched and implemented a policy of 'de-Arabization and de-Islamization of 
society' in domestic and international politics by restricting its ties with the Middle East 
(Yavuz, 1997b: 23). For instance, the Turkish state voted against the Algerian independence 
at the United Nations, while becoming the first Muslim country to establish relations with the 
Israeli state (Yavuz, 1992). As Zubaida argued (2000: 71); 'If Turkey was to become a 
European state ahd nation, all "oriental" elements had to be jettisoned or suppressed. Religion 
was to be purified from its "backward" elements and Turk ied. This way, secularization, of if 
the socio-cultural life has occupied a central place in the transformation of society. The 
radical changes introduced through this state-led secularization policy in the 1930s were 
attempting to eliminate the reproduction of religious authority in the society by banning 
influential religious organizations with a view to expunging the Islamic influence from the 
social space (Berkes, 1998: 483-90). To this purpose, the reforrns were an extensive range of 
various aspect of social life to the extent that it included dress codes. As Helvacioglu writes: 
The staunch secularization policy undertaken also in this period aimed to distance both 
the state and public from the theocratic structure of the Ottoman Empire ... In brief, 
what is now provisionally regarded as the sign posts of "European Cultural heritage" 
was imported as a whole sale package by the nationalist forces during the cultural 
revolution of the 1930s. This wholesale package of European heritage consists of 
Greek philosophy, Roman Law, European nation - state formation, as well as aesthetic 
trends including the Renaissance art, "modem" art and literature, "Western" and 
European films, fashion, architecture and industrialisation (1999: 5). 
When understood within this context offorced secularization, Turkey's experience can hardly 
be considered as an implementation of secularism designed eventually for individual 'liberty' 
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or 'freedom' as in the Western experience (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xvi). In other words, 
while in the Anglo-Saxon European experience secularism was a condition and a means for 
and a more contented life through assigning a private sphere to religion and its institution and 
by severing it from the public space, in Turkey it did not mean a Lockean separation of 
religion and state (Berkes, 1998; Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xv; Tank, 2005: 6) or even a 
'Jeffersonian compromise'. That is, secularism in Turkey can hardly be seen to comply with 
the Jefferson's idea of a separation between church and state or Madison's 'strict 
separationism' (Munoz, 2003a). Nor can it be viewed as identical with George Washington's 
emphasis on the necessity of republican governmental support for a 'pious citizenry' while 
still maintaining church-state separation (Munoz, 2003b: 20-3). 
In Turkey's experience, on the other hand, secularism has come to enforce politics over 
religion in that it has utilized Islam for the political support of the state's republican regime 
particularly since the 1980 military coup decided to cement society through allowing and 
authorizing Islamic educational and organizational outlets (Ayata, 1996; Yavuz, 1997a). This 
fact alone highlights how Turkey's secularism has a different take on the relationship between 
state and religion (Kaplan, 2002)., The 'western experience' about secularism has therefore 
limited -relevance. -for ý our understanding of the practices -of Kernalist secularism in Turkey 
(Tank, 2005). Consequently, the simple official adaptation by the elites of secularism as a 
political ideology for strengthening the state does not necessarily render a polity and society 
6secular' (EI-Affendi, 1997). 
Strikingly, then, the normative ideal of secularism has been rather missing in the Turkish 
experience. Correspondingly, Secularism in Turkey has been more of an ideological and 
political authorization and strategy than a practical device at the service of the people. It has 
become an end in itself. This way, Turkey has become a secularist state rather than a secular 
politY8 . Turkey's adaptation of secularism 
fitted more prolifically into August Comte's sense 
of positivist progressivism coupled with 'social engineering' holding that (social) scientific 
reason will eventually depose religious belief and condemn it to private space (Kadioglu, 
1998a: 27-9; Giddens, 2000: 152-61). Motivated by this Comptean reasoning, the secularist 
state elites (Turkey's 'social engineers'), seized the opportunity to transform the society 
(Gellner, 1997: 243). Hence, the secularization of society and politics was put into practice 
8 Throughout the thesis, whenever the secularism of the state elites is invoked, they are not understood as a 
genuinely 'secular' but secularist elites. 
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through a 'top-down' process of exercising state power (Kadioglu, 1998a). A Turkish version 
of secularism tends to be seen not so much as the separation of religion and state but as anti- 
religious, the limitation-even suppression-by a military-led elite of the expression of Islamic 
piety (Jenkins, 2003: 45; Yavuz and Esposito, 2003). 
Therein, the official state ideology of Kemalism allowed only a facile secularism construed as 
a creed for the elites, and not an instrument embraced by the people. Specifically, the state 
elites strove to reconcile religion with Kemalist-secularism as the most valued normative 
doctrine in the organization of society and polity so much so that they attempted to replace 
religion with the proto-religious credentials of Kemalism or what is sometimes called 
'Kemalist theology' (Yavuz, 2000b: 33; Jenkins, 2003: 47). Indeed, the all-encompassing 
state ideology of Kemalism was attempted to be enshrined in almost every aspect of public 
life: in the Turkish constitution (Turkish Constitution, Article 2), in the architectural 
landscape (Bozdogan, 1997: 136-40), in the pre-school education (Kaplan, 1999: 348-68) and 
in various public rituals (Meeker, 1997: 168-75). In short, as Jenkins argued, Kemalism 
. [h]as acquired many of the trapping3 of a fully fledged religion ... [This] has important 
rqperqussions. for the definition of what it means to be secularist or. Islamist and 
-iiiibuds what*would otherwise appear to be'relativel'y mihor issues with a critical 
importance. Almost all secularists are Kemalists. Mere non-observance of the rites of 
Kemalism (for example, participation in commemorative ceremonies, displaying 
Ataturk's portrait or visiting his mausoleum) by someone known to be a devout 
Muslim tends to be interpreted by Kemalists as an act of Islamic rebellion. Similarly, 
the issue of women covering their heads has taken on an iconic value (2003: 47). 
It is vital to note that this dense representation and internalization of Kernalist secularism is 
most fervently upheld by the military (Jenkins, 2001: 33-5; 2003: 45-8; Cooper, 2002: 120). 
As mentioned, the military has often represented itself as the guardian of Kemalism (Tank, 
2001: 218-20; Cizre, 1997; Demirel, 2003; 2004b). Especially in the post-1980 military 
intervention the military has been assertive. For instance, 'we will insert Kernalism into 
everyone's head', averred Kenan Evren, the former President and the leader of the military 
junta that staged the 1980 coup (Hurriyet, 31 January 1985, p. 1). 
Consequently, secularism has been more than an ideological instrument in Turkey because 
state secularization has not simply changed the worldview of state elites, but has transformed 
their political rationality. Secularism marked the end of the horizontal-theological or spiritual 
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view of the universe divided between Muslims and infidels, and instead opened up the 
possibility for a temporally and geographically construed, vertically divided world of nation- 
states. The basic reference was to that of French secularism sparing little or no space for 
religiosity (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xvi; Tank, 2005: 6). Unlike many of the Western 
examples, however, secularism in Turkey did not in practice designate a church-state 
separation (Thomson, 1957: 37; Berkes, 1998). The outcome was rather that in Turkey 'the 
State has been freed from religion, even if religion has by no means freed from the State' 
(Stirling, 1958: 399). 
While secularization in its theoretical characterization appears as a 'natural process' made 
possible through modernizing practices, the ruling elites of Turkey reversed this 'causal' 
chain and viewed and implemented secularization as a precondition of modernization and as a 
fully-fledged political rationality (Kadioglu, 1998b: 44; Tank, 2005: 5-7). In other words, the 
view that 'secularization leads to modernization' was taken up by the state elites who declined 
to see the secularist paradigm as a 'natural' outcome of the modem developments described 
above. In this formula, modernization required the dismissal of religiosity and secularization 
ceased to be a process and became a Model or project alongwith westernization (Kadioglu, 
. 
1998b:. 44). ' 
Correspondingly, any characterization of the contemporary Turkish political system as 
'secular' would therefore overlook inherently problematic variations that the term might bear 
in the Turkish context. The Turkish state aims to produce secularism and the notion of 
production highlights how such an affirmative ideological tenet would risk discounting the 
underlying rationale behind secular practices. A mere textual interpretation of secularism 
therefore would not easily reveal the intricacies of the Turkish case. In short, secularism in 
Turkey is not the same as it is defined in the context of largely Western political experiences. 
What replaced Ottoman theocratic politics has not been a cushy adaptation of the modem 
secular political structure. The latter can hardly be observed in the Turkish context because of 
the divergent state interventionist practices in the social and political domains and its 
reworking of religion in a wider political landscape. Moreover, the Turkish state has for the 
most part absorbed and used the sphere of religious piety for its political purposes (Kaplan, 
2002; Tank, 2005). The state has politicized Islam whenever it saw fit to the extent that some 
even argued that 'the lay Turkish state enjoyed greater authority in religious affairs than had 
the sultan-caliphs in their days' (Dumont, 1984: 38). The Islamic religion itself became a 
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program of the Kernalist state which 'tried to devise a renovated and turkified Islam that could 
help the State to propagate new values' (Dumont, 1984: 38; Kaplan, 2002). 
Security and Kenzalist Secularity 
How can we account for the processes leading to such an elusive and antithetical quest for 
Kernalist secularism then? After the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and its pertinent 
religious institutions such as the Caliphate, the Turkish republic has not turned into a secular 
state proper, as it was expected by reference to the Western examples. In the name of secular 
production of civility, to date, the Turkish State has continued to have a solid grip especially 
on how to arrange the space and representation of religion in public life. The main stimulus 
for this prolonging political patrol over religion and its institutional visage was always said to 
be necessitated by the security concerns of the political nature of the state. The continuation 
of this protectorate however was also related to other wider concerns such as the nation 
building and (non-political) legitimacy-seeking practices for the ruling military regime as 
particularly evinced after the 1980 military coup (Kaplan, 2002). 
State secularity is largely maintained, by an interventionist. course of action, whenever the 
opportunity arises. The range of action might diverge according to the circumstances. In the. 
relevant course of action, the state, for example, may limit or execute altogether the activities 
of 'dangerous' religious associations, foresee the closure of the legitimate but 'threatening' 
parties, illegalize certain freedoms of religious expression and constrain related human rights 
(Yavuz, 2000b). It controls these religious activities by institutionalizing and bureaucratizing 
Islam and strives to manufacture a 'regime-friendly' socio-religious environment by drawing 
upon educational and institutional techniques such as the introduction of a Directorate of 
Religious Affairs to preside over all the mosques and other sites of religious activity in the 
country (Kaplan, 2002; Tank, 2005). For instance, Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution 
reads that 'religious and moral education will be conducted under the supervision and control 
of the state. To attempt to institutionalize religion in such a way shows that 'Religious 
foundations, education and worship were all subsumed under a state department, what was to 
become the Religious Affairs Directorate' (Zubaida, 2000: 71). 
Although strict official implementation of these secularizing reforms was observed, these 
reforrns did not yield a secular society overnight. Instead, organized religion had begun to 
lose its otherwise powerful political purchase and the religious affairs of the public were 
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supervised or put under surveillance from that moment on. The first Turkish Prime Minister, 
Ismet Pasha (Inonu) accentuated this intention in his speech to the representatives of a 
Teachers' Association Congress in 1925: 
Ten years hence, the whole world, and those who are now hostile to us or who, in the 
name of religion, are anxious because of our policy, will observe that the cleanest, 
purest, and truest form of Islam will flourish in our midst (Quoted in Reed, 1954: 270, 
ft. 3, emphasis added). 
As a result, the state has exerted control and pressure over religious life to conform the latter 
to the needs and concerns of the state (Houston, 1999; Kaplan, 2002). Specifically in order to 
combat the 'politically potent forces' and prevent their potentially Islamic-oriented future 
generations from growing to pose 'threats', the state allocates responsibility in this regard to 
specific organizations as in the case of the Ministry of Education's scrutiny over (religious) 
education. All these proceedings were 
[flo direct and partially control national religious life and the certification and payment 
of prayer leaders, provincial muftis, mosque custodians, and similar persons. All 
imams and muftis are required to hold a government license, and virtually all of themi 
except in the villages, are state employees ... [the state control] has also been criticized 
as illog'ical and hardly secular. - Whateverthe logic of 'these actions, they did have the 
effect of leaving an emotional, intellectual, and spiritual gap in Turkish life which is 
only now being filled by the upsurge of religious feeling and interest (Reed, 1954: 
269). 
In the 1990s, paradoxically, these strict control mechanisms over religious practice created an 
increased piety among some sections of the population (Ayata, 1996; Yavuz, 1997a). 
Meanwhile, the austere and superficial Europeanization not only failed to convey the message 
of the modem, but even sharpened the traditional-religious sensitivities. The 'secularizing' 
reforms had thus an unintended result of enabling religious dissent to reenter the political 
scene in the 1990s as in the case of the Refah Party (Cakir, 1994). Indeed, the sources of the 
dissent can be partially traced back to the refonns, which 
[flouched such vital elements of popular religion as dress, amulets, soothsayers, holy 
sheikhs, saints' shrines, pilgrimages and festivals. The resentment caused by these 
measures, and the resistance put up against them was far greater than, for instance, in 
the case of the abolition of the caliphate, the position of Seyhulislam, or the medreses, 
which was only of importance to official "high" religion (Zurcher, 1997: 200). 
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The polarization between a secular culture associated largely with the state elites and a mass 
traditional and religious culture provoked politicians to capitalize on this differential of 
cultures that has been under way since the 1950s (Carkoglu, 2004). The resultant emerging 
political Islamic counter-discourse has then been seen as challenging the security of theform 
of the state, and, critically, its veryfoundation because it questions the constructed image if 
the Turkish state as a 'civilized' republican nation-state bearing a secular-Westem character. 
The fact is that the number of such 'threatening' groups in the country is limited when 
compared to the vast majority of other peaceful associations, groups or people, who would 
simply ask for political representation and a more expanded public sphere for their civil rights 
to facilitate and exercise their right of religious expression (for surveys see Carkoglu, 2004; 
Kadioglu, 2005). However, from the perspective of the state even the smallest number of 
these 'dangerous people or groups' active within social and political strata appear as a serious 
'threats' to the survivability of the state (at certain times prevailing over all other internal- 
external 'threats') (Yavuz, 2000a; Jenkins, 2003; see Chapter 4). Hence, in comparison to the 
'threat' coming from Kurdish separatist organizations (e. g., the PKK) or Greece, Islamists are 
viewed as more 'dangerous' because, as Houston summarized, for the state the Islamist 
discourse 'does not seek to emulate [the nation-state model] but to assimilate it. Its goal is not 
to carve out a territo. iially separate Islamistan but to desecularize and re-Islamify everything 
within the sovereign boundaries of Turkey' (1999: 90). 
To recapitulate, presenting merely the ideological underpinnings and related ideological state 
vision of secularism in Turkey conceals from view the practices and processes that aim to 
produce a secular civility in the country by state-imposed means. As mentioned, this 
analytical approach is, however, not to be seen as a corrective to the state version of a secular 
society and polity. Instead, it tries to spell out how the practices of secularism relate not 
necessarily to the Western standards but to a particular rationality that is employed by the 
Turkish state, and particularly, its military elites. The state in short seeks to control those 
seeking to 'subvert' its very foundations and who/which in the state discourse are often 
named as 'destructive, 'retrogressive', 'obscurantist threats' to the state's integrity. In 
contrast to the traditional literature on secularism which refers to the political separation of 
religion from politics (Madan, 1987; Bruce, 1996; 2000; Keane, 2000), the Turkish 
secularism served as a political instrument of the state and a key constitutive category of 
rationality of security governmentality. Therefore, rather than being devoted to the ideal of 
human emancipation, Kernalist state secularism was flung into motion through state driven 
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meddle some social engineering with a view to banishing 'dangereous' religion from the 
political space that over time amounted to a secularist doctrine (Vergin, 1994: 13). Secularism 
in this capacity has strengthened the state over society and as such it has been the key 
rationality of govemment to the extent that Kemalist secularism as Yavuz and Esposito 
stressed (2003: xvi) 'differentiated, marginalized and excluded large sectors of Turkish 
society'. 
3.3. REASON OF STATE RATIONALITY 
The 'reason of state' is the second critical rationality of security governmentality. This 
rationality refers to the idea of preserving the nature and the very idea of the state against 
internal and external threats. It is the source of the much-coveted insecurity concerns of the 
state and as such is a cross-fertilizing and operational thought component within security 
govemmentality. Basically, the political tradition of 'Reason of State' (ROS) refers to 
'rationality specific to the art of governing states' (Foucault, 2000: 314). It was a prevalent 
sixteenth-century secular political rationality which basically advised 'the statesmen what he 
must do to preserve. the health and strength of the State' (Meinecke, 1998: 1). The ROS 
rationality-as opposed to alternative rationalities such religious and/or judiciary ones-concems 
'what the state is; what its exigencies are' (Foucault, 2000: 315). ROS aims to 'reinforce the 
state itself, its own strength, greatness and well-being, by protecting itself from the 
competition of other states and its own internal weakness' (Dean, 1999: 86). In short, in this 
rationality the state 'exists to exist' and 'is its own finality', or 'something that exists per se' 
and that becomes a 'kind of natural object' (Foucault, 2000: 408). Once the priority of the 
state is construed as such, in this context, the aims of the state would appear to be: 
[n]ot only the conservation but also the pen-nanent reinforcement and development of 
the state strengths, [and as such] it is clear that the governments don't have to worry 
about individuals-or have to worry about them only insofar as they are somehow 
relevant for the reinforcement of the state's strength (what they do, their life, their 
death, their activity, their individual behavior, their work, and so on) (Foucault, 2000: 
409). 
ROS indicates that a government's task is to strengthen the state, which 'holds out' and 
becomes a 'natural object' for itself separate from the ruler (Skinner, 1998: 355). In trying to 
strengthen the state, the statesman is 'constrained' in the process by the 'inescapable' forces 
of power and environment. This process strengthening the state is driven by 'necessity' or 
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other power considerations (or 'Kratos'). However, ROS also entails a teleological process 
shaped by purposes and values (or 'Ethos') in that it serves as a bridge, providing 'the 
consideration of what is expedient, useful beneficial, of what the state must do in order to 
reach occasionally the highest point of its existence' (Meinecke, 1998: 5). The difficulty of 
ROS is that this function of bridging is devoid of easy solutions. As Meinecke wrote: 
For it is precisely on this bridge that one sees particularly clearly the frightful and 
deeply disturbing difficulties which are concealed by the juxtaposition of what is and 
what ought to be, of Causality and Ideal, of Nature and Nfind in human life. Raison 
d'etat is a principle of conduct of the highest duplicity and duality; it presents one 
aspect to physical nature and another to reason (Meinecke, 1998: 5). 
The ROS has four layers. First and as already mentioned, it implicates a particular function of 
politics as increasing or decreasing the strength of the state. This function is in relation to both 
its internal forces and other states in a permanent competitive external environment dealing 
'with an irreducible multiplicity of states struggling and competing in a limited history' 
(Foucault, 1991: 23; 1995: 408-9). Secondly, ROS is imbued with a particular understanding 
of the relationship between the individual and the state, which is called 'political 
marginalism'. The latter indicates that individuals are of relevance when they contribute (or 
not) to the force of state. Individuals here matter only in terms 6f their political utility. From 
the perspective of ROS 'the individual exists insofar as what he does is able to introduce even 
a minimal change in the strength of the state, either in a positive or a negative direction' 
(Foucault, 1995: 409). Thirdly, ROS implies and legitimizes a particular hierarchy in the 
political conduct at a state level. When necessary for its security, the state has the 'right' to 
overrule the existing code of ethics (Sancar, 2000: 25) or occasionally bypass the existing 
legal framework (Meinecke, 1998: 132). Fourthly, ROS necessitates a certain kind of 
&expertise' whose exclusive attributes separate them from other knowledge structures. 
The fourth layer is a cardinal aspect of ROS in that it calls for a particular kind of knowledge. 
An Italian Jurist from the sixteenth century, Giovanni Botero, likens ROS to: 'A perfect 
knowledge of the means through which states form, strengthen themselves, endure and grow' 
(cited in Foucault, 1995: 406). This knowledge has to be precise, concrete and measured such 
that it indicates a kind of 'political arithmetic', or political knowledge of both 'the state and 
the knowledge of different states'. For the attainment of such knowledge, 'the statesman 
should educate and form himself culturally for it' (Meinecke, 1998: 6). 
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It can be argued that the overriding concern exhibited here for the strength of the state and its 
'holding out' against internal and external challenges suggests that 'reason of state is 
intrinsically founded on the problem of security' (Dean, 1999: 87). ROS concerns both 
relations between states and within a state. Overall, the ROS rationality enables one to 
understand the logic behind the numerous incursions of the state into the realm of social and 
personal conduct in the name of security and state strenght leading to what is sometimes 
called 'colonization of the lifeworld' (Savvides, 2000; Bernstein, 2004: 160). In other words, 
while externally it is concerned with maintaining the strength of the state in relation to other 
states; domestically it is also about augmenting of the elements and the forces that constitute 
the strength of the state (Dean, 1999: 89). The existential security concerns preside over other 
'essences' of the state such as justice or concern for the political rights of the ruled. The latter 
are either to be subordinated until 'the State has achieved its first rudimentary objective of 
becoming powerful' or suppressed altogether. Justice and political rights are not simply 
absorbed into the 'essence of the State' but have surrendered their 'own autonomy' 
(Meinecke, 1998: 398-9). Their 'autonomous powers' in turn would be utilized by the various 
techniques for the strength of the state (Insel, 2003: 135-8). As Dean argues: 
What is demonic is the way 'fundamental experiences' of life and death, of health and 
suffering, of desires and needs, of individual and collective identity, of toil and labour, 
have become matters for extremely sophisticated regimes of government and complex 
forms of knowledge and expertise, and that all this is linked to the exercise of the 
sovereign power of the state (1999: 96). 
Reason of State in Turkey: Strong State Tradition 
In line with the reason of state rationality, the main tenet of security govemmentality has been 
preserving the nature and the very idea of the state against internal and external threats. This 
rationality of security govemmentality provides frames of reference and gives meaning 
structures to the state and people to grasp past, present and future. So construed, the idea of 
the Turkish state itself becomes a singular referent object of security9. Specifically, 'the 
concentration of all loyalty' of the state elites has been ultimately on the sovereign (secular) 
state (Booth, 1998: 52). The nature and the very idea of the state can here be referred to as 
'organizing ideologies' of a state, which, as BuZan argues takes; 
9 It can be pointed that many other states might just as well be concerned about he security of their states. Yet in 
the Turkish case, it is ultimately the concern over the (secular) nature of the state rather than national security 
that is often invoked. 
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the form of identification with some fairly general principle, like Islam, or democracy, 
or some more specific doctrine, like republicanism or communism ... Since these ideologies address the bases of relations between government and society they define 
conditions for both harmony and conflict in domestic politics ... In some cases, an 
organizing ideology will be so deeply ingrained into the state that change would have 
transformational or perhaps fatal, implications (1991: 79). 
It should be noted here though that state security is not associated with 'inadequate 
statehood' or any lack of natural, evolutionary or teleological process of 'state-building', 
which should not ideally be distorted by externally 'imposed deadlines', as argued in the 
context of the 'Third World security predicament' (Ayoob, 1995: 28,32). Rather, Turkey's 
security problematic is reflective of the very 'idea of the state' itself. The latter denotes an 
elusive category in security analysis which represents a rather different configuration from the 
physical and institutional bases of the state (Buzan, 1995; Williams, 1998). The 'idea of the 
state' is essential since it makes available meaning for the link between the 'territorial- 
society-polity' with different historical forms (Buzan, 1991: 85; Shaw, 1993). The latter 
, 
delivers the ensuing readings of security. Hence for Buzan: 
Tracing the essence of the state to the socio-political level gives us a major clue about 
how to approach the idea of national security. If the heart of the state resides in the 
idea of it held in the minds of the population, then that idea itself becomes a major 
object of national security (Buzan, 1991: 64). 
As explained in Chapter 2, there is a strong state tradition in Turkey (Heper, 1992; Shaw and 
Sozen, 2003) and in this sense there has been continuity between the Ottoman and the Turkish 
state structure (Heper, 2000; Jung and Piccoli, 2001). Correspondingly, it is the unitary nature 
of the state its public order and national security that constitute the main political values and 
standard functions of the strong state rather than, say, providing welfare or social services 
(Tachau, 1984: 59). Any challenge to these values or functions is frustrated by such state 
institutions that incorporate a strong, centralized, bureaucratized political-administrative 
structure. This strong state tradition in turn helps deliver a persistent lack of individualism and 
yield communitarian allegiances shaping around ethnic (e. g. Kurdish or Turkish) and religious 
(cultural or Islamic) cleavages (Carkoglu, 2004: 111-2). As a result, group identities tend to 
obstruct more impersonal institutionalized, rational and legal political relations (Sozen and 
Shaw, 2003). Hence, contemporary Turkish political and social culture exhibits a tendency 
towards the 'strong state' tradition, which includes, as Tachau argues (1984: 66-7), 
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[t]he notion that the state is a proper repository of legitimate authority, and that the 
legitimate wielders of that authority have a responsibility to preserve the public order 
and promote the general welfare. From that experience there also emerges the notion 
that the social order over which the state presides should be stable and unchanging, 
and that there is a natural division between the rulers and the ruled. 
Particularly when it comes to matters of state security, the Turkish state and its bureaucratic 
apparatuses (e. g., the military) are not beholden to the society, a tendency that helps the state 
elites to by-pass the societal demands (Yavuz, 2000a: 33). The state (seen as 'Father State') is 
largely autonomous of societal or economic groups and this way it is seen as above 'ordinary' 
society and the 'mundane' polity (Heper, 1992b: 147). People serve the state rather than vice 
versa (Sozen and Shaw, 2003). For, the hierarchical, patrimonial and vertical social structure 
in Ottoman-Turkey for long lacked functional, differentiated and antagonistic socio-economic 
strata or classes which would rally people around common goals for the promotion of 
conflicting interests (Heper, 1992b: 148; cf. Jacoby, 2004). In other words, what is missing 
has been political mediums for pressurizing the ruling elites to recognize and materialize their 
civil and political rights against the power of the state (Heper, 1992b: 150). Consequently, the 
strong state tradition has rendered domestic politics not a process of meeting or 
accommodating diverse group demands but as an institution serving state interests 'like a 
Platonic government controlled by guardians who personify the essence of the public interest 
and the approved ideology, who are to be their devoted instruments' and who becomes a 
normative category in search of the 'right' for the entire nominally 'egalitarian' society 
(Heper, 1984: 93). 
Political Arithmetic of Reason of State Rationality 
In the context of security governmentality, the fourth layer of ROS namely the 'political 
arithmetic' of the state can help us to better clench the logic behind the pervasive ROS 
rationality. Arguably, the 'political arithmetic' of Turkey's security rationality has been best 
articulated in a book that has been influential in informing the Turkish official views on the 
practices of its security rule throughout the 1990s (Kivanc, 1997: 27-45; Sarlak, 2004: 288). 
The book is entitled as 'Devletin Kavram ve Kapsami' [The Concept and Content of the 
State], '10 and published in Ankara by the Secretariat of Turkish National Security Council 
(NSC) in 1990. The book reveals the logic and mode of thinking by the military on the 
10 Devlet'in Kavram ve Kapsami (1990) Ankara: Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterligi Yayinlari. The 
following translations used in this chapter are the author's. 
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Turkish state, nation, government of state and society and plainly discloses the ways of 
thinking derived from the tradition of ROS. 
One of the book's premises relating to the ROS rationality is about the teleological process 
shaped by the values (Ethos) of the Turkish state, it reads: 'The reason of the existence of the 
Turkish Republic lies in the eternal qualities of the Turkish country, nation, and the holiness 
of the Turkish state' (1990: 16, emphasis added). This commonplace ethereal vision is 
accompanied by other state attributes such as the adn-ftistrative-technical virtuosity, 
sovereign virility, imagery of monolithic-homogeneous nation and its subsequent power. The 
book makes the relationship between the 'Turkish nation' and the 'Turkish state' clearer: 'a 
real nation is aware of the fact that its existence and strength is dependent upon [its] state's 
existence and strength' (1990: 100). 
In the book, the functioning logic of state elites is reduced to finding the equilibrium between 
'internal and external balances'. It holds that for a state to exploit external (international) 
conditions, it has to have an effective control of internal forces (i. e. society's constituting 
elements). In its dealings with societal forces, the state should strive to supply the conditions 
of an 'internal balance; the manner of which reveals the structure of state-society relations. 
To ensure this precarious internal balance, the state 'has to seek for and provide a common 
consciousness, shared attitude and behavioural patterns in line with the reason of state or its 
'national interest' amongst real or corporate persons, all kinds of official or non-official 
institutions, associations, political actors, political parties, and the legislative, executive, 
judicial and representative organs of the state (1990: 47). DevIetin Kavram ve Kapsami thus 
states: 
Out of these state activities emerges the resultant 'national power'. The latter is 
defined as 'the total efficiency of the material, spiritual, quantitative and qualitative 
values, used to meet the national interests and national targets' (1990: 95). 
The book also hints at the relationship between the state elites and the political elites and 
between democracy and 'national security system'. It reads: 
[t]he research, assessment, decision-making and implementation and other similar 
activities pertaining to the preservation and maintainenance of national security need 
to be carried out in the democratic and yet in a shorter system with a view to keeping 
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its secrecy and specialization. This is called national security system (1990: 434, 
emphasis added). 
This book perpetuated the very idea of the Turkish state as an exclusive referent object of 
security reflecting the reason of state rationality since the mid-1990s. The implication of this 
is that whenever 'the idea and the nature' of the Turkish state is believed to be endangered 
because of new or threatening conditions, the state existence is protected under the light of the 
political arithmetic and other three logics of ROS briefly explained above. 
The Consequences of Rationalities of Secutity Governmentality 
There are mainly three consequences of the dimensions of rationality. The first is that the 
pressing issues of Islamic identity claims (such as public visibility) and Kurdish socio-cultural 
rights (such as the language and broadcasting rights) have been largely denied by the 
rationality of state security. The latter invalidated and disproved any public representation for 
the demands of the pious Islamic groups in Turkey. Since the political has been conditioned 
by a secularist strong state tradition, the frame of politics eventually appeared very limited for 
the governed population. This led to a more polarized cleavage, which led to the state 
intervention not only'in politics, but*also in the multi-ethnic and religious social space in the 
name of state security (see Chapter 4 and 5). In brief, the ruling elites saw ethnically and 
religiously inforined political demands as simply 'security threats' that had to be de- 
politicized and dismantled. Denying, for the most part, any political and even social demands 
tended to galvanize and radicalize the political elite discourse against the state and provide the 
conditions through which authoritarian state security discourses and practices were 
reproduced. 
Secondly, the secularization of the state alienated the religious sections of the population. In 
other words, the 'top-down' modernizing-transformation project lacked genuine 'bottom up' 
social support. The constitutionally established and implemented stem Kernalist secularism 
generated not an absolute or 'indivisible unity' of state and society but furthered the social 
and political fragmentations and also diminished the role of the state control over the 
symbolic reproduction of society (Gole, 2002). Instead of an 'indivisible unity' between the 
state and the nation as foreseen by the constitution(s), in time, there emerged a significant gap 
between the ruling centre and the ruled periphery because of the differences in their 'make- 
up' or 'social habitus' (Jung and Piccoli, 2001). The ruling centre failed to reach out to the 
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periphery which remained to a large extent uninfluenced by these sweeping changes, as 
Yavuz argued; 
The resultant secular-national 'high modem culture' of Europe remains to be mostly 
embraced by the state-centric elites including state officials, artists, journalists and big 
city based businessmen. The ruling centre fails to reach the periphery, which remains 
rather uninfluenced by these sweeping changes. Instead, the republican elite and their 
supporters choose to cast their internal 'Others' by identifying and distinguishing 
themselves as secularists (laikler) while referring to the masses as 'backward 
Muslims' (gericiler) (1997a: 64). 
The secularist policies were developed more amongst the state elites in urban centers and 
were not fully embraced in more traditional Anatolian social and economic bases whose 
fervent political opposition was felt more intensely after the mid-1980s (Onis, 1997; 2001). 
Accordingly and thirdly, the secularization (and nationalization) of public space led to certain 
confrontations on a wide range of policies between state elites and the general population, 
which produced an increasing alienation of most of Turkey's Muslims and Kurdish citizens 
(Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b; Carkoglu, 2004). 
SUMNURY 
This chapter investigated the main constitutive rationalities of security governmentality with a 
view to delineating its broad epistenze. It argued that two are most prevailing aspects of 
rationality of security governmentality: secularism and the 'reason of state'. The chapter first 
outlined the official state ideology of Kemalism as an ideational-pragmatic program of the 
state. It then argued that Kemalist secularism has constituted and constrained the domestic 
political conduct especially since the mid-1990s. Secondly, the chapter explained the other 
component of rationality: the 'reason of state'. It argued that the 'reason of state' rationality 
can be understood by the strong state tradition, which signified the idea of preserving the 
nature and the very idea of the state against internal and external dissenters and threats. 
More specifically, the chapter identified Kernalist secularism as a rationality of governing 
society within security governmentality. Kemalist secularism served as a lever to banish the 
religious rationalities from the political space. Rather than being an ideal of human 
emancipation, the Kernalist secularism functioned as one of the powerful instruments of the 
state against domestic society. The chapter then went on to identify the 'reason of state' as 
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another constitutive rationality that shaped the concerns of the state and informed its 
activities. This section also argued that the 'reason of state' rationality in Turkey finds its 
most vivid expression in the strong state tradition. In Turkey's strong state tradition, the 
unitary nature of the state, its public order constitute the main political values. Within this 
context, the strong state tradition endorses and even hypes state security discourses and 
practices. Any socio-political challenges to these values or functions are likely to be frustrated 
by the state institutions most notably the military and other bureaucratized political- 
administrative elites. This is basically because the Turkish state elites have confidence in the 
Kernalist ideology that preaches unity, cohesion, solidarity, ethnic homogeneity rather than 'a 
debilitating pluralist conception of democracy'. This world-view upholds 'a rationalist 
understanding of democracy' that could be 'induced' and voiced by those founding 
revolutionary cadres or other bureaucratic elites rather than self-propelled social change. 
Overall, Kernalist secularism and the 'reason of state' rationalities are two obstacles, which 
prevent the state elites from easily adopting a more liberal conception of security (a prequisite 
of EU membership). It has been the reason of state and its sister (the 'strong state tradition') 
that has reacted to the re-fragmentation and re-polarization of society along with diversc 
ethno-cultural cleavages especially in the contexts of the politics of 1990s (Carkoglu, 2004). 
The relevance of these recurring rationalities within the parameters of security 
governmentality is noteworthy. For instance, the significance of fragmentation and 
polarization in polity is not welcome by the reason of state rationality in general and strong 
state tradition in particular. Because at these times state security becomes the prime concern 
of the state elites, and the ability of the governments to switch effectively to a more liberal 
rendition of security problematic is then plagued. In other words, whenever the chronic 
political instability threatens the principles of the Kernalist regime especially secularism; the 
discourses and practices of state security are evoked in the form of the techniques of security 
govemmentality, which are investigated in the next chapter. 
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CHAI'rER 4 
TECHNIQUES OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY 
The techniques of security govemmentality refer to the means through which security 
govemmentality is practically implemented. This chapter argues that there are ordinarily two 
core techniques in use for the state elites. These are broadly named as macro- and micro- 
techniques. Macro-techniques signify legal-constitutional, institutional and other formal 
sources of state intervention into the domestic political sphere. Micro-techniques, on the other 
hand, refer to the means of intervention that interconnect the institutional techniques with 
state security. Macro-techniques stem from the relevant legal-constitutional texts with 
'binding rule-making function', and are implicated in the formal institutional codes of 
conduct. Macro techniques bestow formal authority and practical-instrumental direction for 
state intervention. The most effective and powerful institutional source utilizing macro- 
techniques in security governmentality are identified as the National Security Council (NSC) 
and the military. In course of their interventions into political conduct; the NSC and the 
military harness the existing legal texts such as the national security concept and the National 
Security. Policy Document. As described in Chapter 2, these serve for the military as -: ý, 
technique of discourse and agenda control in domestic politics. It is chiefly through these 
techniques that the military-led state elites find institutionally and legally authorized channels 
of intervention into Turkish politics. Then the chapter discusses micro-techniques that grant 
discursive passages of intervention between the state authority and individual conduct through 
a connecting discourse of security. Here, the chapter discusses two dimensions of micro- 
techniques: securitization as the main discursive articulation of state intervention and the 
mainstream Turkish media as the space for linking the discourse of state security with the 
individual life-styles, choices and other private conducts. In the last section, the chapter 
introduces a case study for illustrating the practical uses of the macro and micro techniques in 
security governmentality. The case investigates the military intervention in February 1997 or 
the so-called famous 'post-modem coup' with a view to showing how these techniques can be 
effectively implemented. 
Technical Dimension of Governmentality 
The technical dimension of security governmentality is of crucial significance since it is in 
part through these methods that the defacto politico-military regime has been perpetuated. In 
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relation to the technical aspects of governmentality, Foucault (1994: 71) notes the emergence 
of 'the political problem of population' starting from the second half of eighteenth century 
that renders the existence of populations as dependent upon multiple 'artificially alterable' 
factors rather than earlier divine laws. This reconfiguration of populations, in turn, generates a 
space for 'biopolitics' of state intervention in living conditions of populations 'in order to 
alter them and impose standards on them ... through laws, but also through changes of 
attitudes, of ways of acting and living that can be obtained through "campaigns"' (Foucault, 
2000: 71-2). The attempts to employ specific techniques of govemmentality in specific 
contexts are predicated 'on a claim to knowledge concerning the character of the human 
subject [which is] seen as ... the focus of instrumental control' (11indess, 1996: 115). 
In Turkey, the variegated state interventions into 'ways of acting and living' stretch well 
beyond the traditional exercise of state power. The conventional aspects of the latter are 
non-nally utilized for penetrating and coordinating social life through 'centralized, 
institutionalized and territorialized regulations of many aspects of social relations' (Mann, 
1986: 26). The importance of this aspect of state power notwithstanding, the military- 
dominated Turkish state elites do not apply their rule over civil society classes and other elites 
simply by -drawing . -upon such 
'infrastructural sources of state power' such as literacy, 
coinage, measurement, transportation of communication and people, division of labor and so 
forth (Mann, 1988: 5). There exist an additional and more vindictive 'heterogeneous array of 
techniques', which can be defined as 'ways or methods of intervening in the non-discursive 
world constructed by political rationalities that work across private and public boundaries to 
realize, or at least attempt to realize, governmental programmes' (Sigley, 1996: 459). These 
techniques are vital components of the study of governmentality. To signify the political 
importance of such interventionist techniques, Foucault argued that 'it is the tactics of 
government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within 
the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on' (1991: 
103). 
BroadlY put in the Turkish context, these tactics or means of intervention are referred to as the 
techniques of security governmentality. Hence, in line with the studies on governmentality, 
the Chapter tries to find out 'by what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, 
techniques, technologies and vocabularies is authority constituted and rule established' (Dean, 
1999: 31). 
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4.1. NL4, CRO TECHNIQUES OF INTERVENTION 
National Security Council 
The Turkish National Security Council (NSC) is the key security institution embedded in the 
political system. It was established on II December 1962 as a result of the 1961 constitution 
which was prepared under the auspices of the military following the 1960 coup (Jacoby, 2004: 
135). The ideational source of the Turkish NSC is in large measure the 'strong state tradition' 
(see Chapter 2), which provides the rationale for creating such state institutions (Heper, 
1991). Although its exercise of power reached its peaks in the 1990s, the NSC has a long 
institutional history dating back to the early years of the modem Turkish Republic, which is 
established in 1923 (Bayramoglu, 2004: 60). The first historical precedent of the NSC can be 
seen in the form of 'the General Secretariat of the Supreme Defense Assembly', which was 
formed by decree in 1933 for national security matters. Initially, this institution was formed 
for national mobilization issues. Later with an Act in 1949, the scope of its role was extended 
to include the preparation of national defense policy (Savci, 1961). 
Adcording to the . 1961 constitution, the NSC was legally defined as a 'consultative body' 
advising on the govemment about national security issues. It was originally set up as the basic 
institutional channel through which the military and the civilian representatives of the 
govemment discuss 'all matters touching on the security of the state' (Brown, 1989: 389). 
The NSC is specifically composed of both political and military members under the 
chairmanship of the President of the Turkish Republic. Ex-officio members of the NSC are 
selected from the military and the govemment each having five chairs. These members are the 
Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of 
Interior Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Commander of Land Forces, the 
Commander of Naval Forces, the Commander of Air Forces, the General Commander of 
Gendannerie and the General Secretary, which is always a serving full general or admiral 
(Mite Paper. Defense, 1998: 9-10). 
The main task of the NSC is to consult the government on the domestic, foreign and defense 
policies (Bayramoglu, 2004: 77-9). The internal functioning structure of the NSC is secret and 
except in rare cases, its decisions are not publicized. The decision-making process of the NSC 
remains vague (see below discussion) and it is largely through its decisions that the country's 
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domestic internal and external policies is designed. Although the NSC was ostensibly set up 
to submit its 'advice' on national security to the cabinet of the day, it has been often seen 
functioning as 'the principal decision making body on foreign and security issues' (Ozcan, 
2002: 24). Specifically, later under the law of 1983, the NSC was further empowered and 
turned out to be capable of influencing the political decisions of the country through 
interpreting almost everything at the table of discussion as a security issue (Jenkins, 2001: 
46). The NSC was expected to 'preserve the existence and independence of the State, the 
integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society' (Lowry, 
2000: 41). The NSC has been the most powerful politico-military institution in Turkey 
designed to function as a forum for the exchange of views between the military generals and 
the civilian politicians largely about the country's security concerns (Jenkins, 2001: 45). State 
security is put under the responsibility of the NSC by Article 118 of the Constitution, whose 
tasks are identified as the following: 
The national security council shall submit to the council of ministers its views on 
taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, 
establishment, and implementation'of the national security policy, of the State. The 
council of ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the national 
security coupcil concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation 
the eilstence ýnd independence of the State, the integrity and'indivisibility of the 
country, and the peace and security of society (quoted in Lowry, 2000: 45). 
The interpretation of the matters pertaining to the 'national security policy of the State', 
however, was kept wide enough to include 'almost all issues which fall under the 
responsibility of govemment' (Jacoby, 2004: 145). Indeed, one factor that stretches the 
authority of the NSC over other govemmental organs is its fonnal and informal capacity to 
decide upon a whole range of issues. Agendas of NSC meetings reveal how many otherwise 
clearly social and political issues are thought of, taken measure against and securitized. In the 
military-dominated NSC meetings the agendas might have such a far-reaching catalog that it 
may include: 
[i]nspecting education system, stopping the activities of Sufi orders, controlling certain 
media reports on the military actions, preventing violations of the dress code and 
practices that portray Turkey as backward, making sure that hides from the Feast of 
Sacrifice are donated to designated organizations each year, allowing no leniency 
whatsoever for violations of the Law on Crimes Committed Against Ataturk of for 
displays of disrespect towards him (Shmuelevitz, 1999: 25-7). 
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The legally more powerful status of the NSC was later set up by the 1982 Constitution 
(Kinzer, 2001: 14). The political power of the NSC was furthered by the latter, which 
stipulated that the Council of Ministers had to give 'top priority' to the suggestions made by 
the NSC (Heper, 1990: 323, italics added). Article 118 of the 1982 constitution obliged the 
Council of Ministers to: 
[g]ive priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council 
concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence 
and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the 
peace and security of the society. 
The NSC secretariat (associated with the military flank) has important functions such as: 
preparing all the agenda to be present at the table, coordinating the government to implement 
the NSC decisions, and checking whether the decisions are implemented on time (Ozcan, 
2002: 25). The NSC secretariat has under its command approximately 350 permanent staff 
most of which are either serving or retired military personnel together with some civilian 
bureaucrats, who are used 'to liaise with and collect information from their former 
institutions'. (Jenkins, 2001: 51).. The NSC secretariat's monopoly of gathering security 
related information is an important activity of its permanent staff. This moncpoly was enabled 
by controlling other relevant political institutionsý arid if necessary f6rcing them to provide the 
required information in order to take certain 'financial, economic, social and other measures 
for meeting the National Security Policy services' (Bayramoglu, 2004: 95). The NSC's 
intelligence and knowledge production was to be aided by such wide ranging bureaucratic 
institutions as the TRT (state controlled television network), RTUK (the High Audio-Visual 
Board that serves as the state's censoring institution over the media); DPT (the State Planning 
Institution); YOK (the Higher Education Board that supervises universities) and local 
governorships (Bayramoglu, 2004: 95-6). With all these power bases, the NSC has been the 
'supremo' of Turkish politics (Cizre, 2003: 220). 
This is not to suggest that the military cannot securitize an issue outside the institutional realm 
of the NSC. Rather, it is to pinpoint that the legal-constitutional framework provided by the 
NSC enhances the reach and impact of its decisions into the realm of administration and 
politics (Aybay, 1978; Insel, 1997). Therefore, while the most notable securitizing actor is the 
Turkish military, the NSC is the authorized body for implementing and completing the 
securitizing moves of the military through existing legal and constitutional sources. The NSC 
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effectively fosters a disproportionate power base for the military over the civilians in security 
governmentality mainly because the decisions of the NSC can neither be challenged through 
democratic procedures nor can its decision-makers be held accountable to any public and 
political scrutiny (Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 109). The elected politicians or the parliament 
hardly ever present counterproposals to the decisions taken by the NSC (Ozcan, 2002: 25-6). 
Information on the internal decision-making process of the NSC meetings is extremely 
limited. Only the summary results of the NSC meetings are press-released. The most notable 
sources detailing the meetings are the daily newspapers, which rarely report the details of the 
discussions in the NSC meetings. From these sources we know that the governmental 
authorities such as the mentioned ministries and the PM do take part in the decision making 
process in the NSC meetings, however, it is also a well-known fact that these elected-civilian 
members often retreat from disagreeing with the military members of the NSC in the meetings 
held regularly every month. 
it is a remote possibility that there exists a voting procedure taking place over each issue 
(Jenkins, 2001: 51). It is more likely that the military members 'convince' the civilian 
counterpart of their views. As then Chief of General Staff Dogan Gures once stated, 'We do 
not count fingers, we just convince each other' (Sabah, 25 April 1993, emphasis added). The 
membership structure and informal norms of conduct ensure that 'the government virtually 
never resists given the required "priority consideration" to NSC recommendations' (Pope and 
Pope, 2004: 150). Indeed, 'governments have never directly tried to challenge the 
recommendations emanating from their monthly meetings with the armed forces commanders 
in the National Security Council decreed by the constitution' (Pope and Pope, 2004: 341). 
Furthermore, in the decision-making process of the NSC the military members are most likely 
to form a 'bloc' view rather than having individual voices, which gives the military an 'added 
advantage' over their civilian counterparts (Ozcan, 2002: 24). Overall, it is held that the NSC 
has 'a dominant place in the policy-making structure' of the country and as Sozen and Shaw 
argue 'it is well known in Turkey that the views of the military normally dominate the 
decisions of the NSC, whose recommendations have always become national policies (2003: 
110). 
The NSC has therefore been institutionalized as 'the highest non-elected decision-making 
body of the state' (Karabelias, 1999: 135). It has long enjoyed broad yet astounding legal- 
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political powers. It has functioned as the dominant decision making body not only in foreign 
and security policy but also in many fields of domestic politics (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997: 
160). The NSC has been the primary institutional conduit which 'crystallized and 
spearheaded' the military's authority over areas of civilian control and consolidated 'its 
political hegemony more deeply' (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997: 157). As such, it served as a 
significant channel of the military's intervention into the domestic politics. Through the 
enhanced political profile of the NSC, the military has been able to control the political scene 
and enforce its will whenever it deemed the security of the state was at peril. This way, the 
military exercised an 'independent political power particularly through the National Security 
Council' (Heper and Guney, 1996: 620). Ibe principal significance of the NSC for the present 
discussion derives from the fact that the securitization of political and social issues by the 
military is mediated and legalized through the institutional structure provided by the NSC. 
The significance of the NSC lies in that fact that it functions 'as a platform from which the 
military can exercise its informal authority by presenting the civilian authorities with policy 
guidelines' (Jenkins, 2001: 43). The NSC gave the military a dual function as being armed 
forces and an executive at the same time: in other words, through the NSC the military 
monitored Turkish political life (Heper, 1992b: 163). 
The role the NSC plays in security governmentality is, however, more extensive than its 
description warrants. Although the primary role of the NSC seems to be 'advisory', the 
military members of the NSC have come to propose, shape and oversee the implementation of 
policies they 'advice. The fact that Article 118 urged the Council of Ministers to give 
4priority consideration' in all matters that related to the national security policy of the state 
'has come to be interpreted as putting even religious expression under the mantle of state 
security' (Lowry, 2000: 45). 
To recapitulate, the NSC constitutes the main institutional facilitator for the interventionist 
practices of the military in politics. That is, the NSC serves as an authorized institution for 
calling an otherwise political issue a security issue. The NSC is a powerful instrument in the 
political system, because it is a constitutionally empowered site for the legitimization of the 
actions of the military. The constitutional and legal aspects of the NSC indicate that the 
military adheres to the formal democratic politics and does not prefer to interfere into politics 
directly in the form of a direct military coup. Yet, it is precisely here that such an NSC 
effectively substitutes for the crude coups d'etats of the past. Partly through the NSC, the 
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military has been embroiled almost in the day-to-day machinations of civilian politics and 
acted as an alternative springboard institution to articulate, legalize and justify this overt 
political function. 
Military Interventions 
It should be noted that partly because of its 'permission' of civilian-democratic rule (Heper, 
1992; Dagi, 1998), the military in the post-Cold War era has not pursued a direct coup d'etat 
to take over the political process (Heper and Aylin, 2000). In fact, even at times when it did 
stage direct military coups, 'the military did not stage coups to stay in power ad infinitum' 
(Heper, 1992b: 162-3). This, however, did not mean that the military bureaucrats lacked any 
aspiration to influence the decision making process (Heper, 1984: 81). On the contrary, as 
discussed below, the newfound means of intervention (such as securitization and public 
manipulation through the instruments of the mainstream media) equipped the military with a 
powerful repertoire and springboard to influence the decision making process (Lowry, 2000: 
51-3). This kind of interventionist venture was evinced particularly when the political 
decisions of the. elected civilians were thought of as detrimental to the highly valued 
rationalities of reason of state and Kernalist seculafism (Yavuz, 2000a: 33; Kinzer, 2000: 151- 
162). Unsurprisingly, thereafter-came a long tradition of clampdown on civil. liberties mainly 
because of the military interference in Turkish politics by referring to the 'open threats and 
vague hint of military intervention' (Nye, 1977: 214). 
Even after its political power peaked in the late 1990s, the military has not shied away from 
intervening into politics. The Turkish military has no longer resorted to an overt military coup 
established in the form of a classical coup d'etat as defined in the civil-military literature 
(Huntington, 1957; Finer, 1962; Nordlinger, 1977; Kolkowicz, 1982). However, instead of 
staging coups, the military has tried to influence the political process to 'counter' the effects 
of the 'anti-state' domestic forces in the name of protecting 'secularism and national unity' 
(Narli, 2000: 108-9). Over-concemed with saving the Kemalist state from the challenges of 
the internal Kurdish and Islamic 'threats', the military has put forward its sophisticated 
institutional instruments to upset the agendas of the political class whenever it collided with 
the military agenda of 'saving the state' (Peker, 2000: 80-1). 
It is significant to note that despite this interventionist tendency, which mainly fell short of 
direct political rule, the Turkish military generally managed to stay away from the pulling and 
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the hauling of the 'mundane' political life. However, this observed political detachment has 
waned, particularly in the aftermath of the latest military intervention that is after the so-called 
'post modem coup' of February, 28 1997. Particularly from then onwards, the military has 
been increasingly influential in exerting pressure over the elected governments on various 
domestic issues that are much diverse and wider than those falling within the general argot of 
gnational security' (Lowry, 2000: 41-50; Cizre, 2003). What are the mechanisms for this 
military influence? 
As the relevant literature on civil-military relations stressed, the bond between the military 
and the public is enhanced by military service (Huntington, 1996: 11). This technique not 
only aims to shape a particular breed of political actors in the country but more crucially by 
finding 'inroads into the society' and trying to convince the average individual that the kind of 
'militarist thinking' about the relevant political decision making item is both necessary and 
desirable (Mahcupyan, 2003: 56). In similar vein, the individual conformity to the military 
and its Kemalist rationalities is significantly enabled by the compulsory military service in 
Turkey (Altinay, 1999: 200-8; Cizre, 2003: 224). In addition to the compulsory military 
: service, the'process of molding individuals starts with the integration of militarist values into 
the definition of identity both by general social values and through stat-- education (Kaplan, 
2002; Mahcupyan, 2004; Demirel, 2004). 
Another important component of this is related to what is sometimes called the 'militarization 
of education'. At a more systematic level of education, the intense inculcation of such 
Kernalist state principles as secularism and nationalism is provided through a type of 
'Hobbesian political education' according to which the sovereign needs to educate the subject 
about how to internalize and conform to the state authority in order to govern more effectively 
(Kaplan, 1999: 25-31; 347-82). That is, starting with the primary schools, the state controlled 
education system has enhanced Kernalism and military values by imprinting them into the 
hearts and minds of the pupils by molding their upbringing through the teachings of school 
textbooks (Kaplan, 2002; Altinay, 2004: 179-200). This way, the individual male citizen is 
subject to the various moldings attempts of the state elites, who strive to cajole them into 
granting their consent for the non-democratic moves of the military curbing civic 
consciousness about normal procedures of democratic politics (Mahcupyan, 2004: 129-33). 
Therefore, although these types of interventions overall do not neatly amount to 'the 
disciplinary gaze' for producing 'docile bodies' (Foucault, 1977: 135-70), they nonetheless 
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effectively make inroads into the 'minds and hearts' of the citizenry through symbolic and 
confirmatory education of nationalist-military values (Kaplan, 2002; Bora, 2004). 
Particularly relevant here is the 'National Security Knowledge Course' that is given as a 
compulsory course along with mathematics, physics, and social sciences for educating the 
students about the military service and national security (Altinay, 1999; Altinay, 2004). Since 
1926 this course has been a compulsory course to be taken by the pupils in primary and later 
in secondary schools (Altinay, 2004: 182). The aim is to educate pupils in general Kernalist 
political ideology (see Chapter 3). The content of the course book is designed and prepared by 
the Office of General Staff and the course is taught by the retired or acting military officers to 
educate and 'internalize' n-fflitaristic, nationalist values (Altinay, 2004: 182-95). If the officer 
is a retired officer, the attributes of would-be-teacher-officer are to include active participation 
in 'military missions against terrorists'. The overall aim of the course is stated in the preface 
of the course book as follows: 
Because of its geopolitical position, the Turkish Republic is the target of the games 
staged by the outside [powers]. The Turkish youth has to be ready against these 
games. Being ready is conditional upon accepting that a secular and dem I ocratic 
structure is the most ideal system for Turkey and being knowledgeable about this. This 
condition can be attained by not only internalizing [Kemal] Ataturk's principles on the 
thought level but also as a life-style ... As long as the Turkish youth is aware of the 
games staged against Turkey and internalize Ataturk's principles as a life-style, there 
will be no doubt that Turkey will reach the level of contemporary [Western] 
civilizations ... Then the aim of the national security course is to make the Turkish 
youth go alongside these two important behaviors [that is, internalizing the principles 
both at the thought level and as a life-style]. By confirming to the latter two behaviors, 
the Turkish youth thus will not turn down Ataturks' expectations from them (National 
Security Knowledge Course Book: 6, quoted in Altinay, 2004: 184-5, my translation, 
emphasis added). 
In addition to these structural interventions, a more crucial element in the military's new 
political attitude has been the particular channels for fusing civilian and military functions 
from the mid-1990s onwards. Especially since the mid-1990s, there has been a shift in the 
military functions from defense matters straight into the political realm that is facilitated by 
the military's 'own expanded intelligence networks, political espionage, and 
counterintelligence activities' (Cizre, 2003: 218). Specifically and as asgued further below, 
the Turkish military has effectively employed two novel means of intervention. The first was 
disguised in the form of a 'public campaign' mainly addressed to and echoed by 'the 
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mainstream media, several leading business associations, labor unions, university presidents 
and senates, the majority of intelligentsia, and other members of Turkey's ruling elite [which] 
created a climate of acceptance, not a negative reaction' (Lowry, 2000: 42). The military's 
'public campaigns' was based on a politics of fear, which capitalized on the secularists' fear 
that the political Islamists (i. e. Refah government) would take over the state (Akpinar, 2001: 
229-32). The novelty of this style of military intervention was unmistakable in that instead of 
roaring its tanks in the streets of the capital the military garnered public support for a its 
vision of society and polity understood within the purview of reason of state rationality and 
Kernalist secularism as described in Chapter 3. 
The Working Groups of the Military 
The second novel technique of intervention by the military was the establishment of military 
units, or 'working groups' most famous of which was the Western Working Group (WWG). 
The working groups were semi-secret branches of the military and established without 
informing the Prime Nfinister. They employed officers from all the forces, who were tasked 
with monitoring, gathering relevant information and devising policy recommendations about 
the political orientations of institutions and public figures in the country (Lowry, 2000: 42). 
As' -regards to the- internal workings of these 'working groups' in his interviews with 
journalists and former government ministers in Ankara, Heath W. Lowry finds that 
Whenever a particular question arises, the relevant working group sets up a task force 
to produce a study. Recommendations are passed to the military wing of the NSC and 
fed to the elected officials for implementations. Whenever the elected politicians move 
outside the boundaries decreed by the military, they are quickly shown the folly of 
their errors (2000: 42-3). 
More specifically, the military established working groups to acquire relevant information 
about the activities and outlooks (dress codes) of civilians including the state bureaucracy, 
business circles, financial institutions, teachers, civil society associations and so on with a 
view to naming dangers to the secular nature of the state (Bayramoglu, 2001: 297-8). As Cizre 
argues in relation to the WWG: 
It is clear that BCG [WWG] was set up out of the realization that because the National 
Intelligence Agency (Milli Istilibarat Teskilati-MIT) was responsible to the Prime 
Minister and police intelligence to the Minister of Interior (in turn answerable to the 
Prime Minister), intelligence reporting on extreme Islamic activities was bound to be 
tempered by the more permissive attitude of the civilians. Therefore, the General Staff 
ill 
felt that it would be safer to set up BCG [WWG] as its own intelligence department 
vis-A-vis Islamic activity (2003: 219). 
One of the 'top secret' reports prepared by the WWG was leaked to the press on August 1, 
1997 in regard the conditions of the 'religious awakening' in the country. The report clearly 
spelled out the military's mindset, which clearly was in line with security goverrimentality's 
rationalities of secularism and reason of state. The WWG reported that: 
The power of religious organizations, due to years of government indifference, had 
grown to the point that the forces who seek a return of the Seriat system [an Islamic 
state] in Turkey had managed to take over key governmental agencies. Further, that if 
steps to the contrary were not taken, it is possible that the fundamentalists' political 
wing [Refahl could come to power by itself in the year 2000 (quoted in Lowry, 2000: 
46). 
Consequently, it can be argued that part of the infrastructure of the military-expertise in 
politics has been these flexible 'working groups' that are composed of the staff officers, who 
are able to conduct research aided by the information gleaned from different state institutions 
with a view to producing 'briefing documents, even policy drafts, on a wide variety of issues" 
(Jenkins, 2001: 50). These working groups were formed to' especially `rnonitor Irtica 
[regresýsive Islamism'or fundamentalism] and devise policy recommendations for dealing with 
it' with the intention of 'playing upon the secularists' fear of an Islamic takeover of the state' 
(Lowry, 2000: 42; Hurriyet, 02 January 2002). In the 1990s, the WWG, the most famous 
military working group, was specifically established to combat Islamic Fundamentalism under 
the supervision the Naval High Command. Its duties included: 
[m]onitoring not only violent extremist groups but also the Islamist media, 
organizations and educational establishments and identifying suspected Islamist 
sympathizers in the central and local government bureaucracies, trade unions and 
employers' organizations ... the establishment of an Economics Working Group to 
investigate for instance links between Turkish banks, bureaucrats and the underworld 
(Jenkins, 2001: 50). 
In one of the internal memorandums of the 'Western Working Group', the Commander of 
Navy General Guven Erkaya highlighted the extensive reach of the military into the private 
and personal conduct of the citizenry: 
All the infonnation pertaining to the biographical and political views of the following 
individuals and institutions in cities and townships are to be identified and recorded at 
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the headquarters of the Navy Command Office: each and every occupational and 
voluntary associations, civil society organizations, trade unions, institutions of higher 
education, governors, student dormitories; mayors, members of city councils and 
executive branches of political parties and other officials; and the information relating 
to the local TV stations, radios, newspapers and magazines, and other broadcasting 
agencies (Intelligence 3429-3,97AKK. S. 5 May 1997, Navy Commanders 
Headquarters quoted in Bayramoglu, 2004: 102). 
There are also other branches operating under the auspicious of the NSC such as the 'Special 
Politics Unit', whose under-secretaries produce 'expertise knowledge' include 'social politics, 
economy politics, education and cultural politics, science and technology politics' 
(Bayramoglu, 2004: 96). Another institutionalized branch is the 'Office of Public Relations', 
whose under-secretaries include 'Psychological Action and Education Secretariat, Print Media 
Secretariat, Visual and Audio Media Secretariat, Internet Secretariat, Civil Society 
Organizations Secretariat' all of which show the monitoring, maneuvering and policy making 
capacities and activities of the NSC (Bayramoglu, 2004: 96). Thus whenever the military sees 
a particular security question arising in one of the above fields, it enables the relevant working 
group to set up 'a task force to produce a study' (Lowry, 2000: 42). 
What can be said in relation to the institutional efficacy of the military working groups? The 
working groups' briefing documents and reports are prepared by blending with other data 
collected by the state intelligence agencies (e. g., the National Intelligence Service and Police 
Intelligence Office). These then are provided to the NSC secretariat, which interprets the 
whole information in security logic, alluded to the present threats to the state (Yucel, 2002: 
14-5; Bayramoglu, 2004: 95). The NSC secretariat then presents it to the governments and 
their political representatives in the NSC. 
In light of this discussion, it can be argued that with the introduction of such sub-military 
units as the WWG, a sturdy structure of a defacto dual-track government at once revealed. 
The political government appeared as an outer ditch, behind which stood the military's 
WWG-like units and sub-institutions 'in which many of the nation's real policy objectives are 
being generated by the TGS and its various working groups and task forces [such as] an 
Aegean working group, a media working group, and an economic working group' (Lowry, 
2000: 42). Without having to bear primary responsibility for running the government and by 
occupying a key institutional role in policy formulation for certain civilian issues, the military 
curtailed the civilian authority on the issues it saw as threatening 'the security of the state'. 
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Therefore, security of the state was conceived as synonymous with public policy by letting the 
existing national security concept 'influence' the codification of laws, decrees, and 
regulations amounting to 'criminalizing certain political activities and constraining public 
debate' together which 'gives the Turkish military a wide latitude in policy making and law 
enforcement' (Cizre, 2003: 219). 
In brief, it should be noted that the military has successfully adapted its strategies of 
intervention to the changing conditions of post-Cold War politics. Partly in response to the 
public outrage in the aftermath of the Susurluk incident that revealed the corruptions in the 
security forces most apparent in the members of 'gendarmerie intelligence' (Jung and Piccoli, 
2001: 11-8), the military further changed its overall methods of engagement. That is, in the 
history of the modem Turkish republic since 1923 the military no longer had to rely on the 
more crude techniques of intervention into the structures of power such as staging coups at the 
expense of the elected political parties in power, as it previously did in 1960,1971 and 1980. 
Instead, the military transformed itself through the language and medium of the media into a 
center of institutional gravity, which 'voices' and 'shares' its concerns with the society over 
such internal political matters. The military through such techniques poses not so much like 
an opposition party, but rather an alternative government with an alternative political agenda 
enabled by the generous-affirmative coverage of the mainstream media. 
4.2. MICRO TECHNIQUES 
Turkish Mainstream Media 
Turkey's vast communication space is one of the most media-saturated in the region. It has 10 
national newspapers; 20 national, 35 regional and 350 local television stations; 41 national, 
120 regional, and 1234 local radio stations (Yavuz, 2003b: 180-1). The political effects of the 
media skyrocketed especially in the late 1980s and 1990s with the proliferation of new 
technologies of communication ranging from the press and the broadcast media to audio and 
the videocassettes (Sonmez, 1996: 76-86). As a result, with the help of the interactive use of 
telephones, faxes and internet 'asymmetries between the senders and receivers' were reduced 
as more people participated into religious, civil and political discourse of anonymous public 
which is less policed (Eickelman and Dickenson, 2003: 3). This in turn helped generate two 
effects. The first was the emergence of alternative configuration of norms that has either 
challenged or transformed the existing hegemonic social imaginary and the ideal of public at 
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large (Warner, 1992: 378-9). Secondly and consequently, the boundaries between the private 
and public have been bluffed. One effect of this developments has been that the open and 
increasingly accessible modes of communication helped give a lesser degree of state 
broadcast control and instead diffused 'the normative language of Islam' (Eickelman and 
Dickenson, 2003: 1). 
These developments in media were helped by the era of 'media privatization' that referred to 
the opening of communication space 'for licensing to commercial broadcasting' by the state 
(Price, 2002: 93). As the relevant literature stressed, the impact of these competing narratives 
on the capacity of the state has clearly been a concerning issue for the authoritarian 
governments (Postman, 1984: 16-30; Comer, 1999: 21-3; Price, 2002: 197). For instance, as a 
result of and through these communication opportunities the 'Muslim public' in Turkey began 
to more openly 'challenge or limit state and conventional religious authorities and contribute 
to the creation of civil society' (Eickelman and Dickenson, 2003: 1; Yavuz, 2003a: 15; 
Yavuz, 2003b: 181-184; Cakir, 1990: 267-79). 
-In the Turkish context these developments, however, have not necessarily designated a system 
of an 'independent'-, information circulation- bent on capturing the democratic content of. 
politics as opposed to state interests often cloaked as 'the national interest' (Kinzer, 2000). 
Put differently, what did not happen was a significant weakening of the hold of state security 
discourses and practices over the social and political agenda of civil society. In this context, 
what mattered was that the mainstream media often appeared as 'a mere surrogate or alter ego 
of the state-as was often the case in Russia, Malaysia, and Turkey' (Price, 2002: 95). Indeed, 
to make sure that the press would remain a 'surrogate of the state', press freedom was put 
under siege in Turkey throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (Kinzer, 2000: 147-66). As 
documented by the 'Committee to Protect Journalists'; dozens of journalists were imprisoned 
for their work under restrictive laws. As they predict: 
Despite the recent improvements, Turkey has a long way to go to reach press freedom 
standards acceptable for a democracy. Turkish law, even under the reforms, still 
allows for journalists to be criminally prosecuted and imprisoned for their work (CPJ. - 
Attacks on the Press Annual Report, 2004). 
One particular reason for this dependent character of the media has been related to the fact 
that the journalists in Turkey have traditionally acted not as 'neutral brokers', but as 
115 
'Jacobinist journalists'. That is, the journalists perceived themselves 'as the guardians of 
public interest, as they themselves interpreted it' and 'as the holders of the ultimate truth' 
(Heper and Demirel, 1996: 120-1). These 'Jacobinist journalists' subscribed to the 'rationalist 
democracy' espoused by the military. According to Heper and Demirel, they 
[h]ave tried to shape the political regime's policies and the course of events in polity 
and society by trying to mould public opinion. They looked on democracy as basically 
theirfreedom to engage in this type of activity ... When that happened they tended to 
magnify the issue, sometimes to crisis proportions, which, of course, did not bode well 
for regime stability and for maintaining a delicate balance between political 
participation and prudent government, both of which are critical for the consolidation 
of democracy (1996: 121, emphasis original). 
This Jacobinist identity orientation of journalists in turn has had practical policy stances in 
regard to the countries' pressing social and political problems. In addition to the limitations on 
the freedom of press introduced often after the military interventions, 'a culture of self- 
censorship' ensued in the press (Kinzer, 2000). This self-censorship put a curb on the 
'objective' coverage of such sensitive topics as the religious liberties, the Armenian 
massacres, Kurdish identity, the cult of Ataturk and the role of the military, which have been 
deliberately avoided by the press (Alpay, 1993: 83; Kinzer, 2000: 151-5; Jung and Piccoli, 
2001: 102). 
In relation to the media's role in security governmentality, even a hasty glance at the 
headlines of the main Turkish mainstream media in the second half of the 1990s would reveal 
how often private (cultural-religious) choices of the individuals and groups had been 
presented by these journalists in a security language (Akpinar, 2001; Cevizoglu, 2001). 
Indeed, the 1990s were a period of the identity-based politics that subsumed 'all forrns of 
class and ideological divisions in identity categories [and] political debate became dominated 
by the themes of Islam vs. secularism, Sunni vs. Alevi, and Kurd vs. Turk' (Yavuz, 2002: 
202). In this process, the mainstream news media contributed to rather than helped redress the 
practice of identifying friends and enemies of the state (Heper and Demirel, 1996: 118-9). It is 
essential then to take into account such an alarmist-dramatized security articulation by the 
mainstream media of the private choices of the individuals/groups. For, the effects of 
confrontation between the individuallgroups of Islamic persuasion and the secularist 
military/civilian circles are heightened by the media 
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It has been argued that the role in memory of photographs/imagery and narratives of 'enemy 
and friend' is 'more important for their role in priming pre-existing interpretive schema, 
linking the viewer's memory to familiar news categories and scenarios than their referential or 
descriptive function' (Griffin, 2004: 384). In Turkey, especially the private TV channelles 
'informed' the news audience by the seemingly unvarnished narrative and visual images 
regarding what constituted the 'enemy' or 'danger' to the secular nature of the state in the 
form of certain representations of the individual life-styles such as religious dress codes. As 
argued below, throughout its repeated and enduring representations of its enemy-producing 
images; the media played an important role in the military intervention of 28 February 
Process. In other words, the news media in Turkey helped establish enduring images that 
sustained a 'dominant representational paradigm' (Griffin, 2004: 383) with regard to the role 
of the military, enemies (i. e. Islamists) and friends (i. e. secularists) of the state. 
The influence and sophistication attained by the military interventions can hardly be grasped 
without taking into account the role of the mainstream media. Indeed, the military polished its 
techniques of intervention over the body politic with the benediction of the mainstream media 
'(I-owry, '2000; Kinzer. ' 2000). In the process the military and the'media have particularly 
brought into the living rooms of the audience chimerical fears to haunt and circumvent public. 
opinion on the relevant issue at hand in order to securitize an otherwise political problem 
(Yavuz, 2000b). The media-helped securitizations resulted in removing issues from the realm 
of politics and placing them instead into the supposedly apolitical security field, which 
requires the expertise and knowledge of the security actors such as the military. As Cizre 
argues: 
During the 1990s, the secret behind the military's strength lay not just in its 
traditionally control oriented discourse but also in the inroads the TSK [the Turkish 
military] has made on the fabric of Turkish society. In this regard, the military's 
agenda has been supported by a media that, whilst formally independent and 
pluralistic in structure, has purveyed a monistic nationalistic image (2003: 217). 
Within this context, it is possible to argue that especially since the mid-1990s the mainstream 
media in Turkey has helped the construction of 'security threats' particularly in its secularist 
contributions to the ensuing war of words and images between secularists and the Islamists 
(Heper and Demirel, 1996: 118). This was particularly so between June 1996 and June 1997 
when the Islamist coalition government was in power (Yavuz, 2003a: 244). The mainstream 
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media's representations of the religious dress codes such as headscarf as 'security threats' has 
helped to 'symbolize generalities, providing transcending frames of cultural mythology or 
social narratives in which the viewer/reader is led to process and interpret other information 
on the page or screen' (Griffin, 2004: 384). 
Such an approach to the mainstream media indicates that the springboard between discursive 
and institutional techniques of intervention in security governmentality is partly conferred by 
the visual and print media. Here, the Turkish media, that is the mainstream media, can be seen 
as a major crucial linkage between state intervention and individual conduct. To do so, the 
media literally and visually (e. g. selective photo-editing) singles out, names and shames 
certain (religious) individuals because of the 'security threat' associated with their otherwise 
private life-choices such as sending pupils to religious schools, religious dress codes and 
bodily expressions such as beard-shaving or accessories and so on (Akpinar, 2001: 160-4). 
Certain religious individuals are represented as 'deviants', who are held as potential criminals 
by the very virtue of their life-choices that could allegedly subvert the secular 'nature of the 
state'. 
-th -styles and spaces were skillfully publicized and carried This way, c . 'dangerous' private life 
onto the political sphere by representational strategies of the mainstream media in a 
particularly dramatized security language, which aggrandized the fears of the secularist ruling 
elites (Ahmed Ozcan, 2000: 56-7; Yavuz, 2003a: 248). In the process, the media acted not as 
neutral brokers but rather as an intermediary functional securitizing actor in the various 
securitization processes. It did so in two ways. Firstly, it carried the messages and images of 
the 'security threats' to the attention of the securitizing military elites. Secondly and after it 
diffused these 'security threats', the media circulated the securitizing message of the military 
for the attention of the general audience. In this while, the mainstream media acted as a 
'functional securitizing actor' (Buzan et. al., 1998: 36). In other words, securitization of the 
individual life choices was assisted by the mainstream media. It provided both the referent 
object of securitization and the main venue for the securitizing message. The mainstream 
segments of the Turkish media served as a significant contributor to the securitizing act of the 
military along with the other relevant institutional actors. 
In short, the mainstream news media in the 1990s and 2000s chose to voice a particularly 
elitist and alarmist-security language in reproducing certain secular, national and masculine 
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subjectivities. In this process, the related news are made functional for security politics by 
using an alarmist security discourse as the main medium to understand and color certain 
policies as security rather than purely political matters. 
Secutitization 
Securitization as a technique in security govemmentality basically functions as a political 
instrument for the state elites to intervene into the domestic political and private spaces by 
blocking or rear-ranging normal political process (Buzan et al., 1998: 28). This is done most 
visibly through naming 'the secular-nature of the state' as the most reverend and threatened 
referent object of security. The logic runs as follows. Because the secularity of the state is 
'being existentially threatened', the survival of the state is at stake, which in turn forces the 
state elites to lift the related range of policies above ordinary politics and to assign 'a special 
urgency and necessity' or 'a swiftness and drama high enough to make a point of no return 
credible' (Laustsen and Waever, 2000: 708). 
In the Turkish case, it can be argued that the securitizations iD security govemmentality 
provide and locate the military in both an ontological and strategic space in Turkish politics. 
First,. -securilization-moves grant an ontological space in that in these moves the! military L, - 
represented as the secular and uniting agent of the state. A strategic space is also endowed by 
the securitizing discourse that declares the military as a means for 'protecting and preserving' 
the policy of 'the indivisible entity of the Turkish state with its territory and nation'. 
The construction process of state securitizations can be traced back to the Cold War period, 
when the communist ideology was taken as a 'threat' by Turkish state elites. Later with the 
disappearance of the 'communist threat, there came a widening distance between Turkey and 
the Western world in the early 1990s mainly because of the absence of a unifying 'threat' like 
that of the 'communist menace' (Kubicek, 1995; Muftuler-Bac, 1996). Short of the latter, the 
state elites rushed in to point to the new security 'threats' in order not to lose their powerful 
position as security providers in the political system (Cizre, 2003). Crucially, at that time 
these threats were increasingly found at the domestic level (Jenkins, 2001). These were named 
as 'Islamist threat' against the 'secular nature of the state' and in this regard, political Islam 
was named as the most perilous 'threat' (Kosebalaban, 2002). From the mid-1990s onwards, 
the state's relations with any government or individual who happened to have any connections 
with this sort of threat were increasingly securitized. 
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Since the mid-1990s, the breeding context for securitizing private matters of the individual 
(e. g. the headscarf as a 'security threat', discussed in Chapter 5) is mostly related to relations 
between the secularist state and the Muslim society (Yavuz, 1997b). It is no secret that 
historically the relationship between the two was not established on grounds of mutual- 
identification (Mardin, 1971; Turkdogan, 2003). However, the political developments of the 
1990s that saw an Islamist government in power further exacerbated this already ailing 
relationship and rendered it more problematic (Cakir, 1994; Yavuz, 2000b: 35; Ergil, 2000: 
61; Carkoglu, 2004). Consequently and particularly from the second half of the 1990s 
onwards, the military elites (as the 'vanguards and guardians' of the Turkish Republic) 
increasingly resorted to a security discourse to increase the hold of the state over society and 
the political process (Cizre, 2003). This led to 'state interests' to come before societal or 
individual interests (Sozen and Shaw, 2003). It is in this context that the military employed 
the securitization of governmental policies and private lifestyles of individuals as a general 
rather than restricted method of political intervention in Turkey. 
According to- securitization theory it is. not the case -that'anyone wishing to employ 
securitization for political purposes can -do so and that: there -are -certain conditions fbr. ýa 
successful securitization (Buzan et. al, 1998: 28). However, it is not very clear what f/actors 
facilitate the process of securitization (Huysmans, 2002; personal correspondence 2004). Ole 
Weaver asserts (2000: 252) that securitization is not decided by one single sovereign subject 
and that it is inter-subjective, he goes on to suggest that: 
No condition (any number of tanks at the border) or underlying cause (motivation of 
leaders), not even a solid position of authority of the speaker of security, can make for 
a securitization-they can only influence a political interaction which ultimately takes 
place among actors in a realm of politics with the historical openness this entails. 
Arguably because of his take on (liberal) politics and/or lack of clarification of what he 
means by 'politics' Ole Weaver's formula does not help much at least in the Turkish case 
with identifying particularities of securitization (Johansen, 2001; Huysmans, 2004). The 
factors he downgrades can well be more than 'influences'. Following Michael C. Williams 
(1997: 287-307) it can be pointed out that formal organizational and institutional sources of 
securitizations can well be seen as more than 'influences' such as the military in the Turkish 
case. As argued in Chapter 2, the military in security governmentality enjoys a considerable 
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legitimacy unquestioned by the larger society (Demirel, 2003), and consequently its security 
discourses enjoy a hegemonic status in the public. 
Hence, it is worthwhile to note that some of these conditions of possibility for a 'successful 
securitization' exhibit rather different patteriis iii4the Turkish case than foreseen by the 
proponents of securitization theory (see Buzan et. al, 1998: 141; Weaver, 2000: 252-3). The 
degree of this difference makes a textbook adoption of securitization rather difficult. For the 
process of securitizing an issue does not merely take place at the political level. The 
securitizing agency is what makes the Turkish case rather unusual. The most accredited 
securitizing agent in the Turkish case is a democratically unaccountable security actor, 
namely the military (Yavuz, 2000b: 38). Furthermore, not only is the securitizing agent in 
most of the cases the military, but also it does so by quite independent of political process. 
Securitizing an issue in Turkey does not appear to be at the mercy of the political class or a 
particular political institution, say, PM office or defense ministry. In other words, 
securitization in Turkey does not necessarily spring from a political environment, which could 
ultimately be dependent upon to public and democratic scrutiny and democratic 
accountability. - 
This upper-hand in security field allowed the Turkish military to securitize some of the 
political matters almost at will (Cizre-Sakalligolu, 1997; Cizre, 2003; Insel, 1997; 2001). The 
issue area of state security for the military could involve not only the conventional themes of 
anti-terrorism laws, counter-insurgency or internal security arrangements, it also involves 
securitizing and criminalizing alternative lifestyles, identities and political activities for 
constraining the public debate (Yavuz, 2003a: 248; Insel, 2001; Cizre, 2003). In fact, it is not 
unusual to find the infusion of the military logic of security in other states. For instance, in the 
2000s the security agenda of U. S. was broadened to the effect that the exercise of US federal 
government power was reconfigured from being 'the old warfare state to the new crimefare 
state' (Andreas and Price, 2001: 36). However, it is arguably in the Turkish case that we can 
find one of the most proficient and skillful articulations of securitization as a technique of 
government. Most significantly for security governmentality, the securitization technique is 
not simply employed as a last resort method by the political class for dealing with the political 
quandaries of Turkey. Instead, it seems that particularly from the second half of the 1990s 
onwards when identity politics subsumed political debate, securitization has been one of the 
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most competent and effective methods of state intervention into public policy and private 
matters. As Yavuz argues, 
Securitization allows the military to deny autonomy to the civilian institutions that 
might recognize the identity claims of Kurds and Islamists. In accordance with its 
endowing ideology of Kemalism, the Turkish military regards ethnic or religious 
diversity as a cause of hatred and a precursor of disunity. This fear of ethnic and 
religious diversity guides the current state policy of depriving people of their ethnic 
and religious identities (2002: 201-2). 
In addition, Turkey's securitization process entertains other institutional mechanisms to 
become successful. The life-styles (dress codes) and private (religious) choices of the 
individuals or other societal groups have often been represented (by the military) in security 
language and put into circulation for the 'approval' not deliberation of the audience (citizens) 
through the mainstream media coverage. As argued above, the latter represent these private 
matters as 'perilous and threatening' practices by the dangerous men and women, who 
allegedly strive to destroy the 'secular nature of the state' (see Hurriyet, Milliyet and Sabah 
between June 1996 and June 1997). Another crucial issue of securitizing private images of 
certain religious practices is not analyzed in the theory, which, as Williams argues (2003: 
525-31), places the conditions of a successful securitization exclusively to the linguistic- 
discursive realm and thus offers little help here. 
Its important differences notwithstanding, securitizations in security governmentality can be 
understood as a successfully deployed, effective and major technique of political intervention 
at the service of the authorized military-led state elites. Particularly the 'threats' of political 
Islam and/or certain religious practices are cast as the newfound 'existential threats' to the 
secular state and help the power-holders to present and utilize securitization to protect their 
powerful positions in the political domain (for such an example see headscarf conundrum in 
Chapter 5). 
4.3. A CASE STUDY OF TECHNIQUES IN SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY: 
THE 28 FEBRUARY 1997'POST-MODERN COUP' 
To provide a model of intervention by the techniques discussed above, an important example 
is elaborated below. This is an account of one of the least-studied military interventions in 
Turkish politics. It is ordinarily called as the 'soft coup' or 'post-modem coup' of 28 February 
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1997 (Doxey, 1997: 12). Because of its relevance to the micro and macro techniques 
explained in this chapter and its understudied nature this particular intervention is put under 
scrutiny below. The 'post-modem coup' is discussed as a microcosm of the practical 
application of the micro- and macro-techniques in security govemmentality. This military 
intervention into domestic politics should not be grasped as an instant ousting activity, where 
an elected government would be simplyforced to side - step (Ergin, 2001: 14). After a brief 
description, the socio-ecenomic factors, techniques used and a general assessment of this 
&coup' will be presented below. 
The 1997 post-modem coup was unlike its predecessors in 1960,1971, and 1980 (Candar, 
Sabah, 29 February 1997 p. 18; Alkan, Radikal, 16 January 2001 p. 15). It was 'unique in 
style' in that it 'did not involve troops taking over the streets, the declaration of martial law, 
and the open assumption of civilian powers by the military' (Lowry, 2000: 41). Indeed, this 
post-modem coup represents a newfound style of military intervention and evades easy 
categorizations for two main reasons. Firstly, the military's extensive methods in the said 
intervention do not fall comfortably within the categories of a military coup found in civil - 
military relation literature (Cizre, 2003: 215-6). Secondly, this intervcntion is a peculiarly 
continuing intervention, one well-expressed in the term: the '28 February Process' (Sevinc, 
2000: 60-71). Indeed, instead of thinking it in terms of a classic coup d'etat, the post-modem 
coup of 1997 can be defined as an attempt at 'social engineering' by the military (Insel, 1997: 
17; Cigdem, 2000: 26). As General Cevik Bir put it 'the phenomenon of 28 February is the 
integration of the Turkish public and the Turkish Armed Forces through the phenomenon of 
social engineering. The 28 February has been conducted together [that is] with the Turkish 
military as the social engineer and the Turkish Republican Public' (quoted in Insel, 2001: 13). 
The 1997 post-modem coup was an unconventional military intervention into domestic 
politics in the name of state security that ended in toppling the elected pro-Islamist Refah 
(Welfare) coalition government in the summer of 1997 (Salt, 1999: 72-8). The coup and the 
subsequent '28 February process' were rooted in the declaration of the 'eighteen measures' 
that were designed to thwart the perceived threat of Irtica (Islamic fundamentalism) to be 
implemented by the Islamist Refah-led coalition government (Gokmen, 2002: 347-50). On 28 
February 1997, after an 'eight-hour marathon' meeting in the NSC with the generals, the PM 
Erbakan had to put his signature to the military's demands, which risked confronting his 
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constituency and 'thereby seemingly endorsing the power of the NSC to mandate state policy 
on domestic issues' (Lowry, 2000: 4 1). 
For a while, the Refah government shied away from implementing the 'eighteen measures' 
and other secularist ultimatums of the military fearing that it would alienate its religious 
constituency. However, under the sustained military-media 'public campaign', the Refah 
government was forced to resign on 18 June 1997 (Salt, 1999: 72-8; Carkoglu, 2004: 111). 
Later in January 1998, the Constitutional Court decided to close down the Refah party on the 
grounds that it posed a 'threat to the secular nature of the state' responding positively to the 
accusations of State Prosecutor Vural Savas, who claimed that the Islamist party ran foul of 
Article 69/6 and 68/4 of the Constitution by becoming 'a centre of anti-secular activities' 
(Savas, 2001a: 260). 
Consequently, the military-led state and civilian elites spectacularly managed to pull off a 
coup in the name of securing the secular nature of the state from an elected and fully 
, legitimate civilian government. The military 'justified' its undemocratic involvement by 
resorting to the discourse of security of the secular state (Doxey, 1997: 12-3). This was a 
media-simulated coup since the military's securitizing message was carried out in the live 
coverage. It was made possible not through the physical forces of the military but by utilizing 
6civilian' methods and actors (i. e. the agitating mainstream news media and some civil society 
groups (Gokmen, 2002: 350, ft. 6). Therefore, throughout its 'secularist jihad' against the 
Islamists in power, the military put into use an audacious and effective securitization strategy 
with the help of a media campaign to outpost the elected 'Islamist government' (Aydintasbas 
1998: 32). This intervention was later playfully named as a 'post-modem coup' by one of its 
Generals (Former Secretariat of Chief of Staff, General General Erol Ozkasnak Hurriyet, 15 
January 2001, p-1,17). Later, in a revealing passage this event was also described by another 
General as 'an ongoing reaction to a security problem' (Interview with the former 
Commander of the Naval Forces General Salim Dervisoglu, in Cevizoglu, 2001: 16-7, italics 
oiiginal). 
The Socio-Economic Factors 
Following the international systemic changes of the early 1990s, Turkey's social and political 
predicaments were exacerbated (Muftuler-Bac, 1996). The state elites could no longer easily 
reap the benefits of the Cold War global security and political structure, which had largely 
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allowed the state to bottle up the demands of different social and identity groups for wider 
recognition and representation in the political process (Muftuler-Bac, 2000; Bilgin, 2002). 
Domestically, the liberalization process of the 1980s in Turkey reflected itself as a booming 
economy and brought in a newly emerged economic class named as 'Anatolian Tigers', 
whose demands included the assertion of their religious identity and space for recognition and 
public visibility (Bugra, 1998; Onis, 1997; 2001). The so-called 'Anatolian Tigers' were 
comprised of rather traditional families forrning small-medium size firrns and coming from 
the communities preserving their Islamic culture and identity (Yavuz, 1997a; Bugra, 1998; 
Jacoby, 2004: 149). They utilized 'opportunity spaces' in civil society and then moved into 
the 'political opportunity structure to make demands for making political, social and 
economic inclusion, in addition to justice' (Yavuz, 2003a: 15). Drawing on developments of 
the international system in the 1990s to find a helping new discourse of human rights, 
multiculturalism and democratic governance that were seen as the new norms, challenging the 
state-centric international system; these groups used to using human rights and democratic 
rights as a legitimate basis for expressing their Islamic identity claims (Gulalp, 1997a; 1997b; 
Bayramoglu, 2001: 70; Dagi, 2005). 
Contrary to the expectation of this economically powerful and politically ambitious emergent 
class and the globalization of democratization norms, the Turkish state apparatus shied away 
from such demands and responded by launching a secularist reaction (Gulalp, 1999; Yavuz, 
2000a). Instead of accommodation and compromise, a thoroughgoing domestic conflict 
ensued between the self-styled secularist and Islamists (Yavuz, 2000b). The state together 
with the visual and rhetorical representational devices of the mainstream news media 
managed to present and painstakingly criminalize certain private religious conducts (e. g. 
headscarf ban) and demands of individuals (e. g. sending pupils religious schools) (Insel, 
2003: 132-5). This way, certain segments of society were stigmatized for trying to express 
their private-religious preferences in the public sphere as 'threats' to the 'secular nature of the 
state' (Gole, 2002). 
Indeed, after the second half of the 1990s Islamic religious life-styles of the individual 
citizens have been increasingly presented by the military-dominated state elites as 
'threatening' to the secular nature and security of the state (Karaman, 1999). The individual 
private religious choices such as certain dress codes and bodily expressions were increasingly 
securitized (for a detailed chronicle of this and other events see Akpinar, 2001). The military 
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legitimized its interventions by taking a security perspective against such social and political 
Islamic groups and reduced 'major social, political, and economic problems to security issues' 
(Yavuz, 2002: 203). In this manner, not only the Islamists but also many citizens of Islamic 
persuasion were accused of trying to convert the secular Turkish state into a religious 
theocratic state (Kosebalaban, 2002; Cizre, 2003). As mentioned, in confronting such 
'domestic security threats', however, the military set aside its previous methods of 
intervention such as staging coups d'etat, overthrowing and punishing the governments. 
Instead, the military was able to instigate a catalog of techniques, which included both the 
necessary legal-constitutional contexts and the effective institutional assistance from the NSC 
and the media to oust the civilian government from power (Yavuz, 2003a: 244). 
Techniques of the 1997 Post-Modern Coup 
In an attempt to grapple for the meaning of the post-modem coup of 1997, a leading student 
of Turkish politics Professor Metin Heper recently stressed that an adoption of Eric 
Nordlindger's typology of military coups (1977) that concerns different styles of military 
interventions within 'Ruler, Moderate and Guardian' types could be of help in understanding 
this intervention and then named the 28 February intervention as an instance of the 'guardian 
type' (Interview With Metin Heper, Birmingham, 26 September 2003). Helpful though it 
seems, such characterizations of the 28 February 1997 intervention not only tend to gloss over 
the particular non-military methods used in this intervention such as securitization but also 
leave aside the crucial role played by other nominally 'civilian' agents such as the mainstream 
media in toppling the Islamist government. This was certainly a different military coup in the 
making. So much so, that when one of its central figures asked to define it, he grappled with it 
as follows: 
This 'post-modem coup' is a very successful ongoing process, which was done like a 
piece of cake, was like no old military coups, was without bloodshed, without making 
anyone sad, was approved by the NSC with very democratic practices and staged by 
the kind of people from the person on top of the state [the president] to every related 
ministry and even with our nation through civil society institutions (Former Secretariat 
Chief of Staff, Erol Ozkasnak, quoted in Cevizoglu, 2001: 56-7). 
The 1997 coup was no ordinary military coup in the sense that the military itself ruled out an 
old type coup with the military tanks rolling down the streets of the country on the grounds 
that such a crude military coup was 'not suitable for the [democratic] conditions of the 
country' (Interview with the former General Secretariat of the Chief of Staff Erol Ozkasnak, 
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Posta, 16 January 2001, p. 13). The military's main antagonist Islamist Refah government was 
brought down by the distinct techniques of security governmentality not by the crude show of 
the military force (Sevinc, 2000: 60-1). As explained below, in the main the peculiarity of the 
coup sprung from both the way it was conducted and the set of participants that took part in 
overthrowing the government from power. 
Macro-Techniques of the 1997 Post-Modem Coup: the Military and the NSC 
First, it should be noted that the NSPD was amended in 1997 by the military with a view to 
reordering the internal and external threat perception due mainly to new developments such as 
the increasing individual piety, religious activity, outward dress codes and coming to the 
power of the Islamic coalition government, as discussed in Chapter 5. In the new NSPD, the 
military defined 'domestic threats' as Islamic Fundamentalism, Kurdish Separatism and 
Organized Crime (Jenkins, 2001: 47). The crucial novelty here was that unlike the 1992 
NSPD, which named the Kurdish separatism as the primary domestic threat (Sevinc, 2000: 
68), the new NSPD instead placed Islamic fundamentalism as the primary threat and 'warned 
that what it described as. "political Islanf', namely the Turkish Islamist movement headed by 
the VVT [Refah Party], continued to pose a threat to the country's security' (Jenkins, 2001: 
48). 
Secondly, the military was not alone as an institution in staging this coup. As a legally 
responsible and authorized security institution, the military took an active part in the process 
with the help of and through other state institutions against such social and political Islamic 
leaning 'threats'. In this respect, an important institutional lever used by the military in the 
process was the Higher Educational Board (YOK), which is in control of the university 
administrations in Turkey. This was particularly pertinent in the military's efforts to keep the 
universities under control through the latter institution (see Carkoglu, 2004: 112 and Chapter 
8). To maintain the Kemalist doctrine in higher educational institutions and to cleanse 'all 
forms of Kurdish or Islamic identity claims' from educational settings, the military issued a 
new set of regulations to all the university administrations: 
The new regulations empowered the university administration to fire those who "acted 
against the Republic and its values" and to strip professors of their academic titles. 
Violators also could "lose their social security rights and face a life ban in state 
service... (Yavuz, 2002: 204). 
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Thirdly, having realized that it could not initially enforce the Islamist Refah government to 
abide by the NSC decisions, the military launched a novel public-media campaign to 
securitize the religious practices of the certain segments of the society and blamed then the 
ruling Refah Party for inaction against such 'security threats' (Akpinar, 2001; Yavuz, 2003a: 
244). Particularly, following the 31 March 1997 NSC meeting, the military resorted to a rarely 
seen technique of 'public briefings' in order to 'inform' the public about the 'security threats' 
posed by the Islamist religious activity (Akpinar, 2001: 229-32). In this 'campaign' against 
the Islamists, according to Yavuz, 'the military used the mass media, press briefings, 
conferences, and regular public announcements to inform public opinion about the threat to 
the existence of the state and homeland stemming from political Islam' (2002: 203). 
In the period between 1996 and June 1997, the Refah government's tenure and political 
agenda unfolded like football match frenzy covered live by the mainstream news-media 
ending with an enforced resignation of the government in June 1997. First, a media savvy 
inflation of fear and insecurity was created by the military's public campaign and press- 
briefings that securitized certain policies of the Islamist government by denouncing them as 
the 'clear signs' of an 'Islamist -counter-revolution', which allegedly amounted to -'an 
unprecedented anti - secularist, obscurantist and fundamentalist uprising against the secular 
Republic' (Then Commander of the Naval Forces General Salim Dervisoglu, Milliyet, 16 
January 200 1, p. 19). Further adding to the dramatic tension, the military regularly accused the 
government of harboring secretive and malign intention to subvert 'the secular nature of the 
state' (Former Secretariat of the Chief of Staff, General Erol Ozkasnak, Cumhutiyet, 16 
January 200 1, p. 1,19). 
Micro-Techniques: Media and Securitization 
All this while, a media army of nationwide newspapers and TV channels joined the 
securitizing chorus by dramatizing the unfolding details of the confrontation created by the 
military against the government (Cevizoglu, 2001). It was in front of the live coverage of the 
media channels that the military-dominated NSC intervened into politics by issuing its 
package of secularist measures (see Appendix 1) to be 'immediately implemented' against 
what the military called the 'Islamist threat' to the state survival (Shankland, 1999: 112). In 
order to thwart the 'threat of Islamist government' the military spearheaded a 'concerted 
civilian pressure mechanism' through organizing press-briefings between 1996 and 1997 
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(Interview with the Fonner General Secretariat of the Chief of Staff Erol Ozkasnak, 
Cumhuriyet, 16 January 200 1, p. 1). 
As to the architects of the intervention, the military was not the only significant actor to 
galvanize the 28 February Process against the 'threat of Islamists'. In the process, the 
military-orchestrated a political initiative that gained momentum and peaked with a public 
campaign, which has been schemed by the mainstream media, the state-sponsored big 
business groups, and powerful civilian and bureaucratic circles including some university 
academicians (Shmuelevitz, 1999: 16-23; Laciner, 2000: 16; Cigdem, 2000: 22-6). In all, the 
military 'encouraged' the so-called 'unarmed forces' of central civil society actors to join the 
bid to topple the government (Akpinar, 2001: 329; Gokmen, 2002: 347-50). Such 'civil' 
society institutions as the media, universities, business circles, labor unions took active part in 
ousting the elected government (Milliyet, 16 January 2001, p. 15). Hence, in order to push the 
elected government to accept its own downfall, the 1997 post-modem coup bore witness to 
the birth of the new military method that utilized legal, ideological and institutional sources 
such as the constitution, the NSC and the media rather than its tanks (Salt, 1999: 72-8). 
The military's public briefings were addressed to some civil society groups, the editors -and 
columnists as a method of airing the securitizing message and were in turn abundantly 
covered by the media in a dramatized secularist and sneering-berating tones (Akpinar, 2001: 
229-32). The military briefings represented secular concerns over the policies of the Islamist 
government. The mainstream media was of great help for the military in that it constructed 
spectacles out of seemingly spontaneous eventful stories that tended to be emblematic of such 
heated security themes as the danger posed by the Islamic dress codes (Lowry, 2000: 51-6). 
For instance, part of the frenzied media coverage in the early 28 February process was about 
the alleged attempts of the leaders of Turkey's major religious orders at subverting the 
secularity of the state together with the Refah government (Akpinar, 2001: 161). The specific 
event took place on 12 January 1997, when the religious leaders gathered at the PM's Office 
for a traditional fast-breaking in the holy month of Ramadan. The TV channels and later 
newspapers covered the event as a breaking-news. The entry into the PM Office as guests of 
the bearded leaders of religious orders dressed in religious robes visually and symbolically 
supported the verbal securitizing text. This event caused great controversy and was 
represented by other rival political parties, the press and the military as the 'penultimate 
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threat' and the manifestation of the challenge posed by the Islamist government to 'the secular 
nature of the state' (Akpinar, 2001: 160-4). 
Through these effective media coverages and 'public briefings', the Islamist party in power 
was on various occasions accused by the military of being 'costly' inactive at the time against 
such 'security threats' that tried to convert the secular character of the constitution, which is a 
criminal offence (Ahmed Ozcan, 2000: 56; Akpinar, 2001: 229-32). In these briefings and 
after presenting such cases of 'threatening' religious practices, the military often speculated 
about the 'coming of an Islamist political state' in Turkey that would wreck 'the secular 
nature of the state' and against which the government was doing so little (Ahmed Ozcan, 
2000). 
In all, the mainstream news media served the established narrative themes depicted within the 
parameters of the official security discourse that represented forms of dress as 'threats to the 
secular nature of the state. The visual information provided by images and photographs of 
bearded and robed men or especially females with veils or headscarf were put into use for 
manifesting the 'coming of the threat' to the secular character of the state (for a discussion. see 
Gole, 2002). Indeed, the role the media played in this, intervention was significant in that its 
representations of some religious dress codes as intrinsically 'dangerous' to the secular 
character of the state overshadowed any fuller or more complex range of depiction of those 
forms of dress. It simply provided ammunition to the confrontation by providing such news 
coverage. 
In this way, the securitizing discourse of the military against the religious activities of people 
and the Islamist party was put in full circulation for the public attention. The religious people 
in question and the Islamist Refah party in power used a democracy discourse claiming that 
these religious practices were private matters and as such they did not constitute any security 
threat to the state (Heper, 1997). Despite this counter-discourse, the military together the 
effective media coverage was successfully able to air its securitizing message for the 
population and express its political reactions against the government in such a way that would 
clearly be considered 'as anomalous for a liberal democracy', which is normally embraced by 
Turkey (Norton, 1995: 4; Demirel, 2004: 127). 
An Assessment 
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Overall, the military-managed post-modem coup and the subsequent '28 February Process' 
was a successful securitization that later resulted first in the overthrowing and then banning of 
the Islamist Refah party. It is true that the military's intervention targeted the Islamists in 
power and eventually forced it to resign just after one year of its power (Shankland, 1999: 
110-26). However, this was a different intervention in that it made use of distinct techniques 
of information-manipulation and securitization through a media savvy public campaign that 
led to the subsequent resignation of the Islamist PM. This is why the coup was shrewdly 
dubbed as a 'post-modem' military intervention by a veteran columnist (Candar, Sabah, 28 
June 1997, p. 23; Yeni Safak, 16 January 200 1, p. 11). Indeed, then the secretary of the Chief 
of Staff and one of the influential generals of the time, who took an active part in the 28 
February process, explained in an interview the logic of and reasons for the intervention and 
he also confirmed this post-modem nature of the intervention: 
Of course, the '28 February Process' can be considered as an activity of the Turkish 
Armed Forces. I am someone, who was given a role within that process. Prior to the 
28 February, there had been no period in the history of the Republic in which the 
foundations of the secular Republic were strenuously shattered by a legitimate 
government. [like that of the Islamist Refah Party]. There is no example of such. an 
event or process [like the 28 February]. The'leaders of the, Sheri'at [groupsl and 
-obscurantist, mentality 
in their-religious -caps and robes had never before been present 
in the Prime Minister Residence and posed on televisions. And the comments and 
images of the dribbling [like dogs] obscurantist people had never been aired that much 
on televisions of the country in the so-called 28 February process. Therefore, the 
efforts and struggles of such persons who played a role in this [intervention] Process 
were for preventing the country from falling into an obscurantist dark bog and from 
resembling the Iranian Mullah Republic. Some gave this [intervention] Process a very 
beautiful name: 'post-modem coup', a name given by cleverness. In fact, in my 
opinion the 'post-modem coup' is the best name given. This 'post-modem coup' is a 
very successful ongoing process, which was done like a piece of cake, was like no old 
military coups, without bloodshed, without making anyone sad, was approved by the 
NSC with very democratic practices and staged by the kind of people from the person 
on top the state [the president] to every related ministry and even with our nation 
through civil society institutions. The most active participants [of this intervention] 
were the Chief of the General Staff and other the commanders of the an-ny. (Interview 
with Erol Ozkasnak in Cevizoglu, 2001: 56-7) 
This ardently stage-managed military intervention led to the continuation of restrictions on the 
political rights of the new religious and ethnic communities and individuals (Salt, 1999: 74-7). 
In a press briefing for selected journalists on September 3,1999 for addressing the problems 
arising out of the devastating earthquakes of August 1999; then Chief of General Staff 
Kivrikoglu strayed from his 'prepared text' and most revealingly declared that: 
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On the 28th of February [1997] an 18 article decision was adopted by the national 
security Council. To date only four of the 18 recommendations contained in this 
decision (including that concerning basic education) have been enacted by legislation. 
However, we see no sign that there are efforts to push ahead with implementation of 
the remaining articles. We are also face to face with an approach which says that "the 
28th of February is over. " The 28th of February is a process. It began in 1923 and from 
that date until the present it has continued in keeping with the threat of irtica [Islamic 
fundamentalism]. We accept our role as the defenders [against irtica]. If necessary, the 
28th of February will continue for ten years. If necessary, one hundred years. If 
necessary, for a period of a thousand years. We are expecting parliament when it 
reconvenes on October Ist quickly to take up the matter of enacting legislation to 
implement the remainder of the February 28th decisions (Quoted in Lowry, 2000: 45). 
Indeed, what makes this intervention most peculiar is that unlike its previous three military 
interventions, the army carried this intervention through macro and micro techniques 
discussed above. That is, the military did not carry this intervention alone, but via the 
National Security Council (NSC) and through other institutions such as the media (Kinzer, 
2000). The specific discourse of the communiqu6 and the resultant 'post-modem coup' was 
. finely tuned to the securitization of the 
life styles and cultural demands of the mentioned new 
'Islamic groups _(Yavuz, 2003a: 
239-65). This'negating 'powerful campaign 'against the 
Islamists in. turn -aroused the. indignation of some -Islamic communities, which reacted in ia 
more aggressive and more critical tones by questioning the merits of such a stem secularist 
stance of the military (Akpinar, 2001: 166-72). The military elites then skillfully used this 
aggressive tone as a material 'proof' for their earlier accusations that these groups and their 
Islamist representation in government ran foul of the constitutional secular characteristic of 
the state and thus had to be ousted and punished (Akpinar, 2001: 240-1). 
The representation of the Islamic demands as 'security threats' to the 'nature of the state' hit 
the headlines almost daily throughout the rule of the Islamist Party between June 1996 and 
June 1997. The media reported continuously about the allegedly 'real intentions' of the 
Islamist Refah party in power as attempting to change the secular 'the nature of the state' for 
an 'Islamic Republic' despite the numerous declarations of the party to the contrary (Yavuz, 
1997a; Heper, 1997). Most crucially, this alarmist representational mode of the individual 
religious choices (dress codes, headscarf issue, attending the religious schools and other 
religious expressions) by the mainstream media in turn literally paved the way for the kind of 
securitization moves and subsequent 'extraordinary measures' taken up by the military 
(Shmuelevitz, 1999: 3940). In general the military accused the party of trying cunningly to 
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'take over the state by stealth' through the media and on various public declarations (Akpinar, 
2001: 240-1). Furthermore, the military capitalized on the media reports about the 'anti- 
secular' religious deeds of the party. 
The publicized eighteenth points were in essence the detailed list of the military-vision of 
politics, demanding the Islamist government to 'rectify' its ongoing failings in relation to the 
secular principles of the state (Shankland, 1999: 204-8). These points were read immediately 
on the national TV channels, giving the full dramatic tone to the course of events (TRT1- 
News, 28 February 1997). The military utilized this media savvy security campaign in order to 
force the Islamist PM to ultimately accept the NSC Recommendations designated as '18-point 
ultimatum' (Shmuelevitz, 1999: 36-7). Later, the Islamist PM bowed to the military-media 
pressure and resigned form government after the daily news that reiterated and shored up the 
military's allegations against the party (Shmuelevitz, 1999: 34-8). In line with the discussion 
of the techniques of security governmentality, the mainstream media astutely helped 
securitize the demands for recognition of the Islamist party and its electorate. Throughout the 
-period of the Islamist party government between June 1996 and June 1997, the agile and 
skillful -representational rhetorical and visual devices of the mainstream media helped 
securitize- the Aiscourse and private practices of the religious individuals as 'threaW-to the 
secular 'nature of the state'. Hence securitization was achieved successfully. 
The role the Turkish media played was of utmost importance, because in this incident it acted 
proficiently as the intermediary between the macro (the military and the NSC) and the n-dcro 
(individual and society) sources of security governmentality. These 'intermediary actions' by 
the media helped lock the relations between the acting units into a security logic and enmity 
after which the road to the 'orthodox logic of military dialectics' opened up (Buzan et aL, 
1998: 57). It is also through this usage of the media that the military's 'actions outside the 
normal bounds of political procedure' were justified in the eyes of those individuals, who 
already laid an unconditional trust on these two institutions namely the military and the media 
(Heper, 1997). 
In all, the 1997 post-modem coup was therefore a military intervention into politics made 
serviceable and operative through a catalog of techniques of intervention in security 
governmentality. The application of macro-interventionist techniques by the military and the 
NSC under a broadly defined security agenda (through the NSPD) is here combined with the 
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application of micro techniques such as the securitization of religious private conduct and the 
subsequent media coverage. Specifically, these techniques successfully represented the 
private cultural-religious choices of the pious citizens as 'security threats' to the secular state. 
The military was able to activate such an intervention mainly by linking the question of 
'survivability of the secular state' with the 'subverting religious practices' of the Islamist 
Refah Party in power. The military was also able to exert such a pressure upon the political 
r process by making inroads into the hearts and minds of the individual by launching the 
'public campaigns' with and through the channels provided by the media. The end result was 
that instead of accommodating such political demands of the religious citizenry into modem 
politics, the anomaly of a military-media coalition reigned at the expense of more pluralist 
liberal democratic values. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed the techniques of the security govemmentality in Turkey. It has 
argued that these techniques mainly contain two patterns that can be basically called as micro 
and macro strategies of intervention. The macro sources of intervention basically originate 
from two sources, the legal-institutional space of the NSC and. the military interventions. The 
working mode of the macro techniques is such that the formal aspects of the prevalent 
security understanding are first implicated in the legal and constitutional texts (such as the 
highly extensive national security concept and the fon-nal text of National Security Policy 
Document), and then these are utilized by the military as authorized means of intervention 
into politics primarily through the institutional space of the NSC. 
Secondly, there are micro techniques of security governmentality. These relate to socially 
oriented and rather subtler strategies of intervention chiefly targeting the individual conduct. 
The micro sources include two main aspects. The first is the securitization of socio-political 
affairs, representing individual life styles such as religious choices as 'security threats' to the 
4secular' nature of the state. The second method concerns the mainstream news media images 
and representations of the 'security threats' to the 'secular' nature of the state. In the last 
decade, beneath the platitudes of 'free press', the Turkish mainstream media has chosen to 
serve the state by representing these images for security-threat-production. Thereafter, it has 
become commonplace to represent outward expressions of religious garment of some 
citizenry as security threats to the state rather than as private religious choices mostly seen as 
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I normal' in liberal democracies. In so doing, the mainstream media employed a pro-state, 
striking alarmist-security language in reproducing and privileging secular, national and 
masculine identities over unvarnished news coverage or any other alternative political 
identities in the making. In this way, the print and visual media gained prominence and 
appeared as a powerful source of secularist opinion making and threat construction. 
Overall, the macro- and micro-techniques of intervention have proved to be very functional 
for the inner workings of security governmentality in that these interventions helped the main 
actor of security governmentality namely the Turkish military to make inroads into the 
political and social spaces to establish the mould of the predefined (secularist) human 
subjectivity. It can be argued that the Turkish military systematically has used these micro and 
macro techniques of intervention not only to ascertain the competence of the state but also to 
reproduce the legitimacy for its own political interventions. In other words, the military's aim 
for using such techniques has been to protect its politics of security from the named domestic 
dissenters and reestablish itself as the prime protector of the state. 
In view of that, a significant consequence of the usage of these techniques is the fact that the 
-military 
has prevailed as the most visible. employer of such techniques. Through, these 
techniques the Turkish military has acted as a democratically unaccountable but a politically 
over-active securitizing actor. It represented itself to the population as a 'credible' and 
6efficient' institution and used its 'historical mission' of being at the service of the country 
against all kind of external and internal threats. In this fashion, the Turkish military as a 
security actor has assumed the capacity of the most influential political institution within the 
existing state structure. It acted not simply as a traditional institution for external security 
provision but rather as a democratically unaccountable but legally and institutionally powerful 
domestic political agent. This is not to suggest that the military's established role of external 
defense ceased. Rather, it is to refer to the increasingly politicized role of the military and to 
highlight the corresponding results of its interactions with other actors and processes in 
Turkish politics. 
The chapter also noted that the macro and micro interventions have not served as a 
homogeneous or uniform pattern of military intervention that could be seen in the example of 
a coup d'etat, which haunt political systems from outside. Instead, these techniques were seen 
as attempts to haul politics and private conducts into the preconceived programmes and 
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fonnula, which are reflective of a set of pro-state and/or illiberal knowledge and values. 
Consequently, the Turkish military found venues of participation into the political process not 
as an unwelcome outsider but as a 'virtues' agent of the state bereft of the democratic 
accountability but dutiful to the state secularism and 'reason of state' rationalities of security 
govemmentality. It was largely through these techniques that the security govemmentality 
reproduced itself and gave the Turkish military ample ground to reach deep down into 
Turkey's socio-political divide. 
On the whole, the macro- and micro-techniques of intervention have four main consequences 
for security governmentality (for other consequences see the Conclusion). First, the chief 
undercurrent within these techniques is a security rationale manifestly in line with the 
rationalities of security governmentality argued in the Chapter 3; namely fostering the 
strength of 'reason of state' and the secular character of the state against internal and external 
challengers, which are legally and constitutionally named as 'security threats'. Secondly, the 
micro- and macro-interventionist patterns expand the boundaries of state security not only 
conceptually, but institutionally and politically- as well. Thirdly, these techniques inculcate a 
socio-political space of confrontation between the state and the individuals/groups. A sense of 
Jear- and insecurity prevail, which in turn rnight call for the military- to provide. security. 
Fourthly, democratic institutions and processes are weakened, because the state in general and 
the Turkish military as a security actor in particular is disproportionately empowered in the 
decision- and policy-making processes at the expense of such other groups as the civilian 
governments in power and the non-state agents including the intellectuals, ethnic-religious 
groups and women. In short, these techniques 'correspond to a society controlled by 
apparatuses of security' (Foucault, 2000: 221). 
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CHAPTER 5 
IDENTITY IN SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY 
This chapter aims to establish the identity dimension of security governmentality that gained 
salience especially since the mid-1990s. The broad argument of the chapter is twofold. Firstly, 
the identity dimension in Turkey's security governmentality emerges from the state-imposed 
distribution of secular vs. Islamic identities and secondly this distribution generates a 
confrontational politics between the state and the society. Crucially, the ensuing political 
confrontation between these two identity orientations has been couched in state security 
discourses of security governmentality. To have an understanding of the political furor this 
confrontation between the secular and the religious sets off, the chapter investigates the 
processes of secular vs. Islamic identification. Here, the secularist identity refers to the 
political identity of the state elites and lay the groundwork for their ethical course of action. 
Islamic identity is upheld by the Islamist political parties who want to react to the state- 
imposed secular identity. To understand the confrontation between the two, the chapter first 
examines the attempts to secularize the society -by the state elites. Secondly, the chapter 
probes the - counter-identity of Islam. Thirdly, the - chapter - examines -the ensuing 
confrontational logic and political space deriving from these two identity orientations and 
their implications for security goverrimentality. Lastly, the chapter presents a case that 
illustrates the political relevance of these two identities. 
Identity in Security Governmentality 
The pertinent issue here is that the discourses and practices of state security aim to foster, 
promote and attribute various capacities, lifestyles, aspirations, identities to certain individuals 
and groups with a view to making politically distributed identities such as a good citizen, 
activist, conscious consumer, hooligan, secular person, pious and so on. It is in this context 
that spaces of politics and bodies/selves are linked. The state elites attempt to 'affect and 
shape in some way who and what we are and should be' (Dean, 1999: 12). Therefore, it is 
imperative to get a grasp on the operative context of the state's ambitious attempts to 
distribute identities for the people, since it is chiefly through these particular forms/channels 
that 'the statutes, capacities attributes and orientations are assumed of those who exercise 
authority and those who are to be governed' (Rose, 1998: 10; Dean, 1999: 32). 
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Undoubtedly, these two orientations (i. e. secularist/Islamist) do not exhaust the available 
venues of identity formation for the population concerned. Nonetheless their relevance to our 
present study is of significance since the confrontational space they produce is a constitutive 
of the security discourses and practice of security governmentality. It is also equally important 
to note that the emphasis upon confrontation does not implicate a primordial or in-built 
necessity for conflict but rather a politically constructed and conflictual political space 
between those who advocate stringent secularist principles/policies and those who endorse an 
Islamic political identity and the subsequent life-world it purports to represent. 
Here, the secularists are defined as the state elites, which include the military but also parts of 
the state bureaucracy, civil society associations, bankers, professors and artists (Heper, 1997). 
The Islamic political identity, on the other hand, is found as an expression in the form of party 
politics (Yavuz, 1997a). It also includes a cultural space sprung from Islamic networks of 
communication and dissemination of Islamic culture through newspapers, books, television 
channels together which help constitute an Islamic 'counter-elites' (Mardin, 1983: 139; Gole, 
1997a; 53-7; Howe, 2000: 4). 
5. - 1. SECULARIZATION OF THE POLITICAL IDENTITY 
As argued in Chapter 3, Turkish state secularism does not correspond to the Anglo-American 
experience of secularity, but rather from the antireligious French model that seeks to eliminate 
or control religion (Candar, 2000: 124-8; Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xvi; Tank, 2005: 6). To 
recall, in the Western tradition, secularism is generally seen as the result of functional 
differentiation of society-economy, rationalization and modernization, which lead to an 
historical process of separation between sacred and profane and between state and religion 
(Berger, 1969; Bruce, 1996). It is generally argued that secularity of liberal politics limits the 
primary purpose of Christianity to that of individual 'therapy' in that secular liberalism fosters 
the public/private divide, scales down the truth claims, shifts the focus of religious activity 
from the social to the individual and so on (Bruce, 2000: 35-9). It is in this context that 
'religion has been displaced and denuded and the guardians of orthodoxy have either actively 
promoted the new order or acquiesced in it' (Bruce, 2000: 35). Furthermore, the distinction 
between private sphere (interior thoughts, beliefs, emotions) and public sphere (government, 
market) serves as a legal protective umbrella for the Church-State separation and the tensions 
that might arise between (Garvey, 1993b: 38). 
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Contrary to this liberal tradition, the Turkish state elites do not necessarily have in mind 'the 
normative ideal of secularism' (Keane, 2000: 5-6) as a necessary condition of a pluralist 
democratic order. It is vital to note that in Turkey the term secularism does not conjure up the 
oft-cited ideal definition of secularity as the separation of temporal/profane from 
spiritual/metaphysical in policy and law-making or as cutting 'the umbilical cord between 
heaven and earth' (Madan, 1987: 753). That is, the oft-cited liberal characterisation of 
secularity as the separation of Church and State does not apply to the state's secular identity. 
Significantly and paradoxically, secularists in Turkey do not necessarily believe that the 
clergy should, to quote Alexis de Tocqueville, 'give up the support of the state rather than to 
share its vicissitudes' (quoted in Marquand and Nettler, 2000: 1). On the contrary, various 
political uses of Islam by the state-albeit paradoxically-have been a recurrent technique of the 
security govemmentality. The Turkish state's secularization program from its embryonic 
stages onwards displayed a mode of state control over religiosity of the people. Well-known 
scholar Ali Fuat Basgil pointed out that this misplaced-secularism in Turkey led to a clamp 
down on various religious freedoms, which generated a system of a 'state dependent religion' 
(quoted in Demirel, 2003: 234). 
These differences in perceiving secularism notwithstanding, the Turkish state, together with 
the Iranian state under the Pahlavi rule, has often been characterized as exemplary of 'radical 
secularization' and as an adamant secular fortress in the Middle East (Najmabadi, 1991: 54- 
5). Starting with the establishment of the principle of secularism in the Turkish political 
system in 1937, the founder of the Turkish state Mustafa Kemal Ataturk himself 
unequivocally saw the role of religion (specifically Islam) as antithetical to the development 
of the modem Turkish state and society in his ambitious modernization project (Tank, 2005: 
5). He had this to say: 
The Turkish Revolution signifies a revolution far broader than the work revolution 
suggests ... It means replacing an age-old political unity 
based on religion with one 
based on another tie, that of nationality (quoted in Nadolski, 1977: 539). 
Replacing religion with nationalism and secularism as an identity and the 'nature of the state' 
was a palpable difference that marked the distinction between the theocratic political system 
of the Ottoman Empire and the modem Turkish state (Kasaba, 1997: 24). However, while 
other institutional structures of the new Turkish republic had been modelled upon the western 
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examples (such as the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Penal Code), Turkish secularization, 
as explained above, did not entail a fully adapted western secular model in which a private 
space for Islam free from the state control could be set up (Esposito and Yavuz, 2003). 
Likewise, the appeal of the 'totalistic ideology' of French Jacobinism, which espoused 'the 
possibility of transforming society through totalistic mobilized participatory political action' 
(Eisenstadt, 2000: 596) was quite tangible for the Turkish state elites (Candar, 2000). 
Concomitant to its radical project of secularism, the Turkish state had to 'intervene' forcefully 
in the sacral domain of religion and thus-in stark contrast to private-public/state-society 
distinction in the liberal western tradition-violated its citizens' private spheres in the name, 
and as the self-declared agent, of modernization. While state elites were attempting to bring 
Islamic authority under the full control of secular state, secularism was gradually 
institutionalized within the state: for instance, a Directorate of Religious Affairs, operating 
directly under the prime ministry, was established so as to bring all religious activities under 
complete state authority. 
As argued in Chapter 3, one major reason for this was that secularism was firmly embraced by 
the -central Kernalist elite for -whom Islamic religion became 'synonymous -with 
obscurantism', which should be kept under'state control. The secularism the state. -has 
espoused in Turkey has been reminiscent of 'the dominant French assimilationist model, 
rooted across the political spectrum, [which claims] that to be truly French, Muslims must 
abandon the right to their own identity' (Bouteldja, The Guardian, 22 July 2005, p. 25). The 
principle of secularism has been strictly upheld and the public visibilities of Islamic religion 
were restricted to the extent that the state elites often looked 'for ways to overthrow Islam, 
which in their mind was anathema to progress and whose demise was a prerequisite for 
survival of the state' (Candar, 2000: 124, emphasis added). So much so, as political scientist 
Binnaz Toprak argues, the politically powerful force of 
Kernalist secularism has been strictly safeguarded by the courts, the mainstream of 
university circles, much of the press and the military all of which are important centres 
of public opinion formation as well as major sources of influence on public policy. 
This vigil over secularism has resulted in state control over all political activity 
directed toward promotion of religious interests (1993: 627-8). 
Since the setting up of the Turkish Republic, secularism, contrary to its ideal-ideological 
character, became, in large measure, the embodiment of the belief that Islam was inimical to 
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the logic and development of modernization and was an 'obstacle' in the process of 
westernization. The religious-cultural elements were seen as the remnants of the Ottoman 
state and society and as such were represented as having 'vigorous resistance to westernized 
innovation'. This 'resistance' necessarily came to an abrupt end with Kemal Ataturk's 
secularist revolution after 1923, which led to 'the collapse of the existing [Ottoman] order and 
the formulation of an entirely new rationale of state and society' (Spencer, 1961: 272,276). 
Once perceived and upheld this way, the political changes led to a relatively swift launch of 
the project of secularization of Turkish society. This cognitive outlook on secularism and 
Islam was perhaps more widespread and gripping than any other example in the Middle East. 
For instance, unlike the Iranian example, where secular legacy was challenged also from the 
secular left in addition to the religious right; in Turkey 'Ataturk left a secular republican 
legacy behind in Kernalism that continues to this day as the dominant ideology of the Turkish 
ruling elite' (Tehranian, 2003: 92). 
For the Turkish state elites, the appeal of secularism lies in its ability to cut off the Islamic- 
influence on body politic rather than its democratic value (Kadioglu-9 1998b). Starting with the 
new republic,. secularization attempts -in the Turkish context appeared as an outright elite 
project to foster individual secular subjectivities in society (Kadioglu, 1998a). After the 
establishment of the new Republic in 1923, the Kernalist secularization project embarked 
upon formation of a new identity for the Turks through corresponding legal and institutional 
practices (Helvacioglu, 1999; Jacoby, 2004: 80). In this process, the Kemalist ruling elites 
wanted to replace Islam's role as a source of social identity with that of modem national and 
secular identity. As Eleanor Bisbee (1951) explained, the ruling elites took on board the 
western cultural and institutional codes of life-conduct for the construction of 'New Turks'. In 
so doing, the new republic wandered off the Islamic markers of identity pertaining to social 
and political arrangements. As Spencer argued: 
The decades since 1923 have seen the wholesale eradication of the cultural virtually 
all that was traditional in Turkish culture and society. The Turks had learned to live 
with new legal codes, with an essentially new economic system, a new calendar, with 
new modes of dress (1961: 275). 
Building a new source of identification from the moribund Ottoman Empire's multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious identity-structure proved that the question of finding a new secular 
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identity for the new Turkish Republic would be of no small magnitude though. Firstly, the 
religious-symbolic Islamic administrative system under the political wing of sultan-caliphs of 
the Ottoman state was seen an impediment in building a Turkish national identity. To secure 
the establishment of the latter, Ataturk and his followers resorted to 'enforced culture change' 
through institutional, legal and educational reforrns from 1924 to 1937 (Spencer, 1958: 642). 
They abolished the office of the caliph, religious schools, ecclesiastical law courts, and the 
Ottoman ministry of religious affairs. They introduced decrees suppressing the religious 
orders, shrines and houses. New legal and dress codes from Western Europe were introduced; 
Arabic alphabet was replaced by Latin alphabet. The Gregorian calendar instead of Islamic 
lunar (Hicri) and sonar (Rumi) calendars were also adopted. The official weekly holiday was 
changed from Friday (the Muslim Sabbath) to Sunday. To further conform to the European 
family patterns, family surnames were adopted. The latter change in names together with the 
change in alphabet constituted perhaps the most radical reforms to break with the traditional 
sources of identification in order to attain the modem forrn of national identity. Through less 
or no access to the Islamic-Arabic literature because of the language reform and lineage 
differentiation induced by the family names; these changes made the Turkish people less 
conscious of their genealogy (Spencer, 1958: 643-6; Jacoby, 2004* 80-1). 
Behind these radical transformation efforts was one important conviction on the part of 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his colleagues, which to date informs the views of the secular 
forces in security govemmentality. This was the conviction that the westernizing state agents 
of the late Ottoman reform process (Tanzimat) had got it wrong. That is, the elites of 
Tanzimat declined to see that in order to get to the (instrumental) rationality of the West, 
which was seen as crucially necessary for the security and prosperity of the state; there was to 
be not piecemeal butfull westernization including that of changing the individual and social 
identity away from Islamic markers and frontiers toward the western cultural edifice (Mardin, 
1990: 161-80; Ahmad, 1993: 52-7 1). 
Hence, it should be noted that secularism served another important purpose: a guiding identity 
for the Turkish state elites. In other words, secularism for the elites has been a marker of 
identity. Through different outward codes, mediums and expressions of secularism; the state 
elites have come to experience and exhibit a sense of group persona, identity and distinction 
(Gole, 1997a: 46-50), which is likely to appear within 'a hierarchy of worth' (Kandiyoti, 
1997: 119-20). One major source and outcome of this rather unusual political appropriation of 
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secularism is that the secularist state elites have an exclusive self-image. They are, according 
to Hakan Yavuz, 
Like the ancient prophets of Israel, they believe they have a duty to guide an exodus 
from the Ottoman-Islamic past, and they use the French conception of rigid secularism 
as a compass to determine the direction of the exodus (Yavuz, 1997a: 65). 
In this view, since western civilization did not include an Islamic precept, neither should the 
Turkish modernization project. For the ruling elites of the new Turkish Republic, the 
Tanzimat remained largely as a political reordering and was not complemented by a social 
and cultural revolution. According to their view, the social body as well was to be 
transformed. Kemal Ataturk was determined to discard religion from Turkey's modernization 
project. This was his distinct approach to the issue of culture change. Overall, the 'significant 
strand to follow, then, in establishing the link between the Young Ottomans, the Young 
Turks, and Ataturk [has been] the weakening of Islamic content' (Mardin, 1962: 404). 
All these and other relevant revolutionary changes are rightly pointed out as an example of a 
&cultural revolution' or 'revolution of values', which brushed aside the institutional rebgiou,, -
legitimizing system and replaced it with a secular one (Mardin, 1971).. Through these 
iconoclastic legal changes, 'at a stroke, even the literate people were cut off from their past: 
overnight, virtually the entire nation was made illiterate' (Ahmad, 1993: 80). Particularly, 
these reforms gradually made a good deal of people oblivious to their Ottoman-religious and 
non-national sources of identity. In short, these changes 'aimed at destroying the symbols of 
Ottoman-Islamic civilization and substituting them with their western counterparts' (Toprak, 
1993: 630-1). Instead of Ottoman-Islamic civilization and traditional-religious identity, the 
Western identity soon became the only 'agent' of the Turkish modernization project in social 
political and cultural structure (Kahraman, 2003: 126). 
Just as in other new nation-states, it has been the state/state elites that represented what is 
modem (and western and secular) and attempted to mould its citizens in its own image. 
Religiosity, in particular Islamic identity, was cast in the language of traditionalism that 
urgently needed to be transformed (Yegen, 1996). Such obstacles on the road to 
modernization and to have a modem (secular and national) identity constituted security 
problematic for the state elites whose cognitive make up, shaped in unfortunate times of 
imperial breakup, matched religious traditionalism with underdevelopment and insecurity of 
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the state, reasoning that religiosity of the Ottoman state was the major cause of its late 
development vis-a-vis the westem/European states and ultimately its dismemberment. 
Because Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his colleagues saw the role of religion as detrimental to 
'order and progress' within the state, these secular changes got increasingly radicalized and 
shook to its core the role Islam had played historically in the social and political arrangements 
(Tank, 2005: 4-7). To strengthen the new Turkish state after the Ottoman decline, the new 
state elites cleansed the institutional Islam from the public sphere (Yavuz, 2000b). In terms of 
the emergent political identity of the state, Islam was further displaced from the public sphere 
by disbanding the institutions of religion (Yavuz, 2000a: 22). 
The most interventionist attempt on this this respect was recorded in the 1930s when the 
project of secularization and nationalization took its most radical turn: in an attempt to 
secularize and nationalize Islam (as part of forming the new identity consciousness of the 
New Turk) the secular state elite changed (ultimately unsuccessful, however) the call for 
prayers (ezan) from its original Arabic to Turkish under the control of the Directorate of 
Religiouý Affairs. 'As a result of such a radical intervention into the domain of religious 
-knowledge %and, ýritual/practice, the Turkish state became both involved in religious 
transformation and violated central tenets of secularism of the liberal strand. Turkish 
secularization depended on not simply a total exclusion of religiosity from the state or the 
social realm, but involved in religious transformation and its ever functioning in accordance 
with the political 'necessity' of state security and state elites' project of identity- 
(trans)formation. 
It should be noted that an essential component of the secularist identity is related to state 
elites' concept and ideology of 'society'. The Kernalist state elites have been informed by a 
particular social ideology, namely the theory of solidarism taken from the French sociologist 
Emile Durkheirn (Berkes, 1934; Davison, 1997). This ideology of society was in line with the 
French official ideology of solidarism in the Third Republic, which was introduced by Ziya 
Gokalp-one of the mentors of the republic-through Durkheim ian sociology (Spencer, 1958). 
This solidaristic ideology foresaw a 'non-conflictual and/or classless' society for the Turkish 
people and laid the priority of the social reason over individual and/or groups (Parla, 1995: 
47-8). This was a this kind of alternative non-religious articulation of solidarity, as claimed by 
a veteran retired ambassador, could only be secured through the internalization of the idea of 
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'nation-state' such as denial of ethnic and religious demands of recognition through 'enforced 
means' such as education, legal and political arrangements (Kirca, 2003: 160-7). The Turkish 
state has largely followed these latter means. In consequence, the state elites have opted for a 
6corporatist' system of governance and devised a 'corporatist' state-society complex, merging 
rather than separating (liberating) the relationship between state and individual citizens (Parla, 
1995). In regard to the latter, for instance, Ataturk in his interviews to the representatives of 
Istanbul newspapers in the late 1920s explained the necessity of forming a 'party for the 
people' (later Republican People's Party, CHP). Ataturk had this to say: 
Classes of the nation cannot be separated from its other classes ... because their interests do not diverge from each other ... This means that the purpose of this party is 
not to garner support of some segments or classes as against the interests of other 
people and classes of the nation. It is to get the otherwise non-segregated nation into a 
unified mode of action in order to reach the common real prosperity. The way and 
extent of endeavour required for this task is different in our case than the natural ways 
and extents found in other situations in which any nation undertakes this task in 
security and serenity. It is very different. Because our nation and country is a prisoner 
of the bad providence of insecurity and bustling even after our most magnificent and 
stunning glories. The [Ottoman] past, the dark and horrid past left to the nation only 
such an inheritance (quoted in Parla, 1995: 215-6, emphasis added) 
One further marker of distinction frorn'the Ottoman 'dark past' Was the reconstruction of* a 
new social identity through the political implementation of social scientific knowledge. Via 
Ziya Gokalp and others, the new ruling state elites held that this knowledge was to be the 
dorganicist Durkheimian sociology'. It was thought that evolutionary Durkheimian sociology 
(by metaphor of organicism) could help delineate the conditions for turning into a modem 
community from an 'irrational past' (Berkes, 1954). By knowing what would be 'normal' and 
'abnormal' in a given community within a state, one could also know what would 'strengthen 
the true state' (Neumann, 2004: 260-4). 
In this positivist rendition of sociology, there was to be an assumed evolutionary march of 
society from primitive, traditional, rural, segmental and irrational societies to rational, 
functionally, urban, differentiated, organic solidarity of societies in Western civilization (or 
from feudal to capitalist) (Eisenstadt, 1984: 3-6). After all, the evolutionary process in 
Western civilization was made 'possible' by 'the victory of rational mind and positive science 
over civilizational Christianity', which is 'destined to become more secular' (Berkes, 1954: 
388). 
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In this evolutionary process, every possible complexity that might emerge was dismissed 
either as 'erratic' or 'transitional' (Kandiyoti, 1997: 129). Instead, society is believed to have 
the opportunity to develop its ethnic, folkloric, fully-fledged national authentic/raw culture. 
The latter culture was necessary for Turkey, which was trying to 'extricate itself from one 
circle of civilization [Ottoman and its theocratic political and religious system] in order to 
enter into other' and thus to become a part of Western civilization (Berkes, 1954: 386). 
However, the difficulty of adjustment and the harmony with the latter was 'the tragic 
situation' of the Turkish case. That is, Turkey was 'out of the folds of European Christianity' 
and willing to undertake this process of transformation in the presence and rise of the Western 
civilization 'before which [Turks] were in a process of collapse'. As Berkes stressed, it was 
believed that Turkey could no longer 
[c]arry on the hang-overs of its imperial and theocratic civilization. It is a 
homogenized product of various racial, ethnic, and religious elements welded to one 
another by historical catastrophes [such as the calamity of World War 1] ... 
In this new 
form of nation, all hang-overs from the tribal or theocratic civilizational elements now 
become "pathologicar'. Only cultural remains are normal, because it is only these the. 
are alive and capable of giving cohesion and orientation to the life of the nation (1954: 
38.6, emphasis original). 
Hence, the leader of the Turkish republic Kemal Ataturk was informed by this sort of ideas 
put into circulation by the Nineteenth century French philosophers and sociologists (Spencer, 
1959) and himself tried to materialize these ideas 'with the establishment of a nationalist 
regime in Anatolia' (Berkes, 1954: 375). It is these positivist renditions of secularism vs. 
Ottoman religious-theocratic 'hang-overs' via the analogy of body that contributed 
considerably powerful cognitive road maps for the secularist forces of the state in their 
struggle against political Islamic identity throughout the 1990s (Davison, 1996; Gulalp, 
1997). 
In short, the ruling elites divested Islam of its function as collective identity provider and 
confined it to thinly defined private realm. The official ideology of the state was pertinent to 
this aim in that 'Kemalism was hegemonic in articulating a central subject position of a de- 
Islamicized subject' (Sayyid, 1994: 285, ft. 20). This was deemed necessary by the state elites 
for the creation and security of a unified national state. That is, a de-Islamicized subject would 
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steer clear of the hangovers of a culturally and socially diverse Ottoman political system and 
pave the way for an internally homogenous nation. 
Furthen, nore, the state elites did not take 'universal tenets of modernization as a world 
historical process' but instead understood westernization as necessarily rooted in the cultural 
practices of the west (Kasaba, 1997: 32). Thereby, state elites' secular modem subjectivity 
embodied an unmediated identification with the identity of 'Western' men and women. This 
new identity was, however, selectively appropriated in that the external outward and formal 
appearances of 'western modem' men and women rather than their substantial, democratic, 
civil, difference - based identity fragments were imported (Yavuz, 2003a: 216-7). Despite all 
these efforts, however, particularly after the mid-1990s this historical and political project of 
secularization was challenged by its 'polar-opposite' project of Islamization of society 
through party politics. As Yavuz argued: 
In spite of the state-led secularization policy, Islam has remained a depository for 
regulating day-to-day social life for the masses ... the republican goal of secularization has met with opposition. Its advocates did not take into account that Islam is socially 
embedded in' vanous forms of sociai life and is more conducive to mass mobilization 
than either nationalism or socialism because of its flexible networks system, norms 
and symbolic value (1997a: '64-ý). 
This challenge of Islamists in the 1990s amounted to a moment of shock for the Kernalist 
state elites. The latter's palliative and superficial understanding of secularity in the form of 
&western wholesale cultural package' appeared to be in stark contrast with the increasing 
visibility in public space of a newly emergent and abundant Islamic religiosity and especially 
its outward dress codes (e. g. headscarf). In other words, the republican project of 
secularization of society declined to live up to the expectations of the state elites and showed 
particular vulnerability in the 1990s especially with the reemergence of political Islam. As a 
reaction, the state elites have not embraced Islamic identity orientations as expressions of a 
liberal democratic plurality. They took up the security measures to 'address' this 'mismatch' 
between their version of secularism and an increased public visibility of religious expressions 
of the citizenry including such private choices as dress codes. Since the n-ýid-1990s, the 
secularist state elites most notably the military employed an antagonistic confrontation 
strategy with the political representation of Islamic identity. The relationship between security 
and secularism has to be scrutinized for a discussion of security governmentality in order to 
understand how certain (mostly secular) identities are disproportionately cast and empowered 
147 
as opposed to other disempowered (mostly Islamic) identities (EI-Affendi, 1997: 3-4; Gole, 
2002: 184-7). 
5.2. ISLAMIZATION OF POLITICAL IDENTITY 
It is not easy to give an all-agreed-upon definition of political Islam and account for its 
complexities within regional or local contexts (Ayoob, 2005: 951-61). However, it is 
necessary to differentiate it from a more generic concept often used by the state elites to 
describe religious activity in Turkey, namely 'Religious Fundamentalism'. This would be so 
because unlike the oft-visited characterization of the latter, the religion-based politics of 
identity in Turkey exhibits a more diverse and nuanced challenge to the state rather than an 
outright denial of its secular programmes and projects (Marty and Appleby, 1991; Marty and 
Appleby 1993a; Marty and Appleby 1993b: 6; Esposito, 1997; Gulalp, 1997a; 1997b: 56-60; 
Cihan, 2002). 
The term. 'religious fundamentalism' mainly hides the dynamic regenerative capacity of 
various Islamiiý identities to induce new social and political repercussions (Beinin and Stork, 
1997: 3). Not only do Islamic identity-orientations display diverse characteristics but. also 
possess and exhibit various ways and means of pursuing power within the purview of 'the 
social, economic and political evolution' (Hunter, 1988: ix-x). Hence, locating the issue of 
Islamic identity solely within the ambit of fundamentalism conceals from view the crucial and 
strenuous attempts of Muslims to peacefully straddle between modernity and authenticity and 
find venues of accommodation rather than confrontation in the destabilizing process of 
westemization/modernization (Hopwood, 1998: 3). In short, it seems deceptive to refer to 
'Islamic Fundamentalism', which generally delivers a disservice to our understanding of 
political articulations of religious identity in the relevant socio-political contexts (Mahmood, 
1994: 29). The pertaining point here is that Islamism or more correctly political Islam serves 
as a better conceptual description than that of fundamentalism in describing the political 
movements of Turkey's religious Refah Party and the like (Beinin and Stork, 1997: 4). 
In the present study, Islamic identity in Turkey is conceptualized as mainly political and 
ideological rather than a religious phenomenon (see Tibi, 2000: 844). Hence, the terminology 
of political Islam is used to better envisage effects and efforts of the Islamic party politics in 
Turkey, which often get caught in the discourse of fundamentalism, which obliterate its 
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political immediacy (Shankland, 1999: 15-44). Especially since the 1990s, the Islamic 
political movement has tried to make its political voice heard not simply by a selective use of 
Islamic idioms and traditions but also by addressing the contemporary social predicaments 
through refon-nulating and regulating the modem conditions of Turkey, for better or worse 
(Shankland, 1999: 87-109). 
Unlike the thesis that Islamic social and political movements represent the failure of the 
modem Muslims to embrace modernity, the religious political movement in Turkey addresses 
modem predicaments by relying upon modern organizational and communicative instruments 
and operating within the institutional and political spaces of the modem Turkish state (Yavuz, 
1997a; 2000b; Heper, 1997; Kamrava, 1998). In other words, various party political religious 
and non-religious discourses do not entertain a 'fundamentalist critique' but rather bear 
witness to the attempt 'to reconcile traditional Islam and modernism [as scientific and 
technological progress] at the political level' (Yildiz, 2003: 189). 
Overall, the. ebb and flow of the experience of political Islam has revealed in Turkey an 
ongoing wrangle between political Islam* and politics of secularism (Yavuz, 2000a: 30-33). 
The Islarpýicc movements' activities. and their Islamic universe in Turkish society entrenched 
not only a 'growing personal piety and greater interest in Islam as a political force', but also a 
&competition with the state, while their emotional religiosity makes them almost the antithesis 
of the sterile rationality of Kemalism' (Robins, 1991: 9). The ensuing conflict, which gained 
momentum especially in the 1990s has been between the proponents of a staunchly secularist 
state identity and those pro-Islamist groups challenging this state identity by seeking change 
in the political status quo (Gulalp, 1997b: 58-60). In regard to the latter, the challengers 
compile a large segment of socio-political groupings ranging from those advocating a more 
politically and socially representative nvironment for Islamic identities to those with liberal 
leanings opting for a more literal interpretation of secularity understood as a Lockean 
separation between state and religion (Salt, 1999: 72-8; Cinar and Kadioglu, 1999: 534). The 
most relevant dimension here for our present discussion of security governmentality is the 
continuing confrontation between Turkey's secularist state identity and one of h& most 
vibrant social identities, namely Islam. 
Political Islam in Turkey 
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Observers of Turkish politics have generally been fascinated about the talk of 'resurgence' of 
political Islam at various times and quarters (Lewis, 1968: 416; Yavuz, 1997: 63-4). This is 
not surprising because Turkey was often dubbed as the example of a successful secular 
transformation project in the Mddle East. Why then has Islamism scored almost always high 
on the agenda of a secular state? Some argued that seemingly recurrent religious awakenings 
were but a 'natural' reflection of 'reactionary' religious groups, which were always against 
the country's progressive march towards modem civility especially after the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic in 1923 (Gulalp, 1997b: 52; Kandiyoti, 1997: 129; Bilici, 2000: 35-6). 
For some political scientists this confrontation was 'natural' given that Islam and the West are 
mutually opposed (Huntington, 1996). For others, this was rather a passing trend in the 
modernization process such that as industrialization and urbanization of the masses expand 
across Turkey, the social bases of these religious movements would be expected to weaken 
(Sunar and Toprak, 1983; Toprak 1993). These explanations notwithstanding, the debate 
revolving around the powerful sources of the Islamic appeal in Turkish society and the polity 
is far from settled across the academic divide (Ayata, 1996; 2004; Mardin, 1997; Gellner, 
1997; M-effendi, 1997; Heper, 1997; Yavuz, 2000b). Here, it is perhaps more helpful to 
resort to a multitude. of factors in the making of this phenomenon of religious awakening 
rather than limiting it-io a numberof essentialist conceptiors. -- ----,!, 
As argued above and Chapter 3, having conceived an 'old-fashioned understanding of 
Westernization' within the purview of a 'progressive, modem, statist, nationalist, 
authoritarian state perception' (Buzan and Diez, 1999: 45; Jacoby, 2004a) Turkish ruling 
elites have long sought to soak secularism in the minds and hearts of population (Heper, 
1997). They sought to foster a secular subjectivity over the body politic through legal and 
political reforms as explained above (Gole, 2002: 184-6). The project of state secularization 
attempted to establish an all-encompassing secular-national identity through a legal/political 
reform process. Overall, however, the result of this ambitious project was that the state was 
able to diffuse such stringently upheld secularism only into 'important but minority sectors of 
Istanbul and Ankara bourgeoisie, political, professional and media elites' (Zubaida, 2000: 71). 
Despite exclusion and marginalization, however, Islam remained as a strong personal and 
social base for identity at the repository of the non-elite and the general public (Mardin, 1973; 
2005; Howe, 2000: 2; Laciner, 2001). Islamic identity also 'has now become an organic part 
of highly mobilized Turkish society and works through the interstices of the "everyday"... on 
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the life activities of citizens' (Mardin, 1997: 72). Therefore, the Kernalist secularist stance 
against religion exemplified by the secularizing reforms in the 1920s and 1930s 'never 
attained its ultimate goal: making religion superfluous in a modem society' (Raudvere, 2003: 
24). The reason for this was not necessarily because 'Islam was in their [people's] bones, part 
of their being' or because 'a great majority of the people felt the need of religious experience' 
(Millar, 1981: 82). There are various reasons for the increasing visibility, revival and 
transformation of an otherwise suppressed religiosity in Turkey. These largely stem from the 
diverse cultural, political, social, and economic sources. 
First of all, the rise of Islamic-politics can be seen as a response to the predicaments of social 
and political change in Turkey induced by the Westemist 'modernization from above', a state- 
led political project and by the enforced secular-nationalism as a social project (Koker, 1990; 
Keyder, 1997: 49-44; Gulalp, 1997a: 54-8). The various reversals and difficulties in these 
projects certainly helped Islamists to represent themselves as an alternative to secularist 
westernization. Furthermore, sharing some elements in the post-modem critique of nation- 
state and modernism at the global level; Islamists launched their criticism by pointing to the 
authoritarian-bureaucratic tendencies of westemization. (Gulalp, 1997a: 423-6). ' However, 
contrary to the lack of social and political alternatives in- the Icynic and nihilist' post modem 
critique, the Islamists proposed an alternative political philosophy (Cinar and Kadioglu, 1999: 
64-9). The latter proved especially appealing in the context of harsh economic liberalization 
programs and rapid industrialization, which failed to bring in a 'quick-fix' between 
democracy and universal human rights in the Middle Eastern countries including Turkey 
(Koker, 1990; Monshipouri, 1995: 20). To find solutions to the problems associated with the 
ever-enlarging concentration of social units in mega-cities particularly after the advent of 
industrialism and nationalism, the Islamists in their local environments resorted to type of 
solutions founded in social welfare policies (Gulalp, 1997). These policies proved effective in 
the revitalization of Islamic politics of identity, as the anthropologist Catharina Raudvere 
observed; 
For many decades now the cultural dominance of the urban secular elite in the major 
Turkish cities has steadily been challenged by first and second-generation rural 
immigrants as well as by a steadily stronger Muslim middle class (2003: 24) 
Concerning personal-religious dimensions, it can be argued that Islam like other belief 
systems provides meaning to human existence and fill the emotional, personal and ideological 
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void often generated by the rapid modernization, atomized individuality and subsequent 
alienation (Toprak, 1993: 628). In this context, the Islamists were instrumental in articulating 
a discursive stance against the 'unjust' elitist and westernist developments in the country by 
establishing a counter-Islamic discourse on 'the cause of the just' and the grievances (Mardin, 
1991: 114). Secondly and as mentioned before, the Kernalist state elites were of the 
conviction that in order to really generate individualistic identities, 'social reason' rather than 
'individual reason' should be a 'criteria for social reconstruction. They thought that the 
personal identity of a Turk should be replaced by a secular and ethnically defined and 
homogenized concept of (Turkish) nationality (Yegen, 1996). This identity formation strategy 
proved idealistic nonetheless. 
Also crucially, Islamic social and political revival can be related to the successes in mass 
recruitment of different Islamic orders (Tarikats), which made use of 'modem organizational 
techniques emphasizing mass adherence to [their] social-religious movements' (Ayata, 1996: 
50). These orders generally served as the medium of protection and resistance towards 
secularizing refonns of the state elites., For their members these orders, mainly the 
Nakshibendi order and its many lodges, provided venues for "the renewal of faith in- Islam' 
,,.. .- under. th-- guise --of 
Suft Islam. These orders' struggle revolve around individual - 'self- 
purification' against 'excessive material desires' to 
[o]vercome the spiritual and political conquest of the West and of Western materialist 
culture, defined as self-indulgence, hedonism, consumerism, and greed for wealth and 
power ... The great struggle, the cihad-i ekber, is to be waged against the camal, bestial, and predatory elements of the individual ego, and cannot take place in a state 
of isolation. Self-reform requires a leader and a devout Muslim community (Ayata, 
1996: 49). 
In addition to the factors above, the successful cultural and political expression of these 
Islamic sensitivities in the 1990s was also made possible through 'the popularization of 
knowledge through mass communication ... by a new class of intellectuals based in the print 
and the electronic media, and of the party's internal organizational flexibility and ideological 
presentation of the [Islamic] "just order"' (Yavuz, 1997a: 66-7). Indeed, parallel to this was a 
new Islamic 'class of intellectuals'. The 'new Islamist intellectuals' employed an effective 
counter discourse against the established secularist state discourse, not shying away from 
utilizing modem conceptions of post-modem critique (Gole, 1997a: 53-7; Gulalp, 1997b; 
Cinar and Kadioglu, 1999: 61-9). 
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Extending beyond the immediate local/national political boundaries and including the Middle 
East and Central Asia in particular, the concerted effort for the 'Islamization of society' was 
also expected to occur through 'self-reform'. A vigilant and powerful social control over a 
'righteous community' and its linkage with the individual are seen especially necessary in the 
market-society of the late modem urban context (Ayata, 1996). Self-reform is in tum 
facilitated by 'orthopraxy', which means observance of various codes of religious conduct by 
the individual, which are 'introduced into everyday life of devout Muslim' (Mardin, 1993). 
These together constitute an Islamic 'identity-formation process', whose 'Other' was the 
cultural influence of the 'West' (Ayata, 1996: 49). Here, the emphasis upon western values 
and culture indicates a significant change in the category of 'Other' for Turkey's socially and 
politically most influential religious order namely 'the Nakshibendi Order'. This, argues 
Mardin, was about a 
[a] basic shift in the nature of the "sounding board" in the elaboration of social 
identity. In the earlier stages, this resonance was acquired by setting oneself against 
heterodox Muslims; in the modem stage, the sounding board is the Western cultural 
-"othei"... By-the very nature of this confrontation a field which in-the beginning was 
theological became cultural. The fact that the West was now perceived as an adver 
" 
sary 
cu re and-that this became the pfimary pr&6cc'upation of Islam, promoted the 
"ideological" use of Islam (I 993a: 204-5,212). 
Overall, these Islamic groups and networks in Turkey established themselves in society we 
can call 'moderate social Islam'. In some respects, Turkey's experience of the latter is no less 
different than to the Egyptian 'centrist Islam', which has tried to extend its message of a 'just 
and humane Islamic society' by social activism in such forms as professional associations and 
charitable work such as health/medical assistance, housing, poor relief, earthquake relief and 
so on (Baker, 1997: 122-8). 
Consequently, these developments together helped form a new 'consciousness' by and 
through mass and higher education, and an ever expanding vista for mass communication 
through print and electronic media that resulted in an increasing influence of the Islamic 
identity upon otherwise detached people (Lapidot, 1997: 67-70). This new socio-religious 
environment gradually turned into a politically rewarding supply line for the politicians of the 
centre and religious right parties (i. e. the majority of the political spectrum). Not surprisingly 
then, the parties in question politicized Islam by competing over the Islamic electorate. They 
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employed religiously informed rhetorical strategies and located Islamic discourse in the 
political debate. Thus, particularly in the 1990s, although Islam had not been 'the language of 
modem Turkish politics, Turkey's political language has been Islamicized' (Yavuz, 1997a: 
73, italics added). 
Within this context, political aspect of Islamic identity of the 1990s overtly manifested by a 
political struggle through the institution of party politics (Yavuz, 1997a). In fact, political uses 
of Islam have already started with the institution of competitive party politics in 1950; centre- 
right parties closed in to the religious groups for political purposes and partially voiced their 
demands. It was the brief Refah Party government (1996-1997), however, 'which was able to 
flesh out the demands of religious expression of the electorate (Karabasoglu, 2000: 45-7). It 
was their Islamic-centred political discourse and policies that touched the raw nerve of the 
secularist establishment of the state and provoked the ensuing security measures, which led in 
only one year to the outpost of the party in 1997 from government and the outlawing of the 
party a year later in 1998 (see Chapter 4). Before analyzing the impact of religio-political 
identity through the Refah Party, a brief account of the political-historical background is 
.- pertinent. : 
Political Sources of Religious Identity 
Following the Second World War, there gradually emerged a public resentment against the 
'visibility and effective control' of Turkish modem centralist state, which had made its grip 
over society overwhelming across the country through its national-secular one-party regime 
(1924-45). Widespread discontent with the latter's radically secularist policies -such as 
enforcing the Turkish translation of ezan (invitation to prayer), increasing alienation and 
resentment against the state, the changing socio-economic pressures for change, external (US) 
pressure to democratize helped make possible Turkey's entry into the multi-party period in 
1946 and democracy in 1950 (Zurcher, 1997: 215-9). 
First the augmentation of the multi-party system in 1945 and later on the fully competitive 
elections in the early 1950s facilitated bringing the socio-political periphery to the political 
center with a new political discourse as an alternative to the elitist state discourse. The latter 
was much typified by the Republican People's Party (RPP/CHP) from its establishment in 
1923 onwards. The CHP's political tone represented secularist and modernist views of 'the 
state-based civil and military bureaucracy' and posed as 'the sole party of the authoritarian 
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regime that prevailed for the next 27 years' (Tachau 2000: 129-30). Positioning themselves 
away from both the political centre represented by the RPP and the civilian-military 
bureaucracy, the emergent Democratic Party and its successor the Justice Party in the 1960s 
began to voice the concerns of the peripherial traditional constitutiencies and later in the 
1970s and 1980s their repressed religious-social demands in the public realm (Mardin, 1990: 
71-7). Consequently, after 1950, the political importance and the demands of the Jay 
person/voter were increasingly felt. Furthermore, the so-called 'ruralizing election' of 1950 in 
Turkey pioneered the impact of the identity of traditional-rural constituencies and helped 
affect an upward mobilization of the 'peasant masses' in the Turkish political system, which 
has been characterized by Samuel Huntington as a classical example of 'Green Uprising' 
(1968: 75). However, contrary to Huntington's expectations, the 'Green Uprising' did not 
result in the stability of the Turkish political system (Tachau, 1971; Tamkoc, 1973). The 
military interventions in 1960,1971 and 1980 disrupted periodically the political socialization 
of the masses: ideological polarization and weak party identification ensued. For after each 
military coup ideological politics was suppressed, democratic channels were extremely 
constrained, political parties were closed and all these resulted in weak party identification. 
Partly for this reason, political opportunism and political patronage became prominent 
features of the Turkish political system (Carkoglu, 1998: 546). As Sozen and Shaw observed 
(2003: 114) 'Having affiliations with large groups, such as families, religious groups (tarikat), 
political parties ... provide security, and hence are seen as very useful, and functional'. These 
political and administrative elements in turn led to patron-client relations between political 
elites and the electorate. This type of relationship also 'filled a vacuum in the absence of 
legal/rational relations in Turkey's public administration' (Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 112). 
These enabling and constraining developments notwithstanding, a crucial development for 
individual identity orientation in the new competitive political environment was that the 
political utility and moral status of the ordinary person changed. It shifted from simply being 
a 'subject' of the state to being 'the electorate', thus assuming a politically important position. 
Turkish party politics was initially characterized by 'intra-elitist conflicts rather than through 
the materialization of the cleavages of society in the national political life' (Sayari, 1978: 40; 
Heper, 1991-35). This began to change especially in the Democratic Party rule between 1950 
and 1960. Competitive politics began to openly court the religious vote; all parties 'turned to 
Turkey's oft-forgotten [religious] man and his family-the peasant majority of Turkey' (Reed, 
1954: 71). Democratic Party, whose political leadership was not from periphery and rarely 
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assiduously cultivated the support of Muslim vote, was nonetheless clearly sympathetic to 
religious demands and helped relieve some of the restrictions placed upon Islamic 
expressions. Centre-right parties too represented the religious constitutiencies but did not 
cultivate an explicitly Islamic-political discourse or helped contribute to the formation of an 
Islamic-political identity. Within this context, the expressions of Islamic identity gradually 
thrived and expanded from private into the official political space of the country. This 
climaxed in June 1996 with the arrival of the first government led by an Islamic leader 
affiliated to an Islamic-oriented political party in modem Turkish history. 
Politicization of Religious Identify: The Refah Pany Expefiment 
The Islamist Refah Party was not the first religious party in the political scene that attempted 
to tap into the religious sensitivities of the populace. There was initially the National Order 
Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) that was established in 1970. It established its political identity by 
an overtly espoused 'Islamist political philosophy' and opened its first congress with cries of 
'Allah-u Ekber' (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1988: 14). However, this party was soon outlawed 
and closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1972 on charges of anti-secularism, that is, for 
violating the -articles, in the constitution that guaranteed secularism by outlawing the political 
use of religion. A follow-up party, the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) 
was formed in 1972 by the same party cadre (Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 432). The MSP wanted 
to re-Islamize socio-cultural life in Turkey and managed to get this message heard as well by 
acquiring 11.8 per cent of the total vote in 1973 elections becoming the third major party in 
the parliament (Toprak, 1993: 635). Throughout the 1970s, this openly religious party in 
secularist Turkey was able to participate in three coalition governments. Yet, its presence in 
these coalition governments did not produce any meaningfully distinct 'Islamic' policy 
outcomes and instead generally took part in the secular policies of other coalition partners. Its 
lack of (Islamic) influence in these governments notwithstanding, the party was overall 
successful in establishing itself finrily in the Turkish political scene. 
Perhaps the most notable factor behind the success of these early experiences of Islamic 
political identity was its ability to integrate the peripheral groups into the political system by 
using Islam as a rallying cry. The party's Islamist political discourse appeared in this regard 
as an antithesis of the secularist modem nationalist centre. Their call for rapid heavy 
industrialization and an economy free of foreign capital based upon an interest free banking 
system were informed by its 'Islamic culturalism' (Ahmad, 1993: 158-9). In essence, the 
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party was able to provide an alternative recipe for the increasingly alienated, traumatized, 
underprivileged and atomized individual of the capitalist-materialist system by offering the 
brotherhood of the Islamic community (Toprak, 1993: 636-7; Onis, 1997: 749). This aim 
failed to materialize though. For the MSP was dissolved in 1981 by the military leaders of the 
1980 coup. However, the Islamic political orientation reappeared in 1983 (when the military 
regime ended) as another party all but in name. The Refah Party was born. 
The electoral success of the Refah Party became increasingly apparent by the early 1990s. It 
had already shown its growing political muscle by winning the municipal elections of 27 
March 1994 in major cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, Kayseri, Diyarbakir and Trabzon. 
Concerned over this success, Turkey's Europhile centre-right parties, namely the 
'Motherland' and 'True Path, launched a campaign of subversive, dismissive and 
inflammatory rhetoric about the Islamic identity of the RP in order to scare and hold back the 
electorate in the 1995 general election process. Uninterrupted by these misgivings, the RP 
participated successfully in the general election of 1995 along with other mainstream liberal- 
conservative secularist parties. The RP emerged the first in the national elections in 24 
December 1995 by winning 21.1 percent of the vote and gaining 158 seats in the 550-seat 
Turkish parliament or Grand National Assembly. The mainstream Motherland Party was, able 
to secure only behind the Refah Party (Turkish Daily News, 26 December 1995). 
There were a number of factors behind the RP's considerable success, such as its ability to 
appeal to the voters on economic grounds. The Refah Party was able to garner support from 
especially underprivileged working and lower middle classes by capitalizing on the harsh 
economic conditions of the 1990s, which included the troubles of privatization, job losses, 
decreasing salaries/wages, the annual rate of inflation running at 110 percent and massive 
devaluation of currency in April 1994, which doubled all prices (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 
1997: 150; Gulalp, 1997b). The Refah Party offered new avenues in economy and culture and 
appeared more attractive since it did not share the same discursive universe with the other 
parties (Sayyid, 1994: 264). As Karnrava underlines, by engaging into politics 'With a 
populist image, a vaguely Islamic platform, and an impressive organizational set-up actively 
trying to attract members and supporters, the party largely succeeded in distinguishing itself 
from the rest of the field' (1998: 276). Crucially, the newcomers in the economy comprised a 
new conservative bourgeoisie, represented by a peak business organization, the Association of 
Independent Businessmen (MUSIAD) as an alternative business establishment to the 
157 
economically strong and politically influential big business (i. e. TUSIAD) (Onis, 2001; 
Bugra, 1998). This association and some other newly emerged small-scale provincial 
economic actors and the petite bourgeoisie of big cities opposed to the state in financing of 
the rich and in its interventions (Onis, 1997: 750). The new conservative business groups 
were dubbed the 'Anatolian tigers' or 'Anatolian bourgeoisie', whose ideology was 'socially 
Islamic', but as well 'economically liberal' (Bugra, 1998: 529-33). They voiced their dissent 
principally through Islamic idioms, symbols and ethics 'as the best weapon to generate public 
opinion against the state and big industrialists' (Yavuz, 1997a: 72). Additionally, in its 
opposition to the Kernalist and secularist political centre, the new conservative businessmen 
sided with other religious peripheral groups. The latter, as Yavuz observes, 
[i]dentify with Ottoman-Islam traditions. Moreover, Sufi orders play a key role in their 
developing business connections and facilitate their penetration into the economy. The 
Turkish [Islamic] Naksibendi leaders, like Senegal's murids, employ traditional 
network systems to pursue modem capital formation. For example, some food items 
produced by one of the leading firms in the country, Ulker Inc., are distributed by the 
[Islamic] Nurcu groups in Anatolia and the central Asian republics' (1997a: 72-3). 
Especially beginning with such centre-right parties as the Justice Party (1961-81), some 
religious orders (especially the Naksibendi order) began to act as important lobbying groups 
and supported mainstream political parties, which provided them with access to 
6governmental patronage resources' (Sayari, 1978: 56). Significantly, this clientalistic close 
relationship also meant placing by these parties men of religious communities in various 
positions in state bureaucracy, which was in turn seen as part of a general strategy of different 
Islamic organizations for 'protection against threats from state and secular forces' and 
gradually led to 'Islamicize the state' (Ayata, 1996: 48). 
As the visibility of this project of 'Islamization of the state' at party political level grew and 
challenged the existing political power structure, it has led to the reinforcement of the state 
identity of secularism and constituted one basic source of confrontation between the state and 
such parties. This was basically so, because the secularist state elites were apprehensive of the 
success of the RP from the beginning and gradually took up such security measures to 
confront the party, as explained in Chapter 4. Indeed, the existence of the Refah Party in 
power as the senior coalition partner was in itself sufficient enough to raise tension in the 
circles of secular elites. However, as argued in Chapter 2, state elites remained committed to a 
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(rationalist) conception of democracy and tolerated within certain limits such a success by a 
religiously informed party. 
The Refah Party in Power 
Short of power to grant a mandate to form a government on an outright basis, the RP 
nonetheless managed to become a dominant partner of a coalition government with the centre- 
right True Path Party on 28 June 1996. The latter's Europhile leader Tansu Ciller had been 
initially reluctant to form a coalition with the Islamist RP. Nonetheless, partly to thwart the 
threat of parliamentary investigation into her corruption accusations, Ciller agreed to form the 
coalition government with Refah. This government included dominant pro-Islamic elements. 
Indeed, this was the very first Islamist government ever in power in a staunchly secular state. 
The veteran outspoken Islamist leader of the party Necmettin Erbakan became the Prime 
Mnister of Turkey after almost three decades of his party's political struggle (Birikim, 
November 1996). 
in particular, when this religious-based political language attracted masses and yielded the 
most dramatic electoral success in the form of an Islamist-led coalition government in the 
summer of 1996, secularist alarm bells went off loudly (Salt, 1999: 72-8). The RP's religious 
discourse together with its alternative non-Western foreign policy orientations proved 
effective in the emergence of the confrontation with the secularist state elites (Ayata, 2004). 
The Refah Party's Political Agenda: Islamization as a Programme and Project 
The crucial implication of the RP's electoral success in Turkey was that its overt and powerful 
presence in the political space was perceived as the success of its Islamic leanings. Despite 
the secularist anxieties, the Refah Party did not promote the disestablishment of the Turkish 
Republic, nor did it diverge from nation-state model (Zubaida, 1996: 12; Heper, 1997; Salt, 
1999: 72-8). However, although it is a gross mistake to equate Islam with this party, the 
secular identity carriers (especially the civilian and military bureaucracy in Turkey) perceived 
it this way (Keyman and Heper, 1998). They identified the party as a representative of the 
country's 'irrational' and 'backward' past. Thus, the cardinal concern since 1923 of the 
central powers of the secularist state, spearheaded by the military became real: men of 
religion had obtained key political posts (Toprak, 1993: 625). Indeed, this political success 
was alarming for the secularist ruling elites. It was for the first time that a party with an 
Islamic political philosophy had come to power. This amounted to be a threatening turning 
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point in the country's republican history and generated concerns over the secular 'nature of 
the state'. 
By coming to power in 1996, the RP had demonstrated its ability to package its cultural, 
political and economic program as constituting the single most popular alternative position on 
the political arena fraught with corrupt mainstream secular political parties (Gulalp, 1997b: 
58-61). The RP also asserted 'the superiority of Islamic over Western values' and its main 
political rhetoric read as 'there are not several parties in Turkey; there are only two: Refah 
and all the others who unite in aping the West' (Gulalp, 1995: 54). The Refah party promised 
that at the international level, for instance, the state policy of joining the EU was to be 
replaced by the inception of an Islamic Common Market (Erbakan, 1991: 91). 
The most alarming for the secular state elites was another radical proposal: a new political- 
legal restructuring of the state and state's relationship to the society. A new legal order based 
on 'multiple legal orders', for instance, was to grant each community the right to perforrn and 
implement its own laws and conventions within their respective legal system (Gulalp, 1999: 
38-40). Plurality of legal system was adopted in the 1993 party conventionand threatened the 
unitary nation-statehood. The former inspired from religious universe- and leaning,, came 
directly to conflict with the state's uncompromising secular western unitary legal system. It 
also meant a diminishing role for and a reformulation of the state's most valued principles, 
namely secularism. To this end, the RP proposed in the parliament a constitutional 
amendment to the principle of secularism, the most sacred doctrine of the republic (Gulalp, 
1995). 
The Refah Party's program viewed society in line with its religious outlook and brotherhood 
and rather as a harmonious and totalizing entity and practically ignored the social and 
economic cleavages underlying Turkey's society. Instead, the party's view on the latter 
foresaw a 'congruence of interests between workers and employers, government administers 
and the people, doctors and patients, and lawyers and clients' (Kamrava, 1998: 289). 
Moreover, in a strikingly similar line with the secular ruling Kemalist rendition of Turkish 
society as cohesion and solidarity, the Refah Party's definition of 'people' was largely based 
on the religious identity of being Muslim, which took shape as 'an organic, collective union 
regardless of class or ethnic divisions. It highlights Islamic solidarity ... society, for the party, 
is composed of Muslims who are unified subjectively by their shared Islamic faith' (Yavuz, 
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1997a: 67). The party's discursive universe revolved around various conceptions of the 'good 
life' that are politically crafted, strategically chosen and defined mostly in Islamic idioms 
(Gulalp, 1997a; 1997b). In essence, this idea of an 'Islamic union' and other religious 
attachment to the party is due much less to a well-articulated religious political system (which 
was lacking anyway) than its use 'as a communication system and metaphysical basis of 
justice' in gamering the support of the electorate. However, the party elites also discerned a 
rather state-centric rendition of Islamic idiom, which catered to an entrenched nationalism 
including such interesting articulations 'powerful state with religious society' rather than, say, 
political and cultural diversity (Gulalp, 1999). This seemed to confirm the observation that 
such religious activities and strategies generally 'assume the space of a centralized modem 
[nation] state, and are directed at its institutions and powers' (Zubaida, 1993: 50). The party 
leader Erbakan had his mantra; 'come, regardless of your background come, whatever you 
are, you should come, come and internalize our identity in due time'. This invitation was, it is 
to be noted, not for changing the party platform through the invited individuals' cultural 
plurality but to 'mold and shape individuals' within the party (Yavuz, 1997a: 75). 
As regards to the identity orientations in security governmentality, it is worthwhile, to note 
that like much dissenting discourse in Turkeyj the RP was not employing a rhetorical stance 
against the top-down transformative schema of the 'Westernization' project (i. e., social 
engineering) as undertaken by the Kernalist state elite (Keyder, 1997: 3946). The RP was 
rather following the footsteps of the Kernalist elites' attempts to enforce particular 
subjectivities. The difference they seemed to propose was that the direction of the subjectivity 
production scheme should be changed towards the right one: their own 'National View' 
(Kadioglu, 1998b; Dagi, 1998: 25). The ensuing confrontation was one of substance and 
identity-orientation rather than of a method. That is, the method seemed similar. 
The Refah Pany Is Foreign Policy Discourse 
Another crucial aspect of the Refah discourse and policies concerned foreign policy 
orientations and objectives. Particularly in the 1990s, it became obvious that the party had a 
global agenda through which it redefined its national outlook and gained a basic source of 
political power, thanks to the increasing Islamic sensitivities among the populace after the 
ineffective Western responses to the Bosnian tragedy and the conflict in Chechnya (Dagi, 
1998: 30). In so doing, the RP also acted against the established parameters and objectives of 
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Turkish foreign policy. As in domestic politics, its discourses and policies were constantly 
juxtaposed with the established state policies. 
The RP had a controversial stand in regard to Turkey's 'role' in world politics in the 1990s. 
The party leadership claimed that when viewed in historical and cultural terms, Turkey was 
not a 'Western' country but belonged to the 'Islamic world'. This view also represented the 
party's official viewpoint, which was not based upon Western models of nationalism, 
socialism or liberalism but rather Turkey's 'own values and culture' that finds its expression 
in the so-called party manifesto 'National View'. The latter term referred to a conceptual and 
historical idea/l that drove mainly from the notion of a 'just [Islamic] order' and the Ottoman 
era respectively (Dagi, 1998: 25; 2005). Clearly, this vision contained a strong dose of 
criticism of the present modem secular social and political structures, which were brought in 
as a result of the 'Westernization' project of the early 1920s. For instance, Erbakan stated that 
the 1991 election was not a mere struggle for power but also 'the struggle over right 
[civilization] and wrong [civilization] and the most important event at this historical moment' 
(Refah Party Election Declaration, 1991: 3). 
In line with its civilizational essentialist approach that defined Turkey, its history and people; 
the Refah Party proposed a radically different political philosophy in foreign policy stemming 
from its Islamic worldview, which came straightforwardly to challenge the traditional 
'Western' oriented foreign policy making. Erbakan perceived the Turkish Foreign Ministry as 
consisting of a 'gentlemen salon', alienated from the country's own culture (Caylan, 1996: 
55). The party's new foreign policy discourse juxtaposed the long established state foreign 
policy of westernization through membership into western institutions. Erbakan on various 
occasions called the Turkish state nothing but an 'imitator' of the West. 
The RP in its 1995 general election declaration denounced the 'dependent' Western-oriented 
foreign policy, and pledged to craft a new one deriving from Turkey's 'own cultural 
imperatives'. This new foreign policy was to be 'independent' and 'historically honorable' 
helping Turkey to be a leader in world politics. Siding neither with the West nor with the 
Socialist East, the RP's leadership found more comfort in the 'Third Worldist perspective' -a 
position from which Western values and its imperialism could be attacked and all other 
parties could be labelled as 'imitators of the West' (Onis, 1997: 753). Rejecting any future 
membership of the EU, Refah's foreign policy was said instead to reflect an 'Islamic 
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transnationalism', which foresaw the brotherhood and cooperation within the Islamic world 
(Onis, 1997: 754). This aim was in stark contrast with the secularist state target of siding with 
the western world. Particularly in relation to the EU, the Refah party held that there could be 
economic relations with European states, however, when it came to political integration, the 
RP clearly refused to accept it (Dagi, 1998: 89-91). 
Some of its international perspectives seemed to have been constructed as an alternative to the 
EU model, which was believed to reflect a 'Christian culture', whereas 'Islamic unity' would 
instead be based on a 'common Islamic perspective'. According to one of the party veterans, 
Oguzhan Asilturk (quoted in Dagi, 1998: 81), Turkey in this unified Islamic world model 
could provide an effective model to be followed by the other yet-to-be-revived Muslim states. 
This new discourse was of role-model for Muslim nations not only different to the established 
secular Westem-oriented foreign policy objectives of the Turkish state, but represented a clear 
challenge to it. This mapping also clearly demonstrated an ambitious attempt to realize an 
international Islamic moral community. The ruling RP's already alarming domestic political 
moves were hence accompanied with such overconfident foreign policy statements, which in 
turn shocked the secular establishments, most notably the military (Akpinar, 2001: 178). - 
Envisaging an Islamic-civilizational community of nations, the RP took on board the practical 
steps to achieve the goal of establishing an Islamic sort of EU in the form of a pan-Islamic 
association of the 'Developing Eight' amongst the most developed Muslim countries (Onis, 
1997; 2001). In this regard, the RP's leader paid his first international visit to the two most 
notoriously 'anti-systemic' states in the region, Libya and Iran. At the domestic level, these 
visits were interpreted by many as revealing the 'real intention' of the party to derail Turkish 
state's European/Western voyage by aligning itself with the Islamic world. Many secular 
circles and state elites observed these two visits as official welcoming and reception of 
political Islam by the RP at the national and international scene. This and other foreign policy 
initiatives served no more than an 'alarming call' to secular circles (Milliyet, 07 October 
1996; Hurriyet, 07 October 1996). As such, political Islam has constituted the most serious 
'security problem' for the state. Why has this been so? 
5.3. SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM: LOGIC OF CONFRONTATION 
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The rise of Islamist electoral forces in the early 1990s and onwards brought in a distinct 
political polarization and tension between 'the secularists' and 'the Islamists' in Turkey. In 
the process of confrontation, the secular state elites have deployed a missionary agency for 
themselves as being 'progressive secular forces' against political Islam, which represented 
'relic' identity orientations of the old Ottoman theocratic regime (Savas, 2001a). The 
perception of Islamic political identity as the number one security threat to the country has 
been officialized and legalized in Turkey's National Security Policy Document (see Chapter 
2.5), which was prepared by the military and approved by the National Security Council in 
1997 (Jenkins, 2001: 48-9). Consequently, Turkish secular state elites have engaged with the 
Refah Party's Islamic political identity in a security mentality and in the discourse of war 
(Bozarslan, 2000: 70). In other words, the secularist state forces took up the Islamist challenge 
from the perspective of a new war front, namely a 'New War of Liberation' reminiscent of its 
'War of Liberation' against the Allied Powers after the Second World War (Turkish Daily 
News, 09 January 1999)1 1. 
For the secularist state forces, Islamic political identity has been but an 'obscurantist' political 
orientation, bent on destroying the secular foundation of the Turkish Republic. Nothing best 
summarizes the general view of the secularists about the Refah Party experience than the 
words of Turkey's former chief prosecutor Vural Savas. In his application to the 
Constitutional Court for disbanding the Refah Party, Vural Savas accused it of constituting 
the greatest danger to the constitutional foundations of the Turkish state. He put a particular 
emphasis on the party's views regarding its discourses particularly on the need to relax the 
strictly observed controversial ban on women dress codes (i. e. the ban that forbids women 
wearing the headscarf in vaguely described 'public spaces', including, for instance, 
universities). He claimed that such religious discourses of the Refah Party represent the 'real 
intentions' of establishing an Islamic state. This way, he reckoned that the Refah ran foul of 
Article 68 of the Turkish Constitution, which requires political parties to observe the principle 
of secularism. Thereby he claimed that the Refah Party represented 'the greatest danger of 
obscurantism Turkish Republic has ever faced in its history' (quoted in Savas, 2001: 347). 
Upon these accusations, the Constitutional Court disbanded the party in January 1998. 
11 The same could be said of a much-publicized new novel: 'Su Cilgin Turkler' [Those Crazy Turks] that 
dramitizes the Turkish War of Independence and implicitely recontextualizes it within the contemporary 
national/international political developments and agenda of the 'Islamists' and imperialist EU. 
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The specific connection between security and secularism in security govemmentality is 
complex as will be seen. Secularization has been conceived first and foremost as a political 
requisite for the state to survive, thrive and prosper. The resultant repercussions, 
unsurprisingly, go well beyond and even against the rationale of State-Religion separation as 
defined in the liberal tradition. In other words, secularism's essential value-laden connotation 
for the Turkish state elites does not seem to derive from being a necessary facilitator of 
national, economic and democratic development but rather from its relation with the political 
security of Turkish state. Secularism of the state elites, in this context, has also been informed 
by the historical memories of political insecurities, which stemmed from the dismemberment 
of the Ottoman political structure (Candar, 2000; Jung and Piccoli, 2000, also see Chapter 
2.2). For the state elites, the ground of the state's survival, fortitude and endurance can come 
only with sticking at all cost to the secular nature of the state. 
The distinguishing feature of the secularist reaction to Islamic political identity was that the 
latter was constituted as a 'security threat' by the state. Anyone carrying an explicit Islamic 
political identity has rarely been taken to be a legitimate actor in their struggles. They were 
. instead 
'assumed' to be representatives of religious sects and/or orientations, ' whose 
. 'repulsive'Y' 
'ietrogressive', 'obscurantist' -and dangerous' political intentions were - to 
eventually destroy the state's existence (see Savas, 2001a; 2001b). Islamists were constituted 
as perpetrators of a 'security threat' posed to the state's treasured political principle namely 
secularism. Attributing such images as 'obscurantism' to this otherwise vigorous political 
movement in the country, the state elites thought it a 'relic' of pre-modem past; as the bearer 
of an 'irrational' past. In the secular state discourse, the awakening of religious identities in 
public space is hence not represented as an occurrence of freedom of expression of individual 
citizens or religious obligations or personal choice. Instead, those sensibilities appear as 
political practice and as 'security threats' to the foundations of secularism. Secularism is 
construed not simply as a matter of political principle, but as a matter of 'life and death'. 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk expressed the connection between secularism and Turkey's survival 
in these words: 'those nations who try to follow the superstitions of the Nfiddle Ages are 
condemned to be destroyed or at least to become enslaved and debased' (quoted in Kasaba, 
1997: 26). 
Turkey's 'civilizing project' along with the 'Western values' carved out and bipolarized the 
political space between the Westernized and Islarnized (Gole, 1997a; 1997b). This space has 
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in turn been concurrently used for the state intervention into the deeds and lives of the society 
to 'rectify' those who do not confide (Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b). The effect on security 
governmentality of such a bifurcation of the society along with 'western' and 'oriental' is 
twofold. Firstly, by rendering identities subordinate/hierarchical and under/privileged it helps 
construct the selves of the ruling Kemalist elites as civilizing agents and the selves of the 
ruled as the blank slate. As Nilufer Gole argued, the secularist elites undertook a governing 
and civilizing mission over their 'primitive' counterparts in the society, which lacks their 
'western' attributes (1997a; 1997b). Gole explains the formation of this civilizing mission 
inside the polity with reference to the construction of barbarians. As regards the issue of 
barbarism, she argues that 
An irony of history is that the Turks, who for centuries symbolized to Europeans the 
barbarian, Muslim other, are now trying to enter the arena of the "civilized" in part by 
inventing their own "barbarians" in the form of, first, the Muslims, and second, the 
Kurds (Gole, 1997b: 85). 
At the political level, the demands of these 'invented /imagined barbarians' for recognition 
"are. not only discarded as 'relic', but also as illegitimate and dangerous 'security threats' to 
the unity, ýnd secular nature of the state. Through this type of threat construction, the 
attribution of 4normal' to secular and 'abnormal' to (political) Islam crucially breeds a 
security dimension, which helps frame the debate on secular vs. religious in Turkey. The 
particular security logic here explains that 'abnon-nal' attributes of a society could be 
detrimental to the existence and strength of the state, just as the 'pathological' would be 
dangerous for a 'healthy' body. Here, Islamic public visibility 'creates such a malaise because 
it has corporeal, ocular, and spiritual dimension' (Gole, 2002: 182). Thereafter, a binary logic 
prevails. That is, the secular/westem identity of the state elites is constructed as 'normal' 
against the religious/non-modern attributes of society, which are thought as 'pathological' 
and/or 'abnormal'. This rendition in turn forms the main constitutive component of the 
discourse of state security. This juxtaposition also becomes a recurrent theme in the identity 
discourse of the Turkish state. The utilization of this theme, in turn, constitutes one main 
component in contemplating the (legitimacy of) subject positions of actors in politics. In order 
to illustrate this kind of juxtaposition of identities in security governmentality, a case is 
presented below. 
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5.4. A CASE STUDY IN THE IDENTITY DIMENSION OF SECURITY 
GOVERNMENTALITY: THE HEADSCARF AS A 'SECURITY THREAT' 
It can be asserted that political Islam and secularism are of crucial significance in 
understanding how identities are rendered under/privileged and subjected to state practices in 
Turkey. As explained above, there is also an operational security logic involved in the 
representation of these identities. That is, the symbolically constructed, enforced and 
appropriated expressions of secular identity for men and especially women is taken as a 
positive-constitutive component of the 'idea of the state' and of public space, while an Islamic 
identity is taken as a different conception of a life-world and as a challenge (Gole, 2002: 184- 
7). The reason for this is that the secular ideal in Turkey is in part transmitted through the 
images of a westernized woman. As Nilufer Gole contends 
Every revolution defines an ideal man, but for the Kemalist revolution, it is the image 
of an ideal woman that has become the symbol of the reforms ... Even more than the 
strengthening of judicial and human rights, it is the status of women as public citizens 
and women's rights in general that are the backbone of Kernalist refonns. The 
participation of women in the public sphere 
, 
necessitates, in the. opinion of the 
modernists, taking off the veil, establishing compensatory coeducation, granting 
women's stiffrage, and the social mixing of men and women (Gole, 1997b: 86). 
In this regard, any challenge but especially symbolically staked and publicly visible Islamic 
identity challenges such as the practice of headscarf wearing can easily become a 'security 
threat' to the state. For a female citizen the taking off the veil (headscarf) comes as the first 
and foremost task in order to participate in the public sphere. In other words, if a woman does 
not take off the headscarf she will still be ignored and even criminalized because of her action 
of entering into the public realm by wearing headscarf. Conflict over outward expressions of 
identity extends to the body and presentations of the self in the Turkish context, evident in 
such labels as the 'civilized and uncivilized bodies' or 'White and Black Turks' (Yumrul, 
2000). 
Specifically, for the secularists the 'true' body imagery for woman requires the so-called 
western dress codes. On the other hand, alternative (not necessarily non-secular) articulations 
of body and dress (for instance, in Islam) entertain their own 'true' ethics and aesthetics, 
somewhat in a different mould bearing symbols such as the headscarf. These differences in 
body conceptions may not only generate 'cognitive dissonances' but in some cases also severe 
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political conflicts between the two sides. Consider the headscarf issue in Turkey: While the 
headscarf is mostly worn by woman as an expression of their Muslim identity (Bulac, 2004), 
this religious attire can be taken by the secularist Kernalist state elites as a symbol of 
Islamization together with the not-so-benign political implications that might follow from this 
(Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 116; Gole, 2002). 
One exemplary representation of the conflicting visions of secular and religious appeared in 
earnest in the Turkish Parliament under the label the 'headscarf crisis' in May 1999. This was 
about the headscarf wom by the newly elected female member of the 'Islamist' Fazilet Party 
(successor of the then disbanded Refah Party). This MP was named Merve Kavakci, a thirty 
one year old female MP. As she entered into the parliament for the swearing-in ceremony on 
2 May 1999 suddenly a concerted, noisy and dramatic protest against her burst out. Angry 
MPs, mostly from the government in power, but also from other oppositional parties in the 
parliament, stood up in the name of Kernalist secularism and shouted at her in protest (Jung 
and Piccoli, 2001: 115). 
Soon the'protestors' incursion turned into a dance-macabre. It became obvious that this noisy 
uproar was'all about her perceived 'dangerous and threatening' appearance, literally about, her 
dress code or more correctly about her headscarf. The 'crisis' broke out because she was 
wearing an unacceptable piece of religious attire, a headscarf. Her political ideas did not pose 
a 'security threat', presumably, since she described herself as a democrat rather than an 
'Islamist'. Indeed, her formal political identity did not generate the crisis as such, not least 
because she was legally eligible for being an MP in the first place; she and her party were 
simply operating within the legal parameters of party politics in Turkey. Further confusion 
about the nature of the crisis was the fact she was actually wearing an otherwise modem style 
outfit that was almost identical with the other elected 'modem-secular' female Mps. She was 
wearing a white headscarf with fashionable frameless eyeglasses and a long-skirted, modem 
two-piece suit. She was a computer engineer, lived in the United States and was divorced with 
two children. As such, she somewhat demonstrated an ability to acquire access to 'powerful 
symbols of modernity and was simultaneously engaged in Islamic politics' (Gole, 2002: 180). 
The 'problem' with her though was precisely that she was wearing a headscarf at the same 
time as the rest of her otherwise modem dress. Arguably without the headscarf she would 
have been perfectly welcomed into the parliament. The crux of the mater was that her 
headscarf was literally taken to be something 'dangerous' to the modem-secular public space, 
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that is, the Turkish Parliament (Gole, 2002: 178). Kavakci's personal Islamic identity in the 
Turkish authoritarian modernity appeared incongruent with the political rationality of the 
Kemalist secularism, as Gole argued: 
Instead of assimilating to the secular regime of women's emancipation, they press for 
their embodied difference (e. g., Islamic dress) and their public visibility (e. g., in 
schools, in Parliament) and create disturbances in modem social imaginaries. Islamic 
women hurt the feelings of modem women and upset the status quo; they are playing 
with ambivalence, being both Muslim and modem without wanting to give up one for 
the other. They are outside a regime of imitation, crucial of both subservient traditions 
and assimilative modernity (2002: 181). 
The headscarf represented something of a 'dangerous threat' to the secular public space and 
then to the state. In other words, because the parliament was supposed to be a secular space 
and a symbol of the Turkish state; it was held that the ethical precepts of the state and 
secularism should be policed at all costs even against the representatives of the people. Those 
who did not conform were to be disciplined and punished by the 'secularists system' of which 
parliamentarians were part. Such was the reason behind this stormy and noisy protest. 
Astonishingly, her troublesome presence in; the parliýment did not last long. Then PM Bulent 
Ecevit and other MPs from other parties urged her to even leave the parliament before taking 
the traditional MP's oath. Indeed after a while, she could not take the oath because of the 
deafening verbal assaults and physical obstruction and she was soon forced to leave the 
parliament. She had de facto lost her title as an MP. Sometime later, her exclusion from the 
polity was also legally legitimized with her dismissal even from Turkish citizenship. 
(Hurriyet, 03 May 1999, p-1,15; Milliyet, 03 May 1999, p. 1,10; Radikal, 03 May 1999, p. 1, 
6; Foreign Policy, 115(Summer) 1999, p. 9; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115; Gole, 2002: 173- 
190; Interview with Merve Kavakci, Kanal D 15 November 2005). 
This successful securitization of her Islamic identity and the controversy around her headscarf 
was allowed by the logic of confrontation explained above. Specific details of the process of 
confrontation went as follows. After an Iranian demonstration in support of her, PM Ecevit 
stated that 'Iran is continually trying to export its regime to Turkey' (Jung and Piccoli, 2000: 
93, italics added). Later, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel named Kavakci as an 'agent- 
provocateur' under the service of foreign powers 'presumably Iran or some other western 
powers' (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115). Along with this, there came highly variant allegations 
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from the mainstream media against her identity such as her alleged 'link with Hamas and 
CIA' two of which were for 'unden-nining' the unity of the Turkish state all the time anyway 
(Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115). But the most dramatic and provocative reaction came from 
Turkey's Chief Republican State Prosecutor Vural Savas, who had initially put the case to the 
constitutional court to disband the Refah Party's successor the Fazilet Party. He charged that 
she was an agent of Islamic states, which reminded him of 'vampires feeding only on blood' 
(Jung and Piccoli, 2000: 93). 
Later, after a further series of securitizing moves by the secular establishment, her title as a 
MP was soon legally stripped away from her, because of the Constitutional Court decision on 
allegations of misconduct. This ousting was generally welcome by the secularist state elites 
and other forces including the mainstream newspapers (Hurriyet, 04 May 1999, p. 1; Milliyet, 
04 May 1999, p. 1). Thus the state elites had successfully interpreted Kavakci's act (entering 
the parliament with a headscarf) as a security threat to the 'secular nature' of the state. 
The point of this episode is that such reactions cannot be simply dismissed as merely 
individual or psychological reactions by the state elites. --As explained in this chapter, these 
and other similar reactions can be'understood as reactions by the powerful-secularist state 
elites against the perceived failings of their ideal 'healthy' image of modem secular Turkish 
women (mostly understood as headscarf-free) and with that the Turkish Republican political 
project thereof (see Savas, 2001a; 2001b). Overall, such impositions or descriptions of the 
headscarf employed by the prosecutor and other top officials help not only to securitize the 
culture of the masses but also to reinforce the dubious image of the Islamic identity 
orientation as a dark, gloomy and sinister figure lurking in the shadows, which waits to strike 
at a proper time against the security of the state. Such strategies are quintessentially relevant 
in reproducing insecurity among the public, which can then consent to whatever is done to 
achieve 'securitization' successfully. 
SUMMARY 
The chapter has argued that the identity dimension in security governmentality comes with 
and revolves around mainly two orientations. These two identity constellations are the 
secularist state identity and political Islam. These orientations are distributed as two of the 
most effective identity orientations for the individuals and groups concerned. The chapter 
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identified these two identity orientations, the conflictual space in between, the ensuing 
political confrontation and the relevant security discourse as the ethical-political space in 
security governmentality from the second-half of 1990s onwards. These two identity 
orientations are crucial for the discussion of security governmentality because the 
confrontational space they produce has been the most notable constitutive and intervening 
component in the discourses and practices of state security. The secularists here are the ruling 
Kemalist state elites, which include the military, some parts of the state bureaucracy, also 
certain civil society associations, bankers, professors and artists. The Islamic political identity, 
on the other hand, is mostly an expression in the form of party politics. It also refers to a 
cultural space of Islamic networks of communication and dissemination through newspapers, 
books, television channels together which help constitute an Islamic 'counter-elites'. 
In order to understand the security aspect of the political furor that this confrontation between 
the secular and the religious sets off, the chapter investigated the processes of secular vs. 
Islamic identification, the interface of these juxtaposed identities and their effect upon the 
country's. socio-political divide. The emphasis upon this confrontation does not imply a 
primordial or in-built necessity for conflict though. Rather it refers to a politically constructed 
conflictual space between these two identity groups. At stake between the secularist identity 
and the expressions of religious identity is a disagreement on the role and scope of political 
intervention into the lives of the population. A particular emphasis is placed upon the 
dialogical relationship between secular and Islamic identities (for example over 
attire/headscarf) to help reveal how groups and individuals come to represent, constitute and 
attach meaning to their collective and self-identity. 
In all, the chapter aimed to show how these identity structures acquire different meanings 
especially when they are crafted in a security language, which is articulated in a particular 
logic and space of conflict. It is in this latter conflictual logic and space that social and 
personal identities gain in political purchase, which is a crucial element for security 
governmentality. That is, the interface between secular and Islamic identities codify and 
reinforce political antagonisms to the extent that personal life-conduct and choices of dress 
become no longer a matter of taste but an issue spectacularly related to political survival of 
the state via state security discourses. This, in turn, contributes to the ways in which state 
power and control are exercised upon the body politic. In this way, the study of identification 
via dress provides valuable analytical tools for advancing our understanding of the 
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relationship between security and identity/appearances, particularly that of the securitization 
of images. Another important undercurrent in the discussion is about the ways the state elites 
in security governmentality find interventionist inroads into the private and public conduct. 
This confrontation between the secularist identity of Turkey's political centre and the 
peripheral religious identity orientations in the thesis's analytical framework lays the fertile 
groundwork for such techniques to be executed (see Chapter 4). Effectively, it is through 
these inroads that the secular establishment successfully resorts to a series of security 
techniques in Turkish politics. 
To sum, the investigation of these processes of identification is of crucial relevance for the 
study of security governmentality in Turkey. This is so, because the relevant matrix of 
collective and confrontational identity formation constitutes the field within which security 
governmentality operates. Significantly, it is within this operational space that certain 
capacities and statuses are promised, promoted, fostered, attributed or denied to particular 
individuals and groups. It is also in this confrontational space between secular and Islamic 
identity orientations that security governmentality profitably sets in and effectively operates. 
-This identification, has long rendered the respective individ'uals/groups with certain identities, 
-,.: - as normal/virtuous or abnormal/criminal citizens. ard then-- 
legitimate/illegitiniate targets -of ------ 
governing. This easy identification, however, has been challenged by the coming to power of 
the 'moderate Islamist' political party AKP after 2002. The AKP, with the help of the EU 
membership reform process, puts forward an alternative identity-engagement with the 
secularist establishment. Indeed, particularly since 1999 the EU has acted as a catalyst for 
change in security governmentality not only in its identity dimensions but also in its other 
dimensions as well. Part III starts to chart these changes in Chapter 6 with the rationality 
dimensions of security governmentality. 
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PART III: SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY AND TURKEY'S 
RELATIONS WITH THE EU 
CHAPTER 6 
CHANGE IN THE RATIONALITY DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY 
GOVERNMENTALITY 
The official EU candidacy granted to Turkey in 1999 has been a catalyst for changing 
Turkey's security governmentality. Part III will start examining this change with the 
rationality dimension of security governmentality. The chapter is divided in two sections. The 
first section illuminates the historically changing contours of the EU membership conditions. 
It argues the significance for the state elites of westemization/Europeanization in their EU 
membership bid. For this reason, it presents a historical background of the relations between 
Turkey and the EU. The period covered begins with Turkey's first application to European 
Economic Community in 1959, includes her renewed application for full membership in 1987 
to European Community, and ends when the EU admitted Turkey as an official candidate 
country for full membership in 1999. Omitted here are those changes pertaining to Kernalist 
secularism, because they are investigated together with the changes in secularist identity in 
Chapter 8. The second section of the present chapter therefore attempts to identify the changes 
in . the. 
'reason of state! rationality of - security governmentalityý assessing how the. EU 
membership reforms strive to inculcate a democratic rationality (enmeshed in EU political 
conditionality) which, as observed, could gradually replace the 'reason of state' rationality of 
security govemmentality. 
6.1. TURKEY-EU RELATIONS FROM THE 1960s TO 2000s 
On 31 July 1959 Turkey applied for associate membership of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Turkey was to become one of the first applicant states to be granted 
associate membership in the EEC. Later, on 12 September 1963, Turkey became officially an 
associate member by signing the Association Agreement or the Ankara Treaty (Tekeli, 1993). 
In 1970 an Additional Protocol was signed, which paved the way for a transitional period, 
expected to end with an economic integration through a customs union between the EU and 
Turkey (Erdemli, 2003: 4-5). These agreements laid down conditions for the successful 
negotiation of the transition stages for eventual full membership into the EEC by the mid- 
1990s. 
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In the 1960s, the EU was more of an economic community than a political organization. After 
experiencing the Great Depression and a major war afterwards, the original six member states 
had set regional economic integration as their target in the post-1945 era (Nas, 2002: 225). 
Accordingly, the content of the EU's first association agreements with Turkey consisted of 
economic matters, which included free trade under institutional and financial cooperation. The 
latter was expected to culminate in economic integration in the form of a 'Customs Union' 
between the parties (Cayhan, 1997: 35-60). 
Throughout the 1970s, the various turns in relations curbed the emergence of a lasting imprint 
of the EU on Turkish politics. This situation revealed an interesting comparison with the 
membership process of the so-called Mediterranean trio, namely, Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
which sought to consolidate their democratic system against their own non-democratic rulers 
through negotiating the full membership process roughly in the same period (Onis, 2000: 
467). EU membership for Greece, Spain, and Portugal meant and provided economic 
incentives and exerted democratic political conditions, whereas for the Turkish state elites EU 
membership remained more of an economic integration project in the 1970s and 1980s (Onis, 
2003: 10). For-largely this reason, the quest for the membership failed to take an account of 
-, the political requirements of the EU. As such the membership process'did not inClude, 
significant shift in Turkey's military-dominated political system. 
Overall in the 1970s a combination of various issues constituted major obstacles for the goal 
of full membership (Onis, 2001b: 111). These issues included size, the underdeveloped 
economy, the threat of a potentially disruptive free labour movement to the EU, mass 
migration, financial burdens, the Cyprus problem, self-exclusion in 1978, the continuous 
rejection by the unfriendly Islamist party in the coalition governments in the 1970s, and last 
but not least the military coup that ended Turkey's democratic politics in September 1980. 
These developments in turn led to a lack of impetus and ground for a possible process of EU- 
led political change in Turkey. 
The military intervention in Turkey in September 1980 strained and further deteriorated 
political relations between Turkey and the EU (Erdemli, 2003: 4-5). It is, however, important 
to note that despite its non-democratic move into politics the military in this period did not 
drifted away from Turkey's full membership goal in the course of relations with EU. In 
December 198 1, for instance, the military-led government's leader Bulend Ulusu stated that 
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To increase its ties with the west, our government has decided to join the EEC after 
preparing the necessary political and economic grounds. Our government has always 
demonstrated special care for the relations with the European Council and European 
Parliament (Quoted in Cayhan, 1997: 242). 
Indeed, this and subsequent attempts by the military showed how the EU project has not been 
sidestepped and that the desire for membership continued to have an extensive reach amongst 
the different political actors in Turkey (Cayhan, 1997: 243). The military's decision not to 
diverge from the membership goal was in line with its traditional Western oriented foreign 
policy and 'Westernization that was the cornerstone of Kernalist state ideology' (Dagi, 1998: 
133) but it also reflected a wider concern that Turkey might be isolated from the western 
world due to the 1980 coup (Jacoby, 2004: 141). 
The EU membership conditions in the 1980s included a new political stipulation in addition to 
the already existing economic conditionality. Democracy gradually became the required 
Fegime type for membership (Onis, 2003: 10-11), while related conditions were also 
fashioned in the. discourse of democracy and human rights, and were implemented ir; 
membership. processes of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Contrary to thq latter developments, 
these years saw Turkey's military regime occasionally claiming that the EU had no right in 
interfering in the country's internal politics (Dagi, 1998: 132-3). The end-result was that while 
the EU was changing its policies of conditionality to include a more overtly democratic 
political proviso, Turkey was driving further towards an authoritarian mentality of rule. 
Turkey's reluctance to respond to the EU criticisms throughout the 1980s attracted various 
counter-reactions by the EU and led to yet another period of frozen relations between the two 
(Eralp, 1997: 101). The influence of the military on Turkish politics lingered to the degree 
that it could hardly be fully and easily eradicated. This in turn constituted another serious 
obstacle in advancing further political integration with the EU (Dagi, 1998: 132-3). The 
military intervention in politics has thus prevented the type of relations that the Southern 
European trio experienced in their political domain with the EU. 
After the donnant EU-Turkey relations of the early 1980s, the Ozal government applied on 14 
April 1987 for full membership to revitalize the potential partnership with the EU. The EU 
Council, however, fell short of processing this application (Erdemli, 2003: 6). Stressing that it 
was not on the verge of another enlargement wave, the EU commission recommended the 
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previously anticipated economic integration instead of a full membership, and thus rejected 
Turkey's application in 1989 (Erdemli, 2003: 6). Another phase began in Turkey-EU relations 
in the early 1990s, when the hardening of membership conditions started to shape relations. 
This was a period of momentous change in world politics, having crucial ramifications for 
Turkey and the EU (Onis, 2003: 9-12). 
The revolutions in world politics between 1989 and 1992 shaped a new European strategy 
towards enlargement vis-A-vis the South/Eastern European countries via various Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements coming to force in the mid-1990s (Missiroli, 2003: 104). The 
EU strove to turn the 'threats of instability' emanating from the post-Cold War politics into 
'opportunities' by integrating the Central and Eastern European countries in its so-called 
'Eastern Enlargement' (Kahraman, 2000: 6; Lynch, 2003: 42-7). These years also witnessed 
further changes in the nature of the EU project: In the post Cold War environment, the 
political elements of EU membership were ever-more underlined so that membership status 
rested on 'performance in relation to democratization and human rights', which found its 
expression in the so-called Copenhagen criteria laid down at the Copenhagen Summit of June 
1993 (Onis, '2003: '11). The criteria disclosed a threefold category of requirements for 
membe. -ship: 'e--onomic, legal and political. In regard to the latter, the European Council- 
stressed that 'membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and 
protection of minorities' (http: //europa. eu. int). The evaluation of candidates' capacities in 
terms of these criteria has recently changed the meaning of the EU membership for Turkey. 
Thus, in the 1990s the EU went through a significant transformation with an overt emphasis 
upon political integration based upon the rule of law, democracy and human-minority rights 
(Hale, 2003: 108). Political values such as liberty, fundamental human rights, democracy and 
rule of law gained explicit legal status under the Community Law. These values basically 
meant that membership into an exclusive economic club was no longer simply the target. 
Following the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, these political values further constituted the 
benchmark of political integration and further enlargement for the EU. Meanwhile, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union had left the central and Eastern European states within the remit 
of the EU membership. The latter embarked upon a task of political transformation in these 
states by way of enlargement. The EU was now in full throttle towards becoming an exclusive 
democratic political club. Membership into this political club required more than a standard 
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econornýic conditionality and incurred serious political costs for the aspiring states such as 
Turkey. The Turkish state elites, however, were slow in comprehending this newly changed 
EU membership conditionality. Their underestimations constituted one of the main reasons 
for the strained and problematic relations between Turkey and the EU that ensued. As Aydinli 
and Waxman argued, Turkey's civilian and military elites 
[flepeated ad nauseam the mantra that Turkey rightfully belonged in the European 
family of nations. They never seemed to ask themselves whether they were prepared to 
pay the price for admission into this exclusive club. To be sure, since the prospect of 
admission appeared remote for so long, such a question would have been premature if 
not presumptuous (2001: 383). 
Later, in 1997, and amidst these developments came the EU Luxemburg decision to exclude 
(albeit shortly) Turkey from membership process (Erdemli, 2003: 6). This decision further 
alienated the country from both the EU line and the relevant democratic reform process it 
entailed (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 198-202). The decision not to include Turkey in 
the list of candidate countries was a major blow to Turkey's hopes of becoming a member in 
ihe EU (M. Laren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 202). Turkey thereafter in large part failed. ta 
develop a*sound strategy of adjustment for enacting the new membership requirements. 
Instead, 'if retained 'a'rather ambiguo'is stance and- was reltictant'to undertake. ' necessary 
political and legal reforms, which would potentially pave the way for a transformation from a 
security mentality of rule to a more democratic mode of politics (Onis, 2000: 464). 
Helsinki Summit of 1999: The Inclusion 
After two years of strained relations, the EU's attitude towards Turkey changed in the 
Helsinki Summit of December 1999 (Erdemli, 2003: 6). At long last in this summit, the 
Council decided to elevate Turkey's status from an applicant country to an officially 
recognized 'candidate state. Turkey was now on track to become a full member of the EU. 
There appeared to be three main factors behind this drastic u-tum in Turkey-EU relations. 
Firstly, there was the coming to power of social democratic governments in such major 
European states as Germany for which Turkey's membership did not look as undesirable as it 
did for their conservative counterparts (Akcam, 2000: 42). This political-ideological change in 
major European governments was a significant and positive development for Turkey's 
inclusion because the emphasis on 'the growing vision of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
Europe' was developed by 'the new wave of social democrats ... to differentiate themselves 
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from the right-of-centre conservative parties' (Onis, 2000: 470-1; Avci, 2003: 150). The 
second positive factor was the renewed recognition of Turkey's potential geo-strategic and 
economic contributions to the EU (Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 499). Last but not least was the lifting 
of the persistent Greek veto over the granting of the candidacy status thanks to the concession 
Greece acquired over the Cyprus issue and its bilateral disputes with Turkey (Jenkins, 2001b: 
270). 
The declaration to include Turkey was in many ways a clarifying decision. By granting 
Turkey candidate status, the EU redressed its ambiguous stance over Ankara's place in the 
recent enlargement process. In other words, after the Helsinki decision in 1999, Turkey-EU 
relations gained a new lease of life. For the EU's Helsinki announcement has overcome the 
impasse in Turkey-EU relations by offering an accession partnership (Avci, 2003: 150). The 
meaning of the 'official candidacy' status for Turkey's governing elite was thoroughly 
evident such that they saw the decision to include Turkey in the enlargement process as 
'correcting the mistakes of Luxemburg' (Eralp, 2000: 29). Crucially, this positive view of the 
Turkish state elite. was one vital legitimizing factor for an otherwise reluctant reform process. 
Furthermore, by offering an official- candidacy status the EU was able to enforce and monitor 
the reform process in Turkey for the first time by presenting a concrete political programme 
or a roadmap instead of an abstract ideal of membership. This way, the EU thwarted the oft- 
stated excuse of Turkey's state elite to escape from realizing the potential political meanings 
of membership. This was so because the elites previously were able to distract the reform 
process by invoking the EU's ambivalent stance over Turkey's membership, as exemplified in 
Luxemburg only two years earlier. As Aydinli and Waxman suggested, 
as long as the Europeans kept Turkey at arm's length, their [Turkey's military and 
civilian elite] willingness to implement the domestic reforms necessary for EU 
membership was never put to test (2001: 383). 
Hence with the Helsinki inclusion, the palpable official EU candidacy status rather than a 
vague promise of it was achieved. This in turn started to put to test the willingness of the state 
elites to prove their much-coveted desire for westernization, which at that moment meant 
conforming to the changing democratic conditionality of the EU (Akcam, 1999: 41). Turkey's 
state elites have come inescapably to confront the plain fact that (unlike their partnership with 
the United States), the strategic and economic interests could hardly offset or replace the EU's 
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impervious. membership requirements on democracy and human rights (Onis, 2000: 465). 
Thus the European Council's decision to grant an 'official candidacy status' in 1999 rendered 
more problematic the elites' reluctant stance on the already pressing issue of reforms 
democratizing domestic politics (Akcam, 2000: 44). 
However, the relations have never gone smoothly. On the contrary, as the nature of the 
proposed changes became increasingly apparent throughout the early 2000s, the state elites' 
difficulties and reluctance to fulfill the membership conditions resurfaced (Jenkins, 2001: 
270). The most outstanding impediment was, of course, the conditionality of the Copenhagen 
political criteria, which disturbed Turkey's relations with the EU in the early 2000s (Kinzer, 
New York Times, II March 2000), for the EU had made the official candidacy and the 
expected full membership only conditional upon meeting politically difficult conditions set for 
Turkey's existing political system (Onis, 2000: 470). In short, at the domestic level it was 
mostly after 1999 that the EU was able to firmly convey its political conditionality for 
membership into the minds of Turkish policy makers. It amounted to a 'soul-searching' 
experience (Avci, 2003: 156). 
The, difficulties notwithstanding, the EU -Helsinki decision -in . 1999 brought a renewed 
confidence and optimism to the Turkish side, particularly on such problematic issues as the 
democratization process, economic reforms and human rights (Kirzner, New York Times, 13 
December 1999; Peel and Boulton, Financial Times, 13 December 1999). The new Accession 
Partnership and the support of Greece and Gennany gave Turkey the necessary hope for full 
membership by providing a strong impetus for advancing the transformational reform process 
in Turkey's domestic political structure (Avci, 2003: 150-1). Unlike the previous 
disheartening rejections in 1989 and 1997 and the meager financial support and incomplete 
programmes in the membership process, the Helsinki approval of Turkey's official candidacy 
contributed a great deal and encouraged Turkish policy makers to comply with what was 
otherwise radical conditionality (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003). 
6.2. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN 
ORDER 
The importance of the inclusion of Turkey into the European state system can be traced back 
to the trajectory of socio-political reform processes that started with the late Ottoman Empire. 
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Turkey's institutional, political and economic presence in Europe started with the efforts of 
the Turkish modernizers in the period of Tanzimat (1839) with the issue then being involved 
in the 'Concert of Europe' (Dagi, 1998: 128). In fact, this modernization reform process was 
understood as westernization/Europeanization dating back to the late Eighteenth century that 
aimed to create modem state machinery and facilitate the development of modem cultural 
institutions (Berkes, 1998: 137-54; Mardin, 2005: 145-65). These westernization efforts and 
the later search for a 'European' identity had become a central hallmark in the 
Ottoman/Turkish state discourse and a main legitimizing factor for policy making (Onis, 
2000: 466; Akcam, 2000: 43; Yegen 1999b). Initially, the ideal of westernization was a 
currency of the early Tanzimat reforms that reached its zenith in the mid-nineteenth century 
(Lewis, 1968; Shaw and Shaw, 1977). The westernization efforts in the late Ottoman era were 
central for the purpose of modernizing the moribund institutions of the empire. 
After the Ottoman experience the Turkish Republic continued to carry this reforming process 
much further (Kadioglu, 1998). The state sought a European, secular and national identity, 
and to part with the Ottoman Islamic civilization (Yavuz, 2000b). Becoming part of 
'European' civilization was supposed to provide these characteristics and disconnect the new 
-'state from its. Ottoman multi-national past (Kramer, 2001: ý 21,31). Tb. e key d. nve for. the. 
republic was therefore to become an integral part of contemporary western civilization (Onis, 
2003: 16-7). To this aim, the ruling elites of modem Turkey attempted a wholesale 
transformation of not only the state but also the society under the guise of a nation-building 
project-a 'cultural revolution' (Mardin, 1971; Zurcher, 1997: 184-215). Arguably because the 
Ottoman state institutions remained intact after the establishment of the Turkish republic 
(Zurcher, 2004: 103), the modem Turkish state was determined to 'preach a gospel of 
Westernization' into the hearts and minds of the society (Helvacioglu, 1999). Westernization 
was taken so seriously by the founding elites that Mustafa Kemal, for instance, clearly related 
becoming part of western civilization to the security of the state and the very existence of the 
nation when he said: 
Surviving in the world of modem civilization depends upon changing ourselves. This 
is the sole law of any progress in the social, economic and scientific spheres of life. 
Changing the rules of life in according with the times is an absolute necessity. In an 
age [of science] nations cannot maintain their existence by age-old rotten mentalities 
and by tradition-worshipping (quoted in Berkes, 1998: 464, emphasis added). 
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The efforts to acquire the features of 'contemporary civilization' had thus become an integral 
part of the social and cultural revolution, which was launched as a part of Turkey's nation- 
building project. As Berkes argued: 
To reach the stage achieved by the civilized nations! That became the motif of the new 
[Kemalist] ideology. The reforms to be undertaken would imply nothing but a total 
revolution-the appropriation of Western civilization (1998: 463). 
From its inception in 1923, Turkey has struggled for international recognition as a European 
state. As part and parcel of this struggle, the full membership of, and the involvement in, the 
developing institutions of Western Europe since the mid-1950s has been construed as a 
materialization of Turkey's desire to be recognized as such (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 
2003: 197). Along this line, membership in the EU was primary among those institutions that 
could materialize Turkey's desire for recognition (Cayhan, 1997: 417). As such, membership 
into the EU was a central goal for the majority of Turkey's political and military elites in the 
modem Republican history (Aydinli and Waxman, 2001: 382; Ulger, 2002). A natural 
corollary to this was membership in the relevant Western institutions such as NATO and 
OECD (Aybet and - Muftuler-Bac, . 2000: 557-582). The particular - importance of- EU 
membership for th&. state elites lies in their -perception of the-EU'that embodies in today's 
world the much-coveted 'contemporary civilization'. This is a commonly visited and well- 
established element of the official state discourse. For instance, in 2002 the former President 
Suleyman Demirel said: 
Our EU membership effort is not a problem that has emerged recently. Turkey equates 
the values of civilization in being a part of Europe. The EU issue, for Turkey, is not 
only an issue of accession; it is an issue of concept, it is an issue of 
assertion ... Turkey's purpose is not to turn Europe into Turkey, but to make herself 
European. This is an assertion of Republic, a republic in its 78"' year (2002: 46). 
The ideal of becoming a part of 'European Civilization' was also enshrined in the 'reason of 
state' rationality of security governmentality. Since 'Western Civilization' was equated with 
'Europeanization', the membership into the European states could only be a logical foreign 
policy direction for the state. Such a membership could confirm Turkey's 'Western' state 
identity and fulfills the political aim of severing ties with the Ottoman past. Ataturk in 1924 
made these two dimensions crystal clear, saying: 
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There are many nations but there is only one civilization for the advancement of a 
nation, it must be a part of this one civilization ... We wish to modemize our country. All our efforts are directed toward the establishment of a modem, therefore, Western 
[European] government... This nation has accepted the principle that the only means 
of survival for the nations in the international struggle for existence lies in the 
acceptance of the contemporary Western [European] civilization (quoted in Nadolski, 
1977: 539, emphasis added). 
Other state elites were quick to link the issue of membership into the EU with Ataturk's 
political vision presented above. For instance, during the signing ceremony of the Association 
Agreement in 1963 between the EU and Turkey, the president of Turkish Republic Necdet 
Sunay said: 'With this Agreement we are convinced that we have transcended a serious stage 
in Turkey's route to westernization, which is a behavior that had been made into a national 
policy by the beloved Ataturk' (quoted in Nas, 2002: 225). A more recent example in line 
with this came after the EU granted Turkey the much-awaited official candidacy status in 
1999 after which Turkey introduced its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA) as a part of the pre-accession strategy in 2001 (Avci, 2003: 150-1). In the preface of 
this document, it is claimed that 'the Turkish government regards EU membership as a new 
step forwprd, a ipilestone confirnng the 
. 
founding plýilosophy of, and Ataturk's vision for the 
Rep#ic. (Turkish Foreign Ministry, www. mfa. gov. tr). Hence, it. is clear that for. the Turkish. 
state membership into the EU has been more than a simple membership into yet another 
Western institution (Nas, 2002: 225). 
Understanding this positive perception of the EU by the state elites is crucial for grasping the 
potential of a transformation in security governmentality. This is why it is little wonder why 
after so many moments of political rows and national frustrations Turkey still calls for full 
membership in the EU (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 199-210; Caglar, 2003: 242). 
Construed as part of its national identity and political capital, Turkey's main target has thus 
been its well-documented aspiration to become full member of the EU. Having acquired this 
significance, however, relations were rarely bereft of ups and downs. Given the various 
turning points in relations it is unsurprising why Turkey's application is sometimes dubbed as 
a 'journey to an uncertain destination' or a 'dream becoming a nightmare' (Aydinli and 
Waxman, 2001: 382). Indeed, unlike most of other candidate countries, Turkey's relations 
with the EU have been difficult and rather complex. The nature of the complexities and 
oscillations surrounding the relationship between Turkey and the EU in recent years will be 
illuminated next. 
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6.3. THE EU MEMBERSHIP REFORM PROCESS 
Particularly after the Cold War, emphasis on the constitutive liberal norms of proper state 
conduct became a commonplace emphasis in the politics of international organizations such 
as NATO and the EU (Neumann and Williams, 2000; Webber at al, 2004). In addition to the 
traditional tasks of defence and economic integration, these organizations strove to diffuse 
and promote human rights regimes, the rule of law, and democracy as the targets for aspirant 
countries. The latter are expected to adjust their state conduct in order to join (Olsen, 2002: 
923-6; Lavanex and Ucarer, 2004: 418-25). This new set of conditionality, in turn, has 
brought in and helped shape new understandings and management in the security field as well 
(Hyde-Price, 2004: 332-4). More crucially, these organizations have also provided high 
degrees of social and material rewards for the aspirant or existing member states, such as 
economic incentives and/or socio-political recognition (Risse-Kappen, 1996). It is argued that 
The values of economic liberalization, democracy, the rule of law, the 
professionalisation of govcrnment bureaucracies and civilian oversight of the armed 
forces constitute the basis upon which new and candidate states of the EU and NATO 
have been incorporated into these two crucial organisations of security'goveinance. 
The emphasis on these values and the practical processes of conditionality and 
socialization which have followed has fundamentally transformed domestic 
governance in a number of post-communist states as well as laying the ideational basis 
for inclusion in the broader international processes of security governance (Webber et 
al., 2004: 23-4). 
In similar vein, the EU integrated democratic norms into its institutional identity and 
membership conditionality (Olsen, 2002: 926-9). It incorporated standards of human rights 
and democracy into its association agreements and also made its financial and institutional 
ties/aids conditional upon the fulfillment of these norms (Kordell, 1999: 92). The EU has also 
developed a more advanced and effective social and material control mechanism than other 
intemational organizations such as the OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe to make sure 
that member states comply with its basic norms - norms that underlie fundamental principles 
of liberal democracy. 
Particularly with the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria, EU membership requirements 
aimed at a value-based and normatively institutionalized setting for the aspirant non-member 
states, such as Turkey (Olsen, 2002: 927). The EU uses the incentive of membership as a 
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social and material control mechanism to invoke the fulfillment of its democratic 
conditionality (Schimmelfenig, 2001: 58-62). Turkey's willingness to act in accordance with 
the membership requirements increased spectacularly after the official candidacy status was 
granted by the EU leaders in the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 (McLaren and Muftuler- 
Bac, 2003: 208). This decision was significant in that the hypothetical prospect of the 
membership of an otherwise culturally and religiously different country had now been 
broached by the highest executive branch of the EU, the Council of Ministers. This decision 
boosted the legitimacy of the conditionality of EU membership in the pro-EU circles in 
Turkey and bolstered their incentives to undertake reforms, since the EU's official candidacy 
was now in itself a tangible political reward for Turkey that justified and accentuated the 
reform process (Onis, 2003: 12). With this decision, the rightness or the 'normative 
legitimacy' of the EU reform process was enhanced and the EU from then onwards no longer 
relied solely on its 'normative pull to enforce' (Hurd, 1999: 401). By putting the full 
membership in sight, Turkey's pro-EU political and state elites' momentum and motivation to 
execute these reforms was encouraged and since then the reform process has been accelerated. 
The country's decision-makers began to believe that the reward of membership was worth the 
costs of adaptation . (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 208). This link also served to exert 
pressure on, those--. Tur-kish state elites, who had hitherto merely paid lip service to. thcr 
membership goal. The credible prospect of full membership in the EU provided those elites 
with the incentives to embark upon and commit themselves to the reform process, if they were 
genuinely committed to the EU project (Yesilada, 2002). 
The EU emphasis on spreading liberal democratic norms into aspirant states through the 
enlargement process implies an important undercurrent for the prospect of a transformation in 
'reason of state' rationality of security governmentality. Following its 1999 decision, the EU 
has noticeably found it easier to confer a manifest authority upon Turkey's existing political 
structures and force it to comply with membership conditionality (Hale, 2003; Onis, 2003). 
Through its sustained pressure based upon the Copenhagen political criteria the EU calls for 
serious alternations that might potentially rewrite Turkey's security mentality. In this regard, 
the most obvious aspect of transformation implicated in the EU membership conditionality 
aims to replace Turkey's reason of state rationality with a liberal and pluralistic political order 
(Yesilada, 2002: 102-7; Onis, 2003: 16-23). It can be argued that this kind of replacement and 
resultant security conception signifies the point that human beings 'need both freedom and 
security-and the sacrifice of either is a cause of suffering' (Bauman, 2001: 42, emphasis 
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added). This EU induced duality of freedom and security or what can arguably called as the 
'liberal problematic of security' indicates that security 'can be best attained by creating the 
condition under which individuals can exercise various liberties' (Dean, 1999: 116-7). Does 
the EU genuinely lead to a prospect of transformation in reason of state rationality? 
The EU Induced Membership Reforms after 1999 
Before outlining the reforms undertaken, it is necessary to recall the background. The 
prevailing norms in security governmentality in Turkey have contributed to a record of human 
rights violations, legal obstacles to any improving of cultural and minority rights and a 
malfunctioning of democracy in the country. As regards the Kurdish problem, for example, 
the Turkish Constitutional Court had closed various pro-Kurdish parties and jailed their 
parliamentarians starting with the 'DEP Party' in March 1994 (Hale, 2003: 112). Various EU 
Commission reports pointed out that disappearance under custody, extra-judicial executions, 
torture and other human rights violations were widespread; freedom of expression and 
association were seriously curtailed and pressure was exerted upon Turkish authorities to 
solve the Kurdish prr)blem by peaceful and political means (European Commission Report,. 
2001, -2003). Turkey's defi --it ýtandpoint on the Kurdish problem has resulted in numerous 
Europearn - Parliament . (EP) resolutions, asking Turkish authorities to release Kurdish. 
parliamentarians in jail for political reasons. On numerous occasions the EP also explicitly 
'called on the authorities to engage in direct talks with the Kurdish people's representative 
organizations with a view to finding a peaceful resolution enabling their economic, social, 
political and cultural rights to be recognized' (Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 173). 
After granting official candidacy, the EU Helsinki decisions in December 1999 also assigned 
Turkey, like other candidate countries, a pre-accession strategy in order to stimulate and 
support its reform process. To this end, the Accession Partnership was adopted in March 
2001, which has begun to serve as a roadmap for the priority areas in meeting all the related 
criteria for accession. On 19 March 2001, the Turkish Government adopted its National 
Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (Erdemli, 2003: 6). This programme 
outlined the agenda of political and economic reforms and presented how those reforms 
would be carried out. The aim of the program was to satisfy the Copenhagen political and 
economic criteria for membership. 
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Starting with the October 2001 reforms, and in line with the NPAA, the Turkish Parliament 
adopted a package of 34 amendments in the Constitution. These amendments, aimed at 
constitutional liberalization addressed some of the deficiencies created by the traditions of 
security governmentality, pertaining to freedoms of expression, organization and assembly, 
the use of minority languages, the abolition of death penalty and the role of the military in 
politics (Onis, 2003: 13). The EU induced reforms pertaining to the military's role in politics 
will be investigated in Chapter 7; the theme here is whether constitutional liberalization 
promises political liberalization. The next section will therefore focus on those reforms 
pertaining to the process of change in the 'reason of state' rationality in security 
governmentality. Overall, these EU reforms aim to carry out a set of comprehensive 
constitutional and legislative changes that reinforce and safeguard fundamental rights and 
freedoms and democracy. The section below identifies those reforms pertaining to human 
rights, and identifies the challenging EU reforms under two main headings: democracy 
(freedom of expression, association and political parties) and the treatment of ethnic 
minorities (notably the Kurdish people). 
Human Rights 
Under the influence of the EU there have been improvements in human rights provisions in 
Turkey. Provisions concerning freedom of association, and the right to assembly and peaceful 
demonstration have been advanced. The death penalty has been abolished. Various legislative 
and administrative measures against torture and maltreatment have been put into force. The 
right to retrial in the light of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights has been 
introduced. Rules concerning conditions in prisons and detention houses have been brought in 
line with the norms of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and the 
recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The 
Human Rights Advisory Board, with a view to form an effective platform for dialogue 
between the state and civil society in the area of human rights, has become operational in the 
Office of the Prime Ministry. In addition, several conventions relating to the political criteria 
have been signed or ratified. They include Additional Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR 
Concerning the Abolishing of the Death Penalty, the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the LIN 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ILO Convention Concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labour (No. 
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182), and the UN Convention on Prevention of All Types of Discrimination Against Women 
and its Optional Protocol. Governmental circulars have been issued to raise the awareness of 
civil servants on the prevention of torture and maltreatment. Human rights training 
programmes for civil servants, particularly law enforcement officers, have been intensified 
and broadened. Comprehensive training programmes for judges and prosecutors on the human 
rights regimes continue in collaboration with the Council of Europe and the European Union 
(http: //europa. eu. int/comnVenlargement/ turkey). 
The Respectfor and Protection of Minority Rights 
The EU discourse on minority rights does not spell autonomy or independent statehood for 
&national minorities' but mostly articulate cultural rights such as the use of minority languages 
in education and for official purposes. Although the official Turkish definition of minority 
(legally justified with a special reference to the founding international treaty of Lausanne of 
the Turkish Republic) in Turkey singles out only non-Muslim peoples in Turkey (and as such 
does not include full and normal citizens from the Muslim Kurdish community) the term 
'ethnic minority' is nonetheless associated with the rights of the Kurdish population (Onis, 
2003: 14-5). In this respect, Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution that restricted the private 
and public use of Kurdish language were revised by the EU-induced October 2001 
amendments. In line with the clause dealing with the 'protection of minorities' in the 
Copenhagen criteria, Turkey is in the medium term expected to 'ensure cultural diversity and 
guarantee cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origins' (Hale, 2003: 117). In the 
process, bylaws on broadcasting in and the teaching of different languages and dialects (i. e. 
Kurdish) have been adopted; bylaws on the acquisition and disposal of real estate by 
community foundations (i. e. Christian and Armenian minorities), and on associations, have 
entered into force, and the relevant administrative restructuring has been completed. 
Democracy: freedoms of expression, association and political parties 
In this realm of reforms since 2001, various laws have been amended to reinforce gender 
equality, to protect cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights, and to enhance the right to 
learn and broadcast in different languages and dialects. The legislation concerning non- 
Muslim communities and foreigners has been improved. Most restrictions on freedom of 
thought and expression, and the freedom of the press have been lifted. A new Penal Code in 
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2005 that codifies a number of press reforms limits the definition of the criminal act of 
'inciting hatred' to only those cases where the exercise of free expression poses a 'clear and 
present danger'. Furthermore, prison penalties for 'insulting' state institutions were reduced 
with the requirement of proof of intent for conviction. A new press law adopted in June 2004 
abolished the authorities' power to suspend publications, lift prison penalties for certain press 
offenses, and strengthened protection for confidential sources. The state of emergency that 
had been effective since 1979 has been lifted in all provinces including Simak and Diyarbakir. 
The advisory role of the National Security Council has been redefined, as was the consultative 
status of the National Security Council (NSC) through constitutional and legislative 
amendments. The functions of the NSC and the Secretariat-General of the NSC will be 
harmonized with this new definition (http: //europa. eu. int/comm/enlargement/ turkey; CPJ 
Annual Report, 2004). 
The said reforms have introduced path-breaking changes with a view to democratizing the 
practice and mentality of government in Turkey. Yet, some of the 'catch-all' legal precepts 
remain disquieting for the prospect of a more democratic rule. For instance, Article 69 still 
allows the shedding of state subsidies for and the closure of political 'parties' by the 
Constitutional Court. This would be the case when the- latter determines that 'the party in 
question has become a centre for the execution of such activities' that 'violate the fourth 
paragraph of Article 68' which outlines the rights and duties of political parties and requires 
that the 'statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties, shall not be in 
conflict with the independence of the state its indivisible integrity with its territory and 
nation ... [or] the principles of the 
democratic and secular republic' (Hale, 2003: 111). 
Furthermore, in civil-military relations the military's involvement into politics by coups and 
otherwise remains to be a continuing problematic theme in the relations and presents a 
problematic area of reform despite the EU's consistent support for democratic-civilian forces 
against military-statist establishment (Bayramoglu, 2004; Cizre, 2004). 
6.4. THE IMPACT OF EU DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONALITY ON THE 'REASON 
OF STATE'RATIONALITY: TOWARDS A TRANSFORMATION? 
This section will assess whether the EU's democratic conditionality criteria have been 
effectively changing the reason of state rationality of security governmentality. Given the 
traits of Turkish political culture, this section draws on the political implications of the 
188 
changes introduced by EU conditionality rather than attending to the current legal-descriptive 
profile made possible by the reform process. As indicated above the incentive for full 
membership has been playing as the basic mechanism for effective change and compliance, 
rather than the self-regulation of the aspirant state. Consequently, the central channel of 
change and compliance has emerged at the intergovernmental level, or more correctly, 
involved in inter-elite interactions/negotiations more than anyone else. The resultant situation 
is that the EU-induced process of reform and the prospect of transformation in security 
mentality remain in large part at the repository of governmental decision-makers. The latter in 
turn are conditioned by the material and social rewards in the process rather than a genuine 
engagement with democratic conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 499). In what 
follows the effects of these refo 
, 
rms are examined to see whether they so far amount to a 
transformation in Turkey's security rationality. 
To begin with, the reform process underway is a comprehensive historical development. 
Indeed, Turkey has only two historical antecedents to this process. As mentioned, the first was 
the period of Tanzimat reforms in the nineteenth century Ottoman polity and the second was 
the Turkish Republican Revolution that saw the birth of the modem Turkish state in 1923. 
Especially from 1999 onwards, it seems that Turkey's state rationality has once again faced 
the prospect of change, this time through the EU-induced reform process. Considering its 
political consequences, some observers have described this new EU-related process as a 
crevolution' (Kinzer, 2004: 15). But what happens when two diametrically opposed 
mentalities of rule, namely the EU-induced democratic conditionality and Turkey's 'reason of 
state' rationality confront each other? 
It should be noted that one of the basic shortcomings of the EU reforms is that it ignores the 
'weak foundations of liberal politics' in Turkey and quite counter-productively generates a 
nationally and politically 'widespread resentment' in the realm of Kurdish cultural-language 
regulation (Onis, 2003: 15). Crucially, they also pay little heed to the fact that what is 
important here is not which language is used but what is allowed by the state to be taught and 
'on this score numerous constitutional and other rules protecting the territorial integrity of the 
country would still apply' (Hale, 2003: 118). As to the Kurdish problem, for instance, the 
military-led state elites have long held that the problem is one of terrorism and continued to 
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see the problem as a predominantly economic or security issue or external provocation 
(Hurriyet, 17 August 2005). 
An increasing tension can be observed between the state elites and the pro-refornlist political 
elites such as the incumbent ruling party Justice and Development Party (AKP)12 on the 
implications of the reforms undertaken. This tension has largely been a function of the 
concerns of Turkey's powerful civilian and military elites, who are wary of the reform 
process. They, therefore, do not refrain from publicly propagating some of their concerns over 
the perceived consequences of democratic conditionality (Cizre, 2003: 214). A recurrent 
theme in their speeches is that democratic conditionality risks heightening the 'threats' against 
Turkey's 'national and territorial unity' (Bilgin, 2005: 180). They try hard to sell the view that 
the envisioned cultural and political rights will endanger the basic idea of the Republican 
Turkish state. They presume that the specific political rights granted to various groups (such 
as the Kurds) will pose serious threats to the essence of the secular-nationalist state (Khan and 
Yavuz, 2003). In addition, the freedom of expression and association, they see, will curb the 
ability of the state to address these threats (Savas, 2001a; 2001b). Hence it is unsurprising that 
the state elites have been reluctant to fully endorse the implementation of reforms. 
In the reform process, what the secularist security forces, most visibly the military, gasp at is' 
how the politically assertive EU membership process can easily export specific means of 
democracy so detrimental to their privileged positions in security governmentality (see 
Chapter 6). But what does EU membership specifically mean imply for the military's 
underlying rationale to the EU membership beyond its habitual support? There are certain 
parameters that delineate the subdued standpoint taken by the military vis-A-vis EU 
membership. These are related to EU membership mostly through geographic and military- 
institutional capacities and calculations (Ilhan, 2002). The military's underlying rationale to 
EU membership is a particular security approach, which does not bode well with the 'liberal 
EU security approach' (Oguz, 2002; Kosebalaban, 2002). In an interview with a military 
official the meaning of EU membership in this regard was cast as follows: 
The EU membership is detrimental to Turkey's interests because it brings about a 
change in the rules of the game designed for the states in which Turkey has so far 
12 The next chapter examines this tension between the Turkish Armed Forces and the ruling so-called 'Islamic' 
party (AKP) in the context of Turkey's EU membership process. 
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participated with considerable success. This significant change is worrying simply 
because it takes away the opportunity to play around the country's external security 
card as we did through NATO against the Soviet Russia. It [the EU membership] is 
like throwing out the chessboard. I want to play chess not another game (Interview 
with military official, Ankara, August 2003). 
It can be argued that the military's materialist-rationalist-security outlook on EU membership 
seems to be at odds with the 'liberal EU security approach'. The former tends in particular to 
emphasise Turkey's geopolitical position and military assets as important contributions to 
European security, which in turn is expected to serve as instrumental trump-cards at the 
service Turkey's bid for EU membership (Bir, 1998). The view here casts Turkey's 
geography and military capabilities as the main 'assets' for the interaction and eventual 
inclusion of Turkey in the EU (Bilgin, 2005). In this logic, for instance, membership would be 
made possible largely by and necessarily because of the Turkey's geography and material 
security-military capabilities rather than any genuine interest by the state-security elites in 
promoting democracy (Kardas and Kucuk, 2003: 14). After all, there should be no need to 
democratize the political system since, in the military's view, since parliamentary formal 
democracy has ýlready been institutionalized (Jenkins, 2001: 34). For them more security 
rather than democracy is what Turkey and its state is in need of. 
We can illustrate this issue within an example. The military's approach to the Cyprus problem 
is a case in point here. The EU recently has implicitly linked the Cyprus problem with 
Turkey's membership, urging Turkey to solve the Cyprus problem (European Commission 
Report, 2004; The Guardian, 03 September 2005, p. 14). Contrary to the bold peace initiatives 
of the 'Islamist' AKP government in line with the so-called 'Annan Plan', the military has 
seemed reluctant to change its policy over Cyprus and as such 'put reservations' against the 
plan (Cumhuriyet, 5 January 2004, p. 1,9; Hurriyet, 03 September 2005). The state elites' 
attitude toward 'Cyprus at the expense of the EU membership' stems from Cyprus's much- 
coveted 'geo-strategic importance' for the security of the state. The issue is that if Turkey 
becomes an EU full member, the Turkish army in Cyprus will eventually have to withdraw. 
The military elites believe that this is likely to generate 'grave strategic problems' for Turkey 
regardless of the would-be-EU membership (Kardas and Kucuk, 2003: 2-10). According to 
the Chief of Staff Hilmi Ozkok: 
Cyprus is situated on a strategic line that starts from Britain and extends to Gibraltar, 
Malta, Cyprus, the Suez Canal, India and Singapore. This is why Britain is not letting 
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its bases in Cyprus come under the European Union acquis. Britain wants to keep 
them as sovereign bases. The island is a spot in that highly important chain. If we 
consider this from Turkey's standpoint, a hostile force deployed there would gain 
access-especially if it used air force-to those places in the entire eastern parts of 
Turkey that are currently not accessible by plane. As you know, planes coming from 
other countries arriving in those parts can stay airborne for only highly limited periods. 
This is because of the distance involved. It is being said that when Turkey joins the 
European Union these [hazards] would disappear. Yet, we have to do our thinking on a 
more long-term basis. Our vision has depth. When we look at the geographical region 
involved we see that an air force deployed in Cyprus would pose a big threat to 
Turkey... Cyprus would be a region where we would not be able to move freely 
towards Turkey. We already have trouble in the west. If trouble arose in the south as 
well Turkey would become imprisoned. This is what I think (Interview, Radikal, 09 
November 2003, English version from Turkish daily News, 11 November 2003, 
emphasis added). 
In interviews with military staff officers, the geo-strategic and security based reservations and 
misgivings about Turkey's EU membership was also evident. In the following reply to a 
question as to how EU membership might affect Turkey's military security one officer had 
this to say: 
We are already insecure in our external geography [i. e. the war in Iraq]. The [EU] 
membership will worsen Turkey's insecurity this time internally because of, the 
domestic implications of the membership conditionality. Here particularly concerning 
are the legal barriers that can lessen the share of the military spending in the budget 
and thus can make the country less powerful against internal and external threats 
(Interview with military official, Ankara, August 2004, my translation). 
In addition to the geo-strategic concerns, historical animosity between the Western powers 
and the Turkish state still looms large in the secularist/Kernalist discourse of the military 
(Candar, 2000: 122-4). The military-led state elites' position can be understood in terms of the 
continuation of elite perceptions of the historical sources of political mistrust between Turkey 
and the European powers (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115). This indicates that such socially 
constructed cognitive, historical ideational principles can also help constitute the view of the 
military towards the European Union membership (Kardas and Kucuk, 2003: 15-20). In this 
sense, 'external conspiracy' has been particularly operative in the construction of both geo- 
strategically calculated security assessments and the military's 'Kemalist habitus, in which 
goals are 'transformed into action in the light of their ideational patterns' (Candar, 2000: 122- 
4; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115-7). 
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More specifically, the sense of mistrust (exemplified in the so-called 'Sevres Syndrome') 
revolves around the bitter experiences of the wars which took place between the European 
allied powers and Turkey during and after the World War I. The consequent security-related 
mentality affects the perception of EU membership as follows: Just as in these wars the 
European powers showed 'malign' intentions to 'divide and rule' Turkey, so the EU 
membership project in its entirety continues and signifies these same intentions to divide and 
rule (Yazicioglu, 2004: 78). Well-read and retired general, Suat Ilhan (2002: 99-103), has 
made an explicit connection between the 'Eastern question' and the EU membership process 
to the effect that the two head for the same objective: the dismantling of Turkey in the name 
of religious-national minority rights. It seems that these views are shared by military students. 
In interviews with the students from one of Turkey's military academies, it appeared that Sdat 
Ilhan's books are amongst those most widely read (Interviews with military academy 
students, Istanbul, April, 2004). Another widely read writer, retired General Hasan Kundakci, 
claims that there are certain limits to the tolerability of EU-induced reforms, and that the 
military would not allow the civilian governments to go too far (Interview with Hasan 
Kundakci, Milliyet, 19 September 2004, p. 13). 
ia 'iio in process exposes how the military' national secu ty n ddi -n, the EU. membership reforr, ri 
based interventions come to blur the EU-induced conception of democracy. For one, the 
military's custodial political role stands in an uneasy relationship with the conception of 
power and democracy induced by the EU Copenhagen political criteria and EU membership 
in general (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Manners, 2002: 235). As will be explained in Chapter 7, 
the EU membership process has proved great success in lessening the military's political 
autonomy sprung from the National Security Council decisions. However, the EU's broader 
democracy definition that includes 'respect for minority rights' and the 'stability of 
democratic institutions' has come to clash with the military's self-ascribed political role of 
'guardianship of the national interest' and its 'political symbol of nationhood and the 
instrument of preserving the nation' (Kosebalaban, 2002: 135; Cizre, 2004: 120-5). 
Understandably, Turkey's secularists are increasingly lacerated by self-doubt in 
contemplating what has gone wrong in their quest for the EU membership, which happens to 
candidly tarnish their power bases in the Turkish polity (Aydinli and Waxman, 2001; Khan 
and Yavuz, 2003). For instance, retired General Suat Ilhan summarizes the opposition to the 
EU in such a way that Turkey's EU membership is represented to be against the state 
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ideology of Kernalism to the extent that the EU membership would practically signal the end 
of this ideology (Ilhan, 2002: 15-7,35-9,61-3). It is possible to observe this antagonism 
towards the EU membership in the reactions of other state elites as well (Savas, 2001a; 
2001b). A former veteran member of the bureaucrat elite, Yasar Yazicioglu, who had 
extensive roles in national and international state services, simply came to the blunt 
conclusion that EU membership constitutes a 'threat' to the 'national integrity and unity' 
(Yazicioglu, 2004: 413-8). 
In this process of confrontation, the conservative elements in the state establishment have not 
only been the Kernalist civilian and military elites, the Presidency, but also such political 
groups as the national left (DSP) and the national right (MHP). The latter have been most 
vocal in raising their concerns over the above mentioned issues (Tocci, 2001.4; Canefe and 
Bora, 2003: 127-48). Indeed, the DSP and MMT have strived to save the state from the 
'excesses' of democratic conditionality by positing a geopolitical image of Turkey as being 
'strategically indispensable' for the security of the Western states and by demanding certain 
concession and differential treatment in the membership process (Bagci and Kardas, 2003: 
39). When short of these concessions, they call for a reconsideration of the membership bid 
ýAvci, -2003` 159).. --- ---. I.,... : 
Furthermore, the public statements of the general secretariat of the NSC, the General Staff, 
and individual commanders disclose one of their main misgivings and theses about the EU 
membership conditionality. Such reforms, they reckon, adopted as part of the EU membership 
requirements are simply detrimental to Turkey's state's existence because the country's 
sovereign and exclusive political decision-making capacity will be perpetually cramped 
(Ilhan, 2000; 2002). For instance, some members of the top brass thinks that the proposed 
'freedom of expression' ignites 'adverse' Kurdish and Islamic claims for recognition (The 
TNC Press Release, January 2002; also see the speech by Gen. Hursit Tolon, Hurriyet, 20 
September 2005). 
Examples of this security mentality of the Kernalist state abound. For instance, the former 
coalition partner, state minister and the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) Deviet 
Bahceli said: 'We need to have a just and honorable relationship with the EU. We strongly 
oppose the notion that we should fulfill every demand of the EU to become a member or that 
we have to enter the EU at any cost' (quoted in Avci, 2003: 159). In addition, the former 
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National Security Council Secretary General Tuncer Kilinc, in a reaction to the democratic 
conditionality criteria, asserted at the Ankara War Academy that the EU would not accept 
Turkey and that 'thus Turkey now needs new allies and it would be useful if she engages in a 
search that would include Russia and Iran' (The Middle East, May 2002). As a reaction to the 
EU membership requirement from Turkey to allow broadcasting and education in Kurdish 
language, Commander of the Armed Forces Academy, Brigadier General Halil Simsek 
provided a sample of the views of the top brass when he lamented that the EU conditionality 
threatens 'breaking up our country in the name of "cultural rights", "broadcasting in mother's 
tongue, " and "educational rights... (NTVMSNBC News, II January 2001). A former 
prominent diplomat and now commentator Gunduz Aktan also went on to blatantly suggest 
that the pro-EU reformists have a 'lack of confidence in the nation, the Republic and the 
institutions [and] everything called Turkish' (Turkish Daily News, 3 April 2002). 
It can therefore be argued that Turkey's compliance to the conditionality criteria displays a 
materialistic approach towards EU full membership. That is, in line with the pattern of 
'liberalization vs. security pendulum' encountered since the political class initiated the 
process of liberalizing the state (Aydinli, 2003) it is likely that the proposed EU democratic 
rationality -will be sidestepped in cases when the military sees a threat to the securityof. the 
state. This can be observed on two levels. Firstly (as discussed above), the reforrn process 
began to make progress after the tangible prospect of membership appeared in sight, that is, 
when the material reward of EU official candidacy status was acquired. Had there been an 
internalized and well-thought need for these reforms in the mentality of Turkish state elites, 
they could have adopted and implemented the related reforms much before 1999. The reforms 
were taken up at a time when the EU as an external factor pushed for it. Indeed, most of the 
significant reform packages were adopted on the eve of the publications either of Commission 
Regular Progress Reports or the Council summits, when the decision to open accession 
negotiations was on the table. Secondly, the 'political cost-benefit calculations' (rather than 
social value mechanisms) have been primary criteria for Turkey's state elites in adopting the 
necessary membership reforms. In other words, wherever the 'political cost of adoption' 
appeared high (cost is in terms of the sensitive security problems of the state) the reforms 
have been downplayed (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 509). Those changes undertaken with 
relative ease, thus, relate to lesser areas of concern emerging from the reason of state 
rationality. The bold legislative reform packages passed by the parliament in August 2002 and 
2003 in fact corresponded to those issues, whose implementation does not require huge 
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domestic political costs for the Turkish state. An illustration pertaining to the reforms aimed 
at Kurdish problem may help here. 
It is possible to argue that the abolition of the death penalty and the recognition of socio- 
cultural rights for Turkey's minorities are all rather politically low-cost issues for the reason 
of state rationality of rulers. This is firstly, because there have been no executions of the death 
sentence since 1984, that is, there was already a moratorium on capital punishment. Secondly, 
after the capture of its leader Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK largely refrained from armed conflict 
with the Turkish forces. Thirdly, the possibility of an independent Kurdish political 
movement (e. g. the pro-Kurdish DEHAP/DTP party) strong enough to have a seat in the 
Turkish Parliament is small, because it will have to garner more than ten per cent of the total 
votes, which is the national election threshold for representation in the parliament (Tekin, 
2004: 154-5). Overall, there is neither a prolonged armed conflict between the Turkish 
military and the Kurdish insurgents (as there was between the mid-1980s and ýrtid-1990s) nor 
is there a sufficient number of vocal dissenters within civil society (or middle classes) 
challenging the state on this matter (Aktan and Aktan, 2004: 117; Jacoby, 2004: 158, ft. 99). 
,- -- . Significantly; the. implementation of the. adopted EU legislation reforms has proved difficult ., ý 
even in the present context when, for instance, it comes to granting the rights of education and 
broadcasting in Kurdish language. This has been the case, when the state elites have decided 
that Kurdish broadcasting should best be carried out by the state controlled public 
broadcasting channel of the TRT, rather than other private TV stations, because the latter 
might 'usurp' the opportunity and air alternative 'sensitive' programs that would be 
detrimental to Turkey's national security (Zaman, 02 May 2004). The difficulty is that even 
the state controlled TRT programming scheme is rather unaccommodating if not antagonistic 
towards such proposed Kurdish broadcasting programs. The TRT's state appointed 
bureaucrats have defended their decision by claiming that the TRT does not have such 
internal regulation mechanisms so as to allow Kurdish broadcasting (Zaman, 02 May 2004). 
In return, the Minister of Communication Besir Atalay lamented over such TRT bureaucrats' 
escapist tendency and said that he could not understand why they declined to implement this 
proviso (Zaman, 02 May 2004). This is a clear instance (and there are others), where the 
assorted state bureaucrats simply consider themselves as proficiently capable of defending the 
&state interests' and 'national security' by proxy even against their own elected political 
masters (Alper, 2004: 60-77). Therefore, when it boils down to such state security sensitive 
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issues, state officials (as in the case of TRT bureaucrats) often do not shy away from 
contemplating newly promulgated legal precepts and even confronting the political 
authorities. 
In short, the secularist state elites seem to construe the membership in the EU in a different 
fashion than that of their civilian and political counter-parts. The military considers any shift 
to the newly emerging 'civilian-power EU' that could relax nationalist and secularist hold of 
the state over society as something dangerous and potentially costly for the 'national unity 
and security' of the state to the extent that meeting membership requirements could herald 
domestic existential security problems for Turkey (Cizre, 2003: 224; Bilgin, 2005: 189). All 
the above mentioned perceptions by the military and other state elites indicate three main 
points. Firstly, the norms of EU democratic rationality face difficulties in replacing the 
incumbent reason of state rationality. Secondly, the above-mentioned reactions and publicized 
concerns of the state elites over the EU democratic rationality help illustrate that the related 
democratic reforms have hardly been politically internalized by the country's influential 
power brokers. Thirdly, and unless the previous two points change, "the EU reforms leading to 
a more democratic political rationality is likely to remain largely in the legal context rather 
. -than be implemeDted in political practice. The EU-induced legislative reform packages aimed 
at instigating a more democratic rationality continues to meet internal resistance at the stage 
of implementation by the state elites. The EU democratic rationality has met little sympathy in 
the minds of the state elites. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter first outlined the critical developments that occurred in Turkey-EU relations 
between 1959 and 1999 with a view to charting the changing facets of Turkey's membership 
in a changing EU. The latter began to paly a crucial role in anchoring Turkey's security 
govemmentality. As explained, Turkey was granted official candidacy status in December 
1999, which paved the way for the reforrn process necessary for attaining EU full 
membership. Since then, Turkey has stepped up its historic democratic reform process with 
the help of a pre-Accession Strategy and put forward a National Adaptation Program. This 
newfound status has enforced most visibly the state elites to undergo a process of change. 
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Turkey's search for a 'European' identity came to fruit only after the EU's Helsinki Summit 
of 1999. Thereafter, Turkey promised to undertake the necessary reform process in its 
domestic politics in line with the EU Copenhagen democratic political criteria. After the late 
1990s and by means of its Copenhagen political criteria for membership process, the EU 
became an influential actor to reshape Turkey's state conduct both in its domestic and foreign 
realms. In so doing, the EU membership process has also effectively paved the way for an 
otherwise fragile process of transformation in Turkey's security govemmentality. Relations 
between Turkey and the EU can be broadly characterized as still entailing a lukewarm yet also 
gradually experiencing a process of change in security governmentality. This process gathered 
a particular pace in the early 2000s. 
Whether this new environment for reform process is going to be sufficient for transforming 
Turkey's reason of state mentality was the subject of the second section of the chapter. In the 
second section, the chapter noted that the EU membership requirements are gradually 
generating a more liberal political rationality as opposed to Turkey's 'reason of state' 
rationality. However, the prospect of a change in the latter has also aggrieved the state elites, 
particularly the military. To make sense of the military's'unbending reason of state rationality 
in -the: post-EU official candidacy period, the-second section 
laid-emphasis on the-military's 
geo-strategic threat perceptions and negative understanding of the EU membership process. 
To this aim, the lack of state elites' trust in the EU was noted. As such, the persistence of the 
Kernalist reason of state rationality helped by the military is largely related to the discourse of 
insecurity based upon the misgivings in international politics of the EU membership reform 
process 
The chapter found that at a basic level Turkey-EU relations have revealed a significant feature 
of attitudes of the Turkish state elites. At critical moments in relations, those elites have 
demonstrated a reactionary and/or defensive attitude towards the EU membership in general 
and the reform process in particular. At other times state elites have not refrained from 
breaking-off political dialogue with the EU (e. g., post-Luxemburg 1997), whereas the 
prevention or lack of implementation of the reforms in Turkey clearly showed their 
reluctance. 
Overall, the EU-related changes in question do bind the state elites as such, but indicate a 
potential transfonnation in the country's erstwhile political rationality and especially its 
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reason of state mentality. Turkey's ruling elites have been increasingly aware that a change in 
the latter could not only mean a long-awaited membership for Turkey into an 'exclusive 
European club', but more crucially, it could also constitute a fundamental restructuring of the 
Turkey's domestic political order. 
In sum, the EU reform process comprises a comprehensive and radical set of political 
changes, which if successfully implemented and combined with other measures (addressing 
the military preponderance in politics) might bring about a more liberal and pluralist political 
rationality; this would be at the expense of the national security-oriented reason of state 
rationality in Turkey. Although key EU-induced legal and institutional reforms are underway 
that support a more democratic and pluralist political rationality at the expense of reason of 
state rationality, the still powerful misgivings held by the military and other state elites cannot 
be easily by-passed, since they have the political power. 




CHANGE IN THE TECHNIQUES OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY 
This chapter examines the changes in the techniques of security governmentality after Turkey 
gained the EU official candidacy status in 1999. The aim is to evaluate the impact of EU 
accession criteria and the relevant reform process upon the specific techniques of security 
governmentality. The chapter seeks to to discover the extent to which the EU reforms have 
changed the functions and the use of the techniques of security governmentality in Turkey. 
7.1. CHANGES IN MACRO TECHNIQUES 
Following the elevation by the EU of Turkey's membership application to that of an 'official 
candidate country status' in December 1999 Helsinki Summit, the domestic adaption and 
implementation of EU accession criteria gained momentum. Throughout the adaption and 
implementation process the EU has particularly been apprehensive of the fact that the non- 
civilian forces, most notably the military, have been wielding- significant veto power over 
elected civilians through various means in the political system. For the EU membership 
criteria the military preponderance is clearly held to be anomalous for a would-be-member 
state. Through its membership criteria the EU has on various occasions emphasized the 
problem of a civil-military imbalance in Turkish politics (European Commission Reports, 
2003,2004). The EU commission in its regular reports clearly states that 'The basic features 
of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as civilian 
control over the military, remain to be effectively addressed' (European Commission Report, 
2001). 
Indeed, in regard to macro techniques of security governmentality, the EU political reform 
process most notably concerns with the role that non-civilian forces play in the Turkish polity. 
As a response to these concerns and other EU accession criteria, the Turkish parliament 
passed a number of legislative reform packages between 2001 and 2004. Within this context, 
the EU membership reforms on civil-n-fflitary relations have gained particular resonance, try 
to rectify some of the non-democratic techniques of security governmentality. The section 
below first briefly probes the changes in the national security concept and the National 
Security Policy Document. Then, because the EU is particularly concerned with the military's 
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role in the decision-making process, the impact of the related reforms are investigated in 
greater detail in relation to the military's role in security govemmentality and the related 
techniques. 
National Security Concept 
As explained in Chapter 2, an all-embracing national security concept and related legal 
provisions have served as an effective brake on democratizing the country's politics of 
security. This is so because the duties and roles of the military are defined by these crucial 
legal provisions. In relation to the EU, it can be argued that the subsequent reform process 
seems to have been ineffective in leading to substantial changes in the existing legal 
provisions surrounding the concept of national security. Article 2a of the National Security 
Law of 1983 (No. 2945) is a case in point. As noted by the EU, the wide-ranging national 
security definition in this article, which can cover almost every policy area, remains intact. 
Likewise, Article 35 and Article 85/1 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, 
which defines the duty of the Turkish military as 'to protect and preserve the Turkish 
Republic on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity, secularism and republicanism' 
have not been abrogated in the reform process either (EU Commission Regular Report#'2004: 
23).. Due to these -unchanged provisions and as -opposed to all other ground-breaking EU 
related reforms, it is still possible for the hard-liner state elites most notably the military to 
reclaim their grip on the national security policies, which helps 'to provide the military with a 
wide range of [political] maneuvre' (EU Commission Regular Report, 2004: 23). 
National Security Policy Document (NSPD) 
As explained in Chapter 2, the NSPD is a classified document that gives specific direction and 
content to state security discourses and practices in security governmentality. Despite its 
classified nature the content of this document is sometimes leaked to the media. This is then 
not disowned by the military, indicating the complacency on their part (see Ergin, Hurriyet, 
24 November 2004). From these sources we know that the NSPD not only singles out in 
detail the domestic and external threats to national security but also lays down the reletad 
policy guidelines for the government and other state institutions to be implemented (Jenkins, 
2001: 43). As described in Chapter 2, the NSPD holds the government responsible for 
formulating its policies according to these set security policies/named threats in the context of 
the views articulated in the military dominated National Security Council. The latter, not the 
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Parliament, is ironically also in the position to approve the outline of this document. As such 
this document is a powerful repertoire for security governmentality. 
The question to be discussed here is whether the status and power of the NSPD within 
security governmentality is changing after the acquiring of the EU official candidacy status 
and the subsequent reform process. Despite the secrecy cloaking it, according to press reports, 
there seems to be a 'prospect of change' in the content of the NSPD. The military is preparing 
a new NSPD to be 'decided' in the NSC and as such the existing NSPD (last amended in 2001 
naming 'Islamic Fundamentalism' as the most serious threat) is 'very likely to change' (Ergin, 
Hurriyet, 24 November 2004). This change was introduced by the last secretary general of the 
NSC, General Sukru Sariisik, and fully undertaken under the first civilian general secretary, a 
senior diplomat Yigit Alpogan (Bila, Milliyet, 25 November 2004). The latter was appointed 
in line with the EU reform process, with a view to transforming the role of the military in the 
NSC 'into a body serving a purely consultative function' (EU Commission Regular Report, 
2004: 22). 
Despite the expectations, it is worthy of note that the change in the NSPD appears'at best to 
be a re-arTangement in the internal and external threat cataloguing (Mahcupyan, Zaman, 24. 
November 2005). First, the newest NSPD is claimed to note that the new security concerns 
such as 'terrorism' gains priority over the old issues arising from 'state-to-state threats'. This 
new direction in turn is held to necessitate different conceptual and policy guidelines. Hence, 
at least conceptually, there has been a shift from the classical state-oriented 'defense' to 
'security', which is assumed to better address such contemporary issues as 'asymmetric 
terrorism' (Bilgin, 2002). The latter constitute part of the new security language concurred 
with globalization that according to the military, further deteriorates the provision of security 
(Bilgin, 2005). However, the unmistakably unchanging element in the 'new NSPD' is the 
fully-authorized role of the military in addressing these 'global challenges'. In policy terms, 
the new NSPD is expected to endow the military with a new mission for addressing thus 
naming the newfound concern over 'global terrorism' that requires only a 'slightly changed 
force structure' (Bila, Milliyet, 25 November 2004). 
Interestingly, this anticipated change is not about the de-classification or opening up the 
content of the NSPD to public debate, political control and scrutiny. Nor is it even about 
stripping the military of its overassertive ability to decide on and enact the proposed security 
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agenda. In other words, the change seems merely in the content of the NSPD not in the 
powerful status of the NSPD in politics. Hence, the granting of EU official candidacy status in 
December 1999 does not seem to have been effective for generating substantial changes in the 
status of the NSPD in the political system. The NSPD continues to be one of the most 
effective techniques that grant the military the opportunity to get involved into politics. As 
such, it is highly likely that the military will continue to have the capacity to name certain 
internal political and social actors as security threats through the NSPD. 
National Secutity Council (NSC) 
As argued in Chapter 4, the NSC constitutes to be a central institutional technique of security 
governmentality in Turkey. To briefly recall, the NSC was established by Article 111 of the 
post-1961 coup Constitution. The NSC's power was then further extended by the post-1980 
coup environment under 'The National Security Council Law of 1983'. The latter law entered 
into force chiefly for formulating, establishing and implementing the 'national security 
concept' in the form of NSPD, which reflect the military's exclusive assessment of the 
intemal and extemal threats to Turkey. 
. -'As also,. outlined 
in. Chapter 4, the conceptual scope and political competence of the NSC -has 
been so extensive that it could be 'interpreted as covering almost every policy area' and 'seen 
not just as the defense of Turkey's territory and its political and economic interests, but also 
the preservation of its Kemalist [ideological] legacy' (Jenkins, 2001: 46). This process of far- 
reaching internal and external security assessment takes place exclusively within the NSC, 
whose decisions are to be implemented without any parliamentary debate or ratification. 
Thus, the Turkish NSC amounted to, in the words of the most perspicacious observer of 
Turkish civil-military relations, 'the most decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision 
making, the other leg being the council of ministers' (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997: 158). The 
crucial issue here was that the widespread scope and political nature of the NSC decisions 
could be easily be extended well over areas that normally fall under the rubric of state 
security, which meant bypassing civilian authority in decision- and policy-making. 
It was this substantial political weight of the NSC that became a target of the EU that aimed to 
reclaim the civilian upper hand. In line with EU democratic accession criteria, the Turkish 
parliament on 3 October 2001 instigated related constitutional amendments to rectify this 
undemocratic anomaly. Basically, these amendments increased the number of civilians in the 
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composition NSC so that the civilian supremacy could be established over the military. As 
opposed to the NSC's earlier internal structure that was established with Article 118 of the 
1982 Constitution, the EU induced amendments that led to the inclusion of the Justice 
Minister and other civilians in the NSC to establish the arithmetic supremacy of the 
participating civilian members over the military members (Bayramoglu, 2004: 109-13). The 
political weight of the NSC has also been slashed by reducing the weight of the executive 
powers of NSC decisions from having the status of 'priority consideration' to that of 
'recommendation' for the governments (Cizre, 2004a: 120-1). 
Specifically, on 30 July 2003, the Turkish parliament again introduced other 'revolutionary' 
changes in the law pertaining to the role of the military in politics to meet EU accession 
criteria. Indeed, the so-called the seventh National Adaptation package introduced serious 
steps in changing the civil-n-fflitary imbalance towards civilian favor by severing the 
competence and political weight of the NSC and its secretariat (Kardas, 2004). Specifically, 
these reforms both terminated (Article 9,14 and 19) and put forth certain amendments 
(Articles 4,5 and 13) regarding the crucial National Security Council Law (Resmi Gazete, 7 
August 2003, No: 25192). By and large, these reforms were intended to cut the direct links 
between'-the NSC--and the military and- thus -put an end to the political -responsibility,. - 
competency and wherewithal of the NSC. For instance, unlike the previous practices where 
the selection process of the General Secretary was under complete military design and 
control, the General Secretary of the NSC is now to be nominated by the PM and approved by 
the President (Article 15). 
As regards to curbing the NSC's widespread political reach: the responsibility of the NSC was 
reduced to that of an 'advisory body' (Article 4). This was a significant change in that the 
NSC's full political competence, which was extended over the Prime Nfinisterial decision 
making capacity (Article 9,14 and 19) were removed. The meeting frequency of the NSC was 
also lowered such that it is now to meet every second month rather than every month (Article 
5). Lastly, the political responsibility of the NSC General Secretary was significantly lessened 
to common secretariat activities as appropriate to the NSC duties now given as 'advisory' 
decisions (Article 13). This shift meant radical progress towards a more democratic political 
order. For, the NSC secretariat's legal-institutional authority to fully supervise the wide 
ranging NSC decisions at the expense or even contrary to the parliamentary decisions has now 
been curbed (Bayramoglu, 2004: 110). On the whole, these changes implied significant 
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ramifications in relation to the technical dimension of security governmentality. We can 
consider these ramifications on three levels. 
1. The first level concerns curbing the knowledge production capacity of the NSC. That is, the 
EU-induced reforms curtailed such domestic security techniques of interventions into the 
Turkish body politic as infon-nation gathering, which had grown apace particularly in the late 
1990s and early 2000s (see Chapter 4). 
2. The second level concerns ending the NSC secretariat's ability to control the social and 
personal conduct through its institutional techniques of intervention. This is an important 
improvement if we bear in mind the wide ranging reach of these institutions. The latter 
included the National Security Policy Headquarters; the Information Gathering, Research and 
Assessment Office; and the Civil Defense and the Office of Relations with Society. The latter 
was particularly relevant in that it was designed around five sub-offices: Psychological Action 
and Education; Print Media; Visual and Arial Media; Internet; and lastly and ironically Office 
of - Civil . -Society Institutions. These militarily dominated offices were utilized for 
fimanipulationj supervision and policy making activities' designed exclusively by the 'political 
-. and ideological control of the -military' and undertaken by the majority of the. military 
personnel in the relevant institution (71 percent) (Bayramoglu, 2004: 95-6). 1 
3. The third level concerns challenging the securitization technique used by the NSC. That is, 
the EU-induced reforms aimed to end Article 13, which rendered the decisions of the NSC 
with a view to disallowing the securitization of the NSC's acquired information. Initially, 
securitization was made possible through processing and articulating the acquired information 
and knowledge by the NSC Secretariat into a security language and then putting it into 
political-bureaucratic attention for taking 'extraordinary measures' to meet the national 
security policies. With the EU refonris this ability seems to have been curbed (Bayramoglu, 
2004: 110). 
In all, these EU-induced reforms are truly path-breaking and (if implemented) of utmost 
importance for a fuller de-securitization and democratization of Turkish politics. So much so 
that the NSC's often cited function of 'legitimizing' and 'civilizing' the 'military policies' has 
been notably restrained by the EU (Bayramoglu, 2004: 112). Through these refonns, the 
particular functions of the NSC have been substantially and symbolically dislodged. The 
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significance of these changes can be more easily grasped if we recall how politically 
scheming institutionally manipulative and legally appropriated the NSC had been throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s, especially in relation to the so-called 'post-modem coup' in February 
1997. Indeed, the significance of all these reforms could be easily recognized if we bear in 
mind that in Turkey 'since 1909, there has been only 10 years in which a fully civilian 
administration has governed' (Jacoby, 2003: 669). 
The Military 
This path-breaking set of EU-induced changes in the composition and function of the NSC 
notwithstanding, it should also be noted that the reforms pertaining to the role NSC fall short 
of fully addressing the wider issues and complexities associated with the democratization of 
civil-military relations in Turkey. The still powerful role of the military in politics - even after 
strict observation of the EU accession criteria-clearly attests to this point (Insel, 2004; Bora, 
2004). This shows that socially and historically rooted misgivings regarding the realm of 
civil-military relations linger (Cizre, 2004; Demirel, 2004b). An analysis follows of how 
much change has been made after the EU reforms, in relation to the political role the military. 
After briefly. emphasizing the general political, legal, institutional and financial power 
structure the military, still inhabits; the military's paramount -political position is illustrated by 
presenting specific examples to that effect that occurred after the official EU candidacy in 
1999. 
Firstly, and as mentioned before, in the literature of civil-military relations the issue of 
holding the military responsible to the Defense Ministry (rather than the Prime Minister as is 
in Turkey) has been established as a crucial element for the efforts to bring the military under 
democratic surveillance (Rial, 1996: 62; Diamond and Plattner, 1996: xxxi; Onyszkiewicz, 
1996: 106-08). In Turkey this has yet to be attained because making the Turkish Chief of Staff 
responsible to the Defense Minister instead of the Prime Minister has not been achieved 
(Cizre, 1997; 2003; 2004a). With respect to the lingering effect of the military in the political- 
institutional structure, there thus exists this unaddressed issue of the institutionally 
insubordinate status of the military. 
The second example relates to the legal aspects of military power. For instance, the issue of 
subjecting the decision of the I-Egher Military Council (YAS, Yuksek Askeri Sura) to civilian 
judicial competence is yet to be accomplished. Together with other non-democratic 
206 
components in the Internal Military Criminal Code YAS has been used by the military high 
command to assure that some allegedly 'dissenting' key middle-ranking officers opposing the 
military's role in politics would be either kept at bay or removed from office altogether 
(Jacoby, 2003; Kardas, 2004). This proved especially useful in the post 1997 coup 
environment as an effective intemal-disciplinary mechanism to thrust aside those 'unwanted' 
personnel from the military because of their 'obscurantist Islamic' ideological leanings (Salt, 
1999: 72-8). 
The third illustration is about the continuation of the power that the military wields in the 
political system and is related to the lack of effective parliamentary control over the defense 
spendings. This is another significant indicator established by the literature on civil-military 
relations as to whether militaries effectively give in to civilian control, because parliamentary 
control over defense spending is important for enhancing the transparency of the military's 
defense expenditures (Diamond and Plattner, 1996: xxxii; Huntington, 1996: 5). Regarding 
the Turkish case, however, instead of fuller parliamentary control, the procedure of extending 
the remit of the Turkish Court of Auditors to national defense expenses has been introduced 
--, as"a substitute refonn' (Bayramoglu, 2004: 113-6). Consequently, although this 'substitute 
-reform' is expected., to -curb the substantial.. autonomy the -military has -in preparing and 
establishing the defense budgets and controlling the extra-budgetary funds, it clearly falls 
short of providing EU-set targets on this issue. For example, Article 30 of the Turkish Court 
of Auditors that exempt the military expenses from monitoring process still remains in effect. 
Overall, the only change introduced is to monitor and supervise the military in the Turkish 
Court of Auditors if and whenever Turkish parliamentary deems necessary to do so, which, 
because of the complaisant political class, is not expected to happen (Bayramoglu, 2004: 
114). 
Aside from these specific reform-related areas of concern, there are other more 
straightforward examples regarding the military's lingering role in domestic politics even 
after the EU official candidacy status. We can start by referring to a particularly telling event 
that signaled the persistent nature of the military's undemocratic interest and power in 
domestic politics. The 'Republic National Holiday' day on 29 October 2001 saw the military 
commanders telling some 'accredited' journalists that the military thought it would be 
appropriate if the then sick and ailing PM Bulent Ecevit gave the Premiership to one of his 
ministers: Husamettin Ozkan (Bila, 2003: 24). A second overt political involvement occurred 
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when it dawned on the military that Tayyip Erdogan's 'moderate Islamic' Justice and 
Development Party was certain to win the general elections of November 2002. Alarmed by 
this possibility and in need of reversing this trend in the November 2002 election period, the 
Chief of General Staff asked the then reluctant popular Economy Minister Kemal Dervis of 
the main opposition party the Republican People Party (CHP) to take over the party 
leadership post in order to gain the swing votes and prevent the upcoming 'Islamist' Tayyip 
Erdogan's government (Sabah, 10 April 2004). These two episodes were blindingly obvious 
examples of the military's lingering undemocratic interest in the political order. 
As argued in Chapter 2, the compliant political culture has also served as another facilitating 
layer of military influence in domestic politics and a revealing example of the continuation of 
this trend can be found in the stance taken by the main opposition party CHP in a rift between 
the military and the party. On October 9,2004 this party sacked one of its local party head- 
representative, namely Mehmet Hasbioglu of Marmaris who caused consternation in the party 
due to his support for the so-called 'Netekim Festival'. The latter was to take place in 
Marmaris, which is normally known as a popular international tourist destination in Turkey's 
Aegeary Coast. However, the significance of Marmaris for our case -lied elsewhere. 'It derived 
from -the -, fact that the former Chief- of Staff (1977-1983) and. later the President (1983-199 1) 
General (ret) Kenan Evren, who was the leader of the military junta that staged the 1980 
military coup is residing in his villa in Marmaris. 
The politically turbulent 'Netekim Festival' was to be a village fete for protesting and calling 
for the perpetuators of the 12 September 1980 military coup including Kenan Evren to be 
brought up before the civilian courts. The Marmaris fete was organized by a civil society 
organization for attracting the public attention against the military junta leader Kenan Evren's 
legally and socially uninterrupted period in there. The main opposition party CHP's local 
party head-representative, Mehmet Hasbioglu, gave his permission and stood behind the 
political purpose of this fete, whereas the party's veterans were much more cautious. Amid 
the in-party friction about whether or not to support the festival, the seasoned oppositional 
leader of CHP Deniz Baykal came to Marmaris and implied that he was against such a festival 
aimed at putting to trial the retired junta leader General Kenan Evren. Furthermore, after the 
rebuke of CBP leader, Mehmet Hasbioglu was removed from his office and later other local 
ruling authorities of the township banned the festival (Zaman, 09 October 2004). This 
confrontation revealed that even such democratically significant political actors (here CHP the 
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main opposition party) tend to become part of rather than solution to the irrevocable question 
of the military's power in domestic politics as was the case in this example. Acting this way, 
the influential politicians do not help reduce the military's shadow in politics, and instead 
bring in further obstacles in democratizing the civil-military relations. 
It should be noted that here the issue is not to point out how ineffective the EU reform process 
has been. Indeed, these obstacles may not even seem to fall in any of the category of the EU 
reform process. The point is rather to highlight how the important members of the country's 
political class fail to flesh out and cooperate with the EU reform process, when it comes to 
such thorny issues of curbing military's role in domestic politics. This type of non- 
cooperative stance taken by political parties makes it extra difficult to empower the country's 
civilian forces, to say the least. Neither is it true that the EU simply declines to pay attention 
to the problem of the military role in politics. On the contrary the EU knows only too well the 
role the military plays in politics; as it has repeatedly referred to this problem in its reports 
(European Commission Regular Reports, 2000-2004). 
Yet at ; the game time, the examples given above illustrate how the EU can be limited, in 
-spotting these kinds- of military interventions mainly because of its legal-procedural approach 
to the problem of civil-military imbalance in Turkey. For the EU's legal-procedural approach 
in large measure neglects the role of the indistinct techniques used by the military to influence 
the socio-political development (Cizre, 2004b: 107-25). In the above example we can note 
that utilizing the 'accredited' veteran media representatives as the military's 'message- 
carriers' proves a more efficient yet indistinct method for changing the governmental posture 
than that of a crude military coup (see Chapter 4 and below section 7.2). The 'Marmaris Fete' 
example can as well strongly suggest how the military can prove too great an obstacle for the 
political actors to tackle. This is largely due to the still meek political culture. 
There is another difficulty: it should also be noted that in the civil-military literature, effective 
or 'objective civilian control' over or civilian empowerment against the military is seen as an 
'incremental' and gradual socio-political venture, which cannot be simply changed by merely 
legal procedural regulations (Huntington, 1957: 83-85; Kemp and Hudlin, 1992; Diamond and 
Plattner, 1996: xxx; Onyszkiewicz, 1996: 99-100; Jones and Mychajlyszyn, 2002). The 
pertaining EU reforms do not propose such an 'incremental and gradual' approach to the 
military power in domestic politics (Panel discussion on Turkey-EU Relations, Bin-ningharn 
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26 September 2003). Additionally, adopting legal changes in the membership context can 
hardly be considered as sufficient for fully curbing the military's role in politics. The problem 
is that the EU is applying a legal-procedural attitude in assessing whether Turkey did, or is 
likely, to turn into an effective democratic rule (Cizre, 2004a: 107-25). The EU's inability in 
this respect derives, in large part, from its liberal conception of civil-military relations, which 
might not be fully applicable in other contexts such as Turkey's (Cizre, 2004a: 117). 
Arguably even the very distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' might not hold and apply 
in the same manner in Turkey in that the civilians might just as well help sustain the political 
weight of the military in the system (Demirel, 2004b: 350). Some civilians and politicians, for 
instance, might be quite content with the existing political tutelage of the army, as a result of 
which, historically 'demands for curbing military autonomy [appear] few and flimsy' 
(Demirel, 2004a: 138). Arguably because of the latter fact and as above examples suggest, the 
main reason as to why the Turkish army has not further escalated its objections to the EU 
reform process (while it was enacted by the politicians) is that the reforrns by themselves do 
not effectively alter the existing imbalance of power. Therefore, there is little the military is 
scared of and that its guardianship role can still supersede the political authority, as Cizre 
succinctly argues. 
The fact of the matter is that MGK [the NSC] and the General staff have given the 
green light to the amendments on condition that integration with Europe will not 
interfere with the military high command's traditional involvement in law and order, 
internal enemies, and foreign policy. Nor does the TSK [The Turkish military] 
associate democracy packages with the elimination of its political autonomy (Cizre, 
2003: 220) ... The high command, being perfectly aware that the voice the military 
cannot be altered just changing the composition of the [National security] Council, has 
supported the idea of including more civilian ministers into its fold (2004a: 121). 
Overall, it can be argued that the 'dual system of executive decision making' in Turkish 
politics that locate the military and government as two differing sources of authority in the 
system seems to have continued even after the EU official candidacy status was acquired in 
1999. The military's propensity to influence the fundamentals of the political agenda while 
remaining beyond the checks and balances of the parliamentary system seems also to remain. 
On thw whole, this implies that the military is still capable of making and delivering decisions 
as the most influential agent of security govemmentality by making use of available 
techniques of security govemmentality in spite of the EU membership reforms such as media- 
manipulation and securitization. 
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7.2. MICRO TECHNIQUES 
How much has the facilitating/functional role the media plays in the securitization process 
changed after the official candidacy status was gained? Has the most pervasive technique of 
security govemmentality-securitization-changed as a result of the EU official candidacy 
status? Has there been a de-securitization process at work for improving the responsiveness of 
democratic institutions? 
The Media and Secufitization 
Its positive approach to the EU membership notwithstanding, the mainstream media's role as 
a message conveyer of the moves of the military seems to have persisted after Turkey gained 
official EU candidacy in 1999. As illustrated below, the mainstream news media has not 
declined to disproportionately cover the political ponderings of the military. This has been 
particularly so in its function of projecting the military's securitizing discourses. That is, the 
military's securitizing attempts of otherwise political issues continues to be facilitated by the 
mainstream media's avid coverage. The mainstream media helps elevate the military's 
securitizing- message to the level of politically significant headlines that helps it more easily 
acquire the political urgency it needs. Two cases are presented below to illuminate the 
continuation of the securitization technique that comes out with the help of the media as the 
'functional [securitization] actors' in the process (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). 
There has been a telling example illustrating the continuation of the securitization of political 
issues. This example concerns a speech delivered at Turkey's well-known centre-right 
'Motherland' (Anavatan Partisi) party's convention on August 4,2001. The former Prime 
Minister and the leader of the Motherland Party (that formed one leg of the three-party 
coalition between 1999 and 2002) Yilmaz delivered an unexpected and extraordinary speech 
that was formally addressed to his party but in reality it was particularly addressed to the 
public and the content of the speech 'sent shock waves right across the political divide' 
(Cizre, 2003: 213). 
In his speech, Yilmaz apparently wanted to name and shame explicitly what he called 
Turkey's 'national security syndrome'. To his reasoning, the latter curbed the country's 
national and democratic development because it fuelled 'full-scale' answers to the cryptic 
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'security threats', which occasionally lead to violations of human rights and civil liberties 
hence producing a 'low-quality democracy' (Yucel, 2002: 8). According to Yilmaz, Turkey's 
overburdened state security had impaired democratic system and made the entry into the EU 
all the more difficult. He further commented on the subject and eventually made it clear that 
the EU membership in this context becomes a 'prerequisite' for overcoming the 'taboo' of 
discussing national security. In his own words: 
National security is an essential paradigm, which ultimately aims to preserve the 
survival of a state. Yet the practice of the concept today [in today's Turkey] seems to 
work quite the contrary. The term national security has become a conundrum that 
thwarts every single step to enhancing the future of this country. Turkey could have 
been the only country, which could manage to utilize such a term to cut off all the 
veins of the state [ ... ] and so did it happen. The key for change is hidden in the term gnational security'. However, it has been virtually impossible to take steps in the 
attempt of reinforcing the survival and increasing the welfare of our state, repeatedly 
with reference to national security. If Turkey wants to make progress she has to 
overcome the national security syndrome. The content and the circumstances of 
national security should be opened to public debate. The true key and requisite for 
turning our face to the Europe and hence change is to redefine the limits and the 
boundaries of the national security. National security deals with the whole nation and 
so should the nation do with it (quoted in Yucel, 2002: 34). 
With this speech, Yilmaz gave .a- compact and unambiguously stated account'of how the 
existing 'state security' rationality crippled Turkish politics (Milliyet, 15 August 2001). What 
he named as the 'national security syndrome' referred to the military's sense of responsibility 
to the state and its inapt interventions into politics in the name of protecting the Kernalist 
prescriptions of secularism and nationalism for the polity (Insel, 2001: 8-13). He also implied 
that the 'language of national security was being used as a tool to legitimize the need for a 
military role in civilian affairs' (Cizre, 2003: 213), and criticized the political weight of the 
military for interrupting the EU reform process of democratizing of the Turkish political 
system and then went on to argue that the public and political figures alike should question 
the concept of national security (Radikal, 05 August 2001). 
Instead of throwing into relief such a sacrosanct and all-embracing concept of national 
security, Yilmaz's speech revealingly caused huge consternation across the state elites and 
across the political divide. Following the speech, different representatives of civilian groups 
and certain state institutions voiced their understandings and standpoints on national security 
and its political effects (Yucel, 2002: 5-10). By examining these reactions we can assess 
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whether since the granting by the EU of the official candidacy status in 1999, any radical 
change in the techniques of security governmentality is underway and workable. 
To start, Turkey's civil society groups on a wide spectrum were more or less in support of 
further opening up Yilmaz's debate on national security. That is to say, although the wording 
and degree of their support varied, they were generally on the 'pro-Yilmaz camp' in the 
debate and were of the view that national security had had a damaging grip on social and 
economic development of the country (Yucel, 2002: 7-10). For instance, one influential 
liberal association, the so-called Patron's Club, the 'Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's 
Association' (TUSIAD) had been 'a driving force behind the integration with the EU and 
stands for a clear Western and market-economy-oriented course' (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 
102; Piccoli, 2004: 233-4), and despite its close connection with the military and the political 
and bureaucratic state elites, TUSIAD on this occasion took side with Yilmaz in his attempt to 
open up the debate on national security (Bilgin, 2005: 192). Another active and devout civil 
society group, namely the 'Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed 
People' (MAMUMDER) also issued a statement in Yilmaz's favor and argued that basic 
rights and freedoms were treated as 'luxurious' mainly because of the national security policy, 
which constituted a 'taboo' 'dictated from above' (Yucel, 2002: 7). Still another influential 
group, the 'Federation of Turkish Labor Unions' (TURK-IS) also implicitly backed Yilmaz 
by pointing to the neglected economic dimension of national security and stated that 'failure 
to implement social and economic measures in a certain part of the country has resulted in 
separatist terrorism, ethnic nationalism and other movements' (Yucel, 2002: 9). 
As can be seen from these civil society reactions, the debate on the 'national security 
syndrome' was welcome if not fully embraced. This is significant given the fact that 'national 
security' has been one of the striking taboos of the state establishment (Insel, 1997). In a 
democratic political order, what is expected from this kind of civil support is to see political 
parties tapping into the debate and channeling the concerns and expectations of the civil 
society to the political platform (Keyman, 1999: 94-5). 
However, in contrast to this generally supportive civil society environment, the political class 
gave short shrift to such democratic expectations and found the task of 'questioning' the 
military's security concept a daunting challenge and simply did not take it on board (Bilgin, 
2005: 192-3). Ironically, Yilmaz's own junior coalition partners both then-PM and the leader 
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of Democratic left Party (DSP) Bulent Ecevit and Deputy PM and leader of the Nationalist 
Movement Party (MBP) Devlet Bahceli declined not only to back his position, but implicitly 
accused him of meddling into the 'security realm', which to their mind is and should remain 
in the hands and expertise of the military (Bilgin, 2005: 193). M]HP's deputy leader Ismail 
Kose went on to argue that 'national security cannot be altered. Our policy of security against 
those who take up arms against the state in the name of religion or ethnicity will never 
change' (Turkish Daily News, 11 August 2001). Another veteran politician and former 
President Suleyman Demirel also joined in this polarizing debate and took sides with the 'pro- 
military camp' along with many other political actors such as the 'True Path Party' (DYP) by 
stating that 'Turkey has never been harmed because of national security concept; nor is there a 
problem with the military' (Turkish Daily News, 17 August 2001). 
Last but not least, Yilmaz's implicit calls for reform in Turkey's security politics 
unsurprisingly attracted a 'lash-out' by the military, whose response ranged from the 
dismissive to the frosty (Bilgin, 2005: 192). Indeed, Yilmaz's speech, justified on the EU 
criteria and the immanent reform initiative, was securitized by the military through its official 
declaration..: It addressed, Yilmaz's criticism as being staged against the- military as an 
institution concerned with the security of 1he country (Yucel, z 2002: 6). The General Staff in, 
its four-page press release couched the speech in a securitizing language that interpreted the 
speech as a 'political intervention' into the 'non-political' security matters of the country. 
Other centre-right and left parties agreed (Hurriyet, 08 August 2001). The military, through 
the subsequent speeches of its service commanders on various occasions, once again 
reiterated the domestic-oriented national security concept. On 16 August 2001, for instance, 
Turkish Land Armed Forces commander General I-Elmi Ozkok stated that the Turkish 
military has a serious responsibility to protect the secular regime (Milliyet, 17 August 2001). 
In short, the military clearly dismissed Yilmaz's criticisms by portraying them as a product of 
an 'unserious' party convention, urging that 'the matters relating to the existence, prosperity 
and well-being of the Turkish nation should only be discussed at serious platforms' (quoted in 
Insel, 2001: 9). 
The most important aspect of the military's response was its atypical nature. The military did 
not respond to Yilmaz's path-breaking criticisms through its characteristic manner of 
engagement such as 'talking' through the words of a retired general or in a ceremony in which 
a serving general would take up the confrontation and respond (Insel, 2001: 9). Instead, the 
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main response was given through a fully official press briefing by the office of Chief of the 
General Staff. Here, the crucial matter to note was that after the acceptance of the country's 
official candidacy status, and contrary to the EU accession criteria, the military was clearly 
taking an open political stance, acting in the public space of the Turkish polity and opposing a 
prominent political party (Insel, 2001: 9). With its declaration on 7 August against Yilmaz's 
speech, the military in fact stepped out of the routinely (monthly) instigated institutional NSC 
meeting platform, which provided ample ground for political intervention. By this 
intervention the military pulled off something of a successful intervention into domestic 
politics and openly assumed the power of apolitical rather than a bureaucratic institution with 
palpable capacity to intervene into daily politics whenever it deemed necessary (Insel, 2001: 
12). 
Another aspect worthy of note was that the military's engagement with the veteran politician 
and coalition partner Mesut Yilmaz's speech came through not only in its full institutional 
capacity and but also by the briefing fully covered by the media. In all, this manner of bold 
political intervention surpassed the military's established 'apolitical' stance and its other 
secluded measums based on remote control of the political game (Cizre-Sakallioglu, . 1997;, 
Jenkins, 2001). That. is, due apparently to the harshness of the. intended criticism, the military 
this time did not hesitate to undermine its long cherished conceit of staying 'above and 
outside' the daily politics. 
Consequently, the political attempt to desacralize the national security concept was thwarted. 
The ensuing debate did not revolve around the 'national security syndrome' or national 
security concept but rather turned out to be about Yilmaz's political credentials. This example 
once again clearly showed 'the high start-up costs of a fundamental attitudinal shift by the 
political class on a sacrosanct topic' (Cizre, 2003: 214). Hence, apart from his close 
confidantes, Yilmaz's speech did not touch a deep chord in the political system and the 
possibility of opening a space for discussion about Turkey's security politics came crashing 
down. 
The second example concerns the military intervention into an otherwise political and social 
issue when in May 2004 moderate Islamist the ruling AKP government wanted to pass a legal 
amendment in the parliament. This securitizing move of the military was presented by the 
mainstream media in a statist security language (Hurriyet, Milliyet, 1/10 May 2004). The 
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AKP government's attempt at a legal amendment was about a regulation which would allow 
graduates of vocational religious high schools to get an equal grade-credit in the university 
entrance exams. The new legislation was to abrogate the previous 'injustices in education' by 
giving these students equal chances to sit the examination. The university entrance 
examination in Turkey is very difficult to pass and even a slight change in grades might 
effectively fetter the prospect of success. This new legislation was launched to rid these 
restrictions by giving the vocational high school students an equal chance to enter the 
examination. 
One of targets in this governmental reform was to purge the restrictions on the entry into the 
university entrance examination of the students of a particular vocational school, namely 
religious high schools also known as Imam Hatip schools. The latter schools have 71.000 out 
of 20 million Turkish school students and were initially founded to train mosque preachers 
but later 'lost their vocational focus and [have] become state-sponsored religious high schools 
where conservative parents send their sons or daughters' (Pope, The Middle East 
Intemational, 14 May 2004,22). 
The. -ruling ýmoderate. Islamist' AKP government. wanted to reform the university entrance 
system specifically by lifting the existing restrictions on the entrance into universities. More 
specifically, the existing restrictions meant that whenever these students selected departments 
other than theology to become engineers, lawyers or doctors: their high school education 
credits (that were to be added into the university entrance examination score) would be 
reduced considerably. This disproportionate reduction practically meant that they were 
allowed to study only theology in the universities. This reform attempt of the AK Party 
government in the university entry system, hence, ran aground on the realities of Turkey's 
security politics, when the military explicitly expressed dismay on this legislative change 
(Milliyet, 07 May 2004). 
Before 1997, these students did not have any obstacles to enter the nation-wide university 
entrance examination to become engineers, lawyers, doctors and so on. That is, the graduates 
used to have equal-credits necessary to succeed and/or get better results in the university 
entrance examination. However, after the military intervention against the Islamist Refah 
government by the so-called 'post-modem' military campaign in June 1997 (Chapter 4, 
section 4.3) there came a military-led 'preventive' upsurge against all religious establishments 
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including these high schools to curb the kind of 'security threat' they posed (Carkoglu, 2004: 
112). The military was of the view that these high-school students were a 'security threat' to 
the state because they 'were being used to inculcate anti-secularist values' (Jenkins, 2001: 
62). Later, the graduates of these religious schools began to feel and bear the consequences of 
being securitized by experiencing serious restrictions upon their chance for entry into 
university education put by the military-led secular establishment, which aimed 'to curb the 
influence of political Islam' (Pope, The Middle East Intemational, 14 May 2004,23). 
The military was against the AKP's governmental reform plans since these allegedly 
intervened into the issues pertaining to 'the security of the secular state' (Hurriyet, 07 May 
2004). The military's securitizing reasoning into this otherwise political issue of university 
entrance examination run as follows. Since these schools are high schools, which give 
religious education (in addition to the regular high school curriculum) to their students, these 
students should find jobs in religious services rather than in other vocations, which 
necessitates finishing the relevant university departments of Islamic theology. Consequently, 
any attempt to switch tracks in their career path should be discouraged. Their grades should 
be reduced in comparison to other regular non-vocational high schools students, who are freer 
to choose a non-vocational career path. Since the AKP government attempt to change this 
logic by a new legislation, then this can only mean that the 'moderate Islamist' AKP 
government is plotting against the 'secular' character of the state (Hurriyet, 07 May 2004). 
Consequently, the military did not welcome this regulation, because it simply held that it 
would 'jeopardize' the security of the 'secular state' (Financial Times, 07 May 2004). With 
this logic, the Turkish General Staff issued a stem warning in the form of a public declaration 
that was immediately grabbed by the media hitting the headlines and later fully covered by the 
print and visual media. The General Staff declaration stated read: 
Those groups and institutions, who are loyal to the basic natures of the Republic [i. e. 
secularism] cannot be expected to give consent to such kind of amendments ... The 
thoughts and attitudes of the Turkish Military Forces towards the democratic, secular 
and social state principles of the Republic is what it was before, it has not changed and 
will not change tomorrow. Nobody can be expected to misunderstand this fact... We 
believe that the related institutions and organizations will carefully and common 
sensually approach the issue and that our great nation will show the necessary 
sensitivity to this matter... (TRT News, 07 May 2004). 
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This particular securitization by the military regarding the education refon-n is clearly an 
example of the undemocratic conduct often seen in security governmentality. Blocking such 
reforms can only be oblivious to the consequences of excluding these students of religious 
schools from entering one of the most identity-transforming modem institutions that is the 
universities. The consequence is that such attitudes against religious high school graduates in 
the university examination are likely to hinder the development of a wider participation into 
modernity by the religious citizens (Gole, 2002; Kaya, 2004). Moreover, it also increases the 
insecurities felt by these students: It is commonly held amongst the students of these religious 
schools that although their mental or physical outlook is no different than other regular high 
schools students, the newfound restrictions aimed to specifically block their entrance into 
universities mostly because of their supposed 'potentially dangerous' Islamic identity. For 
many, this 'potentially dangerous' identification with the Islamic religion remains a dubious 
claim and as such the students feel categorized on unjust and unwarranted bases (Interviews 
with the students, Istanbul, Izmir, April 2004). 
Similarly, another instance of successful securitization by the military can be given. This case 
revolved around the issue of minority rights, another matter relating to the EU reform process 
for. democratizing the country's domestic politics (Yesilada, 2002: 106-7). As explained in 
Chapter 6, minority rights constitute a considerable dimension of the EU conception of 
democracy as defined in the Copenhagen criteria. The impact of the military in the domestic 
political scene here evinced in the publication and press release of an outspoken report on the 
issue of granting more rights to the country's minorities (Hurriyet, 30 October 2004; Milliyet, 
30 October 2004). The content of the report promoted a more liberal approach to minority 
rights and proposed that 'Turkish citizenship' should be developed instead of an ethnically 
oriented concept of 'Turkishness', which was not welcomed by some Kurds (Pope, Middle 
East Intemational, 5 November 2004: 23). The content also described the fear of granting 
more rights to minorities as leading to the break up of the republic as 'paranoia' (Pope, 
Middle East Intemational, 5 November 2004: 23). The advisory body that prepared this report 
was linked to the prime minister and was formed from a wide range of social institutions and 
some academics (Hurriyet, 30 October 2004). Released primarily for facilitating an 
atmosphere of civil debate and deliberation, this report associated with Turkey's 'moderate 
Islamist' PM Erdogan on human rights instead led to a sharp division across the social and 
political spectrum (Pope, Middle East Intemational, 5 November 2004: 23). In front of the 
TV cameras at a press conference a labor union official member of the body grabbed the copy 
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of the report from the chairman's hands, tore it in pieces and denounced its content (Milliyet, 
30 October 2004). 
After the row, the content of the report also proved too harsh to digest for the many quarters 
of the country's hard-line security establishment. The head of state President Necdet Sezer 
opposed the conclusions of the report by stating that 'the definition of the concept of minority 
is clearly written in the Lausanne Treaty [which grants minority status to non-Muslim 
religious groups such as Jews, Armenians and Greeks rather than Muslim Kurds] ... and it 
won't change'. Despite his otherwise generally moderate stance towards the EU reforms 
process, the Chief of the General Staff 1-filmi Ozkok also took a critical stance by publicly 
wryly declaring that 
There is no reason to be scared of Turkishness being a supra-national identity. The 
word Turk represents the entire country. I believe any attempt to try to change this will 
result in great confusion and disturbance (both quoted in Pope, Middle East 
Intemational, 5 November 2004: 24). 
The. obvious securitizing move itself came through a press briefing in the Office of the 
General Staff by the_deputy Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug: 
The most important issue with regard to which the Turkish Armed Forces has always 
taken a stance and will continue to do so is to protect and preserve the indivisible 
entity of the Turkish state with its territory and nation. The unitary state is a value not 
only of the security forces but also of the nation and must be carefully protected and 
preserved by everyone. The unitary state either exists or not, there is no middle ground 
(Zaman, 02 November 2004). 
Consequently (and quite usually for security governmentality), this securitizing move by the 
military proved sufficient for the 'moderate Islamist' AK Party government to shelve the 
report. The government later distanced itself from the advisory body that prepared the not-so- 
debated report (Zaman, 20 November 2004). By securitizing a civil society discussion about 
minority rights, the military once again both undermined the ground for a democratic debate 
and established itself as the ultimate arbiter and perpetuator of security governmentality. 
As argued above, the EU is mostly blinded to these securitizing moves of the military mainly 
because of its legal-institutional approach to civil-military relations (Cizre, 2004a: 117-22). 
The EU seems capable only of dimly spotting the military's securitizing moves. For instance, 
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one recent report, namely, the 2004 Regular Commission Report, hints that the military 
4continues to exercise through a series of informal mechanisms. On various occasions, the 
military members of the NSC expressed their opinion on political, social and foreign policy 
matters in public speeches, briefings or statements to the media and declarations' (European 
Commission Regular Report, 2004: 23). This is rather an underestimating assessment. As can 
be seen in the above examples, the political effects of the securitizations by the military are 
graver than assumed by the EU. 
In brief, in the aftermath of the EU official candidacy period various securitizations of 
political issues by the military and by the mainstream media actors have shown how the 
security mentality still remains powerful. The securitization technique of the military has not 
seemed to fade away. This has been the case even after and despite the most encouraging and 
obvious leap forward in Turkey's EU membership process for years, namely the coming of 
the much-awaited EU Commission Report that recommended opening negotiation talks with 
Turkey in November 2004. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the EU-related changes in the techniques of security governmentality. 
it investigated whether the role of the military and these techniques in security 
governmentality have been loosing their grip on the political domain after the EU official 
candidacy status was granted. As argued in Chapter 4, an important issue pertaining to the 
military's role in Turkish politics has been the specific techniques it uses in security 
governmentality. The military through these techniques has established itself as the most 
notable and potent agent of security governmentality. One obvious outcome of using these 
techniques has been that the military has been able to set forth its influence through and 
against the democratic procedure. Therefore, studying changes in techniques is vital in 
grasping the prospect of a transformation in security governmentality. 
The chapter noted that there have been some important changes introduced by the EU reform 
process in regard to the technical dimension of security governmentality. Here, the most 
significant change involved curbing the power and functions of the NSC. The EU reform 
process has successfully halted the power and status of the NSC in the political system. 
However, this successful transformation has not been supplemented by necessary changes in 
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other techniques of security governmentality. The national security concept that covers a wide 
range of issue-areas has not been changed. The military's ability to decide on the national 
security agenda through the NSPD is also left unchanged. The securitization of politics by the 
military and the role the media plays in securitization are two other unchanged techniques of 
security governmentality. The examples studied in this chapter also show how the military 
involvement into politics harvests domestic rows between the governments and the military 
on various political-social matters and woefully underpower the governments. 
In all, the portfolio of changes introduced after the official candidacy in 1999 indicates that 
the most influential agent of security governmentality the military is still capable of making 
and delivering decisions through various techniques of security governmentality. The 
investigation in this chapter also shows that despite the EU-led reforms that call for curbing 
the military power and democratizing Turkish politics, events continue to point to the power 
wielded by the military in the political system. The military extracts its interventionist 
political power from its 'non-political' social and legal position, which is seen as being above 
the confines of daily politics with respect to its internalized-legalized guardian and vanguard 
role and its ability to define/act upon intemal security threats. These 'apolitical' security 
interventions and securitizations are then quite paradoxically integrated into and internalized 
by the political system. These interventions are used as a major policy tool against the serving 
governments that happen to stay on the military's way. It is these kinds of interventions that 
the EU finds difficult to realize and/or act upon after so many reforms. 
More specifically, it should be emphasized that the current EU reform process seems 
particularly inadequate in rectifying one of the complex techniques employed by the military 
in security governmentality, namely the securitization technique that is facilitated and 
transmitted by the media. The lack of scrutiny by the EU on the uses of the securitization 
technique in turn contributes to the lack of democratic control over the military's 
interventionist attitude into politics. Consequently, it can be argued without a concerted 
emphasis on such techniques it might not be possible to deliver the desired outcome of 
removal of military further from politics. 
Overall, the chapter's investigation about the techniques of security governmentality bears 
mainly two results for security governmentality. Firstly, is that the EU has been ineffective in 
fully curbing the political clout of the military interventions in politics. Secondly, and 
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accordingly, in order to reach out a more democratic system of governmentality the 
institutional and procedural roadmaps designed by the EU about the role of the military in 
politics should be supplemented with the efforts to rectify other military techniques such as 
securitization. If these techniques are reformed, the prospects for a more pluralist democratic 
rule will be enhanced. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CHANGE IN THE IDENTITY DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY 
GOVERNMENTALITY 
This chapter explores the changes in the identity dimensions of security governmentality in 
the period since Turkey gained the EU official candidacy status in 1999. As argued before in 
Chapter 5, the identity dimensions of security governmentality are about identity-conflicts 
that function as a central means in the justification and perpetuation of security 
governmentality. As shown in Chapter 5, the security-based antagonistic and unsettling 
political space of security governmentality springs from the mutually exclusive 
confrontational identification between Kernalist secularism and political Islam. Accordingly, 
it is reasonable to argue that changes in these identities would result in a retreat from this 
confrontation. In view of that, in investigating changes in these identities it becomes vital to 
grasp whether they can correspond to broader changes in security governmentality. For it is in 
part through the securitization of conflicts between these identities that security 
governmentality finds a fertile ground for political and cultural justification. To this -end, the 
present chapter examines the relevant changes in the secularist and the religious identity 
orientations. It scrutinizes these identities in line with possible changes in their most visible 
representatives: the military-led Kernalist state elites and the Islamist politicians. The chapter 
therefore addresses two questions. First, how much have the secularist and religious identities 
in security governmentality changed since the EU official candidacy status was gained? 
Second, to what extent can these changes in these identities affect the competence of security 
governmentality? To substantiate its claims the chapter employs the 'data triangulation' 
method (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 23). This involves collecting empirical information from a 
range different and multiple but related sources including interviews conducted with military 
personnel and political representatives of the Islamist movement. The latter took place in 
January, April and August 2004. This information is used to clarify the relevant actors' 
cognitive affiliation with democratic politics, secularist/Kemalist-Islamic political identity and 
EU membership. 
8.1. CHANGES IN SECULARIST IDENTITY 
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To what extent has the secularist identity of the state elites changed? It is argued below that in 
the official candidacy period, the secularist-Kernalist political identity of the military-led state 
elites has not undergone a substantial change. The military has indeed continued its security- 
based interventions into domestic political conduct justified in the name of protecting and 
preserving the secular nature of the state (Jenkins, 2001: 84; 2003). Besides, since the coming 
to power in 2002 of the 'moderate Islamist' Justice and Development Party the secularist 
fears/concerns of the military and its interventionist approach into politics therein have not 
been on the decline (Gurgen, 'AKP'ye Ilk Elestiriler', Radikal, 09 January 2003). 
As argued in Chapter 3, one of the constitutive dimensions of the rationality of security 
governmentality is the ideology of 'Kemalist secularism. Indeed, the Kemalist state ideology 
concedes a tenacious weight to secularism, which has produced a considerable normative 
justification for the military coups (Tachau and Heper, 1983; Jenkins, 2003; Demirel, 2003; 
Cizre, 2003). This secularist excess has at times given rise to a politics of 'militant 
secularism' (Bora, 1998: 82). As Feroz Ahmad-a prominent historian of Turkey-wrote (1993: 
213) in this regard: 'the possibility of another coup [after the 12 September 1980 coup] is 
always present so long as the Turkish army perceives itself as the guardian of the republic and 
- .- its Kemalist legacy'. One can argue that more than ten years on Ahmad's prediction continues 
to hold ground with the important caveat that the military does not simply consider staging 
direct coups to uphold its political muscle given the availability and efficiency of specific 
techniques of political intervention in security governmentality as argued in Chapter 4. Out of 
a repertoire of techniques, the military has at times used the media-hyped concern over the 
&secular nature of the state' by way of securitization of Islamic identities to topple 
governmental policies (Ayata, 2004: 244-8). The section below will show that the military 
and other representatives of the state such as the Presidency have since 1999 tended to guard 
the secularist identity of the state no less eagerly. 
Militant Secularism vs. Democratic Politics 
The basic credentials of parliamentary democracy have hardly been sidestepped merely by the 
military's (secularist) interventions into politics since 1999. This is particularly visible when 
we compare the reactions by the military towards the electoral successes of two Islamists 
parties namely the Refah Party in 1997 and the AKP in 2002. As argued in Chapter 4, the 
military stage-managed the 1997 post-modem coup with the help of mainstream media that 
acted as 'functional securitization actor' in securitizing Refah government as an 'Islamist 
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domestic threat' to 'the secular nature of the state' (Lombardi, 1997: 213). Yet, this kind of 
dismissive and outright reaction has not appeared against the 'moderate Islamist' AKP 
government. Instead, the military openly 'accepted' the landslide victory of the AKP in the 
November 2002 general elections by plainly declaring the electoral result as the 'will of the 
people' (TRT-INT News, 05 November 2002). Indeed, as Larry Diamond-a leading student of 
democratization-observes (2003: 169) the decision by 'the national security establishment' 
gnot to block' the AKP's 'moderately Islamist' electoral victory has signified an important 
step in the development of Turkish democracy. So much so, that the possibility of another 
open military coup against Islamists has appeared unpopular amongst the military top brass 
(Interview with Metin Heper, Zaman, August, 2004). However, opting 'not to block' the 
'moderate Islamist' AKP cadres from coming to power does not mean unconditional 
toleration of its policies by the military (Cizre, 2003: 226; Jenkins, 2003: 66). The point is that 
the military does not need to block the AKP in the first place because with the help of 
techniques discussed, it would be able to continue to exert its traditional influence to let or 
block certain policy initiatives by any government it deems 'anti-secular' and 'anti-Kemalist'. 
As argued in Chapter 4, the military managed such securitizations not by acting against the 
legal constraints, but precisely by using such legal precepts that provided the space to take up 
such securitizing moves. 
What drives the military to cast a constant watch on the parliamentary democracy and the 
representatives of the people? This question is important to consider given the fact that the 
mistrust in party politics and politicians informs securitizing moves of the military (Cizre, 
1997; Yavuz, 2000b; Demirel, 2004b, see Chapter 2.3). The custodial non-democratic role of 
the military and its institutional political autonomy is sustained by a security-informed task of 
gmaintaining national unity' (Demirel, 2004a; Jenkins, 2001: 18; Yavuz, 2000a: 36). The 
crucial ingredient in the military's role in security governmentality has been its constitutional- 
legal capacity to find political latitude by acting in the capacity of being the 'guardian and 
guarantor of national security' for 'maintaining national unity' (Jenkins, 2001: 33-5). The 
latter is officially defined in relation to the 'internal threats to the state unity' or 'threats to 
Turkey's unitary state quality and secularism' (Cizre, 2003: 216). Behind its mistrust in 
politics and politicians also is the military's low-esteem for the institution of party politics in 
general and the professional political class in particular. As Cizre-Sakallioglu stresses: 
225 
The hallmarks of the civilian world, according to the military are its praetorianism, 
instability, inefficacy, careerism, populism, lack of prudence, corruption, and 
irresponsibility. This antipolitical cognitive road map of the Turkish officer corps is 
incongruent with even the most flexible versions of the concept of democracy (1997: 
156). 
The mistrust by the military against the institution of politics and the political class have 
persisted in the post-1999 period including the period of 'moderate Islamist' AKP 
government (Gurgen, Radikal, 09 January 2003). This attitude was evident in the initial 
secularist reaction to the AKP by the military: the so-called 'young officers' crisis that broke 
in the early 2003. Mustafa Balbay from Cumhuriyet daily reported in a series that some 
influential officers within the military were 'uncomfortable' with the idea that a 'moderate 
Islamist' government could take hold of the state with its 'anti-secular inclinations' 
(Cumhuriyet, January 2003) 13 . Given the fact that the AKP government was just formed, it 
was not much clear as to what 'anti-secular inclinations' did the military have in mind other 
than the previous political experiences of its leadership. Nevertheless, the sheer spectacle of 
the report ensued for days and showed that neither the military nor the mainstream media cast 
away its gaze over the government of Islamic inclinations. When asked in an interview what. it 
meant to be 'uncomfortable' with the 'anti-secular inclinations' of the AKP, a military officer 
gave a glimpse: 
The company with the AKP leader-PM Erdogan of his wife in public places, who 
wears headscarf is a sign of their unacceptable religious inclinations... It is not 
acceptable to see the PM's wife appearing in public ceremonies wearing a 
headscarf ... She can wear it [headscarf] when she stays at home ... Wearing headscarf in public places is against the secularism of the state (Interview with a military officer, 
Ankara, August 2003). 
Another example of such a secularist reaction that showed the continuing prevalence of the 
secularist identity of the n-fflitary-led state elites can be given in relation to the EU-induced 
'University and Education Reform'. According to the newly-established 'moderate Islamist' 
AKP government, the latter reform was designed to 'democratize' the higher education 
system by transferring more power to the bottom-up representatives of universities from their 
state appointed rectors, which necessitated changing Article 2547 of the Higher Education 
Board (YOK) Law (Guclu, Milliyet, 15 September 2003, p. 10). 
13 Cumhuriyet is the representative of the ideology of the state in the media. Its political power and influence 
spring from its ideological linkage not correspondent to its level of circulation. 
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Unsatisfied with this EU induced reform-initiative of the AKP government, some secularist 
university rectors and other representatives of YOK strove to bypass the AKP's political 
authority by acting as 'functional securitizing actors'. The activities of the latter included 
provoking the secularist sensitivities of the military by presenting the university reform not as 
one of a democratic necessity but of an 'Islamist threat to secularism' (Cumhufiyet, 15 
September 2003, p. 8). Playing secularist raw nerves of the military by visiting their 
headquarters, the representatives of the YOK sought refuge in the military's 'political 
autonomy and authority in the system' (Cizre, 1997: 155-65). The military undertook the visit 
at the highest levels possible, namely by the offices of Commander of the Army Aytac 
Yalman and Chief of Staff I-Mmi Ozkok himself (Radikal, 15 September 2003 p. 7). Following 
the public row that broke as a result of this university rector/military collaboration, the Office 
of the Chief of General Staff issued a public declaration, which successfully securitized the 
governmental reform and eventually resulted in the shelving of the reform. The securitizing 
declaration read as follows: 
As stated in Article 42 of our Constitution, the Turkish Anned Forces holds to heart 
the principle that "education in Turkey is conducted in line with Ataturk's principles 
and revolutions and according to the contemporary scientific and educational 
bases"... It is natural for the Turkish Armed Forces to carefully and closely watch over 
the developments [the reform attempt] regarding our national education system, which 
is of life-and-death importance for Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 15 September 2003 p. 1; 
Milliyet, 15 September 2003 p. 10, emphasis added). 
If we take up the definition of consolidation of democracy by a Turkish student of democracy 
as 'a situation in which democracy becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine 
acting outside democratic institutions' (Ozbudun, 2000: 2), the university/military 
securitization just described reveals a distinct nature of Turkish democracy: Secularism 
informed security govemmentality often trumps basic features/institutions of democracy in 
Turkey. Thus, in practice the military's secularist proclivity simply becomes the Achilles heel 
for any government in power. Also, when considered in this fashion the military's 
identification with Kernalist secularism attains a persistent political purchase that well 
exceeds the capacity 'to make or break the governments' within the confines of electoral 
democracy. Indeed, it is this constantly active secularist gaze that endows the military with 
the necessary power to outperform the functions of a direct military coup (Salt, 1999: 72-8). 
This type of acting well outside democratic institutions is still evident even at the apex of the 
EU membership process, throughout which the military craved to preserve its power (Cizre 
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2003: 225; 2004: 108). It is within the context of secularist sensitivities that the military 
retains an unashamedly proprietorial attitude towards the political system. 
Therefore, confronting an allegedly 'Islamist' government in power, the military is likely to 
retain its 'militant secularist' trepidations and interventions into domestic politics (Jenkins, 
2003). However and as argued before, the EU is increasingly apprehensive and critical of the 
military's influence in domestic politics. Bearing in mind the fact that the military has 
repeatedly assured the national and the international public that it supports Turkey's bid for 
EU membership (Altayli, Hurriyet, 21 December 2004), one can expect a less interventionist 
military. Yet, behind its ostensible official support the military elites have at times rendered 
the EU political membership conditionality as potentially undermining of the national unity 
and integrity of the state (Drorian, 2004: 18; Bilgin, 2005). In other words, the kind of the EU 
membership the military espouses is not quite the one which includes fully embracing the EU 
as 'civilian power' (Manners, 2002) that is bent on changing the domestic political behaviours 
of the aspirant candidate states (Schimmelfennig et al, 2003) and especially its politically 
ambitious plan for transforming the exigencies of Turkey's non-democratic security politics, 
Consequently, it becomes uncertain NOether the military will ever fully embrace the more 
pluralist democratic public space that the EU promotes. 
8.2. CHANGES IN ISLAMIST POLITICAL IDENTITY 
Particularly since the collapse of the Islamist Refah Party government in June 1997 as a result 
of the military's post-modem coup, the manifestations of a major change in Turkey's Islamic 
political identity have become all the more evident (The Middle East, May 2004: 345; 
Newsweek, II October 2004: 38-42; Yavuz, 2003: 239-65; Mecham, 2004: 339-45; Dogan, 
2005: 421-37). Indeed, the coming to power of the 'moderate Islamist' AKP has confirmed 
the prospect of a political identity change at a nation-wide level. How can we account for this 
dramatic change in Islamic political identity and its implications for the identity dimension of 
security govemmentality? 
The issue of change in Islamic political identity is a rather perplexing one. Deliberations by 
analysts and political scientists over the underlying economic and political factors that can 
account for such a change have been recently flourished (Cakir, 1992; 1994; Laciner, 2002; 
Bora, 2002; Yavuz, 1997; 2003; Heper, 1997; Heper and Toktas, 2003; Yildizoglu, 2003; 
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Ozel, 2003; Onis and Keyman, 2003; Mecham, 2004; Dogan, 2005). The present section 
argues that the issue of change should also, perhaps primarily, be couched in the 
confrontational security space (a product of security governmentality) between the secularist 
forces (i. e. the military) and Islamist (party political) forces. First though, it is necessary to 
briefly survey various social, economic and political factors that played significant roles in 
changing the Islamic political identity in Turkey. 
Changes at the Socio-Histofical Level 
Behind the recent upsurge of changes in the Turkish polity were social and economic troubles 
that included the catastrophic effects on large segments of society of the rapid inflation in 
2001, global competition, and the economic recession that 'narrowed opportunities for spoils' 
and generated 'large and persistent pockets of poverty' and further unemployment (Ozel, 
2003: 83-5; Onis and Keyman, 2003: 97). In the early 2000s, a palpable widespread 
dissatisfaction with the ineffective parliamentary system together with rampant cronyism, 
highly personalized political battles between party leaders, blatant populism, political 
patronage and corruption all meant. an alienated electorate and an ailing political system 
(Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 61; Ozel, 2003: 86; Onis'and Keyman, 2003). The change in Islamic 
political identity in recent years is also closely related to the decreasing power of the Kemalist 
state ideology in dominating state-society relations (Gulalp, 1997: 56-8; Keyder, 1997: 46-8; 
Onis, 1997; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 119; Jacoby, 2003; Yavuz, 2003: 15). Here, the 
phenomenal change in the Islamic political identity should be explained with a reference to its 
roots in the crucible of state-society relations that overtime failed to ensure the steadfast grip 
of the secular state identity over Islamic social identity (Gole, 1997b: 83; 2002). 
More specifically, the historically dominant position of the Kernalist state ideology and 
bureaucracy was initially weakened as a result of the neo-liberal economic transformation 
process, which was introduced during the early 1980s by the then PM Turgut Ozal (Ozel, 
2003: 84-6). Ozal managed to circumvent the powerful state bureaucracy by his own style of 
politics (e. g., bold leadership and ruling by decrees for bypassing normal parliamentary 
constraints) that led to 'the weakening of the bureaucratic or state apparatus' (Onis, 2000b: 
96-102; 2004: 115). The shrinking of state control over the economy and politics was 
furthered by the advent of democratization and economic liberalism supported by the EU 
membership process (Muftuler-Bac, 2000; Onis, 2003). Over time, these weakening factors 
have also led to the loosening of the tight grip of the state over society, which has in turn 
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allowed Islam to occupy a more central place in public space (Gulalp, 1997b). By exploiting 
and being receptive to the growth of the 'opportunity spaces' of education and new media 
outlets within the public sphere; Islamic political identity has 'become a motivating force for 
economic expansion, democratization, and the popular acceptance of many aspects of 
modernity' (Yavuz, 2003a: 15). The end result of this new Islamic political identity, as Nasr 
argues, is such that 
Its political vision is inclusive of secular ideas and practices and sidesteps the 
uncompromising demands of Islamist dogma and its goal of creating an Islamic state. 
Neither is Islamic activism in Turkey directed at the creation of such a state, nor does 
it view the Islamic state as the guarantor of survival and propagation of Islamic values 
in society. In fact as the rise of AKP suggests, Islam in Turkish politics is rapidly 
adapting itself to the demands of a democratic and economically liberal Turkey (Nasr, 
2004: 627). 
Changes at the Political Level: The Birth of the AKP and the 'Quite Revolution' 
After the military's post-modem coup (Chapter 4: 3) against the Islamist Refah Party 
government, the political future of the party was clouded further by the judiciary. In addition 
to the military campýign, on 22 May 1997 the Public Prosecutor Vural Savas applied to the 
Constitutional Court for unlocking the drama by asking for the closure of the party on the 
grounds th'at -it -ranlýul of secularist pririciples (Savag, 2001a: 263-274). Furthermore, the 
pressures of the military-led campaign were accompanied by the erosion of the coalition 
government's majority by resignations from the True Path Party. As a result, the first Islamist 
PM Erbakan resigned on 18 June 1997. Later, in January 1998, the Constitutional Court 
closed down the Refah Party and banned its leader Erbakan from politics for five years. 
Alerted by the impending closing net on their party, most of the members of Refah Party 
joined the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, which was founded by the confidantes of Erbakan on 17 
December 1997. Having taken up a more moderate language of politics than the Refah Party's 
earlier inflammatory religious rhetoric, the successor Fazilet Party ran for the general election 
on 18 April 1999 but in the end secured only 15.4 per cent of the national vote. Despite the 
fact that the Fazilet Party adopted from the onset a more moderate political discourse by 
declaring its commitment to secularism, the Constitutional Court once again stepped in 
politics and announced the closure of the party in June 2001 on the same secularist grounds 
that closed its predecessor Refah Party (Mecham, 2004: 339-46). The Public Prosecutor 
applied to the Constitutional Court on 7 May 1999 for the closure this time of the Refah's 
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successor, the Fazilet Party, by claiming that the party was undermining secularist principles 
of the state referring to the headscarf conundrum (Savas, 2001a: 443). 
Particularly after its unsuccessful election results in April 1999 and the Constitutional bans, 
signs for a new initiative within the Islamic political cadres became more visible. Afterwards, 
it emerged that the Islamist political movement could not bear these fatal blows by the hands 
of the military and the judicial establishment. The movement split into two separate parties. 
The older generation loyal to the founder of the movement Necmettin Erbakan formed a 
successor party under a different name: The Saadet (Felicity) Party. The younger generation 
of the movement headed by Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, on the other hand, staked 
their bid higher by establishing a wholly different party: the Justice and Development Party 
on 14 August 2001. Significantly for security governmentality; the AKP government, unlike 
its predecessor Islamist parties, has repeatedly underlined its commitment to secularism and 
has waved the flag of democratic institutions and, last but not least, strove more than any 
other government for Turkey's EU membership bid (Dogan, 2005). By according its message 
to the mainstream centre, the AKP has transformed itself 'into a politically sophisticated, 
progressive and moderate participant in normal politics' (Mecham, 2004: 340). The party 
immediately disowned its predecessors' more contentious Islamic dcmands and adapted a 
more moderate and avowedly democratic and centrist political stance (Laciner, 2001: 4-5). 
The new AKP then came to power by winning a landslide victory in November 2002 national 
elections. This political triumph has shown that the electorate was highly receptive of this 
political-identity change (Onis and Keyman, 2003). In the words of Deborah Sontag: 
Justice and Development would be a party in which religious people could feel at 
home, but it wouldn't be a religious party. Its members would be Muslim Democrats 
in the mold of Europe's Christian Democrats. It would entice Westernized Turks from 
abroad, like Egemen Bagis, 33, a businessman living in New Jersey until Erdogan 
recruited him to run for Parliament without, Bagis said, ever asking whether he drank 
(he does) or whether his wife covered her hair (she doesn't) (New York Times, II May 
2003). 
Graham Fuller, a close follower of Turkish politics, has argued that one key principle behind 
the revival of political Islamic movements has been the conviction on the part of its actors, 
which 'attribute the past achievements and past durability of Islamic civilization to the very 
message and implementation of Islam itself' (Fuller, 2003: 2). In this logic then any straying 
from that faith might be perceived 'as a direct source of decline and failure' (Fuller, 2003: 2). 
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If this is a yardstick against which we can question the political principles and style of the 
AKP it is clear that the latter does not constitute yet another version of political Islam. The 
modernization and politicization of the one of the most influential religious orders, namely 
Naksibendis-parts of which formed the AKP-also helped change the Islamic political identity 
(Interview with Prof. Serif Mardin, Milliyet, 28 February 2005). The AKP ideologues now 
clearly represent the party as a typical 'Conservative Democratic party' that signifies not 'a 
status quo but open to change and future oriented modem conservatism, which defines change 
in an evolutionary transfon-nation of society ... a space for conciliation' (Radikal, 11 January 
2004). Hence, the result is a transformation from political religious discourse to a Western 
style (conservative) democracy discourse that corresponds to an 'eclectic and liberal' ideology 
(Akdogan, 2003; Mert, 2004: 36; Alkan, 2004: 50-2). 
That the general election of 3 November 2002 has transformed the Turkish political landscape 
has become the commonplace argument amongst political analysts (Insel, 2002; Cinar, 2002; 
Bora, 2002; Yarasir and Akgun, 2002; Ozel, 2003; Jenkins, 2003; Yavuz, 2003; Carkoglu, 
2003). Between 1986 and 2002, never one party was able to win majority of seats in the 
parliament. In the November 21002 elections, the electorate ousted (with a 'damning 
:. -. indictment') the incumbent governing parties of centre-left and right-wing tripartite coalition, 
whose members could not win this time even a single seat in the new parliament (Onis and 
Keyman, 2003). A then new and untested party namely the AKP achieved electoral victory 
despite the fact that it has never competed in Turkish national elections before (Laciner, 2002: 
13). There was perhaps nothing new regarding this election bearing in mind that Turkey is 
generally seen as a country fulfilling the necessary (but not sufficient) condition of 
democracy, that is being 'electorally competitive' political system (Arquiatte, 2004). The 
victory acquires significance, however, if we consider that as a 'moderate Islamist' party, the 
AKP was one of 'the parties that Turkey's politically powerful inflitary least wanted to see 
win' (Stepan and Robertson, 2004: 143). As Sontag summarizes, the AKP's victory in the 
political system 
[w]as a resounding rejection of the old, corrupt, mismanaged and fragmented Turkish 
political order. It was also an embrace of Erdogan personally but not of Islamism. On 
election night, Erdogan immediately sought to reassure the establishment that he 
would not be an agent of unwanted change. In a news conference, he said that his 
government would not interfere with anyone's way of life, would uphold Turkey's 
Western-oriented foreign policy, would abide by an International Monetary Fund 
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rescue plan and would continue the battle for admission to the European Union. [After 
which the] Turkish markets soared (Sontag, New York Times, 11 May 2003). 
The results of the local elections in March 2004 confirmed, despite all these misgivings, that 
majority of the electorate embraced the AKP's political message. This triggered a whole new 
debate as to what exactly were the hopes of the party and the masses. Contrary to the 'politics 
of fear' that have been prevalently at work for a time (Yavuz, 2002) the economic policies 
and the general political perfon-nance of the AKP government has surprised even the most 
unrepentant cynics and staunch critics of the party (Altayli, Hurriyet, 30 December 2004; 
Ozkok, Hurriyet, 30 December 2004). 
The AKP and the EU Membership Process 
This dramatic rise and ascent to power of the 'moderate Islamist' AKP with a massive 
majority in a most secular and geo-strategically key NATO member and an official EU 
candidate state has been seen by many observers as something 'perplexing' (Mango, 2003; 
Jenkins, 2003). This is so not least because the Turkish state was always seen as a pro- 
Western parliamentary democracy, and a 'success story of secular nationalism', one - which 
'served as the paragon of secularism across the Muslim World' (Turam, 2004: 358; Nasr, 
'ý004., " 62'7). ý Que§fi'dihs surrounding: the coming to the'p6wer ofthe AKP gained "a new 
resonance and further political importance beyond Turkish polity in the wake of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and 'war on terrorism'. The questions were compounded also after the 
Turkish parliament's refusal to allow the deployment of the US troops to form a second front 
in Northern Iraq in 2003 (Robins, 2003: 547). Furthermore, the AKP's Turkey has also 
'become a propaganda asset, a riposte to fears of an impending clash of civilizations between 
Islam and the West' (Jenkins, 2003: 45; also Toynbee, The Guardian, 20 September 2005; 
Bunting, The Guardian, 26 September 2005). 
A prominent observer of Turkey and journalist Stephen Kinzer has recently suggested that a 
revolution is taking place in Turkey chiefly as a result of the AKP's EU policy (2004: 14). 
Kinzer reckons that the AKP initiatives in the political realm informed by the EU membership 
process have amounted to a 'quite revolution. He noticed that a 'Muslim party' takes the lead 
in Turkey's quest for the EU and this 'is a deliciously subversive contradiction' (Kinzer, 
2004: 15). Others have pointed to the potentially transforming effect of the AKP both in 
Turkish and even Islamic politics in the Middle East. A prominent professor of political Islam 
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John Esposito of Georgetown University stated that with the coming to power of the AKP, 
Turkey is developing an inclusive rather than exclusionary 'democratic secularity', which 
should ease the initial fears of the EU about membership. Francis Fukuyama too joined the 
chorus by praising the 'conservative democratic' identity of the AKP, claiming that 'the best 
thing that can happen to the Islamic world is to generate an Islamic version of the Christian 
Democratic movement in Europe' (both Interviews in Zaman 25 November 2002). The latter 
view has been echoed in the Arab media as well, as Sid-Ahmed has written: 
At a time tensions between Islam and the West are running high, and with the region 
poised on the brink of a war with unforeseen consequences, the significance of an 
Islamic party in power that seems determined to address explosive problems in a 
peaceful manner cannot be overstated. Even if Turkey is an atypical Muslim country, 
even if it has specific characteristics not shred by other Islamic states, its current 
experiment with democracy is a beacon of light in a dark landscape. What is 
happening in Turkey today stands as a denial of the "clash of civilizations". The rules 
governing relations between the European Union and the Islamic world are still in the 
making. The Turkish experiment can do much to suggest positive ideas in this 
connection (Al-Ahram Weekly, 16-22 January 2003). 
Indeed, this manifest transformation from the kefah's Islamist party ideology to the AKP', % 
EU endowed discourse of democracy and human rights signals a momentous change in the 
coniempoiary identity of the Islamic political movement. It is in part this change that has 
consequently put the dynamics in motion to transform security governmentality. It seems that 
Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and the AKP as a party employ a political discourse attuned to 
a full EU democratic conditionality, by means of which they target without overt political 
confrontation the reason of state rationality and techniques of security governmentality (see 
The AK Party Program, 2005). They articulate their EU-centered democracy discourse by 
embedding it within a placid socio-cultural 'Islamic' identity rather than sticking to a vaguely 
defined 'Ottoman golden age' or the capitalist credentials of the EU (Interviews with the party 
officials in Istanbul and Kayseri April, August 2004, respectively). 
In order to get a glimpse of this profound change one need look no further than the initial 
landmark foreign visits of the two Islamic-inclined governments, when they first come to 
power. In June 1996, the first Islamist PM Necmettin Erbakan, had paid a series of visits to 
Muslim countries including Iran and Libya 'in a calculated rebuke to Turkey's Western allies' 
in order 'to form a trading bloc of eight Muslim countries as a potential alternative to the EU' 
(Jenkins, 2003: 53). This move eventually fuelled a secularist reactions headed by the military 
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and the media and led to the downfall of the government as was argued in Chapter 4. Upon 
taking office in November 2002 the AKP's preferred political move under Tayyip Erdogan 
leadership was immediately turning its face to the Western world. In a series of European 
visits, Tayyip Erdogan made crystal clear its government's first major policy formulation: 
Making the case for Turkey's full membership and integration into the EU (TRT-INT. News, 
10 November, 2002). 
As was shown in Chapter 6, the EU has increasingly acted as a policy entrepreneur at the 
international level projecting its policies and institutions (Glenn, 2004: 4-6,25). Such a 
'policy transfer' attitude by the EU is basically premised upon its membership conditionality 
and is in turn adapted by the third countries as 'a source of legitimacy' (Radaelli, 2000; 
Schmelfennig, 2001). The changing contours of EU membership criteria in the early 1990s 
significantly helped to shore up the democratic political discourse of the AKP and other 
democratic socio-political forces against the state security discourse (Dogan, 2005: 421-37; 
Cizre, 2003: 224-9). The narrowed-down political sphere of security governmentality enabled 
the AKP to expand the political space mostly within the developing context of the EU 
membership process'(Cinar, 2002: 40-2; Cizre, 2003: 224-9). The basic formula to do so lied 
in the effbiLs of the party to cross-fertilize the party's and society's needs into real politics 
wit h the help of the sense of direction offered by the EU conditionality (The AK Pany 
Program, 2005; Dogan, 2005: 421-37). 
The EU membership conditionality set in the Copenhagen criteria presented, from a policy- 
transfer perspective an institutional-discursive niche that has helped the AKP to thwart 
domestic 'uncertainty when imitation provides a means to avoid lengthy and controversial 
policy debates over ambiguous situations at home' (Lavanex and Ucarer, 2004: 421). EU 
democratic membership conditionality empowered the AKP to be able to put forward an EU- 
oriented democratic (counter) discourse against the security-strewn discourse of the secularist 
establishment (Cizre, 2003: 224-9). Turkey's relations with the EU made it evident that the 
global conditions of international politics has more and more blur-red the boundaries of the 
national and global, and Turkey's secularist establishment is now increasingly left in an 
anachronistic position that fails to withstand the test of the long-cherished state target of 
reaching the level of 'contemporary Western civilization' that is the EU (Cinar, 2004: 31-2). 
Such a pro-EU move by the AKP exposed the state elites to the charge that the establishment 
is still embedded in the nineteenth century designed 'modernization project' that seems 
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irreversibly eclipsed by the contemporary EU's post-modem project (Buzan and Diez, 1999; 
Onis, 2003). 
The AKP capitalizes on EU membership by not only presenting the EU as 'the twenty-first 
century phase of modernization' but also by repositioning itself as a modernizing 'moderate 
Islamist' force, moving its socio-cultural. identity from the fringes of policy into the centre 
(see the speech by PM Erdogan, Hurriyet, 03 September 2005). While the state elites have 
increasingly found themselves less in touch with the EU project as a whole, the dominant 
Islamist political movement under the AKP has come to the fore as a pro-EU political force in 
the system (Laciner, 2004; Dogan, 2005). The AKP strives to realize its political stature first 
by giving up on confronting the secular sensitivities of the state at the domestic level, and, 
second by reassuring its moderate Islamic political position by synchronizing its preferences 
with the EU conditionality. By so doing, the AKP has successfully integrated itself into the 
internal and international legitimacy channels (Laciner, 2004: 20-2; Hurriyet, 03 September 
2005). 
Indeed,. emerging successfully out of the fringes of the anti-systemic Refah Party politics, the 
,. moderate Islamic-oriented AKP has, crucially found a politically rewarding refuge in,. the 
contemporary democracy discourse of the EU membership process which is to be utilized 
against the politically influential discourses of state security. In the process of engaging and 
eventually transfon-ning security governmentality, the EU-membership conditionality has 
proved particularly useful in helping shape the AKP's democratizing policy preferences 
without denouncing frames of its root and letting it to stay mostly within frames of the 
electorate's socio-religious identity (Onis and Keyman, 2003: 97,106; Cinar, 2004: 33). The 
AKP, as a prominent joumalist-academic argues, 
[h]as succeeded in the last local elections to garner votes from all sections of society 
who support steps towards greater freedom and prosperity regardless of ethnic origin, 
religious belief or political conviction, and thus appeared on the national scene as the 
party that unites the country ... [n1o doubt that the determination of the AKP 
government in pursuing the reforms, is the main factor which explains for the 
6sufficient progress' in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria required to start 
membership negotiations with the EU next year (Alpay, Zaman, 19 June 2004). 
In addition, this interaction with the EU also helps the AKP's leadership to reformulate the 
party's self-styled 'conservative democratic' identity (Yildiz, 2004: 54) and accommodate it 
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with the secularist political system along the spectrum of EU's democratic discourse. The 
argument is that because the latter has been established as a 'state policy' (Cicek, 2003: 53) 
AKP discourse and policies should not contradict with state interests and/or 'the matter of the 
state'. As Simon Tisdall puts: 
In more than 40 years of trying, no previous Turkish leader has come this close to 
success. Several European governments, having accepted Ankara's bid in theory, are 
plainly uncomfortable at having their bluff called at last ... The reality is that Mr. Erdogan, both devout Muslim and worldly-wise leader, has imperfectly achieved what 
many thought utterly impossible: the harnessing Turkey's religious and secular 
(military) in joint pursuit of democratic modernization (The Guardian, 14 December 
2004). 
Perhaps the most obvious tuming-point in the transformation of the political identity of 
Islamists has been the competency of the AKP-led moderate Islamists to be able to revitalize 
their political discourse and policies in line with the hegemonic 'state policy' of 
Westernization and EU membership (see the speech by PM Erdogan, Hurriyet, 03 September 




ropgh its institutions such as NATO and now the EU has, in largq measure, overlapped this 
time with the aims of the AKP to traverse the boundaries of what is politically permissible 
%ýithin security governmentality and 'bring the politics back in' (Cinar, 2004: 32). Hence, its 
self-proclaimed rhetorical identity-tag 'Conservative Democrat' notwithstanding, the AKP's 
political ideology informs a strategy of integration with the 'international system by talking 
the language' and yearning for 'globalization, Europeanization and liberation' together with 
the 'modernization of Turkey through the EU' (Bilici, 2004: 58; PM Erdogan, Hurriyet, 03 
September 2005). In this respect, the AKP program clearly reads: 
Our Party constitutes a ground where the unity and the integrity of the Republic of 
Turkey, the secular, democratic, social State of law, and the processes of 
civilianization, democratization, freedom of belief and equality of opportunity are 
considered essential... Regarding fundamental rights and freedoms, our Party will 
achieve the following objectives: Standards in the area of human rights contained in 
the international agreements to which Turkey is a party, especially in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, Paris Charter 
and Helsinki Final Act shall be put into force (The AK Party Program, 2005) 
Not only has the party embraced and promoted EU-centered democracy discourse at the 
leadership level but found support also at the intermediate party organizational level (see 
Appendix 2, the questionnaire distributed with the AKP party members in Istanbul, April 
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2004). For the active members and officials, the party provides primarily an institutional and 
social context for otherwise diverse social groups/forces to promote and pursue their interests 
against the confines of security governmentality rather than being merely a religiously and 
ideologically motivated site of action (Interviews with the AKP officials, April 2004). 
An example of the meaning of articulation of democracy discourse for the party circles, 
against security govemmentality appeared in education policy discussed Chapter 7: the 
religious school students' university entry struggle. The exclusionary practices on that 
occasion seem to have sharpened the political identity consciousness of these schools' 
graduates, who have appeared to form a closer bond with AKP than other parties. First and 
foremost these religious state school graduates have long been aware of the political nature of 
the state elites' exclusionary practices, implications and the long-term effects of the 
'stigmata', of their religious high school education, upon their vocational experiences. For 
instance, in a rather typical response one graduate had this to say: 
Unless I was asked, I did not mention where I graduated from. For I have had 
difficulties -in 
finding jobs whenever I did pot keep my educational backgrgund in 
secret. 
'I 
know I will constantly struggle to climb the career ladder. Because whenever 
1'revealed my background I was treated in a discrii-ninat6ry manner and was discarded 
even though I scored higher in the job-examinations than the other applicants... I now 
understand why they want to prevent the religious schools students from entering into 
the university; they do not want to see us in the upper echelons of politics and social 
strata. These introduced reductions from the grades before university entrance exam 
and other barriers are for the purpose of holding us back and enlarging the distance 
between us and upward mobility. This is because these reductions make it extremely 
difficult to choose a vocation for new graduates other than theology in the university 
education (Interview, August 2004, Izmir, Turkey). 
The perception and reaction of the graduates of the religious vocational schools to the issues 
pertaining to the political-identity struggle between the secularist state elites and the AKP in 
government is also worthy of note. Many of the students and graduates I have interviewed 
seemed to have long left their previous religious concerns and/or any political implication of 
the Islamic education they have in the schools. Most of them have not only refused to affiliate 
with one-dimensional, ideological-cultural (Islamic/secularist) cleavage but also repudiated 
any zealous allegiance to Islamic parties of one sort or another (as in the case of the 
incumbent 'moderate Islamist' AKP). They hardly ever deny that they find themselves closer 
to the AKP discourse, but the reasons for this are various and can by no means be reduced to 
the party leadership's Islamic-political past. From the perspective of EU membership, for 
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instance, it is interesting to note that the EU discourse of human rights as one condition of 
membership has gained popularity amongst the religious school students, quite contrary to 
their traditional religious/Islamic discourse of human rights. The EU's human rights discourse 
serves not only as a means for their struggle but also provides a 
contemporary/universal/legitimate language of dissent to articulate their claims. One of the 
graduates expressed his take on the controversy in the following words: 
They [the initiators of the restrictions] do not understand. Most of us do not want to 
study theology at the university but rather prefer to be doctors, lawyers, engineers or 
scientists just like many other students in regular high schools. The buzz of 'security 
of the state' around us [that we may be threats to the state] is pumped up by artificial 
secularist media-stimulants, which are unfounded ... The PM Erdogan himself is a 
graduate of Imam Hatip [religious high] schools, does this mean he too is a threat to 
the state or secularism? I think not. On the contrary, he and his party seem to prove 
just as ineffective against the secularists in bringing back our basic rights to education 
including those of students with headscarf, the issue which the party promised to solve 
before they were elected... I mean we do not put in jeopardy or challenge the secular 
character of the state. It [the university entry restrictions] is not fair. Just because our 
parents sent us to state's religious schools, we are discriminated in the education 
system and cannot even choose the university education we have dreamt of. Now that 
char the so-called Islamist AK party cannot introduce the ges to rectify the, situation 
because of the secularist reaction, our only hope is that of entering the EU anytime 
soon. I support. the. EU membership and its emphasis -on human lights because it will 
hopefully provide necessary shelter against such violations of human rights by the 
state and also will save us from the mercy of the outcome of the struggle between the 
AK Party [the AKP] and the military (Interview, September 2004, Istanbul, Turkey). 
Another sign that the political Islam represented by the AKP and its constitutiency has 
embraced the EU democratic discourse and occurred in the interviews with the AKP's heads 
of youth branches' women-division in Istanbul's most populated districts. There the questions 
revolved around women's choice of wearing the headscarf so as to understand their stance in 
relation to the military, the party and the EU As argued in Chapter 5, the headscarf issue 
serves as a means of bio-political state intervention into the individual (female) private 
sphere, and constitutes an important socio-political playground amongst this trio of actors. In 
addition to the dominant themes in their discourse of peaceful relationship with the military 
and conflict avoidance, the active female members seemed to have taken the EU membership 
as an 'individually and independently embraced socio-political project' (Interviews, with the 
AKP Female Members Istanbul, April 2004). During the interviews two questions have taken 
up of particular significance. The first question concerned the possibility of a scenario in 
which the EU supports the Turkish military and other state elites' unbending secularist 
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opposition to wearing the headscarf in such educational settings as the university. The second 
question concerned their reaction to a possible EU ban on the wearing of the headscarf in the 
universities after eventual Turkish membership. Two types of answers to these questions 
revealed widespread awareness of the EU as a 'socio-political project. First was the 
respondents' sheer disbelief in that such a scenario because they held that this would not be 
possible due to the fact that the freedom of religious expression has been firmly established 
within the democratic norms of the EU. The second reaction was summed up by the fernale- 
head of the youth division in Maltepe district of the AKP. She said: 'we will not give up on 
our right to wear headscarf, if such a scenario [restrictions on wearing headscarf in public 
spaces] appears then we will continue our struggle within the EU institutions by democratic 
means' (Interview with Esra Dalyan, April 2004, Istanbul-Maltepe). 
It can therefore be argued that the AKP as a party has largely proven to be the main supporter, 
carrier and implementer of the discourse of EU democratic conditionality amongst other 
political entrepreneurs that sought the title of being an EU-oriented party. Overall, not only 
the party leadership but also 'the rank and file' or 'inter-mediate party officials' have 
embrac&d th6 Elý-injuced democracy discourse. The latter is hardly exploited as rhetori . cal 
windowýdressing but was rather actively supported by the majority of the interviewees. Not 
only did the majority show familiarity with the potentially 'thorny' repercussions of EU 
membership such as Kurdish cultural rights, opening Christian religious schools in Turkey 
and homosexual rights, they also seemed to have accepted all these as necessary 'homework' 
for eventual membership (Interviews with the party officials, April 2004, Istanbul). This has 
been so much the case that the AKP government does not shy away from preparing the 
country for a worst-case situation in which Turkey's EU membership bid would be abandoned 
by the European Council, a prospect that has recently appeared in sight following the rejection 
of the proposed EU constitution in France and the Netherlands. Not only is the government 
'pledging to walk away if a proposal [of EU] to downgrade its membership to [so-called 
'privileged partnership'] is on the table', but also it prepares itself to go alone with the EU- 
induced reform process anyway under another banner: 'Ankara Criteria' rather than the 
Copenhagen Criteria (Watt, The Guardian, 03 September 2005 p. 14; Hurriyet, 03 September 
2005). In short, the fact that the 'moderate Islamist' AKP government has established itself 
arguably the most sustained, enthusiastic and successful party bidding for Turkey's EU 
membership should be a bitter taste in the mouth of the custodian secularist old guard, who 
was supposed to spearhead Ataturk's modernization (Wallerstein, Zaman, 02 January 2005). 
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8.3. POLITICAL ISLAM'S CHANGING ENGAGEMENT WITH SECURITY 
GOVERNMENTALITY 
Particularly since the 'moderate Islamist' AKP government formed the government alone in 
November 2002, there has been an ongoing and palpable anxiety and confusion inside and 
outside of the country about Turkey's modem and Islamic identities (Jenkins, 2003; Kalypso, 
2004). It is argued that Turkey stands at the epicenter of the general 'clash of civilizations 
between Islam and the West' (Huntington, 1993: 42). This is arguably because the 'Islamic' 
and 'secular' identities and the wrangle between are often held as critical domestic dynamics 
(Kaya, 2004: 9-14; Pak, 2004: 321). Behind such an international gaze, however, often Jay 
essentialist readings of the role of Islam in society and politics, which continue to punctuate 
this so-called 'clash' as a peculiarly apolitical (for an exception see Bunting, The Guardian, 
26 September 2005). Well-known historian Bernard Lewis, for instance, puts forward (The 
Times, 15 June 1992, p. 24) such an apolitical nature of the 'clash' by stating that there is a 
[m]ove-and niovement far transcending the issues, the level of issues and policies and 
the governMents that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civi 
i 
lizations-the 
'--peihýps' irrati'onal but surely historic rea'ction'of an" ancient rival against our Judes- 
Christian heritage, our secular present, and the world wide expansion of both. 
The supposed 'clash of civilization' is carried out ironically in the Turkish domestic political 
context between the secularist state elites and the Islamist political actors. It is interesting to 
note how Lewis's comments came close to the justifications given by the Turkish military for 
their 1997 intervention against the threat of the 'Islamist government' in the name of securing 
the secularpresent. There is an intriguing similarity between this discourse of (civilizational) 
identity-conflict and the discourse of the Turkish military-led state elites. Turkey's state elites 
have singled out the rise of the public visibility Of the Muslim citizens as an (apolitical) 
security threat to be eradicated rather than addressed (for such a view see Savas, 2001a; 
Savas, 2001b). Back to Huntington, he attributed this confrontational attitude to a curiously 
attained natural counter-positioning between the westernized governing elites and the 
religious identity of the general population (1993: 39). As a result of the primeval-religious 
factors, Turkey for him has become 'the most obvious and prototypical example' of a 'torn 
country' (1993: 42) between 'the west and the rest' (1993: 39). In terms of the country's 
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future direction, he went on to ask 'Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by 
Brussels, where does Turkey look? ' (1993: 42). 
As this chapter has argued, it now appears that an overwhelming majority of 'Islamic society' 
in Turkey, and most of their representatives in the political scene, look directly to Brussels, as 
the country's ardent bid for EU membership under the AKP government has demonstrated 
(Hughes, European Voice, May 2004: 20). Even the Minister of State for Religious Affairs, 
Mehmet Aydin, has stated that 'Turkey has turned its full face to Europe-geographically, 
culturally. We want a clear answer. The EU has the right to say "no, you are not European"; if 
they do, perhaps we cease to be. Turkey has the full right to press her claim and get a result in 
the end' (quoted in Hughes, European Voice, May 2004: 20). Indeed, perhaps most puzzling 
for the likes of Lewis and Huntington is that Turkey's membership struggle for the EU has 
been fervently upheld by the country's once notorious and maverick 'Islamist' incumbent PM, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his party members (Kinzer, 2004: 11). Indeed, EU membership 
has stood for much of the party's reputation in the international media so much so that it is 
often argued that PM Erdogan 'has staked his political future on the EU' (Smith, The 
Guardian, 5 August 2005, p-17). 
In addition to the existing interviews. with the party leadership, the interviews and 
questionnaire conducted for the present thesis with the 'rank and file' of the AKP in April- 
August 2004 indicate that two expedient factors have practically helped to achieve the 
transformation toward an openly 'liberal-democratic' discourse: the EU memberhisp goal and 
the fear of repeating the costly political mistakes of the Refah party within security 
govemmentality. The change in Islamic political identity is related to the desire of the AKP to 
make Turkey an EU member state. The EU membership systematically helps the AKP to 
carry out a transformation both in 'Islamist' party politics and in security govemmentality 
because the EU membership process requires adapting the democratic membership 
conditionality and abandoning the religiously-articulated policy choices and fiery political 
rhetoric (Dogan, 2005: 421-37). In the process, the AKP government has championed 
Turkey's EU membership bid and consequently EU democracy conditionality seems to have 
had precedence over of the previously held and religiously informed Islamist policy choices 
and rhetoric (Hughes, European Voice, May 2004: 20). 
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The AKP carries out its political aims in part through the EU membership process that 
requires Turkey to democratize. Arguably it is in this sense that the AKP's interest in carrying 
out the reforms in order to achieve EU membership is unrivalled (Alpay, Zaman, 19 June 
2004). EU membership offers not only an invaluable opportunity for eliminating the military 
of its political power but also for a fuller democratization of the political system (Cinar, 2004: 
33). In the process of the EU membership struggle, the AKP also hopes to open up a 
legitimate political space for its religious electorate's demands for recognition (Onis and 
Keyman, 2003: 105-7). More crucially, the AKP aims to curb the political role of the security 
actors including the military by replacing the chronic and politically divisive security 
discourse and logic of security governmentality, which wreck the social and cultural cohesion 
and diminish that of the democratization discourse of the EU (Interviews with the party 
officials, August 2004, Istanbul). 
The changing 'Islamist' political identity has significant implications for security 
governmentality. As Chapter 5 argued, the Islamist political identity is in a constitutive 
relationship with security governmentality for two reasons. Firstly, the exclusive secularist 
and Islamist identification processes have locked the socio-political actors in security- 
discourse political confrontations. Secondly, the degree of 'Islamic challenge' to the secular 
nature of the state has led to the state securitizations that mostly suppressed the demands of 
identity groups within the public as a whole. Consequently, any change in one of the identity 
orientations is likely to yield cardinal effects for security governmentality. 
One of the most profound results of this newfound 'liberal-democratic' orientation in the 
'Islamist' political identity is that it helps release the Islamists from the habit of providing 
ammunition for the secularist military to justify their interventions into the workings of 
democratic politics. Thus, after an ill-founded confrontation with the secularist establishment 
under the Refah, the new moderate Islamist political movement hedged its political bets by 
cleansing itself of any religious-identity driven security rows with the military-led state elites 
(The Middle East, May 2004: 17). So far, the AKP has largely refrained from the discursive 
and institutional confrontations with the secularists, most visibly the military and the 
mainstream media. Consequently, the AKP rarely finds itself locked in confrontation with the 
secularist military; in other words it seems watchfully alert to the 'reason of state' and 
secularist rationalities of security governmentality (for a recent example, see PM Erdogan's 
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speech in Hurriyet, 16 August 2005). Furthermore, the AKP often shrewdly avows that the 
secular state is secure simply because it has 
pledged loyalty to the principles of the Republic and the Constitution... rejected the 
use of religion as well as ethnicity for political benefit... promised to strike a healthy 
balance indigenous values and global norrns... took as its basic reference the United 
Nations Charter of Human Rights and the European Charter for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Basic Liberties (Heper and Toktas, 2003: 176). 
Hence, the AKP government seems quite cognizant of the necessity of undoing the contexts 
and pretexts for the military's securitization attempts as a means to enhance its political 
capacity. Having being alerted by previous experiences of the military's politically 
devastating securitization techniques, the AKP has been vigilant in its steps and political 
moves, and is insisting in its assertions that it does not challenge 'the security of the state' 
despite occasional protests to the contrary. The fact that the AKP leader Erdogan strove to 
make peace with the military, judiciary and the secular circles before coming to power attests 
to this cautionary stance (Cakir and Calmuk, 2001: 101). As Ozel argued, in this overall 
process: 
kýoýked'by* a'mailed fiit : ý*'aihed in'the bureaucratic equivalent of a velvet gl6e, 
some Islamists awoke from the experience with a newfound apprehension of 
democratic principles and a systematic resolve-the first ever in their movement's 
history-to embark upon a principled quest to defend not merely their own liberties, but 
democratic liberties as such. The much-maligned EU and its norms became a key 
source of support for the persecuted Islamist parties. In an ironic way that no one fully 
intended, the postmodem coup paved the way for the generational and ideological 
cleavage and reorganization within the Islamist movement that gave birth to the AKP 
(2003: 89). 
In all, whereas the previous Refah Party government voiced its opposition by claiming that 
Turkey was not 'religious enough, the AKP basically claims that Turkey is not democratic 
enough and the way to democratize is attributed to the EU membership (The AK Party 
Program, 2005). By so arguing, the AKP seeks to free itself from potential anti-secularist 
charges and/or characterizations by the state secularist establishment, which saw the Refah 
and Fazilet as 'a religious, subversive party' and treated them 'as colony of lepers' (Mecham, 
2004: 346). This pre-emptive self-identification of the AKP (with Republican values and the 
EU) leaves little space for the military and the judicial establishment to capitalize on any 
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inflammatory (religious) discourse and provides the AKP with valuable leverage to de- 
securitize the political realm. 
Therefore, the AKP seems particularly aware of the unsettling confrontational identity 
dimension of security governmentality. The AKP seems 'skillful' in not evoking any identity 
confrontations between 'Islamists' and the 'secularists' (Interview with Prof. Serif Mardin, 
Milliyet, 28 February 2005) since inflammatory securitizing discourse (with the secularists) 
can well lay the groundwork for, and legitimize, non-democratic security govemmentality. As 
to the secularist state elites, devoid of any avenues/elements that were available to them (like 
religious rhetoric or religiously informed policies) they have found it increasingly difficult to 
penetrate the political governmental domain since then. 
A specific example in this regard clearly attests to the changing political attitude of the AKP 
within security governmentality. On 21 November 2002, an influential AKP member and 
veteran 'Islamist' politician, Bulent Arinc, attended an official ceremony at Ankara airport as 
the newly-elected speaker of parliament. He was accompanied by his wife., who was wearing 
a headscarf. Arinc and his wife were playing their role in the state tradition of cscolting. the 
President and. his wife to an outbound flight. Once again the problem for thc'secularist 
establishment was that Arinc's wife's 'headscarf' had (albeit unobtrusively) entered an 
'official public space'. This 'action' stiffed a confrontation with and attracted the traditional 
reaction of the secularist state establishment including the military, which took this headscarf 
issue as 'the incursion of religion into the public sphere' and 'an assault on secularism, no 
different from Merve Kavakci's attempt to enter parliament in her headscarf in 1999' 
(Jenkins, 2003: 56). Arinc defended his action of bringing along his wife to an 'official 
ceremony' as not being an offense to secularism (Radikal, 22 November 2002). The Prime 
Minister Abdullah Gul (as caretaker PM due to the political ban on Tayyip Erdogan) in a 
crucial move declined to back Arinc's rather lax attitude and self-interested initiatives. 
Although the AKP promised to ease the headscarf ban, PM Abdullah Gul in a bid to dispense 
with the simmering allegations that the AKP was in fact a 'closet Islamist party' stated that 
the headscarf conundrum requires 'a solution in its own natural [gradual] course' and went on 
implicitly to criticize Ariqc by stating that 'we should refrain from [such] extremities' 
(Radikal, 22 November 2002). 
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What does this change in the AKP's political identity mean for the working of security 
governmentality? First of all, it should be noted that various discursive and policy initiatives 
of the AKP point to a dramatically changing political style that can potentially undercut the 
functioning of security governmentality. This is of utmost necessity particularly in order not 
to touch the secularist raw nerves of the military, the media and other influential actors 
associated with security governmentality. The party's general political initiatives (and non- 
initiatives) indicate that the party proceeds with great circumspection. Secondly, the AKP's 
prudent political attitude heralds a transformation in the Islamist political discourse and 
practices. As Ozel argued, the AKP seemed to have internalized the lessons of the 1997 coup 
and the subsequent '28 February Process' (2003: 89). The state secularist policies in time 
taught AKP party elites and members to acquire a much more moderate take on Islam and its 
limited role in state. Thirdly, the AKP has adopted the EU-oriented democratic political 
discourse for addressing the non-democratic deficiencies of security governmentality. In this 
regard, the AKP government has been pushing for EU-promoted reforms. Indeed, on 7 May 
2004, the National Assembly adopted another series of vital constitutional amendments, 
which, in the words of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, aimed to grant Turkey give Turkey 'a 
stronger democracy and a very different place in the world'; With these amendments were ail 
references to-death penalty removed, the con-troversial State Security Court was abolished, the 
military representative was removed from Higher Education Board (YOK) that governs the 
universities, and more transparency to military expenditures was established (Pope, Middle 
East International, 14 May 2004: 22). The change in Islamic political identity in turn helped 
bring about a prospect of change in the playing field of security governmentality. In a 
nutshell, the securitization of politics staged by the media and the military after 1997 led to 
'profound changes in the composition, ideology and the leadership of the Islamic movement' 
(Mecham, 2003: 339,358; Ayata, 2004: 247; Dogan, 2005; Interviews with the party 
members, April 2004, Istanbul). In general the AKP leaders and the active party officials 
appear to have carefully crafted an effective and alternative political strategy against security 
governmentality. Following that, it is possible to argue that security governmentality has 
paradoxically helped to transform Islamist political identity. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has argued that since Turkey gained official candidacy status, the Islamist 
political identity has significantly transformed whereas such transformation has not taken 
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place in the secularist identity of the military-led state elites. As a result, one key constitutive 
(identity) dimension of security govemmentality (Islamism) is likely to disappear. 
The first section of the chapter argued that the secularist identity of the military-led state elites 
has continued to punctuate the perception of democratic politics and EU membership. In other 
words, the Kernalist-secularist state elites in general and the military in particular have viewed 
democratic politics and EU membership largely from a security-based outlook. In all, the 
latter view has declined to appreciate the help of democratic politics in recasting domestic 
problems in non-security logic and language. It has not fully embarked upon EU membership 
as a primarily political project, which is bent on changing the internal-political structures of 
the aspirant states through 'EU policy transfer'. According to the state elites, the issue of a 
fundamental change in Turkish politics-that would change the political power structure at 
their expense-could be avoided by construing the EU membership process as a security-based 
bilateral negotiation process. This, in their view, would only invest the country's 'material 
power sources' or invoking potential 'security contributions' to the EU security rather than 
embracing a different political logic and agenda. The chapter also argued that the main reason 
for - holding this - kind of perception 
in security governmentality stems chiefly Irom the 
military-led -state elites' reduction - of national and . intemational,, politics - to a sacrosanct 
security mentality and statist discourse. This standpoint of the state elites on the EU helps 
widen the rift with the Islamists (the AKP government). The 'Islamist' political actors are on 
the other hand anticipating different implications from EU membership. 
In the second section, the chapter explained that along with other factors, the dynamics of 
security govemmentality forced Islamist political opinion to change to the degree that it has 
acquired a different and more democratic political vision in keeping with a widespread 
yearning for EU membership. This change was crystallized in the formation of another 
'Islamist' party, namely the Justice and Development Party (AKP). After the banning of the 
Refah and Fazilet Parties by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and 2001 respectively, a 
modernist fraction within the movement gave birth to the AKP and its alternative political 
agenda. The AKP elites first had 'to withstand the legacy of Erbakan's radical provocations of 
the establishment [which led to] a crackdown that would pave the way for Tayyip Erdogan's 
rise' (Sontag, New York Times, 11 May 2003). The coming to power of the AKP in 2002 has 
been central in this transfon-nation process in that the AKP seems to have heralded a new 
political era for Turkey. This way, the AKP has ironically owed its formation to its veteran 
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cadres' initial confrontation with the secularists (Ayata, 2004: 244-8). Indeed, the change in 
Islamist identity is partly related to the workings of security governmentality. As explained in 
Chapter 5, their identity was initially premised in part upon security-based confrontations that 
are found between the Islamic and the secularist state forces. 
The chapter found that the politically unsettling identity dimension in security 
governmentality is rendered as increasingly superficial by the AKP's prudent and non- 
confrontational democracy discourse induced by the EU membership process. The chapter 
also noted that these changes are not only evident at the leadership level but also at the party 
organizational level. The political transformation brought from being a 'religious party' to a 
'conservative democratic party' has enabled the moderate Islamists under the AKP to 
accommodate the secular-democratic political system, which in turn helped transform their 
self-definition and clarify some of their policies on key issues. Hence, the changes in Islamic 
political identity have been based on the changing contours of the 'Islamist' discourse and 
policies that are successfully articulated by the AKP party elites and executed by the 
intermediary party officials. 
Overall, the change in Islamist political identity has produced a momentous effect on 
democracy discourse and even secularizing effects on the Islamist movement itself. This was 
attained first by diffusing the democratic discourse of the party elite down into the party 
organizational level; and secondly, by extracting the EU-oriented democratic political 
discourse for addressing the non-democratic deficiencies of security governmentality. This 
change in question was also established by the desires of the Islamist political party leadership 
and active members at the organizational level to make Turkey a member of the EU. In all, 
the EU membership process has helped the AKP to initiate process of a transformation both in 
the Islamist party politics, with implications in security governmentality. To such an extent 
that the AKP government is eager to go along with the EU reforms even after some leading 
EU member states have hardened their stance against Turkey's EU membership bid after the 
rejection of the EU constitution by French and Dutch voters, who also registered opposition to 
Turkey's membership (Watt, The Guardian, 03 September 2005, p. 14). 
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CONCLUSION 
The central question of this thesis has been the following: what is the nature of the 
relationship between state security and domestic politics in contemporary Turkey? The 
question has been addressed in three stages. Part I laid the conceptual and theoretical 
framework for studying state security in Turkey. It developed an analytical framework, 
gennane to Critical Security Studies and Foucault's concept of governmentality for 
investigating the relationship between state security and domestic political conduct. Part II 
used this framework to organize an analysis of the emergent regime of security practices or 
what I have called as 'security governmentality'. In particular, it analyzed the construction of 
security governmentality in relation to its basic dimensions: visibility, rationality, identity, 
and techniques. The aim was to show how the dimensions of security governmentality have 
come to frame the scope of political and personal conduct and shape the state's response to 
political challengers. The Turkish military is identified as the main agent of security 
governmentality by its capacity to define and respond to the 'domestic threat' of political 
Islam particularly 'posed' by the 'Islamist' Refah government since the mid-1990s and the 
'moderate Islamist' AKP government since the early 2000s. Finally, Part III explored the 
prospects of change in security governmentality with special respect to Turkey's ongoing EU 
membership process from 1999 to the present. It argued that security governmentality has 
faced a democratic political-discursive challenge and to experience a potential transformation. 
This challenge has been evident in the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership and 
articulated inside by the new strong AKP government. 
The conclusion broadly draws on Foucault's philosophy of criticism, namely his 'critical 
ontology of ourselves' (1984a: 46). The inquiries about a 'critical ontology of ourselves' are 
'quite specific in the sense that they always bear upon a material, an epoch, a body of 
determined practices and discourses' (Foucault, 1984a: 49). Hence, instead of regarding the 
presence of security governmentality as 'a moment for despair, emptiness, shallowness, 
fragmentation, nihilism ... millenarian rupture, final denouement or irreversible loss, the 
conclusion seeks to 'renew acquaintance with the present' by 'a permanent questioning of the 
present, an assault upon the ethical certainties' within security governmentality (Barry et al, 
1996: 6; Dean, 1999: 43-4). After briefly summarizing the main findings of Part 1,11, and 111, 
the conclusion is going further to explore two questions: 
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1. What are the consequences of security governmentality? And 
2. What are the prospects for a more democratic mentality and practice of politics in Turkey, 
which could accommodate the demands of socio-political actors such as those of Islamic 
persuasion for wider social and political recognition? In other words, how can a genuine 
transformation in security goverrimentality be possible? 
SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY IN TURKEY 
This thesis has argued that since the mid-1990s a set of security discourses and policies have 
granted state security institutions wide political latitude and that this has given rise to a degree 
of fusion between state security and domestic politics. Consequently, together with the 
attendant rationalities, identities and techniques, there has been a newfound political activism 
relating to security conceptions and institutions (most notably, the military). These politics of 
state security in turn have established a new style of governing in Turkey, which this thesis 
labelled as 'security goverrimentality'. After Foucault the thesis defined security 
governmentality as a regime of - government and state administration that is primarily 
undertaken by the -military-led state authorities and agencies, which employ an,. array. of 
techniques and forms of knowledge that seek to shape political and private conduct through 
the identities, aspirations and beliefs of the population. The thesis used security 
goverrimentality as a heuristic device to describe a de facto political regime, which has 
restricted and sometimes cancelled out the workings of democratic politics. Security 
governmentality is identified basically as the result of the military-led state elites' reduction of 
national politics to a static version of a sacrosanct Kemalist secularism and security based 
approach to domestic politics. For them state security and secularism are much higher values 
than democracy. Security govemmentality is constituted by four dimensions: visibilities, 
rationalities, techniques and identities. 
Visibilities of Secutity Governmentality 
Turkish state security discourses and practices have two major characteristics that have 
shaped security govemmentality. First there has been a historically constructed set of social, 
political, institutional and legal sources, whose primary aim is to save the secular state. 
Second, this set of factors has historically provided the military-led state elites with an 
enlarged political power and executive domain at the expense of elected governments. These 
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elites include the secularist military, state bureaucracies and the mainstream media. Amongst 
them, the military was identified as the main protagonist of security governmentality. It has 
been argued that the top brass of the military are 'the voice and conscience' of security 
governmentality and also 'wield a significant moral authority' (El-Affendi, 1997: 4). Since 
the mid-1990s, the visibility of increased political activism of the military has been realized in 
the name of state security. In the process, to exert non-democratic security control over 
domestic politics, the military has developed new security practices such as staging the post- 
modem military intervention in February 1997. This kind of military activism has produced 
an unconventional military interventionism into certain aspects of politics and society in the 
name of Turkish state security. Since the ir: iid-1990s therefore, it has become commonplace 
especially for the military and the National Security Council to take on the 'domestic threats' 
to the 'security of the secular state' allegedly posed by the parties with political Islamic roots. 
Rationalities of Security Governmentalify 
A key dimension of security governmentality concerns the rationalities of security 
govemmentality that have provided the primary ideological basis for the military 
interventions. These are brought together in the official state ideology of Kernalism, as -was 
argued in Chapter 3. Kemalism was initially formulated 'in response to the emerging needs of 
the modernization process and consists of principles such as nationalism and secularism, 
which can be seen as a rationalization to modernize' (Steinbach, 1984: 78). In particular, it 
was Kernalist secularism that came to constitute the heart of the contemporary rationality of 
Turkish state elites, especially that of the military and civilian bureaucracy (Yavuz, 2000a: 
33-4). Kernalist secularism is often seen as a 'secular experiment' in nation-building 
undertaken by the state elites, who want to marginalize the social and political authority of 
Islam and Islamic groups (Mardin, 1993; Yavuz, 2000a). Since 1997, however, secularism has 
been serving more than a modernization too] and instead has been seen especially by the 
Turkish military as a principle to ensure the 'political survival' for the state (Tachau and 
Heper, 1983: 17; Yavuz, 2000b; Dagi, 2005). 
More specifically, Kemalist secularism is understood as 'the independence of the state from 
religious rules' and is officially referred to as the 'issue of great significance in terms of our 
internal security' (Mite Paper-Defense, 1998: 14). Through its officially sanctioned 
discourses and practices, Kemalist secularism has been increasingly upheld as the 'inviolable' 
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principle of the republic, which, inter alia, situates any visible Islamic expression under the 
mantle of a 'security threat' to the state. A considerable range of religious expressions in this 
context is seen by key state elites as dangerous, adverse, inappropriate and irresponsible 
conduct by individuals and collectivities. The latter are seen as supposedly bent on destroying 
the secular Turkish state as it has developed. Revealingly, such security discourses and 
practices have been ascendant since 1996, when the Islamic political resurgence culminated in 
the formation of the first Islamist government in the history of the modem Turkish state. 
Since 1997, military-led state elites have redefined and broadened the threats to state security 
so as to include certain 'Islamic' domestic political actors as 'threats' (Salt, 1999: 72). For 
Turkey's military leaders, the 'number one' security threat to the state's existence is political 
Islam. The former spokesman for the Turkish General staff, General Erol Ozkasnak best 
summarized this view: 
Henceforth the number-one enemy of the state is filica ['reactionary' Islam]; that Irtica 
represents an even greater threat to Turkey than the PKK [Kurdish separatist 
guerillas];. and that the same diligence with which the armed forces are striving to 
eliminate the danger represented by the PKK will now be directed against the danger 
represented by Irtica ýquoted in Lowry, 2000: 46). 
Techniques of Security Governmentality 
The techniques of security governmentality exhibit an array of forms for military intervention 
into politics in the name of state security, as was argued in Chapter 4. Since the rnid-1990s the 
most effective institutional channel for the military's political involvement has been the 
national security concept, which was constitutionally designed to encompass a wide range of 
issues, and the institutions of NSC, whose constitutional functions were enlarged since the 
1980 military coup (Heper, 1990: 323; Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997). The NSC has been a strong 
lever for 're-equilibrating' democracy (i. e., strengthening the executive) according to the 
aspirations of the military (Heper, 1992b: 162). As argued in Chapter 4, the NCS has proved 
the most effective macro-technique at the service of the military in order to legalize/formalize 
its supervision of major external and internal political decisions (Heper, 1992b: 163; Insel, 
1997: 17). Since 1997, the great state concern over 'territorial integrity and national unity' has 
been the main discursive ammunition that the NSC employed against socio-political 
expressions of the Islamic life-world (Savvides, 2000). Crucially the securitizing moves of the 
military in this regard have been voiced through and made all the more efficient by the 
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dramatized coverage of the mainstream media, which have proved receptive of publicizing the 
issues securitized by the military (Kinzer, 2000; Yavuz, 2000b). The techniques in use have 
given rise to an unprecedented control of the military-led state elites over governments, such 
that it has become 'normal' for the military to monitor, display, boycott, and prosecute certain 
gnon-secular' socio-political actors and dispense with the 'Islamic capital' (Yavuz, 2000a; 
Gole, 1997a; Onis, 1997; 2001; Bugra, 1998; 2002). The interventions have included closing 
down Koranic courses run by various Islamic foundations (vakij), strictly regulating Imam- 
Hatip high schools curricula, putting under strict control the activities of Islamic NGOs and 
foundations and so on (Ayata, 2004). In short, through various techniques, the military 
sought to oblige both state institutions and even civil society associations to eradicate the 
publicly visible signs of 'Islamic threats' by and from themselves as evinced in the 
controversy surrounding the headscarf issue. 
Analyzing these confrontations helps sophisticate our understanding of the techniques in 
which state security helps establish power and control over the body politic. For instance, the 
study of identification via dress codes presents a valuable analytical avenue for advancing our 
understanding of the relationship between security and identity/appearances/images. 
Effectively, it is through such techniques that the secular establishment successfully exerts 
power over the society. 
Identities of Security Governmentality 
The identity dimensions in security governmentality revolve around two main expressions of 
identity, and the confrontational space these orientations produce, as was argued in Chapter 5. 
Identities in conflict involve the Kernalist secularism of state elites, and the Islamism of those 
who endorse an Islamic political identity. Specifically, the secularists are the military, much 
of state bureaucracy, certain civil society associations, bankers, a good deal of professors and 
journalists (Heper, 1997). The Islamic political identity, on the other hand, has found 
expression in the form of party politics (Yavuz, 2000a), but it also includes the cultural space 
in the form Islamic networks of communication through newspapers, books and television 
channels which together help constitute Islamic 'counter-elites' (Mardin, 1983: 139; Gole, 
1997a; 53-7; Howe, 2000: 4). These two identity orientations and the ensuing political 
confrontation between them feed in the relevant security discourse and contribute to security 
governmentality. Thus, according to the pre-set boundaries of politics in Turkey, the military 
keeps an upper-hand through its self-image and role to 'guard' the political system against the 
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'threat of politicization of Islam'. For instance and as was argued in more detail in Chapter 5, 
the Republican State Prosecutor Vural Savas took legal action in May 1997 by applying to the 
Constitutional Court for closing down the Refah party, basing his case on the allegations of 
the mainstream news-media against some of the party members' fiery discourses. The '28 
February Process' came about. One of the most significant aspects of this was that it denoted 
an ongoing process of confrontation and standoff between the military-dominated secularist 
(state) forces and pro-Islamist social forces, a process that in some measure continues to mold 
the basic contours of political life in Turkey (Civaoglu, Milliyet, 16 January 200 1, p. 17). 
Part III discussed the prospect of change in security governmentality especially under the light 
of the impending EU membership process. The central claim is that Turkey's security 
governmentality faces a vista of transformation because of its EU membership. Significantly, 
the latter requires Turkey to conform mainly to Copenhagen Political Criteria. Indeed, due to 
the latter, the Turkish state suddenly found itself at a political crossroads. The EU sought to 
canvas and forge a new consensus within Turkey for a more pluralist democratic polity to 
gradually replace rigid nationalist-secularist authoritarian security governmentality. 
Accordingly, EU membership norms and conditions began to 'weaken the grip of the state 
over political processes and [introduce] 'new' actors who challenge established approaches toi 
issues (such as cultural pluralism, linguistic rights or gender relations) that are considered 
"sensitive" by some' (Bilgin, 2005: 176). The skeptical standpoint of state elites on the EU- 
centered reform process and the pro-EU stance of the moderate-Islamist AKP government 
indicate that the two have different expectations from future EU membership. The most 
obvious paradox facing the governing state elites in their historical yearning for European 
identity and now full membership is that EU membership would potentially rectify 
undemocratic aspects of their hold on power (Keyder, 2003: 231; also see Piccoli, 2004). In 
order for the EU membership dream to come true; political elites have to respond the EU 
demands for full democratization and strive for building a more democratic plural polity. 
Changes in the Rationalities of Security Governmentality 
As argued in Chapter 6, the EU membership conditions are in contradiction with Turkey's 
'reason of state' aspect of rationality. Overall, the EU package includes a radical set of 
changes, which if successfully implemented might lead to a more liberal and pluralist political 
rationality at the expense of the national security oriented 'reason of state' rationality. Certain 
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key EU-led legislation that supports a more democratic political rationality in place of 'reason 
of state' rationality have been established, yet powerful resistance from the military and state 
bureaucracy remains hard to evade. These forces still control some of the influential 
techniques of security governmentality 
Changes in the Technical Dimensions of Security Governmentality 
As argued in Chapter 7, there are some significant changes resulting from the EU membership 
reform process have been in relation to the technical dimensions of security governmentality. 
This has been resulted in the curbing of the powers and functions of one of the strongholds of 
military power in the political decision-making process: the NSC. However, this successful 
transformation in the NSC has not been supplemented by changes in other techniques of 
security governmentality. The EU seems to have paid attention mainly to the certain forms of 
military power, such as the NSC. However, the issue is that the military's power is exercised 
not solely through these institutional channels though. Rather, the military makes use of a 
matrix of power relations. For instance, the national security concept covering a wide range of 
issue areas, remains to be changed and military's ability to decide (through the NSPD) the 
national security agenda is also left unchanged. Most significantly, the securitization of. 
domestic -politics by-the military and most crucially the role-the media plays in helping. 
securitize domestic political issues are two other unchanged techniques of security 
governmentality. So developments continue to point to the strength of the power wielded by 
the military in the political system even after Turkey secured official EU candidacy status in 
December 1999 
Changes in the Identities of Security Governmentality 
As argued in Chapter 8, since 1999 Islamist political identity has significantly changed, while 
the secularist identity of the military-led state elites has not. It can therefore be argued that the 
secularist identity of the military-led state elites still informs the state vision of democratic 
politics and EU membership (for a recent example of such a secularist vision see the Land 
Forces Commander General Hursit Tolon's warning against the threat of 'Islamists', Hurriyet, 
25 July 2005). The state elites in general and the military in particular continue to hold the 
view of domestic politics as largely based on secularist assessments. Meanwhile, the political 
limitations of security governmentality led the Islamist political grouping to change political 
agenda and discourse such that it has acquired a different and more democratic political vision 
in line with a yearning for EU membership. This change was crystallized in the fon-nation of 
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another party with Islamic roots, namely the Justice and Development Party (AKP). After the 
banning of the Refah and Fazilet Parties by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and 2001 
respectively, a modernist fraction within the movement gave birth to the AKP and its 
alternative political agenda (Laciner, 2001: 3-7). In other words, the AKP has ironically owed 
its formation to its cadres' initial confrontation with the secularists (Ayata, 2004: 244-8). The 
coming to power of the AKP in 2002 has been central in this transformation process. 
The change in Islamist political identity seems to be related to the workings of security 
governmentality particularly to its technical and identity dimensions. As explained in Chapter 
5, security-based confrontations between the Islamic and the secularist state forces have 
helped reshape Islamist identity representations at both the leadership and at the rank and file 
party levels. This is largely achieved first by diffusing the democratic discourse of the party 
elite down into the party organizational level, and secondly by using the EU-oriented 
democratic political discourse for addressing the non-democratic deficiencies of security 
governmentality. In return, the change from being a 'religious party' to a 'conservative 
democratic party'. has enabled the Islamists under the AKP to accommodate the secular- 
democratic political system, which in turn transformed their self-definition and clarifies some 
-of their policies. on key- issues., The changes in Islamic political. identity are based on the 
changing contours of the 'Islamist' discourse and policies that are successfully articulated by 
the AKP party elites and executed by the intermediary party officials. Hence, from the outset, 
the AKP employed a prudent and non-confrontational democracy discourse, which embraced- 
if not simply emulated-the secularist sensitivities of the state elites. The significant outcome 
for security governmentality of this change in Islamic political discourse is such that the 
identity confrontations staged often by the military against Islamist political elites are 
rendered increasingly superficial and one-sided. 
THE POLITICS OF SECURITY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
But what are the effects of security governmentality in Turkey? In order to better understand 
some of the effects of security governmentality in Turkey, first it might be useful to compare 
the latter with global traits of politics of security and the yawning chasm between security and 
liberty in some parts of world politics. The recent British political fallout in the aftermath of 
the 7nLondon terTor attacks offers a particularly interesting perspective since like the 
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Turkish case it relates to a complex relationship between a secular state and Muslim society 14 . 
On 5 of August 2005 the British PM Tony Blair issued '12 proposals', a set of radical security 
measures that aimed to restrict some of the civil liberties of the country's Muslim community, 
which led him to bluntly declare that 'the rules of the game are changing' (Cowell, The New 
York Times, 06 August 2005). While arguably containing some justifiable security measures 
against those who, 'preach terrorism' and/or 'advocate violence' against the UK, the British 
government's intended 'change' nonetheless involved a 'startling package of [security] 
measures [which] signaled a turning point in British post war liberalism' and the possibility of 
Britain going to 'renounce part of the European Convention on Human Rights' (Wintour, The 
Guardian, 06 August 2005, p. 1,4). The problem is that these new categories of delinquency 
(such as 'justifying or glorifying terrorism' against the 'British way of life' and the proposed 
clampdown on 'specific extremist websites, book-shops, centres, networks and particular 
organizations of concern') are either unjustifiably vague or needlessly adding to already 
existing 'race relations legislation' (The Guardian, 06 August 2005, p. 4,21). Besides, not 
only do these security measures tend to conflate 'the main causes of terror as its cure' by 
creating an -'us-them divide' within the community, they are also likely to knock back the 
long. ýestablished civil liberties such as extending the period of custody of suspects without. 
charge- beyond -two weeks, using -allegations of 'treason' and the proposed introduction of 
&secret courts with security cleared judges to hold pre-trial hearings' without the presence of 
the accused (Travis, 77ze Guardian, 10 August 2005, p. 8; Klein, The Guardian, 13 August 
2005, p. 20; Yaquub, BBC-NEWS 24 HARD Talk, 17 August 2005). 
It is tempting to suggest that there appear some similarities between these developments and 
measures introduced through security governmentality thinking in Turkey particularly on the 
issue of the securitization of the politics of fear of Islam (Werbner, 2005: 5-9). Blair's '12 
proposals' may recall the Turkish NSC's '28 February' security measures (see Appendix 1) 
taken in the aftermath of Islamist takeover of the government in 1997, which aimed to 
safeguard Kernalist secularism and prevent divisions in the body politic. Undeniably, as in the 
Turkish case, such draconian measures (earlier institutionalized in the US under the 'USA 
Patriot Act') do suggest that there has been an increasing securitization of politics (of Islam) 
in Britain and the EU (Gervasio and Volpi, 2005) and an emergent imbalance between 
14 Surely, this is not to claim that the recent British experience represents a similar case of 'security 
governmental ity'. Instead, here the aim is just to better understand the differences incurred by Turkey's security 
governmentality. 
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security and liberty (Williams, The Guardian, 10 August 2005, p. 19). However, it would 
need a stretch of imagination to liken such post-7/7 security measures to what Turkey has 
experienced in terrns of the relationship between security and liberty in security 
governmentality in the last decade. This would be the case for two reasons. First, Blair's 
proposed measures are for the 'security of the people', whereas in the Turkish case, the 
discourses and practices have been put forward for the security of the state and particularly its 
secularist principle. That is, Turkish state secularism as an ideology is the primary referent 
object of security, not the people. Second and as this thesis showed, the securitization of 
politics and the chronic imbalance between security and liberty within security 
governmentality has been quite different in content and form than its British counterpart. For 
instance, -unlike their Turkish counterparts-the British political elites seem not so easily 
willing to consent to such governmental securitization attempts and are likely to reject such 
'half-baked' moves to use the words of a respected former Home Secretary (BBC2 Newsnight, 
08 August 2005; also see Nfichael Howard, The Daily Telegraph, 10 August 2005, p. 1,22). 
Thirdly, unlike the Turkish legal and constitutional endorsement of such undemocratic 
security discourses and practices, there are impending legal pitfalls in the UK that will likely 
get in the way of-these newfound security offences being implemented in the courts (The 
-Independent, II -August 2005; p. 1; 2). Indeed, Blair's radical security measures are openly 
challenged by the judiciary to such an extent that one editorial immediately ridiculed the 
drafting of these security measures as 'a job creation scheme for the Society of Unemployed 
Human Rights Lawyers' (The Guardian, 06 August 2005, p. 21). 
Most apparently though, whereas it is the Turkish military that attempts to securitize domestic 
politics and cramp the democratic and peaceful solution of conflicts, in the UK it is Blair's 
governmental securitization attempts that threaten to set back established human rights 
regimes. Consequently, the talk of 'change in the rules of the game' by the Blair government 
does not come near such changes wrought by Turkey's security governmentality, notably the 
overturning of a cardinal rule of democratic politics: civilian supremacy over the military 
(Cizre, 1997,2003; Savvides, 2000). The latter principle of democratic politics has indeed 
been a raw nerve in Turkish politics to such a degree that observers often point out that 
'military commanders still call the shots in Turkish politics' (Doxey, 1997: 12; Salt, 1999; 
Cizre, 2004). In brief, the present thesis has showed what can happen when a close 
association between security and politics occurs, and there is a real change in 'the rules of the 
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game' of democratic politics and an ominous setback in civil liberties. Such effects are 
summarized in the following five propositions. 
CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY 
1. Security governmentality has obstructed democratic politics. 
Although Turkey's experience in democracy has often been in a parlous state since its 
inception in 1946, 'the poverty of Turkish democracy' has become particularly more palpable 
in the post-Cold War era (Gulalp, 1999: 35-59). Contrary to widespread expectations, global 
norms of democracy have fallen short of flourishing and taking root in Turkey. During the 
1990s Turkey's integration with global 'turbo-capitalism' has intensified, but political and 
civil rights based on non-ethnic, civic, non-populist citizenship failed to make an effective 
entry into the state (Caglar, 1997: 3749; Gulalp, 1997b). Instead, freedom of expression has 
often been cramped, human rights abused and the very basic rules of democratic politics have 
often been violated by state security authorities (Salt, 1999; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115-129). 
In the name of state.. security, the military-led state elites have exhibited a certain degree of 
mistrust toward the institutions of pluralist democratic politics such as political parties, the 
Parliament, NGOs,, interest groups, associations, organized social movements and so on (for 
such an elite view, see Savas, 2001a, 2001b; Ilhan, 2002; Yazicioglu, 2004). They have 
upheld a vision of politics that 'recalls Plato's government by guardians, who personified the 
essence of the public interest and the approved [Kemalist] ideology' (Heper, 1984: 93). 
The most pressing effect of security governmentality on democratic politics has been the fact 
that the public and even private matters could easily be securitized and the political space 
could be emptied of societal demands due to the (media savvy) security language utilized by 
the military. Specifically, the articulation of different identities and lifestyles in the public 
sphere has been seen to be dangerous by the military-led state elites, who view politics as 'as 
a process of guiding political development and engineering a new society' and who believe 
the public display of cultural diversity will under-mine 'the Kernalist vision of ideal secular 
society' (Yavuz, 2000a: 34). Consequently, while the formal institutions of democracy have 
indeed been established in Turkey (Heper, 1992b; Stepan and Anderson, 2004), the genuine 
and full political participation within security governmentality has been restricted mostly to 
those who subscribe to Kemalist nationalist-secularism. This in turn reveals politics in Turkey 
to be an empty vessel without public presence, or more correctly devoid of any genuine 
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expression of diverse cultural, ethnic, religious or ideological interests (Salt, 1999). What 
instead tends to replace the normal political process in Turkey has been the officially 
sanctioned ideological discourse of state security (Bayramoglu, et a], 2004: 9). It is also in this 
context that the nationalist discourses are deployed against discourses informed by Kurdish 
ethno-cultural expressions for recognition (Bayramoglu, 2004: 37). Overall, the confrontation 
between state and social identities has often been disguised in a security language articulated 
by the military in line with the dominant political rationalities described in Chapter 3. 
2. Security governmentality has accentuated the Turkey's 'double-headed political system ý 
The politics of security governmentality has led to two parallel regimes of practice on the 
level of the executive (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997: 157). The political regime has comprised a 
democratically elected parliament and an elected government with a civilian council of 
ministers. The security regime has consisted of unelected military-led state elites along with 
the National Security Council. The political regime has considerable responsibilities and yet 
little power, whereas the military regime has vast powers and yet few responsibilities. As 
regards to the relations between the two regimes, the chronic mistrust in the political class 
informs the state elites' actions (Heper, 1992b: 147)., On many issues Lhat matter for the 
governing of-the state ranging from the appointment of constitutional court judges to critical 
foreign policy decisions such as the Cyprus Question the military-led state elites have the 
final say. In these matters, many governments have continued to 'dance to the tune of the 
TGS [the military]' (Lowry, 2000: 50). As such, Turkey's current imbalance of civil-military 
relations is in part a consequence of security governmentality. This has been so because the 
military arbitrarily defined the domestic security threats to state secularism and was able to 
determine the 'appropriate' responses to them by bypassing normal democratic political 
procedures (Savvides, 2000). State security now is perceived by the military-led state elites 
&as a question of internal stability challenged by the implosion of religious upsurgeg a view 
strengthened by the 'moderate-Islamist' AKP' s electoral victory in 2002 (Cizre, 2003: 229). 
In sum, state security discourse has been utilized in many instances 'to legitimize the need for 
a military role in civilian affairs' and 'to prioritize the indivisible and secular character of the 
regime as more important than the need for democratic reform' (Cizre, 2003: 214). 
3. Security governmentality has significantly enhanced the political profile of the military. 
The military has historically been a politically autonomous institution 'unbeholden to society 
and to civilian rule' (Yavuz, 2000a: 34). The military's upper-hand in politics derived in no 
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small part from its socially sanctioned 'moral authority' especially over 'Turkey's male 
population, who have been extensively socialized into an unconditional support for the 
military values through compulsory military service' (Cizre, 2003: 217). The military has 
traditionally been apprehensive of pluralist democratic politics. For the military, democratic 
politics is permitted as long as it serves as 'a means of preserving and promoting the state' 
(Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997: 156). In this context, it is argued that 'the past 40 years make it 
clear that the court of last resort in Turkish politics is not the ballot box but the military' (Salt, 
1999: 72). Over time, the military excelled its interventionist political power with a 'ratchet 
effect' from its non-democratic legal capacity conferred to it mostly after the coups d'etat. As 
a result, for the military, it has become a legal duty to define and act upon domestic security 
threats in the capacity of a guardian and vanguard institution. This legal capacity has been 
extended to the NSC and the military itself by the NSC law of 1983 until 2001 when this law 
was amended under EU pressure. 
The secularist military in security governmentality have reproduced an ontological and 
strategic. discourse and political space at the expense of democratic politics by means of 
countering any contestant that is bent on challenging 'the secular natur-e of the state' as: was 
argued in Chapter 4. In the process, it remains likely that -the most, visible agent of the 
secularist bloc, namely the military, 'will not tolerate even relative minor infractions of its 
definition of secularism' (Jenkins, 2003: 61). Any contestation thereof is likely to yield new 
security-based confrontational spaces that would serve as key constitutive elements of 
security governmentality. This in turn can trigger a 'politics of fear' and might lead, if deemed 
necessary, even to the toppling of governments in power by 'the military-led-media 
campaigns'; this was the case in the 'post-modem coup' of 1997. Unlike its predecessor 
Refah and Fazilet parties, the AKP has so far largely remained reserved and declined to 
spearhead such a confrontation with the military (and the media) that might have grown 
concerns over 'the secular nature of the state'. As explained in Chapter 5, past experiences 
have thought us that any challenge to the latter spawns a public call by the secularist media, a 
call which is most enthusiastically responded by the military by interfering into politics. 
4. Security governmentality has generated novel techniques of intervention into the political 
andpersonal conduct. 
As shown in Chapter 4, during the 1997 military intervention against 'the threats of political 
Islam' security governmentality has come to embody much newer techniques of civilian- 
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military relations. Here, the novelty lies in the formation of distinct channels through which 
state security discourses and practices enable the military-led state elites to effectively 
interfere into politics. That is, the military itself has come to the point that it is no longer keen 
on deploying its well-rehearsed military coups to topple serving governments (Interview with 
Prof. Metin Heper, Zaman, 12 August 2004). Governments in power are given a freedom of 
action in their policy-making but this freedom of action is in turn closely monitored and 
controlled (Cizre, 2003: 222-3). The military has formulized a constitutional-legal backing for 
monitoring the Turkish political life that lessens the need to intervene directly into politics 
(Heper, 1992b: 163; Jenkins, 2001). Whenever the governmental agenda does not conform to 
state security concerns, then the General Staff of the Armed Forces puts into use ever-more 
sophisticated methods of intervention: to give examples, first, it leads potent public- 
campaigns in order to galvanize powerful societal elites and to put pressure on the 
governments mainly on the grounds that the 'domestic threats' such as the political Islam 
looms large (Lowry, 2000: 49). Such methods, secondly, included organizing numerous press- 
briefings Ooined by judicial personnel, officials from many other state institutions and 
prominent journalists and even civil society organizations) with a view to projecting the ruling 
-parties or certain social groups as- 'reactionary- Islamic threats' to the state survival -'(Salt, 
-- 74-5; -2). -As argued in Chapter-4, these press-briefings have in turn _1999: Kinzer, 2001: 21 
been frantically covered by the mainstream media that helped heap vitriol upon Islamic public 
displays. 
It is true that since the EU-induced reform process has got underway, the power of the NSC 
has been curtailed down by increasing the number of the civilian politicians within that body 
and also by declaring constitutionally its decisions 'only recommendational' to the cabinet. 
However, this development failed to signal the end of the military's upper hand in domestic 
politics (Hurriyet, 29 July 2005; also see Tank, 2005). Without the NSC's institutionally 
enabling and empowering capacity, the military is likely to consider other techniques at its 
disposal, such as the unchanged national security concept and its scripting of the NSPD. 
Moreover, the military can as well resort to other channels such as the visual and print media 
for its securitizing moves. When, for instance, the security of the state was to be invoked as a 
political act against the moves of the government in power, it was not simply done through 
institutional routine. Instead, the military effectively incorporates 'functional securitizing 
actors' such as the media on its behalf, indeed as it mobilized the secularist mainstream media 
to generate public opinion. In short, the military's interventionist attitude here is related to the 
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media savvy techniques through which it stages its politics. The military often enmeshes the 
media-fuelled anxiety with 'the security of the state', which often interrupts the functioning of 
4normal politics' due to the removal of certain issues from the political realm and put them 
under the security-military logic and expertise. This array of techniques is well supported by a 
socially and historically produced consent and legitimacy granted to the military as an 
institution (Demirel, 2004a). 
Consequently, some techniques of security governmentality in Turkey are likely to remain 
intact. The lack of scrutiny by the EU on the securitization technique is a case in point. 
Securitization circumvents shrewdly democratic control over the military's interventionist 
attitude into the political sphere. In order to reach out to a more democratic system of 
governmentality the institutional and procedural roadmaps designed by the EU about the role 
of the military in politics should be supplemented, with an effort to rectify other military 
techniques including primarily securitization. If these techniques checked and balanced, 
society will be better equipped with alternative strategies for more pluralist democratic rule. 
5. Overall, securitygovernmentality has produced an 'authoritarian governmentality ', that 
empowered military-led state elites, who. regarded. 'the security of the state! as an effective' 
political schemefor the repression of the domestic dissent. 
For long, the unelected state elites have inhibited the development of a socially and culturally 
responsive and politically accountable pluralist democratic regime. Instead, an all- 
encompassing national security politics was established, which endorsed socio-cultural 
homogeneity over diversity, empowered the state over society and privileged the military over 
parliamentary politics. This in turn trapped the country into enduring political crises and 
economic inequalities and the overall result was a failure of transition from an anachronistic 
and superficial secularist-nationalist state ideology to contemporary liberal democracy. The 
ensuing national security politics has in turn led to a political system which imagined certain 
segments of the citizenry as 'the enemy of the state', hence upsetting any prospect for a 
pluralistic democratic political community. Over the years and despite all the efforts of the 
republican state-making elite, security goverrimentality has not delivered 'political security' 
for the military-led state elites. Nor has it signalled the end of the 'domestic threat' 
construction to the 'state survival', as state security discourses and practices hold fast and 
jaundiced (for instance see, 'A Word of Warning against Moderate Islam by President Sezer, 
NTVMSNBC, 7 April 2005). This was mainly because the authoritarian mentality of security 
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governmentality either denied the multiplicity of the governed (i. e., Kurdish, Islamist etc. ) or 
rejected them to incorporate to the political center. Instead, their participation has been 
restricted to the political periphery. Having securitized most of the multi-ethnic and/or multi- 
cultural-religious demands as 'threats to the state survival', the political and social space has 
been occupied by a set of stringent secularist-nationalist practices played out by different state 
institutions. The ensuing political void not only disciplines the way through which the 
discourse of dissent might be articulated but also provides a platform for the state elites to 
reproduce their exclusionary mentality of governing, unitary authority and power. 
Hence, security governmentality breeds a politics of fear in which key socio-political actors 
with potential democratic leanings, including the serving governments, are made less capable 
because they are named as 'domestic threats'. In addition to the robust policy effects, the 
basic outcome of security governmentality reveals itself as an anachronistic secularist, 
security-stricken political order, which is congruent neither with the state's superfluous 
commitment with the widely-held norms of liberal democracy, free market capitalism and nor 
with its long-lasting desire and struggle to become a member of the European Union. 
THE -IDEAL, OF - EU MEMBERSHIP: TOWARD A- TRANSFORMATION- JN' 
SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY? 
Despite all these misgivings, security governmentality has recently come to face a prospect of 
erosion-in particular in its identity dimension-because the EU membership procedure has 
signalled the need for a drastic change in the political mentality of rule in Turkey. Although 
the EU-induced process of change has so far been uneven across the dimensions of security 
governmentality, the transformative impact of the EU membership bid has nonetheless been 
perceptible (Aktar, 2002: 21-4). So much so that the former Enlargement Commissioner, 
Gunter Verhaugen, expressed his amazement about the pace of the political change in Turkish 
politics by stating 'I have never seen in my life such a desire to change' and then he observed 
that the EU enlargement is remarkably transforming the Turkish society and politics (TV 
Interview with Gunter Verhaugen, BBC-News 24 Hard Talk, 16 May 2005). As he suggests at 
stake is a potentially radical transformation of Turkey's understanding and practice of politics 
by means of Copenhagen political criteria (Cizre, 2003). Because security govemmentality 
has run down the political-normative ideal of democratic society in which all can share and/or 
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participate, Turkey's membership bid for the EU appears more promising than simply a 
membership status. 
Indeed, since 1999 and in line with Copenhagen criteria Turkey has embarked upon a series 
of reforms aiming to close the existing gap between its political system and the one 
envisioned by the EU. This has troubled Turkey's security govemmentality in that EU 
reforms have begun to sever the structure, cohesion and legitimacy of security 
govemmentality. The most apparent EU-induced paradox has been that involving the 
constitutive rationality of security governmentality, namely the will to 
Europeanize/Westernize Turkey appears to be in contrast with other dimensions of security 
govemmentality. For instance, such techniques of military intervention as the National 
Security Council have been a target for the EU democratic reform package (Buzan and Diez, 
1999: 46; Keyder, 2003: 23 1). 
In contradistinction to the EU induced reforms, however, the military-led state elites have yet 
to admit the necessity of recasting domestic problems in a non-security logic and language 
and respond accordingly. They therefore defy the reception of EU membership as a primarily 
political project" which is quite openly bent on changing the internal-political structures of the 
aspirant states through 'EU policy transfer' or otherwise (see for such a view see Ilhan, 2002: 
15-7; Manisali, 2002: 183-192; Yazicioglu, 2004: 44). According to the state elites, the issue 
of change in Turkish politics should and could be avoided by avoiding the 'dangers of' EU 
membership process as a security-based bilateral process (Kardas and Kucuk, 2003: 12-20), 
which, in their view, would only necessitate using the country's 'material power sources' or 
invoking potential 'security contributions' rather than embracing a different political logic and 
agenda (Bilgin, 2005). 
In addition, as the present thesis argued, security governmentality has exhibited a complex 
structure of politics of security, which could hardly be wholly rectified simply by passing the 
related reforms to the institutional and legal effects. Despite immense efforts of the pro-EU 
actors to adopt the related reforms, the civilian authorities and governments-including the 
AKP government-still find it difficult to implement their supervisory functions over the 
military activities in practice such as the formulation of national security policy and its 
implementation or the fuller control of the defense budget (Bayramoglu, 2004: 108-116). 
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As to the EU side, it should be noted that the former has not been fully attentive to some of 
the techniques of security governmentality. That is, the EU seems to only have an 
'institutionally biased legal-procedural' diagnosis of the civil-military relations in Turkey, and 
its remedies demonstrate a lack of proper understanding of the role the military plays and the 
techniques it employs in Turkey's political system (Cizre, 2004). In other words, although the 
EU seems to be acutely aware of the necessity of delimiting the military's role in politics, it 
has so far been ineffective to fully curb the political clout of the military. Indeed, the 
military's political profile has not been evaded yet since 'Turkey's status as an official 
candidate for EU membership has, if anything, prompted the military to become more deeply 
involved in politics as it strives to ensure that legislative changes to fulfill the Copenhagen 
criteria do not jeopardize its perception of national security' (Jenkins, 2001: 84). As the EU 
Commission's representative Hansjorg Kretschmer in Turkey warned, 'the military is still 
very effective in the ruling of the country [and this] constitutes an obstacle in the national 
adoption process for the membership' (Hurriyet, 29 July 2005). Indeed, this is especially the 
case with respect to in regard to the securitization technique that at times continues to be 
facilitated and executed by the mainstream media. As argued in Chapter 4, securitization is a 
technique that -diminishes democratic control over the military's interventions into domestic 
-political space. As, Pinar Bilgin argues -in- relations- -to the securitization of pofitics, : the 
military's command of 'security speak' is so prevalent in domestic politics that: 
[s]o long as the military is the major actor in shaping the contours of national security, 
its role in Turkish politics is likely to remain central. This is because, given the 
influence of the term 'security' has on peoples' thinking and practices, those who have 
the power to define what national security means in a given context also have the 
power to shape political processes (2005: 195). 
Consequently, without de-securitizing issues of domestic politics, the EU conditions about the 
removal of the military from politics are hardly likely to be achieved. The institutional and 
procedural roadmaps designed by the EU about the role of the military in politics should be 
supplemented with vigourous efforts to address the consequences of the securitization 
technique. Then Turkish politics can be better equipped with alternative strategies and 
political resources for a more pluralist democratic rule. 
Overall though, it can be argued that thanks to the EU reform process the state elites are put in 
a political dilemma either to 'quit or commit' in their attempts to become a full EU member 
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state. In fact Turkey is either to choose to follow the new European post-Cold War security, 
identity and socio-political architecture (i. e., the EU) and thus at least reforrn the two 
founding components of its political rationality: secularism and reason of state. Or 
alternatively, it could stick to the rigid interpretation of those two principles and perhaps 
forget about the membership. 
In short, the dream of becoming an EU member seemed to have turned into a nightmare for 
the governing elites. For the state elites the EU membership has become not only a defining 
historical moment, but also one of the most fundamental political dilemmas in its modem 
history. If Turkey quits its historic membership bid by not allowing political and cultural 
rights to its citizens, it will possibly stay forever out of the EU. If, however, Turkey remains 
committed to and implements EU political conditionality, then, the EU membership looks set 
to yield an agonizing transformation of its firmly entrenched political rationalities and 
techniques within security govemmentality. For, the EU requires the Turkish state to give up 
on its unbridled security discourses and practices and instead full-heartedly implement the EU 
reforms. 
Democracy and Security Governmentalily -II -ý, -! :-. 
Some of the popular representations both from the inside and the outside of Turkey do not 
sufficiently reveal or account for the complexities of the Turkish polity, and instead accord to 
various self-ascribed ideological representations of the Turkish state (Kasaba, 1997: 30-3; 
Migdal, 1997: 252-9). Such representations often 'have the ability to close off different 
meanings' about the country (Stone, 1998: 3). One such closed-off meaning for Turkish 
democracy concerns the understudied role of the military in Turkish politics, though we are 
continuously reminded at least by the ongoing interventions of the military into politics that 
the military is the Achilles heel for democracy and that the possibility of another military 
coup is always present (Ahmed, 1993; Jenkins, 2003) and that 'the military is able to 
intervene at will in politics' (Candar, 1999: 140). The president of Turkey's 'Human Rights 
Association' Husnu Undul believes that 'You can say Turkey is moving towards democracy 
but it is not a democratic country' (quoted in Hughes, European Voice, May 2004: 20). 
Clearly then, those accounts that succumb to such uncritical representations of the country 
should be carefully unpacked. For the questions about Turkey's future politics go well beyond 
such questionable and alarmist declarations of the collapse of 'secularism' under the 
immanent threat of 'Islamic fundamentalism'. In this line, this thesis has attempted to explain 
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the involvement of the military in politics from a perspective of security governmentality. It 
argues that Turkey's 'established democracy' (Heper, 1992b: 144) or 'electoral democracy' 
(Anderson and Stepan, 2004) remains under the tutelage of the military-led state elites with an 
official ideology of 'secularist Jacobinism' and that authoritarian tendencies within security 
governmentality continue. What is the state of democracy in Turkey then? 
Particularly in the 1990s the various political and economic crises gave rise to a shattered 
credibility of state security discourses and practices (Yavuz, 2000a: 33-4). In this period, the 
Turkish political system has been marked by a sporadic 'legitimacy crisis' in the Habermasian 
sense of the term (Savvides, 2000). As to the understanding of democratic politics, these 
crises have had a bearing on the people's conventional take on democracy for which 
'democracy is equated with populism practiced through clientelistic networks, which often 
requires the bending of rules and laws to distribute the benefits' (Kalaycioglu, 2001: 67). This 
perception is obviously detrimental to the prospect of a healthy construction of civilian 
supremacy over non-civilians (Stepan, 1988; Heper and Aylin, 1996; Ozbudun, 2000; Cizre, 
2004). The civilian empowerment over the non-civifians is an important aspect of 
consolidation of democracy (Onis and Keyman, 2003: 106), and as such can help as an 
efficient route for democratizing security governmentality. This would be so because the 
. 
'percei. ved political integrity on the part of political actors is indispensable for a viable 
democracy to flourish' as opposed to the upper-hand of non-democratic actors (Heper and 
Toktas, 2003: 178). 
Having stressed its importance, it is necessary to also note that nominally civilian forces 
sometimes acted irreverently towards democratic politics, contributing to the strengthening of 
security governmentality. For example, some civilian forces in the mainstream media have 
served as 'functional securitization actors' by representing some controversial anti-democratic 
or anti-secularist remarks in a security language such that the military could draw upon them 
in taking 'action', which in turn only helped 'lock the political arena into a civil war 
atmosphere' (Bayramoglu, 2001: 160-2; Akpinar, 2001: 166-78). In the face of such a 'civil 
war atmosphere', other self-proclaimed civil society groups subsequently carried the claim 
that 'they count on the army to intervene "to save democracy"-a strange conception of 
democracy to be sure' (Norton, 2003: 29). They acted like the 'deputies' of the military in the 
production of 'spontaneous consent given by the great masses' (Gramsci, 1971: 12). In the 
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second half of the 1990s, in fact, certain influential civil society groups participated in 
discursive battles alongside with the non-civilian secularist elites of security governmentality 
such as the military to topple the elected Islamist Refah Party from government by the means 
of 'post-modem coup' in June 1997 and the subsequent '28 February process' (Ayata, 2004: 
244). 
The sluggish civilian support notwithstanding, the effective impact of continuing local and 
global democratizing political forces (the parties having a stake in democratic politics and the 
EU) at the heart of the political system has been a helping factor in the de-militarization of 
democratic politics. These political actors are helping rebuild 'the missing dimension of trust' 
in political institutions and politicians, which can play a direct role in disaggregating trust in 
the military in the system (Cizre, 1999: 15; Cizre, 2003; Demirel, 2004b). The AKP 
leadership and active party organization seem to be aware of this and might help change the 
widespread public distrust of politicians for the better by altering the perceptions of the people 
towards the actors in security governmentality (Interviews with the party officials, August 
2004, Istanbul; also see Hughes, European Voice, May 2004: 20). Indeed, a recent poll 
indicaies'a swift change in this direction. A study by Izmir Dokuz Eylul University 
International Strategic Research Education and Counseling Center on social trends conducted 
in November 2003 (after one year of the AKP government) has revealed some striking 
attitude changes in public towards politics in general and state institutions in particular. A 
year before, surveys had revealed political parties being ranked sixth in terms of public 
confidence and trust in the government ranked eighth. Later public confidence in politics has 
grown, with political parties rising to third place. However, confidence in the law seemed to 
have waned, with the judiciary dropping to eighth place. Universities, on the other hand, were 
at the bottom of the list. This is how the participants in the survey voted, in order of most to 
least confidence: the presidency; the Turkish Armed Forces; political parties; the government; 
the parliament; civil society organizations; the judiciary; and universities (Zaman, 17 
November 2003). If this trend continues to get hold in Turkish society then the prospect of a 
stable democracy is likely to grow (Heper, 2005; Kubicek, 2005). 
What then about the relationship between Islamic political actors and democracy? Unlike the 
Turkish secularist state elites, the idea of 'marriage between Islam and Democracy' is 
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basically shared by scholars (Panel Discussion, BBC4,15 September 2005). Regarding Islam- 
democracy interaction in Turkey, Metin Heper observed that: 
A marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be consummated if the 
radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and set of values 
upon the Islamists, and if the latter do not undermine by word or deed the basic tenets 
of the secular democratic state in Turkey (1997: 45). 
Arguably, then there will be the issue of practicing democratic politics. It seems possible to 
argue that when such a 'marriage between Islam and Democracy' together with making 
'peace with the military' is achieved; then the potential effects are likely to dwindle of the 
anti-political securitization technique of security governmentality. Yet, de-securitization of 
the political order could only be a starting point if the aim is not only to dispense with the 
authoritarian politics of security governmentality but also to change the existing power 
structures. Indeed, a mere de-securitization can hardly ever dismantle the underlying grids of 
power relations embellished within security governmentality. For without such an alternative 
democratic political vision, it is always possible to fall back on Turkey's traditional 
underlying power relations characterized in security governmentality. 
But how can de-securitization of Turkey's politics constrained by the exigencies of security 
governmentality relate to a more pluralist democratic regime of government? From a security 
governmentality perspective applied here to the case of Turkey, it can be noted that the 
securitization theory of the 'Copenhagen School of Security Studies' does not go far beyond 
pointing out alternative democratic political orders (cf. Williams, 2003). It remains rather 
quite on the issue of establishing an alternative politics once de-securitization is achieved 
(Personal Correspondence with Jeff Huysmans, November 2004). Secondly, in the process of 
de-securitizing issues, the Copenhagen School follows Ernesto Laclau's take on 'the 
political', which helps challenge securitizations or other 'taken-for-grantedness of social 
relations' through 'the sphere of choice and contestation by politicization' (Buzan et al., 1998: 
143,161, ft 2). This is an important and helpful approach, however, the underlying 
assumption of the state for the Copenhagen School remains that of the liberal tradition of the 
6strong state' (Smith, 1991: 325-39; Buzan et al., 1998: 146) as opposed to the conception of a 
strong state which is associated with the strength of the executive over the legislative (Dyson, 
1980). Here the problem is that for the Copenhagen School, the securitizing actor within a 
'strong [liberal] state' would be almost exclusively the political elite or 'the government', 
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which 'acts only as the legitimate agent of the nation-state and that its claims are subject to 
public scrutiny and are open to questioning' (Buzan et al., 1998: 146). Whereas for such 
6strong states' as Turkey (Heper, 1991) the securitizing agency may be may located in some 
other state institutions like the military or other branches of state bureaucracy. Securitizing 
discourse may well stem from the authoritarian political tendencies of the military rather than 
the government (Heper, 1991; 1992b: 144-5). This gap in understanding of different 
securitization practices arguably derives from the Copenhagen School's 'definition of the 
political' which resides in a rather conventional take on 'the [liberal] state' as they might 
gwant to retain the Weberian ring to the "politics" of the political sector' (Buzan et al., 1998: 
143). However tenable, this vision of politics risks remaining only in a non-political de- 
securitization level, because as Aradau argues, 'Deprived of political commitment, 
desecuritization can only be a relatively sterile tool, unfit for acting upon the world and 
"transforming prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they 
are organized... (2004: 390). 
From a security governmentality perspective proposed and - developed in this thesis, 
securitization- is only one -part of the overall structure of security governmentallity. 
Consequently, security governmentality should be addressed in its full capacity. At least in. the 
case of Turkey we can better disengage the dynamics of politics of security by making 'the 
definition of the political a question rather than an assumption' (Krause and Williams, 1997: 
xi). Therefore, if de-securitization is to be moved beyond being a 'sterile tool', the 
transformative potential of politics with an interest in 'human emancipation' needs to be 
invoked (Booth, 1999; Wyn Jones, 1999: 153). This concern would be necessary so as to 
spearhead alternative political struggles for 'transforming prevailing social and power 
relationships and the institutions into which [e. g. security governmentality] are organized' 
(Cox, 1986: 208). Then, in the Turkish context, there is also a need for both a re- 
conceptualization of the political and the radicalization of democracy (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985). This could lay the groundwork for the practical issue of the much-needed 
'consolidation of democracy' for overcoming the problems of security governmentality. 
Otherwise, the full potential of transformation through the EU membership might yet filter 
out. In other words, Turkey's EU membership bid has tossed security governmentality into 
the air; how things actually settle afterwards, however, is up to the people on the ground. A 
more pluralist democratic political order will not come about simply by EU membership. It 
has to be fought for and won. And that process is underway. 
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APPENDIX I 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS (THE 28 FEBRUARY 
DECISIONS), 28 FEBRUARY 1997 
1. Secularism is a founding principle of the Republic' Constitution, the fourth of its 
irrevocable articles. It must be protected scrupulously and with great care. In order to do so, 
the existing laws of the Republic must be applied without exception. If the present laws are 
inadequate, they must be revised. 
2. As is required by the [original Republican] law for the unification of education [Tevhid-i 
Tedrisat], private hostels, trusts and schools with links to tarikats must be transferred to the 
control of state organs acting under the supervision of the National Education Ministry. 
3. The still-forming minds of younger generations must be made aware of the Republic, of 
Ataturk, of love for country and nation, and of the aim of the Turkish nation to rise to the 
level of contemporary civilization. They must be protected from the nefarious influence of 
various centres of activity. Accordingly, (a) Eight years' continuous education must be 
, 
instituted throughout the whole country. (b) if a family so decides, children who have 
completed this education may attend Koran courses. The necessary administrative and 
legislative changes must be made for these courses' activities so that they [are removed from 
responsibility of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and] come under he responsibility and 
control of the Ministry of Education. 
4: Those of -our national education -institutions charged with the responsibility to produce 
enlightened. men Qfý Feligion joyal to Ataturk's principles, to the revolution and to - the AtepUbliC', rriu§t'rha"i'main an ethos appropriate to the' secular 'essence of the law f6r the 
unification of education. 
5. Religious foundations under construction in various parts of the country must not be made 
the subject of political exploitation and kept on the agenda in order to present and reinforce a 
message to certain groups. If there is a genuine need for these foundations, they must be 
realized by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, who will examine the situation and co- 
ordinate with the relevant authorities and local administrators. 
6. The tarikats prohibited by existing law number 677, and all the activities declared 
proscribed in that law must be brought to an end. Their threat to democratic society, and the 
political and social laws governing the social order, must be impeded. 
7. Some media groups have been exploiting the fact that personnel are being ejected from the 
Turkish Anned Forces by the order of the High Military Council because of fundamentalist 
activities, attempting to show the armed forces as thereby an enemy of religion. Such media 
groups, and their broadcasts against the Armed Forces and their members, must be brought 
under control. 
8. Personnel who have been ejected from the Turkish Armed Forces because of links with 
illegal fundamentalist activities or for contravening discipline must not be given employment 
opportunities in other public bodies and institutions. 
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9. Public bodies and institutions, particularly the universities, other educational bodies and 
every level of the bureaucracy and the courts, must apply similar precautions to those taken 
by the Turkish Armed Forces in order to restrict the activities of extremist religious groups. 
10. In order to protect the contemporary basis of Turkish society from possible clashes 
provoked by religious exploitation, all activities in our country directed against the regime by 
the Islamic Republic of Iran must be stopped. Whilst so minded, neighbourly relations with 
Iran and our economic ties will be not be broken, but a packet of measures must be prepared 
and put into action in order to impede these distracted and harmful activities. 
11. The extremist religious movement is provoking a separation between sects in Turkey that 
is leading to a polarization within society. These highly dangerous activities will encourage a 
division into enemy camps. They must absolutely and without fail be prevented, by both legal 
and administrative means. 
12. The legal and administrative procedures pertaining to those responsible for events 
contrary to the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, Political Party Law, Turkish Penal Code, 
and especially Municipality Law must be concluded expeditiously, and measures taken to 
ensure that they do not occur again. 
13. Actions contrary to the law relating to clothing and thereby leading Turkey to assume an 
anachronistic appearance must be stopped. Above all, an particularly, in public bodies and 
institutions, the law and the decisions of the Constitutional Courts pertaining to this subject 
must be applied scrupulously, and without any exception. 
14. The -procedures governing the various licenses given for short and long barreled weapons 
must, be reorganized . 
'by making this the responsibility of the appropriate police and 
gendarmes. They must be tightened up. In particular applications to obtain pump-action must 
be carefully evaluated. 
15. The collection of sacrificial pelts for financial gain by unauthorized organizations opposed 
to the present order must be stopped. Those not empowered by the law must not be permitted 
to collect these pelts. 
16. Legal procedures begun against those responsible for security guards dressed in private 
uniforms must be brought to a swift conclusion. This form of illegal activity may reach 
extremely grave proportions and therefore all those private security organizations that fall 
outside the law must be closed and disbanded. 
17. Those who adopt the position that the nation's problems may be solved through placing 
the community of believers [ummet] above that of the nation [millet], and who encourage the 
idea of approaching separatist terrorist organizations with this slogan, must be impeded by 
legal and administrative means. 
18. Those who are guilty of acting with disrespect towards great Ataturk, or conducting 




QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED TO THE AKP MEMBERS IN ISTANBUL 
Do you support Turkey's EU membership? 
1. Yes 85% 
2. No 15% 
How do you define the European Union? 
1. An Economic Organization 40% 
2. A Political and Legal Institutional Model 35% 
3. A Culturally and Religiously Distinctive Institution 10% 
4. Other 15% 
Do you agree with the statement that Turkey's EU membership will resolve her legal, 
economic, and political problems? 
1. Completely agree 5% 
2. Partly agree 90% 
3. Disagree 5% 
Do you agree with the prediction that Turkey's EU membership will worsen the Kurdish 
problem in Turkey? 
1. Completely agree 30% 
2. Partly agree 25% 
-3. ' ., Disagree 45% 
Do you agree with the statement that international organizations like the EU will make 
Turkey economically and politically dependent on these organizations? 
1. Completely agree 20% 
2. Partly agree 55 % 
3. Disagree 25% 
Should Turkey continue with the reform process even if her membership prospect disappears? 
1. Yes 85% 
2. No 15% 
Will the EU membership endanger Turkey's national security? 
1. Yes 0% 
2. Possibly in the future 60% 
3. No 40% 
Will the EU membership threaten Turkey's cultural and religious identities? 
1. Yes 15% 
2. No 25% 
3. Possibly in the future 60% 
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